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Vol. LIX *March, 1965* No. 1

The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe	***Walter Dean Burnham***	**7**
Political Science and Prevision	***Bertrand de Jouvenel***	**29**
Politics and Pseudopolitics: A Critical Evaluation of Some Behavioral Literature	***Christian Bay***	**39**
Conditions for Party Leadership: The Case of the House Democrats	***Lewis A. Froman, Jr. and Randall B. Ripley***	**52**
Deeds Under a Doctrine: Civil Liberties in the 1963 Term	***Walter F. Murphy***	**64**
Mao Tse-tung's Revolutionary Strategy and Peking's International Behavior	***Tang Tsou and Morton H. Halperin***	**80**
Research Notes		
The Illusion of Judicial Consensus: Zoning Decisions in the Maryland Court of Appeals	***Robert J. Sickels***	**100**
Does a "Divisive" Primary Harm a Candidate's Election Chances?	***Andrew Hacker***	**105**
Contested Elections and Voter Turnout in a Local Community: A Problem in Spurious Correlation	***Thad L. Beyle***	**111**
Types of Primary and Party Responsibility	***Ira Ralph Telford***	**117**
Communication		**119**
Bibliographical Contribution		
Foreign Local Government: A Bibliography	***Robert L. Morlan***	**120**
Book Reviews, Notes and Bibliography	***Austin Ranney (ed.)***	**137**
News and Notes	***Leo B. Lott (ed.)***	**236**

(For list of book reviews, see page 137)

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The American
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VOL. LIX MARCH, 1965 NO. 1

THE CHANGING SHAPE OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL UNIVERSE

Walter Dean Burnham
Haverford College

In the infancy of a science the use even of fairly crude methods of analysis and description can produce surprisingly large increments of knowledge if new perspectives are brought to bear upon available data. Such perspectives not infrequently require both a combination of methodologies and a critical appraisal of the limitations of each. The emergence of American voting-behavior studies over the last two decades constitutes a good case in point. Studies based on aggregate election statistics have given us invaluable insights into the nature of secular trends in the distribution of the party vote, and have also provided us with useful theory concerning such major phenomena as critical elections.[1] Survey research has made significant contributions to the understanding of motivational forces at work upon the individual voter. As it matures, it is now reaching out to grapple with problems which involve the political system as a whole.[2]

Not at all surprisingly, a good deal of well publicized conflict has arisen between aggregationists and survey researchers. The former attack the latter for their failure to recognize the limitations of an ahistorical and episodic method, and for their failure to focus their attention upon matters of genuine concern to students of politics.[3] The latter insist, on the other hand, that survey research alone can study the primary psychological and motivational building blocks out of which the political system itself is ultimately constructed. Not only are both parties to the controversy partly right, but each now seems to be becoming quite sensitive to the contributions which the other can make. As survey scholars increasingly discover that even such supposedly well established characteristics of the American voter as his notoriously low awareness of issues can be replaced almost instantaneously under the right circumstances by an extremely pronounced sensitivity to an issue, the importance of the time dimension and factors of social context so viewed become manifest.[4] Students of aggregate voting behavior, on the other hand, are turning to the data and methods of survey research to explore the structure and characteristics of contemporary public opinion.[5] A convergence is clearly underway. One further sign of it is the construction of the first national election-data archive, now underway at the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan.[6] The completion of this archive and the conversion of its basic data into a form suitable for machine processing should provide the material basis for a massive breakthrough in the behavioral analysis of American political history over the last century and a half.

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[1] The leading work of this sort thus far has been done by the late V. O. Key, Jr. See, *e.g.*, his "A Theory of Critical Elections," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 17, pp. 3–18 (1955), and his *American State Politics* (New York, 1956). See also such quantitatively oriented monographs as Perry Howard, *Political Tendencies in Louisiana, 1812–1952* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1957).

[2] The most notable survey-research effort to date to develop politically relevant theory regarding American voting behavior is Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York, 1960), especially ch. 20.

[3] V. O. Key, Jr., "The Politically Relevant in Surveys," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 24, pp. 54–61 (1960); V. O. Key, Jr., and Frank Munger, "Social Determinism and Electoral Decision: The Case of Indiana," in Eugene Burdick and Arthur J. Brodbeck, eds., *American Voting Behavior* (Glencoe, Ill., 1959), pp. 281–99.

[4] Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," this Review, Vol. 57, pp. 45–56 (1963). The authors observe that in the 1958 Hays-Alford congressional race in Arkansas, the normally potential nature of constituency sanctions against representatives was transferred under the overriding pressure of the race issue into an actuality which resulted in Hays' defeat by a write-in vote for his opponent. The normally low issue- and candidate-consciousness among the electorate was abruptly replaced by a most untypically intense awareness of the candidates and their relative postions on this issue.

If controversies over method accompany the development of disciplines, so too does the strong tendency of the research mainstream to bypass significant areas of potential inquiry, thus leaving many "lost worlds" in its wake. One such realm so far left very largely unexplored in the literature of American politics centers around changes and continuities in the gross size and shape of this country's active voting universe over the past century. Key, to be sure, made contributions of the greatest significance to our understanding of the changing patterns of party linkage between voters and government. Moreover, he called attention to the need for quantitative analysis of political data other than the partisan division of the vote for leading offices.[7] E. E. Schattschneider's discussion of the struggle over the scope of political conflict and his functional analysis of the American party system remain a stimulus to further research—not least in the direction of examining the aggregate characteristics of the American electorate over time.[8] Other recent studies, for example of the turnout of voters in Canada and Indiana, have added to our knowledge of contemporary patterns of mass political involvement.[9] The fact remains, however, that no systematic analysis over lengthy time periods has yet been made of the massive changes of relative size and characteristics in the American voting universe, despite their obvious relevance to an understanding of the evolving political system as a whole.

This article does not purport to be that systematic study. It is, rather, a tentative reconnaissance into the untapped wealth of a whole range of political data, undertaken in the hope of showing concretely some of the potentialities of their study. The primary objective here is the preliminary exploration of the scope of changes since the mid-19th century in turnout and other criteria of voting participation, and the possible substantive implications of such changes.

There is also a second objective. The day is not far distant when a major effort will be undertaken to relate the findings of survey research to contemporary aggregate data and then to examine the aggregate data of past generations in the light of these derived relationships. Before such inquiry is undertaken, it will be a matter of some importance to ascer-

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For an excellent cross-polity study of voting behavior based on comparative survey analysis, see Robert R. Alford, *Party and Society* (Chicago, Rand McNally, 1963).

[5] V. O. Key, Jr., *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York, 1961), based largely on survey-research data at the University of Michigan.

[6] This effort, to which the author was enabled to contribute, thanks to a Social Science Research Council grant for 1963–64, has been supported by the Council and by the National Science Foundation. This article is in no sense an integral part of that larger project. But it is proper to acknowledge gratefully here that the S.S.R.C., by making it possible for me to spend a year at the Survey Research Center, has helped to provide conditions favorable to writing it. Thanks are also due to Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Donald E. Stokes and Warren E. Miller for their comments and criticisms. They bear no responsibility for the defects of the final product.

[7] V. O. Key, Jr., *American State Politics*, *op. cit.*, pp. 71–73, 197–216.

[8] E. E. Schattschneider, *Party Government* (New York, 1942) and *The Semi-Sovereign People* (New York, 1960), pp. 78–96.

[9] Howard A. Scarrow, "Patterns of Voter Turnout in Canada," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 5, pp. 351–64 (1961); James A. Robinson and William Standing, "Some Correlates of Voter Participation: The Case of Indiana," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 22, pp. 96–111 (1960). Both articles—one involving a political system outside of but adjacent to the United States—indicate patterns of contemporary participation which seem at variance with the conclusions of survey studies regarding the behavior of the American electorate. In Canada rural turnout is higher than urban, and no clear-cut pattern of drop-off between federal and provincial elections exists. Voter participation in Indiana apparently does not increase with the competitiveness of the electoral situation, and does increase with the rurality of the election jurisdiction. With the possible exception of the relationship between competitiveness and turnout, all of these are characteristics associated with 19th-century voting behavior in the United States; see below.

tain whether and to what extent the basic findings of survey research about the present American electorate are actually relevant to earlier periods of our political history. Firm conclusions here as elsewhere must await much more comprehensive and detailed study. Even so, enough can be learned from the contours of the grosser data to warrant posting a few warning signs.

I

Several criteria of voting participation have been employed in this analysis: (1) estimated turnout; (2) drop-off; (3) roll-off; (4) split-ticket voting; (5) mean partisan swing. Turnout, the most indispensable of these criteria, is also unfortunately the "softest." A number of errors of estimate can arise from the necessary use of census data. For example, interpolations of estimates for intercensal years can produce significant error when abnormally large increases or decreases in population are bunched together within a few years. Estimates of the alien component in the total adult male population must also necessarily remain quite speculative for the censuses from 1880 through 1900, and are impossible to secure from published census data prior to 1870. No doubt this helps explain why students of voting-behavior research have avoided this area. But we need not reject these admittedly imprecise data altogether, because of their imperfections, when secular changes in turnout levels and variabilities from election to election are of far too great a magnitude to be reasonably discounted on the basis of estimate error.[10]

Moreover, the other criteria employed in this study not only share a very similar directional flow over time, but are directly derived from the voting statistics themselves. Free from the estimate-error problem, they are ordinarily quite consistent with the turnout data.[11] What is called "drop-off" here is the familiar pattern of decline in the total vote between presidential and succeeding off-year elections. The drop-off figures usually presented below are reciprocals of the percentage of the presidential-year total vote which is cast in the immediately following off-year election. If the total vote for the two successive elections is the same, drop-off is zero; if the total vote in the off-year election exceeds that cast in the immediately preceding presidential election, drop-off is negative. Secular increases in the amplitude of drop-off could be associated with such factors as a declining relative visibility or salience of off-year elections, or with an increasing component of active voters who are only marginally involved with the voting process as such.

"Roll-off" measures the tendency of the electorate to vote for "prestige" offices but not for lower offices on the same ballot and at the same election. If only 90 per cent of those voting for the top office on the ticket also vote for the lesser statewide office receiving fewest votes at the same election, for example, the roll-off figure stands at 10 per cent. Secular increases in this criterion of voting participation could be associated with such variables as a growing public indifference to elections for administrative offices which might well be made appointive, or with a growing proportion of peripheral voters in the active electorate; or with changes in the form of ballots. Split-ticket voting has been measured rather crudely here as the difference between the highest and lowest percentages of the two-party vote cast for either party among the array of statewide offices in any given election. Zero on this scale would correspond to absolute uniformity in the partisan division of the vote for all offices at the same election. The amplitude of partisan swing is computed in this study without reference to the specific partisan direction of the swing, and is derived from the mean percentage of the two-party vote cast for either party among all statewide races in the same election. Both of these latter criteria are more directly related to

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[10] In computing turnout data, note that until approximately 1920 the criteria for eligibility to vote differed far more widely from state to state than they do now. In a number of states west of the original thirteen—for example, in Michigan until 1894 and in Wisconsin until 1908—aliens who had merely declared their intention to become citizens were permitted to vote. Woman suffrage was also extended piecemeal for several decades prior to the general enfranchisement of 1920. The turnout estimates derived here have been adjusted, so far as the census data permit, to take account of such variations.

[11] If one computes the off-year total vote of the years 1950–62 as a percentage of the total vote cast in the preceding presidential election, a virtually identical correspondence is reached with estimated off-year turnout as a percentage of turnout in the immediately preceding presidential year:

Year	Total Off-Year Vote as % of Vote in Last Presidential Year	Estimated Off-Year Turnout as % of Turnout in Last Pres. Year
1950	82.9	80.4
1954	69.2	67.5
1958	73.9	72.1
1962	74.4	73.6

changes in the strength of partisan linkage between voters and government than are the others employed in this study.

Two major assumptions underlie the use of these criteria. (1) If a secular decline in turnout occurs, and especially if it is associated with increases in drop-off and roll-off, we may infer that the active voting universe: (a) is shrinking in size relative to the potential voting universe; and (b) is also decomposing as a relative increase in its component of peripherally involved voters occurs. Opposite implications, of course, would be drawn from increases in turnout accompanied by decreases in these rough indices of voter peripherality. (2) If split-ticket voting and the amplitude of partisan swings are also increasing over time, we may infer that a decline in party-oriented voting is taking place among a growing minority of voters. Reductions in these criteria would suggest a resurgence of party-oriented voting.

A recent study by Angus Campbell tends to support the view that the above criteria are actually related to the component of marginal voters and voters with relatively weak partisan attachments in today's active electorate.[12] Campbell argues that surge and decline in voting participation and in partisan distribution of the vote result from two major factors: the entrance into the active electorate of peripherally involved voters who tend to vote disproportionately for such beneficiaries of partisan surges as President Eisenhower, and then abstain from the polls in subsequent low-stimulus elections; and the temporary movement of core voters with relatively low levels of party identification away from their nominal party allegiance, followed by their return to that allegiance in subsequent low-stimulus elections. Campbell's study reveals that split-ticket voting in the 1956 election tended to be heavily concentrated among two groups of voters: those who voted Republican for President in 1956 and did not vote in 1958, and those who voted Republican in 1956 but Democratic in 1958—in other words, among those with peripheral involvement in the political process itself and those with borderline partisan commitments. Moreover, roll-off—the failure to vote a complete ticket in 1956—was heavily concentrated among the non-voters of 1958. It is also suggestive that the level of drop-off in Campbell's panel from 1956 to 1958, 23 per cent, very closely approximates the level of drop-off as measured by the aggregate voting data.[13]

II

Even the crudest form of statistical analysis makes it abundantly clear that the changes which have occurred in the relative size and shape of the active electorate in this country have not only been quantitatively enormous but have followed a directional course which seems to be unique in the contemporary universe of democratic polities. In the United States these transformations over the past century have involved devolution, a dissociation from politics as such among a growing segment of the eligible electorate and an apparent deterioration of the bonds of party linkage between electorate and government. More precisely, these trends were overwhelmingly prominent between about 1900 and 1930, were only very moderately reversed following the political realignment of 1928–1936, and now seem to be increasing once again along several dimensions of analysis. Such a pattern of development is pronouncedly retrograde compared with those which have obtained almost everywhere else in the Western world during the past century.

Probably the best-known aspect of the changing American political universe has been the long-term trend in national voter turnout: a steep decline from 1900 to about 1930, followed by a moderate resurgence since that time.[14] As the figures in Table I indicate, nationwide turnout down through 1900 was quite high by contemporary standards—comparing favorably in presidential years with recent levels of par-

TABLE I. DECLINE AND PARTIAL RESURGENCE: MEAN LEVELS OF NATIONAL TURNOUT AND DROP-OFF BY PERIODS, 1848–1962*

Period (Presidential Years)	Mean Estimated Turnout	Period (Off-Years)	Mean Estimated Turnout	Mean Drop-Off
	(%)		(%)	(%)
1848–1872	75.1	1850–1874	65.2	7.0
1876–1896	78.5	1878–1898	62.8	15.2
1900–1916	64.8	1902–1918	47.9	22.4
1920–1928	51.7	1922–1930	35.2	28.7
1932–1944	59.1	1934–1946	41.0	27.8
1948–1960	60.3	1950–1962	44.1	24.9

* Off-year turnout data based on total vote for congressional candidates in off years.

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[12] Angus Campbell, "Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 24, pp. 397–418 (1960).

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 413. The percentage of drop-off from 1956 to 1958, as computed from aggregate voting data, was 25.6%.

[14] See, *e.g.*, Robert E. Lane, *Political Life* (Glencoe, Ill., 1959), pp. 18–26.

ticipation in Western Europe—and was also marked by very low levels of drop-off. A good deal of the precipitate decline in turnout after 1896 can, of course, be attributed to the disfranchisement of Negroes in the South and the consolidation of its one-party regime. But as Table II and Fig. 1 both reveal, non-Southern states not only shared this decline but also have current turnout rates which remain substantially below 19th-century levels.[15]

The persistence of mediocre rates of American voting turnout into the present political era is scarcely news. It forms so obvious and continuing a problem of our democracy that a special presidential commission has recently given it intensive study.[16] Two additional aspects of the problem, however, emerge from a perusal of the foregoing data. In the first place,

TABLE II. SECTIONALISM AND PARTICIPATION: MEAN TURNOUT IN SOUTHERN AND NON-SOUTHERN STATES IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 1868–1960

Period	Mean Turnout: 11 Southern States	Period	Mean Turnout: Non-Southern States
	(%)		(%)
1868–1880	69.4	1868–1880	82.6
1884–1896	61.1	1884–1896	85.4
1900 (transition)	43.4	1900	84.1
1904–1916	29.8	1904–1916	73.6
1920–1948	24.7	1920–1932	60.6
1952–1960	38.8	1936–1960	68.0



FIGURE 1. Patterns of Turnout: United States, 1860–1964, by Region, and Selected Western European Nations, 1948–1961.

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[15] There are, of course, very wide divergences in turnout rates even among non-Southern states. Some of them, like Idaho, New Hampshire and Utah, have presidential-year turnouts which compare very favorably with European levels of participation. A detailed analysis of these differences remains to be made. It should prove of the utmost importance in casting light upon the relevance of current forms of political organization and partisan alignments to differing kinds of electorates and political subsystems in the United States.

[16] *Report of the President's Commission on Registration and Voting Participation* (Washington, 1963), esp. pp. 5–9. Hereafter cited as *Report.*

it is quite apparent that the political realignment of the 1930s, while it restored two-party competition to many states outside the South, did not stimulate turnout to return in most areas to 19th-century levels. Even if the mere existence of competitiveness precludes such low levels of turnout as are found in the South today, or as once prevailed in the northern industrial states, it falls far short of compelling a substantially full turnout under present-day conditions. Second, drop-off on the national level has shown markedly little tendency to recede in the face of increases in presidential-year turnout over the last thirty years. The component of peripheral voters in the active electorate has apparently undergone a permanent expansion from about one-sixth in the late 19th century to more than one-quarter in recent decades. If, as seems more than likely, the political regime established after 1896 was largely responsible for the marked relative decline in the active voting universe and the marked increase in peripherality among those who still occasionally voted, it is all the more remarkable that the dramatic political realignment of the 1930s has had such little effect in reversing these trends.

At least two major features of our contemporary polity, to be sure, are obviously related to the presently apparent ceiling on turnout. First, the American electoral system creates a major "double hurdle" for prospective voters which does not exist in Western Europe: the requirements associated with residence and registration, usually entailing periodic re-registration at frequent intervals, and the fact that elections are held on a normal working day in this employee society rather than on Sundays or holidays.[17] Second, it is very probably true that 19th-century elections were major sources of entertainment in an age unblessed by modern mass communications, so that it is more difficult for politicians to gain and keep public attention today than it was then.[18] Yet if American voters labor under the most cumbersome sets of procedural requirements in the Western world, this in itself is a datum which tends to support Schattschneider's thesis that the struggle for democracy is still being waged in the United States and that there are profound resistances within the political system itself to the adoption of needed procedural reforms.[19] Moreover, there are certain areas—such as all of Ohio outside the metropolitan counties and cities of at least 15,000 population—where no registration procedures have ever been established, but where no significant deviation from the patterns outlined here appears to exist. Finally, while it may well be true that the partial displacement by TV and other means of entertainment has inhibited expansion of the active voting universe during the past generation, it is equally true that the structure of the American voting universe—*i.e.*, the adult population—as it exists today was substantially formed in the period 1900–1920, *prior* to the development of such major media as the movies, radio and television.

III

As we move below the gross national level, the voting patterns discussed above stand out with far greater clarity and detail. Their divergences suggest something of the individual differences which distinguish each state subsystem from its fellows, as their uniformities indicate the universality of the broader secular trends. Five states have been selected for analysis here. During the latter part of the 19th century two of these, Michigan and Pennsylvania, were originally competitive states which tended to favor the Republican Party. They developed solidly one-party regimes after the realignment of 1896. These regimes were overthrown in their turn and vigorous party competition was restored in the wake of the New Deal realignment. In two other states, Ohio and New York, the 1896 alignment had no such dire consequences for two-party competition on the state level. These states have also shown a somewhat different pattern of development since the 1930s than Michigan and Pennsylvania. Our fifth state is Oklahoma, where a modified one-party system is structured heavily along sectional lines and operates in a socio-economic context unfavorable to the classic New Deal articulation of politics along ethnic-class lines of cleavage.

Michigan politics was marked from 1894 through 1930 by the virtual eclipse of a state Democratic Party which had formerly contested elections on nearly equal terms with the Republicans. The inverse relationships developing between this emergent one-partyism on the one hand, and both the relative size of the active voting universe and the strength of party linkage on the other, stand out in especially bold relief.

A decisive shift away from the stable and substantially fully mobilized voting patterns of the 19th century occurred in Michigan after

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[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 11–14, 31–42.

[18] See, *e.g.*, Stanley Kelley, "Elections and the Mass Media," *Law and Contemporary Problems*, Vol. 27, pp. 307–26 (1962).

[19] E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People*, *op. cit.*, pp. 102–3.

TABLE III. MICHIGAN, 1854–1962: DECAY AND RESURGENCE?

Period	Mean turnout		Mean drop-off	Mean roll-off	Mean split-ticket voting	Mean partisan swing	Mean % D of 2-party vote
	Pres. years	Off-years					
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	
1854–1872	84.8	78.1	7.8	0.9	0.8	3.2	43.9
1878–1892	84.9	74.9	10.7	0.8	1.6	2.2	48.0
1894–1908	84.8	68.2	22.3	1.5	5.9	4.7	39.6
1910–1918	71.4	53.0	27.2	3.0	9.8	4.1	40.4*
1920–1930	55.0	31.5	42.9	6.0	10.0	7.3	29.8
1932–1946	63.6	47.3	25.9	6.7	6.0	7.4	47.9
1948–1962	66.9	53.6	19.1	4.1	5.8	4.9	51.0

* Democratic percentage of three-party vote in 1912 and 1914.

the realignment of 1896, with a lag of about a decade between that election and the onset of disruption in those patterns. The first major breakthrough of characteristics associated with 20th-century American electorates occurred in the presidential year 1904, when the mean percentage Democratic for all statewide offices reached an unprecedented low of 35.6 and the rate of split-ticket voting jumped from almost zero to 17.1 per cent. A steady progression of decline in turnout and party competition, accompanied by heavy increases in the other criteria of peripherality, continued down through 1930.

The scope of this transformation was virtually revolutionary. During the civil-war era scarcely 15 per cent of Michigan's potential electorate appears to have been altogether outside the voting universe. About 7 per cent could be classified as peripheral voters by Campbell's definition, and the remainder—more than three-quarters of the total—were core voters. Moreover, as the extremely low 19th-century level of split-ticket voting indicates, these active voters overwhelmingly cast party-line ballots. By the 1920s, less than one-third of the potential electorate were still core voters, while nearly one-quarter were peripheral and nearly one-half remained outside the political system altogether. Drop-off and roll-off increased sixfold during this period, while the amplitude of partisan swing approximately doubled and the split-ticket-voting rate increased by a factor of approximately eight to twelve.

For the most part these trends underwent a sharp reversal as party competition in Michigan was abruptly restored during the 1930s and organized in its contemporary mode in 1948. As the mean Democratic percentage of the two-party vote increased and turnout—especially in off-year elections—showed a marked relative upswing, such characteristics of marginality as drop-off, roll-off, split-ticket voting and partisan swing declined in magnitude. Yet, as the means for the 1948–1962 period demonstrate, a large gap remains to be closed before anything like the *status quo ante* can be restored. Our criteria —except, of course, for the mean percentage Democratic of the two-party vote—have returned only to the levels of the transitional period 1900–1918. As is well known, exceptionally disciplined and issue-oriented party organizations have emerged in Michigan since 1948, and elections have been intensely competitive throughout this period.[20] In view of this, the failure of turnout in recent years to return to something approaching 19th-century levels is all the more impressive, as is the continuing persistence of fairly high levels of drop-off, roll-off and split-ticket voting.[21]

The Michigan data have still more suggestive implications. Campbell's discussion of surge and decline in the modern context points to a cyclical process in which peripheral voters, drawn into the active voting universe only under unusual short-term stimuli, withdraw from it again when the stimuli are removed. It follows that declines in turnout are accompanied by a marked relative increase in the component of core voters in the electorate and by a closer approximation in off years to a "normal" partisan division of the vote.[22] This presumably includes a reduction in the level of split-ticket voting as well. But the precise opposite occurred as a secular process—not only in Michigan but, it would seem, universally—during the 1900–1930 era. Declines in turnout were accompanied by substantial, continuous increases in the indices of party and voter peripherality among those elements of the adult population which remained in the political universe at all. The lower the turnout during this period, the fewer of the voters still remaining who bothered to vote for the entire slate of officers in any given election. The lower the turnout in presidential years, the greater was the drop-off gap between the total vote cast in presidential and succeeding off-year elections. The lower the turnout, the greater were the incidence of split-ticket voting and the amplitude of partisan swing. Under the enormous impact of the forces which produced these declines in turnout and party competitiveness after 1896, the component of highly involved and party-oriented core voters in the active electorate fell off at a rate which more than kept pace with the progressive shrinking of that electorate's relative size. These developments necessarily imply a limitation upon the usefulness of the surge-decline model as it relates to secular movements prior to about 1934. They suggest, moreover, that the effects of the forces at work after 1896 to depress voter participation and to dislocate party linkage between voters and government were even more crushingly severe than a superficial perusal of the data would indicate.

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[20] Joseph La Palombara, *Guide to Michigan Politics* (East Lansing, Mich., Michigan State University Press, 1960), pp. 22–35.

[21] This recalls Robinson and Standing's conclusion that voter participation in Indiana does not necessarily increase with increasing party competition. Of the eight Michigan gubernatorial elections from 1948 to 1962 only one was decided by a margin of 55% or more, while three were decided by margins of less than 51.5% of the two-party vote. Despite this intensely competitive situation, turnout—while of course much higher than in the 1920s—remains significantly below normal pre-1920 levels.

Pennsylvania provides us with variations on the same theme. As in Michigan, the political realignment centering on 1896 eventually converted an industrializing state with a relatively slight but usually decisive Republican bias into a solidly one-party G.O.P. bastion. To a much greater extent than in Michigan, this disintegration of the state Democratic Party was accompanied by periodic outbursts of third-party ventures and plural party nominations of major candidates, down to the First World War. Thereafter, as in Michigan, the real contest between competing candidates and political tendencies passed into the Republican primary, where it usually remained until the advent of the New Deal. In both states relatively extreme declines in the rate of turnout were associated with the disappearance of effective two-party competition, and in both states these declines were closely paralleled by sharp increases in the indices of peripherality.

As Table IV demonstrates, the parallel behavior of the Michigan and Pennsylvania electorates has also extended into the present; the now-familiar pattern of increasing turnout and party competition accompanied by marked declines in our other indices has been quite visible in the Keystone State since the advent of the New Deal. On the whole, indeed, a better approximation to the *status quo ante* has been reached in Pennsylvania than in Michigan or perhaps in most other states. But despite the intense competitiveness of its present party system, this restoration remains far from complete.

A more detailed examination of turnout and variability in turnout below the statewide level raises some questions about the direct role of immigration and woman suffrage in de-

TABLE IV. VOTING PATTERNS IN PENNSYLVANIA, 1876–1962: DECLINE AND RESURGENCE?

Period	Mean turnout		Mean drop-off	Mean roll-off	Mean split-ticket voting	Mean partisan swing	Mean % D of 2-party vote
	Pres. years	Off-years					
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	
1876–1892	78.5	69.3	9.4	0.6	0.6	1.4	47.7
1894–1908	75.7	64.7	12.2	5.2	1.3	6.3	38.5
1910–1918	64.0	51.4	20.0	4.3	4.7	5.8	43.6*
1920–1930	50.4	39.5	28.0	5.2	8.9	7.1	32.8
1932–1948	61.5	51.9	14.9	2.2	1.4	6.1	49.0
1950–1962	67.5	56.3	12.2	1.8	3.1	3.3	49.3

* Combined major anti-Republican vote (Democrat, Keystone, Lincoln, Washington).

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[22] Angus Campbell, "Surge and Decline," *op. cit.*, pp. 401–4.

TABLE V. DIFFERENTIALS IN AGGREGATE TURNOUT AND VARIATIONS OF TURNOUT IN SELECTED PENNSYLVANIA COUNTIES: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 1876–1960*

County and Type	N	% Foreign stock, 1920	1876–1896		1900–1916		1920–1932		1936–1960	
			Mean turnout	Coef. var.	Mean turnout	Coef. var.	Mean turnout	Coef. var.	Mean turnout	Coef. var.
		(%)	(%)		(%)		(%)		(%)	
Urban:										
Allegheny	1	56.6	71.8	6.75	56.7	2.45	43.8	10.11	68.9	5.82
Philadelphia	1	54.3	85.2	4.61	72.9	6.42	50.5	12.57	68.8	4.40
Industrial-Mining:	4	49.0	88.1	4.48	72.8	4.41	54.2	11.63	64.7	10.88
Rural:	8	13.5	88.5	3.12	76.4	3.63	56.0	8.09	65.2	13.20

* The coefficient of variability is a standard statistical measure; see V. O. Key, Jr., *A Primer of Statistics for Political Scientists* (New York, 1954), pp. 44–52. Since secular trends, where present, had to be taken into account, this coefficient appears abnormally low in the period 1900–1916. During this period many counties registered a straight-line decline in turnout from one election to the next.

pressing voter participation. It also uncovers a significant transposition of relative voter involvement in rural areas and urban centers since about 1930.

It is frequently argued that declines in participation after the turn of the century were largely the product of massive immigration from Europe and of the advent of woman suffrage, both of which added very large and initially poorly socialized elements to the potential electorate.[23] There is no question that these were influential factors. The data in Table V indicate, for example, that down until the Great Depression turnout was consistently higher and much less subject to variation in rural counties with relatively insignificant foreign-stock populations than in either the industrial-mining or metropolitan counties.

Yet two other aspects of these data should also be noted. First, the pattern of turnout decline from the 1876–1896 period to the 1900–1916 period was quite uniform among all categories of counties, though the rank order of their turnouts remained largely unchanged. It can be inferred from this that, while immigration probably played a major role in the evolution of Pennsylvania's political system as a whole, it had no visible direct effect upon the secular decline in rural voting participation. Broader systemic factors, including but transcending the factor of immigration, seem clearly to have been at work. Second, a very substantial fraction of the total decline in turnout from the 1870s to the 1920s—in some rural native-stock counties more than half—occurred *before* women were given the vote. Moreover, post-1950 turnout levels in Pennsylvania, and apparently in most other non-Southern states, have been at least as high as in the decade immediately preceding the general enfranchisement of women. If even today a higher percentage of American than European women fail to come to the polls, the same can also be said of such population groups as the poorly educated, farmers, the lower-income classes, Negroes and other deprived elements in the potential electorate.[24] In such a context woman suffrage, as important a variable as it

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[23] Herbert Tingsten, *Political Behavior* (Stockholm, Stockholm Economic Studies, No. 7, 1937), pp. 10–36. See also Charles E. Merriam and Harold F. Gosnell, *Non-Voting* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1924), pp. 26, 109–22, for a useful discussion of the effect of woman suffrage on turnout in a metropolitan area immediately following the general enfranchisement of 1920.

[24] Survey-research estimates place current turnout among American women at 10% below male turnout. Angus Campbell *et al.*, *The American Voter*, *op. cit.*, pp. 484–85. This sex-related difference in participation is apparently universal, but is significantly smaller in European countries which provide election data by sex, despite the far higher European level of participation by both sexes. The postwar differential has been 5.8% in Norway (1945–57 mean), 3.3% in Sweden (1948–60 mean), and 1.9% in Finland (1962 general election). While in 1956 only about 55% of American women went to the polls, the mean turnout among women in postwar elections was 76.1% in Norway and 79.4% in Sweden.

TABLE VI. URBAN-RURAL DIFFERENCES IN STABILITY OF POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT: 1936–60 MEAN TURNOUT AND VARIABILITY OF TURNOUT AS PERCENTAGES OF 1876–96 MEAN TURNOUT AND VARIABILITY OF TURNOUT, PENNSYLVANIA

County and Type	N	1936–60 Turnout / 1876–96 Turnout	1936–60 Variability / 1876–96 Variability
Urban:		(%)	(%)
Allegheny	1	95.9	86.2
Philadelphia	1	80.8	95.4
Industrial-Mining:	4	73.4	249.6
Rural:	8	73.7	447.4

certainly has been in our recent political history, seems to raise more analytical problems than it solves.

Particularly suggestive for our hypothesis of basic changes in the nature of American voting behavior over time is the quite recent transposition of aggregate turnout and variations in turnout as between our rural sample and the two metropolitan centers. In sharp contrast to the situation prevailing before 1900, turnout in these rural counties has tended during the past generation not only to be slightly lower than in the large cities but also subject to far wider oscillations from election to election. In Bedford County, for example, turnout stood at 82.5 per cent in 1936, but sagged to an all-time low of 41.2 per cent in 1948. The comparable figures in Philadelphia were 74.3 and 64.8 per cent, and in Allegheny County 72.5 per cent (in 1940) and 60.6 per cent.

A major finding revealed by survey research is that the "farm vote" is currently one of the most unstable and poorly articulated elements in the American electorate.[25] It is said that since rural voters lack the solid network of group identifications and easy access to mass-communication media enjoyed by their city cousins, they tend to be both unusually apathetic and exceptionally volatile in their partisan commitments. As rural voting turnout was abnormally low in 1948, its rate of increase from 1948 to 1952 was exceptionally large and—fully consistent with Campbell's surge-decline model—was associated with a one-sided surge toward Eisenhower. A restatement of the data in Table V lends strong support to this evaluation of the relative position of the rural vote as a description of the *current* American voting universe.

But the data strongly imply that virtually the opposite of present conditions prevailed during the 19th century. Such variables as education level, communications and non-family-group interaction were probably much more poorly developed in rural areas before 1900 than they are today. Not only did this leave no visible mark on agrarian turnout; it seems extremely likely that the 19th-century farmer was at least as well integrated into the political system of that day as any other element in the American electorate. The awesome rates of turnout which can be found in states like Indiana, Iowa and Kentucky prior to 1900 indicate that this extremely high level of rural political involvement was not limited to Pennsylvania.[26] As a recent study of Indiana politics demonstrates, the primarily rural "traditional vote" in that state was marked prior to 1900 by an overwhelming partisan stability as well.[27]

Perhaps, following the arguments of C. Wright Mills and others, we can regard this extraordinary change in rural voting behavior as a function of the conversion of a cracker-barrel society into a subordinate element in a larger mass society.[28] In any event, this rural movement toward relatively low and widely fluctuating levels of turnout may well be

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[25] *Ibid.*, pp. 402–40.

[26] The estimated rates of turnout in presidential elections from 1876 through 1896, mean turnout in the period 1936–60 and estimated turnout in 1964 were as follows in these states:

State	1876	1880	1884	1888	1892	1896	1936-60 (Mean)	1964 (Prelim.)
Indiana	94.6	94.4	92.2	93.3	89.0	95.1	75.0	73.3
Iowa	89.6	91.5	90.0	87.9	88.5	96.2	71.7	72.0
Kentucky	76.1	71.0	68.0	79.1	72.6	88.0	57.6	52.6

[27] V. O. Key, Jr., and Frank Munger, "Social Determinism and Electoral Decision," *op. cit.*, pp. 282–88.

[28] C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. 298–324. See also Arthur J. Vidich and Joseph Bensman, *Small Town in Mass Society* (New York, 1960), pp. 5–15, 202–27, 297–320.

indicative of an emergent political alienation in such areas. It is suggestive that these movements have been accompanied generally in Pennsylvania as in states like West Virginia by a strongly positive Republican trend in these agrarian bailiwicks during the last thirty years.[29] The impression arises that the political realignment of the 1930s, which only imperfectly mobilized and integrated urban populations into the political system, had not even these limited positive effects in more isolated communities.

TABLE VII. PATTERNS OF VOTER PARTICIPATION IN OHIO, 1857–1962: DECLINE WITHOUT RESURGENCE?

Period	Mean turnout		Mean drop-off	Mean roll-off	Mean split-ticket voting
	Pres. years	Off-years			
	(%)	(%)			
1857–1879	89.0	78.4	9.7	0.6	0.5
1880–1903	92.2	80.5	11.2	0.8	0.6
1904–1918	80.4	71.2	9.2	2.5	3.3
1920–1930	62.4	45.8	24.1	7.9	9.9
1932–1946	69.9	49.1	27.2	7.6	6.5
1948–1962	66.5	53.3	19.0	8.2	11.1

The behavior of the Ohio electorate down to about 1930 closely paralleled the patterns displayed in its neighbor states, Michigan and Pennsylvania. Since then a marked divergence has been manifest.

Two-party competition here was far less seriously affected by the sectional political alignment of 1896–1932 than in most other northern industrial states. Of the eighteen gubernatorial elections held in Ohio from 1895 to 1930, for example, Democrats won ten. But here as elsewhere are to be found the same patterns of decline in turnout and sharp increases in indices of voter peripherality after 1900. Indeed, while turnout bottomed out during the 1920s at a point considerably higher than in Michigan or Pennsylvania, it had also been considerably higher than in either of them during the 19th century. Here too such variables as woman suffrage seem to have played a smaller role as causal agents—at least so far as they affected the growing tendencies toward peripherality among active voters—than is commonly supposed. Drop-off from presidential to off-year elections began to assume its modern shape in Ohio between 1898 and 1910. As Figure 2 shows, roll-off—an especially prominent feature in contemporary Ohio voting behavior—emerged in modern form in the election of 1914.

Ohio, unlike either Michigan or Pennsylvania, has demonstrated only an extremely limited resurgence since the realignment of the 1930s. Presidential-year voting turnout in the period 1948–60 actually declined from the

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[29] John H. Fenton, *Politics in the Border States* (New Orleans, Hauser Press, 1957), pp. 117–20.



FIGURE 2. Increases in Roll-Off: The Case of Ohio, 1872–1962.



FIGURE 3. Increases in Split-Ticket Voting: The Case of Ohio, 1872–1962.

mean level of 1932–44, and was not appreciably higher than it had been in the trough of the 1920s. If mean drop-off has declined somewhat in recent years, it still stands at a level twice as high as in any period before 1920. Moreover, roll-off and the rate of split-ticket voting have actually increased to unprecedented highs since 1948. By 1962 the latter ratio touched an all-time high of 21.3% (except for the three-party election of 1924), suggesting that Ohio politics may be becoming an "every-man-for-himself" affair. This pattern of behavior stands in the sharpest possible contrast to 19th-century norms. In that period turnout had reached substantially full proportions, drop-off was minimal and well over 99 per cent of the voters cast both complete ballots and straight party tickets—an achievement that may have been partly an artifact of the party ballots then in use.[30] The political reintegration which the New Deal realignment brought in its wake elsewhere has scarcely become visible in Ohio.

Two recent discussions of Ohio politics may shed some light upon these characteristics. Thomas A. Flinn, examining changes over the past century in the partisan alignments of Ohio counties, concludes that until the first decade of the 20th century the state had a set of political alignments based largely on sectionalism within Ohio—a product of the diverse regional backgrounds of its settlers and their descendants. This older political system broke down under the impact of industrialization and a national class-ethnic partisan realignment, but no new political order of similar coherence or partisan stability has yet emerged to take its place.[31] Flinn's findings and the conclusions which Lee Benson has drawn from his study of New York voting behavior in the 1840s are remarkably similar.[32] In this earlier voting universe the durability of partisan commitment and the extremely high levels of turnout appear to have had their roots in a cohesive and persistent set of positive and negative group referents. These, as Flinn notes, provided "no clear-cut class basis for statewide party following from the time of Jackson to that of Wilson."[33]

John H. Fenton, discussing the 1962 gubernatorial campaign, carries the argument one step further.[34] Basic to Ohio's social structure, he argues, is an unusually wide diffusion of its working-class population among a large number of middle-sized cities and even smaller towns. The weakness of the labor unions and the chaotic disorganization of the state Democratic Party seem to rest upon this diffusion. Ohio also lacks agencies which report on the activities of politicians from a working-class point of view, such as have been set up by the United Automobile Workers in Detroit or the United Mine Workers in Pennsylvania or West Virginia. The result of this is that to a much greater extent than in other industrial states, potential recruits for a cohesive and reasonably well-organized Democratic Party in Ohio live in an isolated, atomized social milieu. Consequently they tend to vote in a heavily personalist, issueless way, as the middle and upper classes do not. Such a state of affairs may provide clues not only for the relative failure of voter turnout to increase during the past generation, but for the persistent and growing indications of voter peripherality in Ohio's active electorate as well.

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[30] However, Ohio's modern pattern of split-ticket voting, formed several decades ago, seems to have been little (if at all) affected by the 1950 change from party-column to office-block ballot forms. See Figure 3.

[31] Thomas A. Flinn, "Continuity and Change in Ohio Politics," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 24, pp. 521–44 (1962).

[32] Lee Benson, *The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 123–207, 288–328.

[33] Flinn, *op. cit.*, p. 542.

The development of the voting universe in New York is more analogous to the situation in Ohio than in either Michigan or Pennsylvania. In New York, as in Ohio, two-party competition was not as dislocated by the 1896–1930 alignment as a hasty survey of the presidential-election percentages during that period might suggest. Democrats remained firmly in control of New York City, and this control helped them to capture the governorship eight out of eighteen times from 1896 through 1930. There were other parallels with Ohio as well, for here too this persistence of party competition did not prevent the normal post-1896 voting syndrome from appearing in New York. Nor has there been any pronounced resurgence in turnout levels or convincing declines in the other variables since the 1930s. Drop-off, roll-off, split-ticket voting and partisan swing are not only quite high in New York by 19th-century standards, but have been twice as great as in neighboring Pennsylvania during the past decade. This relative failure of political reintegration is revealed not only by the data presented in Table VIII but—in much more dramatic fashion—by the rise and persistence of labor-oriented third parties which are centered in New York City and have enjoyed a balance-of-power position between the two major party establishments. The existence of the American Labor and Liberal Parties, as well as the continuing vitality of anti-Tammany "reform" factions, are vocal testimony to the failure of the old-line New York Democratic Party to adapt itself successfully to the political style and goals of a substantial portion of the urban electorate.

Curiously enough, examination of the data thus far presented raises some doubt that the direct primary has contributed quite as much to the erosion of party linkages as has been often supposed.[35] There seems to be little doubt that it has indeed been a major eroding element in some of the states where it has taken root—especially in states with partially or

TABLE VIII. NEW YORK VOTING PATTERNS, 1834–1962: DECLINE WITHOUT RESURGENCE?

Period	Mean turnout (Prės. years)	Mean drop-off	Mean roll-off	Mean split-ticket voting	Mean partisan swing	Mean % D of 2-party vote
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	
1834–1858	84.8	3.3	1.6	1.2	1.7	50.9*
1860–1879	89.3	7.9	0.4	0.6	2.6	50.1
1880–1898	87.9	10.4	1.2	1.6	5.0	50.5
1900–1908	82.5	8.3	1.1	2.2	3.7	47.2
1910–1918	71.9	10.9	5.1	3.3	3.8	46.2
1920–1930	60.4	17.3	5.5	9.5	8.3	49.6
1932–1946	71.3	22.5	4.9	3.4	3.2	53.2†
1948–1962	67.8	20.6	3.6	6.5	5.8	47.3†

* Elections from 1854 to 1858 excluded because of major third-party vote.

† The American Labor Party, 1936–46, and the Liberal Party, 1944–62, are included in Democratic vote when their candidates and Democratic candidates were the same.

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[34] John H. Fenton, "Ohio's Unpredictable Voters," *Harper's Magazine*, Vol. 225, pp. 61–65 (1962).

[35] This would seem to suggest a limitation on Key's findings, *American State Politics*, *op. cit.*, pp. 169–96.

fully one-party systems where the primary has sapped the minority party's monopoly of opposition. But comparison of New York with our other states suggests the need of further concentrated work on this problem. After a brief flirtation with the direct primary between 1912 and 1921, New York resumed its place as one of the very few states relying on party conventions to select nominees for statewide offices, as it does to this day. Despite this fact, the post-1896 pattern of shrinkage in turnout and increases in our other indices of political dissociation was virtually the same in New York as elsewhere. To take a more recent example, New York's split-ticket-voting ratio was 16.1 per cent in 1962, compared with 21.3 in Ohio, 7.1 in Michigan and 6.8 per cent in Pennsylvania. The overall pattern of the data suggests that since 1932 the latter two states may have developed a more cohesive party politics and a more integrated voting universe with the direct primary than New York has without it.

If the data thus far indicate some link between the relative magnitude of voter nonparticipation and marginality with the cohesiveness of the local party system, even greater secular trends of the same sort should occur where one of the parties has continued to enjoy a perennially dominant position in state politics. Oklahoma, a border state with a modified one-party regime, tends to support such an assumption.[36] The relatively recent admission of this state to the union naturally precludes analysis of its pre-1896 voting behavior. Even so, it is quite clear that the further back one goes toward the date of admission, the closer one comes to an approximation to a 19th-century voting universe. In Oklahoma, curiously enough, the secular decline in turnout and increases in the other indices continued into the New Deal era itself, measured by the off-year elections when—as in a growing number of states[37]—a full slate of statewide officers is elected. Since 1946 very little solid evidence of a substantial resurgence in turnout or of major declines in drop-off, roll-off or split-ticket voting has appeared, but there is some evidence that the minority Republican Party is atrophying.

The magnitude of drop-off and roll-off has become relatively enormous in Oklahoma since the 1920s, with a very slight reduction in both during the 1950–1962 period. While turnout has correspondingly increased somewhat since its trough in the 1934–1946 period, at no time since 1914 have as many as one-half of the state's potential voters come to the polls in these locally decisive off-year elections. Still more impressive is the almost vertical increase in the proportion of uncontested elections since the end of World War II. The 1958 and 1962 elections, moreover, indicate that the trend toward decomposition in the Republican party organization and its linkage with its mass base

TABLE IX. VOTER PERIPHERALITY AND PARTY DECAY? OKLAHOMA, 1907–1962

Period	Mean turnout (Off-years)	Mean drop-off	Mean roll-off*	Mean split-ticket voting*	% of State and Congressional elections uncontested by Republicans	
					Per cent	Mean N†
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)		
1907–1918	52.9	12.1	6.1	3.6	2.1	32
1922–1930	40.1	13.0	13.9	9.7	2.1	31
1934–1946	37.1	32.2	16.4	8.1	14.8	32
1950–1962	44.5	26.3	14.0	10.5	41.3	29

* Roll-off and split-ticket voting are computed for contested elections only.
† Mean number of state and congressional races in each off-year election.

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[36] This designation is given the state's political system in Oliver Benson, Harry Holloway, George Mauer, Joseph Pray and Wayne Young, *Oklahoma Votes: 1907–1962* (Norman, Okla., Bureau of Government Research, University of Oklahoma, 1964), pp. 44–52. For an extensive discussion of the sectional basis of Oklahoma politics, see *ibid.*, pp. 32–43, and V. O. Key, Jr., *American State Politics, op. cit.*, pp. 220–22.

[37] In 1936, 34 states (71%) elected governors for either two- or four-year terms in presidential years, and the three-year term in New Jersey caused major state elections to coincide with every fourth presidential election. By 1964, only 25 of 50 states (50%) still held some of their gubernatorial elections in presidential years. Two of these, Florida and Michigan, are scheduled to begin off-year gubernatorial elections for four-year terms in 1966.



FIGURE 4. Patterns of Political Evolution: The Case of Oklahoma, 1907–1962.

is continuing. In 1958 the party virtually collapsed, its gubernatorial candidate winning only 21.3 per cent of the two-party vote. Four years later the Republican candidate won 55.5 per cent of the two-party vote. The resultant partisan swings of 34.2 per cent for this office and 22.0 for all contested statewide offices was the largest in the state's history and one of the largest on record anywhere. But while 1962 marked the first Republican gubernatorial victory in the state's history, it was also the first election in which the Republican Party yielded more than half of the statewide and congressional offices to its opposition without any contest at all. Even among contested offices, the Oklahoma electorate followed a national trend in 1962 by splitting its tickets at the unprecedented rate of 17.3 per cent.

As Key has suggested, the direct primary has almost certainly had cumulatively destructive effects on the cohesion of both parties in such modified one-party states as Oklahoma.[38] The rapidly spreading device of "insulating" state politics from national trends by holding the major state elections in off years has also probably played a significant role. Yet it seems more than likely that these are variables which ultimately depend for their effectiveness upon the nature of the local political culture and the socio-economic forces which underlie it. Pennsylvania, for example, also has a direct-primary. Since 1875, it has also insulated state from national politics by holding its major state elections in off years. Yet since the realignment of the 1930s, both parties have contested every statewide office in Pennsylvania as a matter of course. Indeed, only very infrequently have elections for seats in the state legislature gone by default to one of the parties, even in bailiwicks which it utterly dominates.[39]

These five statewide variations on our general theme suggest, as do the tentative explorations below the statewide level in Pennsylvania, that an extremely important factor in the recent evolution of the voting universe has been the extent to which the imperatives of the class-ethnic New Deal realignment have been relevant to the local social structure and political culture. In the absence of an effectively integrating set of state political organizations, issues and candidates around which a relatively intense polarization of voters can develop, politics is likely to have so little salience that very substantial portions of the potential electorate either exclude themselves altogether from the political system or enter it in an erratic and occasional way. As organized and articulated in political terms, the contest between "business" and "government" which has tended to be the linchpin of our national politics since the 1930s has obviously made no impression upon many in the lowest income strata of the urban population. It has also failed to demonstrate sustained organizing power in areas of rural poverty or among local political cultures which remain largely pre-industrial in outlook and social structure.

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[38] *American State Politics*, *op. cit.*, pp. 169–96.

[39] In the period 1956–62 there have been 840 general-election contests for the Pennsylvania House of Representatives. Of these all but six, or 0.7%, have been contested by both major political parties. No Pennslvania state Senate seat has been uncontested during this period. Despite the 1962 Republican upsurge in Oklahoma, however, there were no contests between the parties in 11 of 22 Senate seats (50.0%) and in 73 of 120 House seats (60.9%). All the uncontested Senate seats and all but two of the uncontested House seats were won by Democrats.

IV

The conclusions which arise directly out of this survey of aggregate data and indices of participation seem clear enough. On both the national and state levels they point to the existence and eventual collapse of an earlier political universe in the United States—a universe in many ways so sharply different from the one we all take for granted today that many of our contemporary frames of analytical reference seem irrelevant or misleading in studying it. The late 19th-century voting universe was marked by a more complete and intensely party-oriented voting participation among the American electorate than ever before or since. Approximately two-thirds of the potential national electorate were then "core" voters, one-tenth fell into the peripheral category, and about one-quarter remained outside. In the four northern states examined in this survey the component of core elements in the potential electorate was even larger: about three-quarters core voters, one-tenth peripherals and about 15 per cent non-voters.

In other ways too this 19th-century system differed markedly from its successors. Class antagonisms as such appear to have had extremely low salience by comparison with today's voting behavior. Perhaps differentials in the level of formal education among various groups in the population contributed to differentials in 19th-century turnout as they clearly do now. But the unquestionably far lower *general* level of formal education in America during the last century did not preclude a much more intense and uniform mass political participation than any which has prevailed in recent decades. Though the evidence is still scanty, it strongly implies that the influence of rurality upon the intensity and uniformity of voting participation appears to have been precisely the opposite of what survey-research findings hold it to be today. This was essentially a pre-industrial democratic system, resting heavily upon a rural and small-town base. Apparently, it was quite adequate, both in partisan organization and dissemination of political information, to the task of mobilizing voters on a scale which compares favorably with recent European levels of participation.

There is little doubt that the model of surge and decline discussed above casts significant light upon the behavior of today's American electorate as it responds to the stimuli of successive elections. But the model depends for its validity upon the demonstrated existence of very large numbers both of peripheral voters and of core voters whose attachment to party is relatively feeble. Since these were not pronounced characteristics of the 19th-century voting universe, it might be expected that abnormal increases in the percentage of the vote won by either party would be associated with very different kinds of movements in the electorate, and that such increases would be relatively unusual by present-day standards.

Even a cursory inspection of the partisan dimensions of voting behavior in the 19th century tends to confirm this expectation. Not only did the amplitude of partisan swing generally tend to be much smaller then than now,[40] but nationwide landslides of the 20th-century type were almost non-existent.[41] Moreover, when one party did win an unusually heavy majority, this increase was usually associated with a pronounced and one-sided *decline* in turnout. Comparison of the 1848 and 1852 elections in Georgia and of the October gubernatorial and November presidential elections of 1872 in Pennsylvania, for example, makes it clear that the "landslides" won by one of the presidential contenders in 1852 and 1872 were the direct consequence of mass abstentions by voters who normally supported the other party.[42] Under 19th-century conditions, marked as they were by substantially full mobilization of the eligible electorate, the only play in the system which could provide extraordinary majorities had to come from a reversal of the modern pattern of surge and decline—a depression in turnout which was overwhelmingly confined to adherents of one of the parties.[43]

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[40] Mean national partisan swings in presidential elections since 1872 have been as follows: 1872–92, 2.3%; 1896–1916, 5.0%; 1920–32, 10.3%; 1936–64, 5.4%.

[41] If a presidential landslide is arbitrarily defined as a contest in which the winning candidate received 55% or more of the two-party vote, only the election of 1872 would qualify among the 16 presidential elections held from 1836 to 1896. Of 17 presidential elections held from 1900 through 1964, at least eight were landslide elections by this definition, and a ninth—the 1924 election, in which the Republican candidate received 54.3% and the Democratic candidate 29.0% of a three-party total—could plausibly be included.

This earlier political order, as we have seen, was eroded away very rapidly after 1900. Turnout fell precipitately from 19th-century levels even before the advent of woman suffrage, and even in areas where immigrant elements in the electorates were almost nonexistent. As turnout declined, a larger and larger component of the still-active electorate moved from a core to a peripheral position, and the hold of the parties over their mass base appreciably deteriorated. This revolutionary contraction in the size and diffusion in the shape of the voting universe was almost certainly the fruit of the heavily sectional party realignment which was inaugurated in 1896. This "system of 1896," as Schattschneider calls it,[44] led to the destruction of party competition throughout much of the United States, and thus paved the way for the rise of the direct primary. It also gave immense impetus to the strains of anti-partisan and anti-majoritarian theory and practice which have always been significant elements in the American political tradition. By the decade of the 1920s this new regime and business control over public policy in this country were consolidated. During that decade hardly more than one-third of the eligible adults were still core voters. Another one-sixth were peripheral voters and fully one-half remained outside the active voting universe altogether. It is difficult to avoid the impression that while all the forms of political democracy were more or less scrupulously preserved, the functional result of the "system of 1896" was the conversion of a fairly democratic regime into a rather broadly based oligarchy.

The present shape and size of the American voting universe are, of course, largely the product of the 1928–1936 political realignment. Survey-research findings most closely approximate political reality as they relate to this next broad phase of American political evolution. But the characteristics of the present voting universe suggest rather forcefully that the New Deal realignment has been both incomplete and transitional. At present, about 44 per cent of the national electorate are core voters, another 16 or so are peripheral, and about 40 per cent are still outside the political system altogether. By 19th-century standards, indices of voter peripherality stand at very high levels. Party organizations remain at best only indifferently successful at mobilizing a stable, predictable mass base of support.

The data which have been presented here, though they constitute only a small fraction of the materials which must eventually be examined, tend by and large to support Schattschneider's functional thesis of American party politics.[45] We still need to know a great deal more than we do about the specific linkages between party and voter in the 19th century.

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[42] The total vote in Georgia declined from 92,203 in 1848 to 62,333 in 1852. Estimated turnout declined from about 88% to about 55% of the eligible electorate, while the Democratic share of the two-party vote increased from 48.5% in 1848 to 64.8% in 1852. The pattern of participation in the Pennsylvania gubernatorial and presidential elections of 1872 is also revealing:

Raw Vote	Governor, Oct. 1872	President, Nov. 1872	Absolute Decline
Total	671,147	562,276	−108,871
Democratic	317,760	213,027	−104,733
Republican	353,387	349,249	− 4,138

Estimated turnout in October was 82.0%, in November 68.6%. The Democratic percentage of the two-party vote was 47.3% in October and 37.9% in November.

[43] The only apparent exception to this generalization in the 19th century was the election of 1840. But this was the first election in which substantially full mobilization of the eligible electorate occurred. The rate of increase in the total vote from 1836 to 1860 was 60.0%, the largest in American history. Estimated turnout increased from about 58% in 1836 to about 80% in 1840. This election, with its relatively one-sided mobilization of hitherto apolitical elements in the potential electorate, not unnaturally bears some resemblance to the elections of the 1950s. But the increase in the Whig share of the two-party vote from 49.2% in 1836 to only 53.0% in 1840 suggests that that surge was considerably smaller than those of the 1950s.

[44] *The Semi-Sovereign People, op. cit.*, p. 81.

[45] *Ibid.*, esp. pp. 78–113. See also his "United States: The Functional Approach to Party Government," in Sigmund Neumann, ed., *Modern Political Parties* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 194–215.

Systematic research remains also to be done on the causes and effects of the great post-1896 transition in American political behavior. Even so, it seems useful to propose an hypothesis of transition in extension of Schattschneider's argument.

The 19th-century American political system, for its day, was incomparably the most thoroughly democratized of any in the world. The development of vigorous party competition extended from individual localities to the nation itself. It involved the invention of the first organizational machinery—the caucus, the convention and the widely disseminated party press—which was designed to deal with large numbers of citizens rather than with semi-aristocratic parliamentary cliques. Sooner than the British, and at a time when Prussia protected its elites through its three-class electoral system, when each new change of regime in France brought with it a change in the size of the electorate and the nature of *le pays légal*, and when the basis of representation in Sweden was still the estate, Americans had elaborated not only the machinery and media of mass politics but a franchise which remarkably closely approached universal suffrage. Like the larger political culture of which it was an integral part, this system rested upon both broad consensual acceptance of middle-class social norms as ground rules and majoritarian settlement (in "critical" elections from time to time), once and for all, of deeply divisive substantive issues on which neither consensus nor further postponement of a showdown was possible. Within the limits so imposed it was apparently capable of coherent and decisive action. It especially permitted the explicit formulation of sectional issues and—though admittedly at the price of civil war—arrived at a clear-cut decision as to which of two incompatible sectional modes of social and economic organization was henceforth to prevail.

But after several decades of intensive industrialization a new dilemma of power, in many respects as grave as that which had eventuated in civil war, moved toward the stage of overt crisis. Prior to the closing years of the century the middle-class character of the political culture and the party system, coupled with the afterglow of the civil-war trauma, had permitted the penetration and control of the cadres of both major parties by the heavily concentrated power of our industrializing elites. But this control was inherently unstable, for if and when the social dislocations produced by the industrial revolution should in turn produce a grass-roots counterrevolution, the party whose clienteles were more vulnerable to the appeals of the counterrevolutionaries might be captured by them.

The take-off phase of industrialization has been a brutal and exploitative process everywhere, whether managed by capitalists or commissars.[46] A vital functional political need during this phase is to provide adequate insulation of the industrializing elites from mass pressures, and to prevent their displacement by a coalition of those who are damaged by the processes of capital accumulation. This problem was effectively resolved in the Soviet Union under Lenin and Stalin by vesting a totalitarian monopoly of political power in the hands of Communist industrializing elites. In recent years developing nations have tended to rely upon less coercive devices such as non-totalitarian single-party systems or personalist dictatorship to meet that need, among others. The 19th-century European elites were provided a good deal of insulation by the persistence of feudal patterns of social deference and especially by the restriction of the right to vote to the middle and upper classes.

But in the United States the institutions of mass democratic politics and universal suffrage uniquely came into being *before* the onset of full-scale industrialization. The struggle for democracy in Europe was explicitly linked from the outset with the struggle for universal suffrage. The eventual success of this movement permitted the development in relatively sequential fashion of the forms of party organization which Duverger has described in detail.[47] In the United States—ostensibly at least—the struggle for democracy had already been won, and remarkably painlessly, by the mid-19th century. In consequence, the American industrializing elites were, and felt themselves to be, uniquely vulnerable to an anti-industrialist assault which could be carried out peacefully and in the absence of effective legal or customary sanctions by a citizenry possessing at least two generations' experience with political democracy.

This crisis of vulnerability reached its peak in the 1890s. Two major elements in the population bore the brunt of the exceptionally severe deprivations felt during this depression decade:

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[46] Clark Kerr, John T. Dunlop, Frederick S. Harbison and Charles A. Myers, *Industrialism and Industrial Man* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 47–76, 98–126, 193, 233. Walt W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1960), pp. 17–58.

[47] Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties* (New York, 2d. ed., 1959), pp. 1–60.

the smaller cash-crop farmers of the Southern and Western "colonial" regions and the ethnically fragmented urban working class. The cash-crop farmers, typically overextended and undercapitalized, had undergone a thirty-years' decline in the prices for their commodities in the face of intense international competition. With the onset of depression in 1893, what had been acute discomfort for them became disaster. The workers, already cruelly exploited in many instances during this "take-off" phase of large-scale industrialization, were also devastated by the worst depression the country had thus far known. Characteristically, the farmers resorted to political organization while the workers sporadically resorted to often bloody strikes. The industrializers and their intellectual and legal spokesmen were acutely conscious that these two profoundly alienated groups might coalesce. Their alarm was apparently given quite tangible form when the agrarian insurgents captured control of the Democratic Party in 1896.

But the results of that great referendum revealed that the conservatives' fears and the anti-industrialists' hopes of putting together a winning coalition on a Jacksonian base were alike groundless. Not only did urban labor *not* flock to William Jennings Bryan, it repudiated the Democratic Party on an unprecedented scale throughout the industrialized Northeast. The intensity and permanence of this urban realignment was paralleled by the Democrats' failure to make significant inroads into Republican strength in the more diversified and depression-resistant farm areas east of the Missouri River, and by their nearly total collapse in rural New England. The Democratic-Populist effort to create a coalition of the dispossessed created instead the most enduringly sectional political alignment in American history—an alignment which eventually separated the Southern and Western agrarians and transformed the most industrially advanced region of the country into a bulwark of industrialist Republicanism.

This realignment brought victory beyond expectation to those who had sought to find some way of insulating American elites from mass pressures without formally disrupting the pre-existing democratic-pluralist political structure, without violence and without conspiracy. Of the factors involved in this victory three stand out as of particular importance. (1) The depression of 1893 began and deepened during a Democratic administration. Of course there is no way of ascertaining directly what part of the decisive minority which shifted its allegiance to the Republican Party reacted viscerally to the then incumbent party and failed to perceive that Cleveland and Bryan were diametrically opposed on the central policy issues of the day. But contemporary survey findings would tend to suggest that such a component in a realigning electorate might not be small. In this context it is especially worth noting that the process of profound break with traditional voting patterns began in the fall of 1893, not in 1896. In a number of major states like Ohio and Pennsylvania the voting pattern of 1896 bears far more resemblance to those of 1893–1895 than the latter did to pre-1893 voting patterns. Assuming that such visceral responses to the Democrats as the "party of depression" did play a major role in the realignment, it would follow that the strong economic upswing after 1897 would tend to strengthen this identification and its cognate, the identification of the Republicans as the "party of prosperity."

(2) The Democratic platform and campaign were heavily weighted toward the interests and needs of an essentially rural and semi-colonial clientele. Considerably narrowed in its programmatic base from the farmer-labor Populist platform of 1892, the Democratic Party focussed most of its campaign upon monetary inflation as a means of redressing the economic balance. Bryan's viewpoint was essentially that of the smallholder who wished to give the term "businessman" a broader definition than the Easterners meant by it, and of an agrarian whose remarks about the relative importance of farms and cities bespoke his profound misunderstanding of the revolution of his time. Silver mine owners and depressed cash-crop farmers could greet the prospect of inflation with enthusiasm, but it meant much less to adequately capitalized and diversified farmers in the Northeast, and less than nothing to the depression-ridden wage-earners in that region's shops, mines and factories. Bryan's appeal at base was essentially Jacksonian—a call for a return to the simpler and more virtuous economic and political arrangements which he identified with that bygone era. Such nostalgia could evoke a positive response among the native-stock rural elements whose political style and economic expectations had been shaped in the far-away past. But it could hardly seem a realistic political choice for the ethnically pluralist urban populations, large numbers of whom found such nostalgia meaningless since it related to nothing in their past or current experience. Programmatically, at least, these urbanites were presented with a two-way choice only one part of which seemed at all functionally related to the realities of an emergent industrial society. With the Demo-

crats actually cast in the role of reactionaries despite the apparent radicalism of their platform and leader, and with no socialist alternative even thinkable in the context of the American political culture of the 1890s, the Republican Party alone retained some relevance to the urban setting. In this context, its massive triumph there was a foregone conclusion.

(3) An extremely important aspect of any political realignment is the unusually intense mobilization of negative-reference-group sentiments during the course of the campaign. 1896 was typical in this respect. Profound antagonisms in culture and political style between the cosmopolitan, immigrant, wet, largely non-Protestant components of American urban populations and the parochial, dry, Anglo-Saxon Protestant inhabitants of rural areas can be traced back at least to the 1840s. Bryan was virtually the archetype of the latter culture, and it would have been surprising had he not been the target of intense ethnocultural hostility from those who identified with the former. He could hardly have appeared as other than an alien to those who heard him in New York in 1896, or to those who booed him off the stage at the Democratic Convention—also in New York—in 1924. Moreover, his remarks about the Northeast as "the enemy's country"— anticipating Senator Goldwater's views about that region in 1964—could only intensify a broadly sectional hostility to his candidacy and deepen the impression that he was attacking not only the Northeast's industrializing elites but the Northeast itself. Both in 1896 and 1964 this region gave every visible evidence of replying in kind.

As Schattschneider has perceptively observed, the "system of 1896" was admirably suited to its primary function. One of its major working parts was a judiciary which proceeded first to manufacture the needed constitutional restraints on democratic political action—a development presaged by such decisions as the Minnesota railroad rate case of 1890[48] and the income tax cases of 1894–1895[49]—and then to apply these restraints against certain sensitive categories of national and state economic legislation.[50] Another of the new system's basic components was the control which the sectional alignment itself gave to the Republican Party, and through it the corporate business community, over the scope and direction of national public policy. Democracy was not only placed in judicial leading-strings, it was effectively placed out of commission—at least so far as two-party competition was concerned—in more than half of the states. Yet it was one of the greatest, if unacknowledged, contributions of the "system of 1896" that democratic forms, procedures and traditions continued to survive.[51] Confronted with a narrowed scope of effective democratic options, an increasingly large proportion of the eligible adult population either left, failed to enter or—as was the case with Southern Negroes after the completion of the 1890–1904 disfranchisement movement in the Old Confederacy—was systematically excluded from the American voting universe. The results of this on the exercise of the franchise have already been examined here in some detail. It was during this 1896–1932 era that the basic characteristics associated with today's mass electorate were formed.

These characteristics, as we have seen, have already far outlived the 1896 alignment itself. There seems to be no convincing evidence that they are being progressively liquidated at the present time. If the re-emergence of a competitive party politics and its at least partial orientation toward the broader needs of an urban, industrialized society were welcome fruits of the New Deal revolution, that revolution has apparently exhausted most of its potential for stimulating turnout or party-oriented voting in America. The present state of affairs, to be sure, is not without its defenders. The civics-minded have tended to argue that the visible drift away from party-oriented voting among a growing minority of voters is a sign of increasing maturity in the electorate.[52] Others have argued that mediocre rates of turnout in the United States, paralleled by the normally low salience of issues in our political campaigns, are indicative of a "politics of happiness."[53] It is further contended that any sudden injection of large numbers of poorly socialized adults into the active voting universe could constitute a danger to the Republic.[54]

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[48] Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418 (1890).

[49] Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429 (1895); (rehearing) 158 U. S. 601 (1895).

[50] The literature on this process of judicial concept-formulation from its roots in the 1870s through its formal penetration into the structure of constitutional law in the 1890s is extremely voluminous. Two especially enlightening accounts are: Benjamin Twiss, *Lawyers and the Constitution* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1942), and Arnold M. Paul, *Conservative Crises and the Rule of Law* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1960).

[51] Paul, *ibid.*, pp. 131–58.

[52] See, among many other examples, *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report,* Vol. 22 (May 1, 1964), p. 801.

[53] Heinz Eulau, "The Politics of Happiness,"

But there is another side to this coin. The ultimate democratic purpose of issue-formulation in a campaign is to give the people at large the power to choose their and their agents' options. Moreover, so far as is known, the blunt alternative to party government is the concentration of political power, locally or nationally, in the hands of those who already possess concentrated economic power.[55] If no adequate substitute for party as a means for mobilizing non-elite influence on the governing process has yet been discovered, the obvious growth of "image" and "personality" voting in recent decades should be a matter of some concern to those who would like to see a more complete restoration of the democratic process in the United States.

Moreover, recent studies—such as Murray Levin's examinations of the attitudes of the Boston and Massachusetts electorate—reveal that such phenomena as widespread ticket splitting may be associated quite readily with pervasive and remarkably intense feelings of political alienation.[56] Convinced that both party organizations are hopelessly corrupt and out of reach of popular control, a minority which is large enough to hold the balance of power between Republicans and Democrats tends rather consistently to vote for the lesser, or lesser-known, of two evils. It takes a mordant variety of humor to find a kind of emergent voter maturity in this alienation. For Levin's data are difficult to square with the facile optimism underlying the civics approach to independent voting. So, for that matter, are the conclusions of survey research about the behavior of many so-called "independent" voters.[57]

Findings such as these seem little more comforting to the proponents of the "politics of happiness" thesis. Granted the proposition that most people who have been immersed from birth in a given political system are apt to be unaware of alternatives whose explicit formulation that system inhibits, it is of course difficult to ascertain whether their issueless and apathetic political style is an outward sign of "real" happiness. We can surmise, however, that the kind of political alienation which Levin describes is incompatible with political happiness, whether real or fancied. A great many American voters, it would seem, are quite intelligent enough to perceive the deep contradiction which exists between the ideals of rhetorical democracy as preached in school and on the stump, and the actual day-to-day reality as that reality intrudes on his own *milieu*. Alienation arises from perception of that contradiction, and from the consequent feelings of individual political futility arising when the voter confronts an organization of politics which seems unable to produce minimally gratifying results. The concentration of socially deprived characteristics among the more than forty million adult Americans who today are altogether outside the voting universe suggests active alienation—or its passive equivalent, political apathy—on a scale quite unknown anywhere else in the Western world. Unless it is assumed as a kind of universal law that problems of existence which can be organized in political terms must fade out below a certain socio-economic level, this state of affairs is not inevitable. And if it is not inevitable, one may infer that the political system itself is responsible for its continued existence.

Yet such an assumption of fade-out is clearly untenable in view of what is known about patterns of voting participation in other democratic systems. Nor need it be assumed that substantial and rapid increases in American voting participation would necessarily, or even probably, involve the emergence of totalitarian mass movements. The possibility of such movements is a constant danger, to be sure, in any polity containing so high a proportion of apolitical elements in its potential electorate. But it would be unwise to respond to this possibility by merely expressing the comfortable hope that the apoliticals will remain apolitical, and by

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Antioch Review, Vol. 16, pp. 259–64 (1956); Seymour M. Lipset, *Political Man* (New York, 1960), pp. 179–219.

[54] *Ibid.*, pp. 216–19; Herbert Tingsten, *Political Behavior*, *op. cit.*, pp. 225–26.

[55] V. O. Key, Jr., *Southern Politics* (New York, 1949), pp. 526–28; E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People*, *op. cit.*, pp. 114–28.

[56] Murray B. Levin, *The Alienated Voter* (New York, 1960), pp. 58–75, and his *The Compleat Politician* (Indianapolis, 1962), esp. pp. 133–78. While one may hope that Boston and Massachusetts are extreme case studies in the pathology of democratic politics in the United States, it appears improbable that the pattern of conflict between the individual's expectations and reality is entirely unique to the Bay State.

[57] Angus Campbell *et al.*, *The American Voter*, *op. cit.*, pp. 143–45.

doing nothing to engage them in the system in a timely and orderly way. It is much more to the point to seek a way, if one can be found, to integrate the apolitical half of the American electorate into the political system before crisis arises.[58] Such integration need not be out of the question. The United States, after all, enjoyed intense mass political involvement without totalitarian movements during the last part of the 19th century, as do other Western democracies today.

No integration of the apoliticals can be carried out without a price to be paid. Underlying the failure of political organizations more advanced than the 19th-century middle-class cadre party to develop in this country has been the deeper failure of any except middle-class social and political values to achieve full legitimacy in the American political culture. It may not now be possible for our polity to make so great a leap as to admit non-middle-class values to political legitimacy and thus provide the preconditions for a more coherent and responsible mode of party organization. But such a leap may have to be made if full mobilization of the apolitical elements is to be achieved without the simultaneous emergence of manipulative radicalism of the left or the right. The heart of our contemporary political dilemma appears to lie in the conflict between this emergent need and the ideological individualism which continues so deeply to pervade our political culture. Yet the present situation perpetuates a standing danger that the half of the American electorate which is now more or less entirely outside the universe of active politics may someday be mobilized in substantial degree by totalitarian or quasi-totalitarian appeals. As the late President Kennedy seemed to intimate in his executive order establishing the Commission on Registration and Voting Participation, it also raises some questions about the legitimacy of the regime itself.[59]

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[58] The line of reasoning developed in this article—especially that part of it which deals with the possible development of political alienation in the United States—seems not entirely consistent with the findings of Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 402–69, 472–505. Of course there is no question that relatively high levels of individual satisfaction with political institutions and acceptance of democratic norms may exist in a political system with abnormally low rates of actual voting participation, just as extremely high turnout may—as in Italy—be associated with intense and activist modes of political alienation. At the same time, the gap between American norms and the actual political activity of American individuals does exist, as Almond and Verba point out on pp. 479–87. This may represent the afterglow of a Lockean value consensus in an inappropriate socio-economic setting, but in a polity quite lacking in the disruptive discontinuities of historical development which have occurred during this century in Germany, Italy and Mexico. Or it may represent something much more positive.

[59] "Whereas less than sixty-five percent of the United States population of voting age cast ballots for Presidential electors in 1960; and

"*Whereas popular participation in Government through elections is essential to a democratic form of Government;* and

"Whereas the causes of nonvoting are not fully understood and more effective corrective action will be possible on the basis of a better understanding of the causes of the failure of many citizens to register and vote . . . " (emphasis supplied) The full text of the executive order is in *Report*, pp. 63–64. Compare with Schattschneider's comment in *The Semi-Sovereign People*, *op. cit.*, p. 112: "A greatly expanded popular base of political participation is the essential condition for public support of the government. This is the modern problem of democratic government. The price of support is participation. The choice is between participation and propaganda, between democratic and dictatorial ways of *changing consent into support, because consent is no longer enough.*" (Author's emphasis)

POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PREVISION*

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The political scientist is a teacher of public men in the making, and an adviser of public men in activity; "public men," that is, men who are taught, invited or assumed to feel some responsibility for the exercise of political power; "political power," that is, concentrated means of affecting the future.

I

Obviously we can not affect the past, or that present moment which is now passing away, but only what is not yet: the future alone is sensitive to our actions, voluntary if aimed at a pictured outcome, rational if apt to cause it, prudently conceived if we take into account circumstances outside our control (known to decision theorists as "states of nature"), and the conflicting moves of others (known in game theory as opponents' play). A result placed in the future, conditions intervening in the future, need we say more to stress that decisions are taken "with an eye to the future," in other terms, with foresight?

Thucydides puts this utterance in the mouth of Archidamos, addressing the Assembly of Lacaedemonians on the eve of the Peloponnesian War: "For we that must be thought the causers of all events, good or bad, have reason also to take some leisure in part to foresee them."[1]

This can serve as our text: the greatest of historians warns us that we are the authors of our fate. It is levity in an individual to make a decision fraught with serious consequences to himself without forethought; but such levity turns to guilt in the case of the magistrate or citizen participating in a public decision the consequences of which will fall upon a great many. The political scientist then must recognize in foresight a moral obligation, to be felt and taught.

But saying that public decisions *ought* to be taken with foresight is a precept: how can we follow this precept unless we develop the corresponding *skill*? Knowing that foresight is required, the political scientist must therefore seek to develop that skill in himself, and in his pupils, and offer it to statesmen he has to advise. *Foresight is an expertise required in the political scientist:* that is my first point.[2]

Need I stress that expertise does not mean infallibility? A political scientist will often misread the course of events or miscalculate the consequences of a decision, but the frequency of his successful forecasts should be higher than that of the average politician or lay citizen; this is not a great deal to ask, and whoever denies that it can be achieved, thereby denies any practical value to political research. The moral philosopher who deems it his function to teach discrimination of what is best in an absolute sense, does not need to prove himself a good forecaster. But it is otherwise for one who presents himself as a student of behavior. Such a study must be called idle or unsuccessful unless it results in an increasing ability to state what is to be expected.

There is in every science a well known relationship between factual investigation and marshalling hypotheses, meant to account for the facts and assumed to have some predictive worth. It is true that there can be no certain knowledge but of the past: indeed the past is the realm of the "true or false," with which the future contrasts as the realm of "possibles," which are neither true nor false. Therefore only probable statements can be uttered regarding the future, but it is solely through such utterances that the sciences are of practical utility. As I shall stress, it pertains to the nature of the object that such statements should be least reliable in matters political. But if they are not to be attempted, the term "science" should be rejected: nor can we then think of the discipline as conferring positive boons upon the body politic.

II

Since probable statements concerning the future are an outcome of factual investigations, they can, of course, concern only the realm of those phenomena which the student investigates. It is a verbal convention of our time that of two once synonymous terms, one of Latin, the other of Greek origin, both designating originally the whole of human relations, the word "social" has been retained to mean the whole, while the usage of the word "political" has been narrowed down to a part of these relations. In the meantime, however, the functions of government have grown more embracing: therefrom a non-congruence between the field of studies of the political scientist, and the field of concerns of the political magistrate. It follows that the kind of foresight which the political scientist may provide refers to but part of the phenomena the political magistrate has to deal with. This immediately suggests that it falls to other departments of the social sciences to provide complementary varieties of foresight, arising from their specific investigations, and relevant to some kinds of public decisions. It is indeed the practice of governments to consult experts other than political scientists, for the preparation of decisions concerning what Cournot very aptly called "the social economy." When it is future "traffic in towns" which forms the subject-matter of the decision, forecasts regarding the automobile population, the location of industry, the grouping of people, etc., are required of specialists quite other than political scientists.

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[1] Thucydides I, 83. From Hobbes' version, republished by the University of Michigan Press (Ann Arbor, 1959), vol. I, p. 48.

[2] For a more extended discussion of the general topic see my *L'Art de la Conjecture* (Editions du Rocher, Monaco, 1964); eight of the SEDEIS studies in conjecture have been collected, in English, in *Futuribles* (Droz, Geneva, 1963).

This need not be labored and forms my second point. *Public decisions require a variety of foresights other than that of the political scientist.* We may well think of these diverse foresights being brought into play as each occasion demands. But there is a problem here, of no mean importance.

III

I shall introduce this problem by means of a concrete instance: the quotations here are from the *Survey of International Affairs* for the year 1930.[3]

Dr. Brüning became Chancellor of the German Reich in March 1930: "the Budget problem was by far the most untractable of all the problems with which Germany had to deal. . . . up to the time of writing [the Summer of 1931] it was only under the Chancellorship of Dr. Brüning that measures were taken of such a character as to promise real improvement. . . . The cumulative deficit was . . . the prospective deficit was. . . . Action was therefore urgent. Dr. Brüning met his immediate necessities by an emergency decree promulgated in July 1930, and, as the situation was not righted by this measure, it was succeeded by two further emergency decrees issued respectively in December 1930 and in June 1931." While drastically cutting down expenditure, these decrees also raised taxes. "Such were the draconian measures to which Dr. Brüning was obliged to resort. Their effectiveness in practice remained to be seen: their value as proof of the changed attitude of responsible German statesmen in the matter of public finance was beyond question or cavil."

Let me add that, on taking office, Dr. Brüning found three million unemployed: after two years of "draconian measures," he had six million; that he found 12 Nazis sitting in the Reichstag: after six months in office he saw their number raised to 107 (Sept. 30 elections), and soon after he left office (May 1932) the Nazis obtained 230 seats (July 31, 1932).

Now let us imagine a political scientist addressing Dr. Brüning in April 1930: "Ignorant as I am of public finance, I must assume that the measures which have been recommended to you by financial experts are the best for balancing the budget (which in fact they were not); ignorant as I am of economics, I cannot tell you what measures would effectively reduce unemployment: these are matters for different specialists. But it is my office to tell you that unemployment is a more serious evil than budgetary deficit, constitutes a more pressing problem, and that you should give it priority. Further it is my office to warn you that you will put the country in great political peril if you fail to address yourself to the major problem."

There is indeed a very heavy bill to be paid for the misinvestment of public attention, which is a very common fault of politicians. Consider the sad case of Dr. Brüning, an earnest and honorable man, who conscientiously and courageously addressed himself to what he deemed the major problem: but his ranking was quite mistaken, so that his virtuous efforts led to political disaster. This brings out the utility of properly ranking problems. Here I am not thinking of a lasting hierarchy in terms of values (however important that is) but of a here-and-now order of priorities, in terms of the costs of letting various problems fester and come to a crisis.

Politicians having proved remarkably poor judges of such priorities, a better judge is needed to redress their assessments: and this is a role for the political scientist, who to this end must operate as a "generalist," not only as a "specialist" among others. No matter that he is competent to deal only with certain problems, he must also be competent to appraise them all. And this role of "generalist" is logically linked with his role as specialist:

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[3] Royal Institute of International Affairs (London, 1931), pp. 531–6.

because any social problem which is left inadequately attended will ultimately land in that court of passions and conflict which is his particular concern. He can be compared to a suzerain of the social field, who runs but a small part of the realm, but must oversee the whole, as any trouble arising in any other part must seep into his own. He is competent to request attention for a problem, and demand that experts competent therein be called. More than that, he is competent to state what questions they should answer, because he must be aware of interrelations between problems.

Another instance will serve to stress that aspect. Left alone after World War I to maintain the new map of Europe which Woodrow Wilson and Lloyd George had taken so large a part in drawing, France formed alliances with four Eastern Europe states, of which two, Poland and Czechoslovakia, were immediate neighbors of Germany. These alliances committed France to military intervention should Germany attack Poland or Czechoslovakia. Military intervention in what form? A mere glance at the map made it clear that effective intervention could occur in no other form than the invasion of Germany. Therefore these alliances required that the French army be shaped as an offensive instrument: exactly the reverse was explicitly decided, and a purely defensive apparatus was set up. So it was quite easy to foresee a good ten years in advance what happened in 1939: while practically the whole of the German forces was thrown against Poland, the French army sat uselessly on its defensive positions, having been designed for nothing else.[4] Not only was it easy to foresee but it was foretold behind closed doors by certain military leaders, and openly by some young civilians without authority. Now is this not again a clear case for the political scientist? Was it not proper for him to point out the discrepancy between the diplomatic policy and the military policy?[5]

I have chosen two instances of fatal mistakes, of which I can bear witness that they were perceptible at the time. Mistakes, one of which proceeded from a wrong priority of policies, the other from an incoherence of policies. Is it not the political scientist's role to take a view sufficiently panoramic to call attention to such blunders? That is my third point. *The political scientist is competent to appreciate priorities and consistency in policies the details of which he is incompetent to judge.*

IV

The foregoing statement means that the political scientist has to keep track of current and impending changes in non-political fields, and for this purpose to achieve a continual exchange of forward looking views with experts in these other fields. To take a simple instance, suppose that the balance-of-payments specialist foresees the necessity of slowing up the rate of wage increases. Some economists feel that this cannot be achieved otherwise than by a "squeeze," diminishing, as they put it, the pressure on the labor market—in more common parlance, maintaining a certain percentage of unemployment. Others, shocked by this prospect, reject that method and advocate an "incomes policy." Now the political scientist, informed of these views, foresees from the one procedure unpleasant political consequences; while the second poses a problem of political feasibility. Therefore such views are very germane to his concerns: indeed it may be the case that one policy seems to him inadvisable and the other impracticable, which may cause him to ask the economists for some other way: would a flexible exchange rate achieve the object?

As every change assumed to occur has repercussions in many fields, as every change devised has a variety of implications and calls for a variety of adjustments, it is clear that in a society characterized by rapid transformation, there is need for what I have called elsewhere a Surmising Forum where anticipations are confronted, and where incoherences discerned indicate measures to be taken, or alternatives to be considered. I do not propose to restate here the case for the Surmising Forum; all I need is to make the fourth point: *the political scientist must seek to coordinate anticipations.*

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[4] And not well designed even for that, as commandant Souchon noted in 1929, uttering this prophecy: "our future army will be dissociated, pushed around and cut to pieces before having struck the least blow." In *Feu l'Armée Française*, published without signature (Paris, 1929).

[5] One might elaborate upon the consequences of this inconsistency. First, the discovery of the impotence of the French army was a major cause of the French government's attitude at the time of Munich; but as they could not believe this impotence, the Soviet leaders quite understandably interpreted our shameful desertion of Czechoslovakia as inspired by a machiavellian desire to orient Germany toward an attack upon Russia, which was thought of by no responsible Frenchman. Second, as the Poles trusted the French army—as I found while attending them in the 1939 campaign—they thought it quite unnecessary to agree in the previous Anglo-Franco-Russian negotiations to the entry of Russian troops upon their soil, which the Soviets quite understandably made a condition of their military support. And this increased the Soviet suspicion of our good faith, which may have determined the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact.

This attempt to overlook the whole field is useful for the long term, but it also meets a pressing need of the political scientist.

V

This overall watching allows him to detect sources of future political perturbances. *The political scientist should be a detector of trouble to come:* that is my fifth point.

Trouble is indeed his business. Who would deny that he is at his most useful if he warns of war or advises how to avoid it? That the foresight of the foreign policy expert revolves around the possibility of war, will be readily granted; but not so easily that the domestic equivalent of war must play the same central role in the speculations of the domestic expert. The contrast is understandable enough: the international system is thought of as a system of antagonism, the national system as one of cooperation. The very accent of words changes as we move from one system to the other. If we speak of a system of Powers (international), we use the capital to denote independent actors by their factual resources, their *means;* while if we speak of the system of powers (national), the powers we now refer to are *rights* to be exercised functionally in the service of the national whole.

"Home affairs," as the British tellingly put it, are supposed to be altogether quieter than foreign affairs. It is assumed that the institutions set up to take care of home affairs are and will remain adequate to cope with any problems arising: there is a political division whenever people strongly disagree as to what should be done, but this division is thought of as overcome when the matter has been settled by an established procedure of decision (such as a parliamentary "division").

The political scientist should be keenly aware that things are not so simple, but his function as teacher of institutions leads him to convey and therefore to adopt an optimistic vision. His first and foremost function is to address future citizens and potential magistrates, and fit them for participation in the management of public affairs, a management organized according to a certain system. This system must be described and explained to them, so that they shall feel "at home" in it, in the two senses of knowledge and acceptance; and it is surely of great importance to a republic that its citizens should have confidence in and respect for the form of its government. Political institutions, inherently precarious, are made solid and stable by belief, which must therefore be fostered; but, in the process of so doing, it is easy to become overconfident. It improves mores to think that what may not be done can not be done, but it deteriorates prudence. It is good that actions should run between the banks of established procedures, but it is dangerous that the imagination of the expert should be confined between these banks. To cite an admittedly extreme and caricatural instance of such confinement, it was apparently believed by those who called Hitler to the Chancellorship at the end of January 1933, that he would find himself quite paralyzed in this position by article 58 of the Weimar constitution, which stated that all government decisions should be taken by a majority of the members of the cabinet, wherein he was placed in a minority, having only two ministers of his own party! As I warned, this is an extreme and caricatural instance; it is not suggested that political scientists are prone to such mistakes. But it is true, surely, that, not only as teachers of good civic behavior, but also as law-abiding and reasonable men, they are not inclined to lend any great likelihood to strong departures from regular courses.

They are not prone to foresee dramatic events. Surely the United States is the country far the best endowed in political scientists—indeed possibly as many as nineteen out of twenty political scientists operating in the world today are Americans. It would be interesting to know what proportion of these political scientists foresaw—and how early—the sensational rise of McCarthy and his no less sensational collapse. Or again, what proportion foresaw the capture of the Republican Party by the Goldwater group.

This is not meant as a criticism: first, it is in any realm difficult to be a good forecaster; second, the difficulty is at its greatest in politics; last, and chiefly, political scientists have not, in general, deemed it their function to forecast, and when so doing they are apt to stress that they do so as citizens, not as scientists. The only purpose of my remark, therefore, is to note a psychological disposition, which I think would still be operative if political scientists were willing to adopt the view here advanced, that they should regard it as pertaining to their function to forecast, and should indeed regard such forecasting as a practical end-product of their science. Under such conditions, they would still, I think, be reluctant to foresee perturbation, disturbance, trouble. So, if this foresight of trouble is, as I think, the most important, a psychological effort will be required to overcome the tendency to project a relatively smooth course.[6]

That tendency is to be found also in other fields of social science: everywhere prevision resorts to projection of current trends and to reproduction of periodic changes. Economic prevision, to whatever degree of complexity it may be worked out, ultimately rests upon the assumption that certain structural relations are relatively invariant over time. It is natural enough that prevision should assume continuity and recurrence. Therefore it takes an effort to predict discontinuity, a break—in short, trouble.

VI

Political foresight requires study of political behavior: this sixth point is self-evident; every science studies the behavior of those objects about which it proposes to make statements of general and lasting validity, and therefore capable of being used for prediction, or anticipation. Nor is it necessary to advocate study of political behavior: this is presently the most esteemed compartment of political science.[7] Nonetheless something is to be said on this point.

"Behavioral studies," as they are called, are apt to deal with ordinary behavior: the word "ordinary" denotes at the same time, and very properly, what is not uncommon, and what fits into an order. Now times of trouble are characterized by extraordinary conducts: the behavior of the "force publique," when the independence of the Congo was proclaimed, came as a great surprise; no better, and no less surprising, was the behavior of the "gardes-françaises" on the Fourteenth of July, 1789. Quite recently, some meticulous and respected German bureaucrats have been found out, to the shocked surprise of their colleagues, as the authors of most abominable actions in the days of the concentration camps: but for these historic events they might have lived irreproachable lives and no one would ever have imagined them capable of what they have done. Of course, saying that people would not have been criminal but for the occasion is not, as it is all too commonly taken to be, an excuse: the actions are their own and their features then made manifest were potentially there before. But it is a warning that the behavior we presently observe is not the only behavior of which the subjects observed are capable.

The instability of behavior is a great difficulty for political prevision. We know of course that a man's behavior is variable but in no realm is it as variable as in the political. And we get no inkling of behavior under "heated" conditions if we merely observe people under "cold" conditions, when they vote this way or that, attend meetings or not, move resolutions or raise their hands. Under heating, we observe that the same people are not then behaving in the same way; and further we must note that it is not the same people who then claim most of our attention. At all times, if people are ranked according to their degree of political activity, we find that such activity is high only in a limited number and falls off very rapidly as we consider greater numbers. "Heated" conditions are apt to increase the total surface included under such a curve, but they also substitute, for the most active minority under cold conditions, a minority made up of quite different persons.

Whatever the equality of political rights, so small is the share of total political activity performed by the great majority and so great that performed by a small minority, that the total hue and character of national political activity reflects that of the active minority. If that leading company then changes, the whole character of politics changes. And though the heat which changes behavior in the same people does pass away, the change in the people who impart their character to the total system may endure.

The great merit of an effective two-party system is that no man can rise to political importance otherwise than by a slow progress within one or the other party, a progress in the course of which he finds himself subject to screening by monitors at different stages of his rise. It is a major contribution to stability that the two parties conspire to persuade the public that between themselves they exhaust the possibilities. But the political scientist must be aware that, however salutary this belief, it does not correspond to reality: there are people floating in outer darkness who can, if the occasion arises, irrupt upon the scene, casting out both of the small armies that have been engaged in a civilized duel. The heads carried away in the baskets attending the French guillotine represented the whole spectrum of opinions preceding the Revolution (also those which appeared in its course); the same has been true in the concentration camps of Soviet Russia and of Nazi Germany.

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[6] In his masterly treatment of economic forecasting, H. Theil, *Economic Forecasts and Policy* (Amsterdam, 1961), Pt. V, notes that changes to come are generally underestimated. If our mind tends to underestimate shifts in a continuous course, breaks in this continuity are even less acceptable to it.

[7] See the ranking of the different compartments of political science given by Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus, "Trends in American Political Science," this REVIEW, Vol. 57 (Dec. 1963), pp. 933, 941. The authors asked political scientists in what compartment of the science the most significant work was being done and "behavioralism" came an easy first.

All this pertains to the process of "heating." To this, political scientists have given, if I may say so, quite inadequate attention; they have been very prone to regard this as inevitable when it has happened and unthinkable where it has not. That where it has happened it had sufficient cause, is of course true, but uninteresting; what is useful is to pin-point, if we can, what would have made a difference. It is now out of fashion for historians to stop their relation of events when they come to what seems to them a cross-roads, and to note that, from a different decision or action at this point, a different course of things might have followed. It may be that such exercises are unbecoming to historical science; they are surely in the highest degree suitable to political science.

Our science stands in great need of a systematic study bearing upon the occurrence of these "changes of state" here called "heating." Unless I am much mistaken, such a factual study would not confirm the breezy theory that they occur when necessary to allow the coming forth of a predetermined new order—that is, if and only if they serve a providential purpose; strange indeed is the unquestioned providentialism of agnostic philosophers of history.

I have noted that studies of behavior tend to disregard changes in behavior which attend "heating," and that too little attention is paid in them to what leads up to such "heating." Another remark is now called for, relative to normal conditions.

Political phenomena have by nature a tempo different from that of social phenomena. Let us take, for instance, people's attitudes toward the consumption of alcohol. Let us suppose that over time the proportion of teetotalers increases from a small minority to a majority. As a social phenomenon this can be continuous and carried to any degree without a break. But now consider teetotalism as politically militant. Then, as soon as the teetotalers have reached a majority, they will forbid drinking to the minority: a discontinuity, a break, and an occasion of "heating." Thus the diffusion of a political attitude gives rise to distinct events, as it does not in the case of a social attitude.

But the above illustration assumes a perfect democracy, where decisions are made by a popular majority; such is not the practice of any modern state. Indeed, the present trend is to entrust the major decisions to a single person: thus in the United States, while the Congress decides on the President's proposal how much financial aid should be given to South Vietnam, a military operation on North Vietnam can be decided upon by the President alone.

It follows therefrom that the political scientist, operating as "predictor," must pay to individual character an attention which is not called for in the case of the social scientist. A social phenomenon is the outcome of a very great number of individual decisions, an aggregate which reflects individual attitudes in proportion to their frequency. Social prediction can therefore safely neglect attitudes of a small minority—thus, for instance, Amish rejection of the motor-car is insignificant for estimates of future automobile sales—and the social predictor need not (as, indeed, he cannot) pay attention to idiosyncrasies. If interested in estimating the number of divorces next year, he will wave aside as irrelevant a tidbit of information regarding John's disposition to quarrel with Mary. It is not so in politics: an attitude relatively infrequent, such as rabid anti-semitism, acquires momentous importance if it pertains to a man who rises to the highest place. More generally, in the absence of any such extreme peculiarity, every little trait of the Prince's individuality acquires great importance, due to the "multiplier" of great power.

This has ever been recognized. We have centuries-old records of political forecasts in the form of diplomatic dispatches. While the ambassador owes his public character to his being the empowered spokesman of his sovereign, as soon as permanent missions abroad were established, they functioned mainly as listening posts, whence information was sent home, concerning political developments occurring or impending in the country of residence. These are the earliest "political surveys," of enormous value for the historian in that each describes a state of affairs, but also a source as yet untapped for the study of political surmising. The message of the political reporter is the more valuable the more it foretells; therefore, while conveying accomplished facts, the writer must also use them as raw material to convey a "transformed product," his surmise. The abundant diplomatic sources in existence are still to be used for the analysis of the surmising procedures they reveal. But it needs only the barest familiarity with them to remark the place occupied in such dispatches by the description of personal characteristics: the character of the Prince, those of his ministers and favorites, those also of possible successors.

What a change the simplest substitution of persons can make. Consider Frederick the Great in January 1762: he writes to the marquis d'Argens: "If Fortune continues to pursue me, doubtless I shall sink," and suggests that unless a turn for the better occurs, he may next month, take Cato's course: "Cato, and the little glass tube I have." But as he writes the turn has already occurred: Czarina Elisabeth has died, her nephew Peter has become Czar; a fanatical admirer of Frederick, he immediately relieves the pressure upon him by recalling the Russian troops. Peter's bare six months on the throne suffice to turn the tide.

Can we confidently say that personalities matter less in our own day? Why then did a shudder run through the West when the false news of Mr. Khrushchev's death was flashed? Even in the case of a liberal democracy, did we not find the very same men who interpret politics as a working-out of impersonal forces, expressing the utmost alarm at the prospect of a Goldwater presidency?

Personalities always matter in politics, and never have they counted for more than in our century, which has, at one and the same time, tended to collectivize the individual and to individualize collective power. From this has come, as it seems to me, an improved predictability in matters pertaining to the social economy, and a deteriorated predictability in matters specifically political. Far be it from me to exaggerate the freedom of action of the man who sits at the top of a nation. He is always "riding a tiger," but the way he rides it makes a very great difference indeed.

From these remarks it seems to follow that the methods which serve us well in the prevision of social change, which is continuous and insensitive to idiosyncrasies, cannot be suitable for political phenomena, which have different properties.

VII

It is a great ambition of modern social science to study phenomena without "insight"; an understandable ambition, this being the way which has led the human mind to phenomenal success in the physical sciences, which serve as the model and basis of all others. Standing in the way of such progress was the "pathetic fallacy," our apparently innate propensity to lend quasi-human personalities to objects. It is not helpful toward the control of floods to regard them as fits of anger in the river genius, who should therefore be appeased by gifts, perhaps human sacrifices. Our knowledge and mastery of nature have progressed as we have ceased to regard natural objects as whimsical persons, who behave according to their mood, and have come instead to regard them as "things" which behave as they are made to by circumstances. Containing as it does a most vigorous repudiation of animism, a depersonalization of objects, the Bible can be said to have helped open the way for Western science.[8]

We find the eviction of "genii" historically associated with a procedure of inquiry which seeks to ascertain how the object behaves under varying conditions, and to derive from observed regularities assertions of predictive value. The procedure has its utmost practical value when it leads us to foretell with certainty how the object will behave under certain future conditions as they occur, and therefore also, what conditions we must create in order to make it behave as suits us. These great practical rewards of the method are fully attained when the object studied is a "thing" which must perforce "behave" in perfectly passive compliance to the conditions wherein it is placed. This being so, it is understandable that the method was extended to animals in consequence of Descartes's assertion concerning their "machine" character, and that Condillac and La Mettrie should have, by their views of man, encouraged its extension to him.

Whatever historical role the inclination to regard man as also a "mere thing" may have played in the extension to him of this method of inquiry, it is surely a mistake[9] to regard the validity of the method, applied to his case, as dependent upon this ontological assumption. In fact the very first finding from such an application is that men do not display that uniformity of behavior which we expect from "things." Thus an application, scandalous to some who regard it as debasing man to the status of "mere thing," in fact demonstrates that he is not such. But the method is not, in consequence, valueless: though we find in a number of men different conducts in the same circumstances, if we note the distribution of such conducts and its mode, and if we can find that over time this distribution and its mode change but little or shift but slowly, we have therefrom a predictive tool, as stressed by Quételet.[10]

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[8] It is here beside the point that "the death of the Great Pan" or depersonalization of natural objects, has implied a great loss of reverence and sensitive enjoyment of them.

[9] This mistake gives rise to heated quarrels between those who, being revolted that man should be thought of as a "mere thing," therefore needlessly repudiate the scientific method and those who, addicted to this method, therefore needlessly champion the "mere thing" notion. Justification or condemnation of the method does not rest thereupon but depends upon its efficiency. Here I would like to digress to say that the true danger of a scientific approach, but shared with any other form of intellectual outlook, is that excessive enthusiasm for general statements, however useful, should impair our appreciation of the particular and unique.

Now a few words about "outwardness." The scientific method in respect to things has substituted for interpretations of their "genius" the examination of their performances. We attempt no sympathetic "understanding" of the thing's spirit but proceed by watchful "overstanding." In the metaphysical squabbles of social science, there is much argument for and against such "outwardness."

I can see no harm in observing a nation as one would an ant-heap; this just happens to be a hampering method. Were it the best, ethnologists who go out to investigate so-called "primitive peoples" should be strictly forbidden to learn the language of their hosts; for conversation conveys some insight into people's feelings, intentions, values. Thereby you lose the outwardness which some deem so essential.

Outwardness has indeed been used as a literary artifice by eighteenth-century wits, foremost among them Voltaire, to ridicule social behavior. If you look at conducts from an angle which annuls the values inspiring them and thus robs them of meaning, it is easy enough to make them appear nonsensical; thereby also they are made unpredictable. This is a clear warning not to press outwardness too far. The social scientist has to set the tangible behaviors he observes within the framework of prevailing beliefs and interests. An economist may dislike motor cars, he may, as a joke in the common room, describe weekends as an aimless buzzing of urbanites out of the hive, arising from a periodic perturbation of the regular courses therein: his forecasts must nonetheless rest upon men's known desires for cars. No forecasting is possible unless data about what people do are complemented with data about their feelings, wants, aspirations, judgments. These data may figure but implicitly in a model, which then assumes either their invariance over time, or that their changes will follow a certain ascertainable course.

But it is quite otherwise for the political forecaster: he has to focus upon feelings, attitudes, judgments, because these, in his field, undergo swift and vast changes, with major factual consequences. How soon, how very soon it was after Hitler's last stand in Berlin, that I heard an ADA group in New York acclaim Mayor Reuther's formula: "Berlin is the outpost and symbol of freedom!" What a reversal of significance! Did it occur because the national interest of the United States demanded it? I have no patience with those who explain the emotional attitudes of actual people by the rational interest of collective entities: it is rather the other way round. Is it credible that the anti-Soviet revulsion of the United States soon after the end of hostilities was inspired by the national interest? If so, surely, in the last weeks of the war, the American troops should have been urged to gain as much ground in Germany and in Czechoslovakia as was possible, and to keep it. But no, the policy of containment came as an aftermath of a change in the affective valuation of Stalinist Russia.

History would be different—indeed there would be very much less of History as commonly understood—if policies corresponded to a relatively stable conception of the national interest. For instance, consider Britain's "war or peace" relations with Hitler over a period of less than five years. March 1936: Hitler's troops march into the Rhineland, demilitarized under the Locarno treaty, to which Britain is a party; all that Britain needs to do is to give backing and encouragement to the wavering French, who then can easily reoccupy the Rhineland, thus dealing to Hitler's prestige a possibly decisive blow. The British choose the opposite attitude. Summer of 1938: after the Anschluss, Czechoslovakia is threatened, the French make ready to march on its behalf, the British government invents the Runciman mission which leads to Munich, "peace in our time." The strategic situation is now much deteriorated, but the takeover of Czechoslovakia, which was made helpless by amputation, scandalizes British opinion and Britain waxes militant. No matter that the hoped-for alliance with Russia falls through, it is war; the now reluctant French follow unwillingly, and, as it proves, ineffectively. October 1940: France has been utterly overcome; the only Power left standing in Europe, the Soviet Union, is presently Germany's ally; Hitler offers peace to England, at no cost to her—let her attend to her Empire, which Hitler admires. The offer is not even considered; by now the hearts of the British have been so turned against Hitler that, regardless of relative resources and chances, he must be fought, come what may.

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[10] A. Quételet, *Sur l'homme et le développement de ses facultés ou essai de physique sociale*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1835).

The terrible ordeal was unnecessary; such mistakes will not be repeated: nonsense! Of course they are repeated all the time—though let us hope with no such dramatic consequences—and naturally so: because, at any moment, "the present situation" is appreciated in terms of the present feelings and evaluations. It is not like a chessboard problem which different onlookers can be unequally competent to solve but which they must all see alike; it is a different situation according to the onlooker, not the same to Baldwin or to Chamberlain as to Churchill. Nor are the policies of a nation the outcome of one man's reading of the situation but of an aggregate of visions. Doubtless the United States could have prevented the Munich capitulation, and Roosevelt saw it should be prevented; but if he expressed it as a private opinion instead of throwing the weight of his nation in the balance, it is presumably because he felt that the nation's mood did not allow him to do so.

What appears as a glaring mistake in a game of strategy may be a natural outcome of a psychological context which "gaming" ignores, and *vice versa*. The last war would have been won by Germany and Japan had the latter Power attacked Russia instead of making the capital blunder of outright aggression against the United States fleet. It was so obviously good strategy for Japan to make sure that Russia was counted out, and so obviously a bad move to bring in the United States, that the unravelling of the psychological motives for such conduct should be very instructive.

There is a political context to strategic situations; situations which are much the same in strategic terms are very different in political terms. An instance is afforded by very recent news. Taking it as a datum that, throughout the period considered, the United States has been interested in precluding the spread of communism in the Indo-Chinese peninsula, we note that, a little more than ten years ago, American aircraft carriers were in the Gulf of Tonkin, available to the American President for an air-strike. In the spring of 1954, great results could be hoped for from an air-strike at Dien-Bien-Phu. Results then likely (not of course certain) were: the French army saved, Giap's army (then offering a concentrated target) crippled, the State of Vietnam (not then partitioned) relieved for a time from communist pressure and communist infiltration in Laos and Cambodia precluded. President Eisenhower decided against making the air-strike which might have had such consequences; an air-strike was made in early August 1964 when it held out no such promises. In terms of strategy, it cannot be explained that it was done in 1964 rather than 1954. It has to be explained in political terms; not of course in terms of formal politics, for an air-strike in 1954 would have been made at the request of a formally sovereign state on its own territory against those who were formally rebels, while the air-strike of 1964 was made against the territory of a sovereign state. The explanation is not then to be sought in "politics" understood as "public law." The explanation is to be sought rather in terms of a far different emotional context.

Explanation and *a fortiori* prediction are impossible in politics without understanding of affective attitudes. "The springs of politics are the passionate movements of the human heart," says Cournot.[11] Tragedy is meant to display the swiftness and amplitude of such movements, a lesson which statesmen forget to their undoing. It so happens that France in early 1848 had for Prime Minister an eminent political scientist, indeed the restorer of our Academy of Political and Moral Sciences, Guizot. A rare feature in France, the parliamentary opposition acknowledged a leader, Thiers, who was a distinguished historian. Neither of these men had an inkling of the revolution which was to sweep away the regime in a few days of February. What is more, neither of them took seriously the massing of a crowd on February 22d—a crowd which indeed, according to students of those fateful days, showed as yet no signs of violent excitement.

Up to the last moment these eminent men did not foresee the revolution, and had they been told that within a few years Louis Bonaparte would be Emperor, they would have taken it as a joke. Now let me add that the history Thiers had written was that of the Revolution and Empire. He was familiar with such events as were to be repeated, but he must have felt, "It can't happen now"—another version of "It can't happen here." This instance stresses that *the political forecaster must guess how people will come to feel* (my seventh point) and also that this is no easy thing.

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[11] A. Cournot, *Traité de l'enchaînement des idées fondamentales dans les sciences et dans l'histoire*, para. 460, p. 525 of the 1911 edition.

To this concern the study of public opinion corresponds, but it may be asked whether adequate attention has been paid to the dynamic of moods.

VIII

Consider "the body politic" as a vast army "making its way" in a literal sense; this raises a variety of problems, to be foreseen by a variety of social scouts, the political scientist a coordinator, wary of mix-ups which would generate excitement and anger. Such is the rough sketch of the picture which has been presented in the preceding sections. This so emphasizes policy expertise as to be possibly shocking, relatively to the established idea that the political scientist is an expert on *institutions*. But far from there being a conflict between the two conceptions, on the contrary the rolе of the political scientist as detector of problems breathes life into his role as student and designer of institutions.

Institutions are of instrumental value, good in so far as they efficiently cope with problems arising, and operate toward the achievement of social goods. If the machinery of government proves such that no timely action can be taken to ward off some visibly impending harm, a vice in the institutions can be presumed. Of course I do not mean that *any* bad policy is proof of bad institutions; none are so excellent as to exclude the possibility of foolish decisions. What I do mean is that frequency of failure to cope or achieve is a judgment upon what is in essence a coping-and-achieving machinery and nothing else.

Now this is precisely where institutional expertise is needed. Left to itself, public opinion will be apt to reject the whole system, throwing away what is good therein—and thus, for instance, turn from a "government by discussion" regime which is not working well, to a more efficient tyranny. It is for the institutions expert to indicate the more modest adjustments required. But, as a forecaster on how people will come to feel (point seven), he must be aware also that by the time public opinion has been aroused against the inefficiency of the system, its disposition will be to repudiate it altogether, so that minor adjustments, however well they might serve, will not be acceptable to it. These therefore must be made before the public has been aroused; and this is no easy thing, as the public does not then demand it and the wielders of the government machinery bask in complacency.

Indeed the political scientist should foresee the deficiencies of the institutional system not only before these have excited popular discontent and brought it into discredit, but even before these deficiencies have been made manifest by faulty performance. For this purpose he will rely to a considerable degree upon the assumed stability of social trends, ask himself how their estimated course will alter the demands made upon the "coping machinery," seek to assess its adequacy to such different demands, and thereupon look for the adjustments which can improve such adequacy.

To be sure, social change by itself has a direct impact upon the institutional machinery and tends to weaken or atrophy some institutions, to strengthen or hypertrophy others. Such direct impact may happen to work toward an improvement of the machinery: but it would be most unwise to take this as a postulate. Quite the reverse can be the case.

I do not propose to develop here my eighth point: *the political scientist should foretell the adjustments suitable to improve the adequacy of the institutional system to cope with changing circumstances*. Of the different points made here, this is the only one which is sure to be accepted by all; therefore the case for it need not be argued. If it comes here as the last point, it is because the institutional preoccupation is made most meaningful when derived from more immediate and concrete preoccupations. The future inflow of public business, its increasing volume, its new varieties, must be vividly pictured by the expert: only thus can he recommend adjustments in the public machinery, adequate to a liberal democratic handling of heavier and shifting burdens.

Any maladjustment enhances attitudes which amount to regarding political and private freedoms as conflicting with progress. It is for rulers who alone are far seeing, to lead their people in the way of progress, untrammelled in their decisions by lengthy discussions, and riding rough-shod over individuals: such is the immanent doctrine sugar-coated in different ideological colors. This nefarious doctrine is rendered plausible thanks to the fact that the ancient bulwarks of liberty are often used as defensive fortifications by the very people who would in previous times have opposed their erection, and the character of such defenders provides an argument for the flattening out of these bulwarks. It seems a most urgent preoccupation for people committed to political forecasting to see what can be done for the progress of liberty in a materially progressing society, the features of which could not be imagined in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

POLITICS AND PSEUDOPOLITICS: A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF SOME BEHAVIORAL LITERATURE

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A curious state of affairs has developed within the academic discipline that bravely calls itself Political Science—the discipline that in a much-quoted phrase has been called "a device, invented by university teachers, for avoiding that dangerous subject politics, without achieving science."[1] A growing and now indeed a predominant proportion of leading American political scientists, the behavioralists, have become determined to achieve science. Yet in the process many of them remain open to the charge of strenuously avoiding that dangerous subject, politics.

Consider a recent essay on the behavioral persuasion in politics. The conclusion stresses the purpose of political inquiry: "The Goal is Man." There is to be a commitment to some humane purpose after all. But what kind of man? A democratic kind of man, a just man, or perhaps a power-seeking man? The answer follows: "These are philosophical questions better left to the philosophers."[2] Behavioral students of politics should, as scientists, engage in no value judgments concerning the kind of man or society their researches ought to serve. This is the general inference to be drawn, not only from this particular essay, but from much of the contemporary literature on political behavior.

As Heinz Eulau, the author, points out in the same essay, the area of behavioral political science includes a particular domain called policy science, in which empirical inquiry is geared to explicitly stated goal formulations; within *this* domain "political science, as all science, should be put in the service of whatever goals men pursue in politics." *Any* goals? Not quite; in this context Eulau points out that the choice of what goals to serve is a matter of personal ethics, and incidentally reminds us that behavioral research can be readily utilized also for purposes conflicting with the original ones. "In this sense, at least, science is value-free. I don't think the scientist can escape this dilemma of having his work misused without giving up his calling." And the author concludes with these words: "Only if he places himself at the service of those whose values he disagrees with does he commit intellectual treason."

In these pages I am concerned with sins less serious than intellectual treason; perhaps intellectual indolence is a more accurate term. My argument will be that much of the current work on political behavior generally fails to articulate its very real value biases, and that the political impact of this supposedly neutral literature is generally conservative and in a special sense anti-political. In conclusion I propose to develop a perspective on political inquiry that would relate it more meaningfully to problems of human needs and values; in that context I will suggest some important but neglected problems lending themselves to empirical research.

I am not about to argue that our investments in political behavior research have been too large; on the contrary, we need much more work in this area. But my principal concern is to argue for a more pressing need: an intellectually more defensible and a politically more responsible theoretical framework for guiding and interpreting our empirical work; a theory that would give more meaning to our research, even at the expense of reducing its conceptual and operational neatness.

I

It is necessary first to clarify some basic terms in which my concern is stated.

The prevailing concepts of "politics" in the literature under consideration are surely an important source of the difficulty. Definitions gravitate toward the most conspicuous *facts* and shy away from all reference to more norm-laden and less easily measurable aspects of social life. For the sake of brevity, let us consider only the most recent formulation by one of the unquestionably most influential political scientists of the present generation: "A political system is any persistent pattern of human relationships that involves, to a significant extent, power, rule, or authority."[3] My objection is not primarily to the extension of the reference of "political" to private as well as to public associations, and even to clans and families as well; rather, it is to the absence of any reference to a public purpose. Research work on power, rule, or authority can contribute significantly to our political knowlege, even if the data come from contexts not ordinarily thought of as political. But its significance must be gauged in relation to some criteria; until these are articulated and justified, or at any rate chosen, we can only intuit whether our researches on, say, power behavior are tackling significant or trivial issues.

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* I am indebted to my friend Herbert H. Hyman, who has been generous with advice for improvements on an earlier draft. It should not be inferred that he is in agreement with opinions expressed in this paper, or that he might not once again find much to criticize in it. At a later stage I have received helpful suggestions also from Sidney Verba and Andrew Hacker.

[1] Alfred Cobban, "The Decline of Political Theory," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 48 (1953), p. 335.

[2] Heinz Eulau, *The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics* (New York, 1963), p. 133 and pp. 133–37.

"Politics" should refer to power, but the term should also refer to some conception of human welfare or the public good. The achievement of Plato and Aristotle is in part a result of their starting out by asking some of the right questions; above all, what is politics *for?* Their limitations were logical and methodological or, if you prefer, conceptual: they had not learned to distinguish between verifiable *descriptive* statements, statements of *normative* positions, and (empirically empty and normatively neutral) *analytical* statements, including definitions and other equations.

Once these distinctions had been developed, a process that began with David Hume, it became easy and fashionable to expose fallacies in Plato and Aristotle; but instead of attacking the ancient and perennial problems of politics with our new and sharper conceptual tools, recent generations of political scientists appear to have sought safety in seeking to exclude the normative realm altogether from the scope of their scientific inquiry. "Politics" has consequently been defined in a simple institutional or behavioral manner, unrelated to normative conceptions of any sort. Ironically, most modern behavioralists are back with the Greeks again in their assumption that political inquiry can be pursued by much the same methods as natural science inquiry; they have adjusted to David Hume and the modern logical positivists by the neat device of definitions that limit the scope of their inquiry to observable behavior.

This surely is a stance of premature closure. The alternative proposed here is to insist on the need for a political theory that deals with *basic human needs* as well as overt desires and other observable aspects of behavior. The task of improving concepts and methods toward establishing a stricter science of politics is formidable; but let us avoid establishing an orthodoxy that would have the whole profession contract for a fainthearted purchase of rigor at the price of excluding much of the meat and spirit of politics.

As a modest and fragmentary beginning toward a more appropriate theory, let me suggest a distinction between "politics" and "pseudopolitics." I would define as *political* all activity aimed at improving or protecting conditions for the satisfaction of human needs and demands in a given society or community, according to some universalistic scheme of priorities, implicit or explicit.[4] *Pseudopolitical* in this paper refers to activity that resembles political activity but is exclusively concerned with either the alleviation of personal neuroses or with promoting private or private interest-group advantage, deterred by no articulate or disinterested conception of what would be just or fair to other groups.

Pseudopolitics is the counterfeit of politics. The relative prevalence of the counterfeit variety of democratic politics presumably depends on many ascertainable factors, including a society's degree of commercialization and the degree of socio-economic mobility (or the size of the stakes in the competitive struggle); on the other hand, the proportion of pseudopolitical activity would correlate negatively with the amount of psychological security, the amount of social welfare-type security, and the amount of political education effectively taught.

For present purposes it is not necessary to demonstrate in detail how the distinction between politics in the narrower sense and pseudopolitics can be made operationally useful. Suffice it to say that only a saint is pure from the taint of pseudopolitics and that hardly any pseudopolitician would be *wholly* without concern for the public welfare; mixed motives, in proportions varying from one person to the next and from one situation to the next, pervade all actions. It is a difficult but surely not an impossible task to develop indices for assessing the relative prevalence of political versus pseudopolitical incentives in voters and other political actors; the only essential prerequisite is to decide that the task must be tackled.

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[3] Robert Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, 1963), p. 6.

[4] "Priorities" here refers to norms for guiding the choice among conflicting needs and demands. Political ideals and visions of the good life enter in here, and would do so even if our knowledge of needs and of human nature were as extensive as our knowledge of demands and of social determinants of "public opinion."

Without attempting to make this kind of distinction, untidy as it may at first appear to many a behavioralist, I dont see how we can begin to approach a condition of tidiness in our discussions of the *political significance* of research, or of the *political responsibility* of political scientists. But what should we mean by these two highly eulogistic terms; might we not be better advised to shun them altogether? The bulk of this paper seeks to demonstrate some sorry consequences of the latter course. We cannot avoid the realm of normative issues unless we really wish to disclaim all political significance for our work. Probably very few in our profession would adopt this position.

Although explicit cognizance of normative assumptions in his theoretical frame of reference is likely to entail some inconvenience for the researcher, he will by no means be blocked from continuing much of his present work. It should be clear that all competent research on pseudopolitical behavior illuminates political behavior as well, as the relative presence of one signals the relative absence of the other. In the real world the two aspects of behavior always coexist. My quarrel is not with research on pseudopolitics *per se*, but with the way findings are usually reported and interpreted. I object to the tendency in much of the behavior literature to deal with the pseudopolitical aspects of behavior almost exclusively, and to imply that the prevalence of pseudopolitics is and always will be the natural or even the desirable state of affairs in a democracy. Consequently, I object also to the absence of interest in research that could reveal some of the determinants of the relative prevalence of pseudopolitical behavior on our political arena, by which we might learn more about how we may advance toward a more strictly political consciousness, in the sense of concern for the public interest and for the future, in our population.

Now, how should we define political significance and political responsibility? In my conceptual world the two terms are tied together; I would judge degrees of political significance of research studies in the same way that I would judge degrees of political responsibility of political scientists (in the role of theorist-researcher, as distinct from the role of citizen). A research report is politically significant to the extent that it contributes to the kinds of knowledge most needed by politically responsible political scientists.

"Political responsibility" in this paper refers to the extent to which the social scientist observes the canons of rationality on two levels, which I shall call formal and substantive.[4A] Formal rationality refers to the familiar notion of clarifying the objectives first and then paying heed to the best available knowledge when seeking ways and means to implement them. Competent behavioral research in political science is highly rational in this formal sense; this is what the extensive work in theory and methodology is *for*.

The lack of political responsibility that I ascribe to much political behavior literature relates to the other level of rationality, the substantive level, which involves articulate attention to questions of fundamental commitment in social and political research literature. Problems of human welfare (including justice, liberty, security, etc.), the objects of political research and of politics, can be adequately studied, and dealt with, only if their *ought*-side is investigated as carefully as their *is*-side. Ought-side inquiry must pertain to wants (or desires or, if insisted on, demands) as well as needs. Political communication must be analysed carefully so that we may learn what aspects of *wants* are most salient and could be frustrated only at the cost of resentment, alienation, or upheaval. Yet, only analysis of data on wants in terms of a theory of *needs* will permit us to evaluate wants and aspects of wants with a view to longer-term consequences of their relative satisfaction or frustration.

There will be more to say about wants and needs in the concluding section. At this point it should only be added that the student of politics, once he has adopted a conception of human needs, should proceed from there to make explicit his inferences about political objectives and his choice of commitments with the utmost care. If this kind of inquiry is neglected, as it certainly is in the political science curricula in most of our universities, the danger is that the political scientist unwittingly becomes the tool of other people's commitments. And *theirs* may be even less responsibly arrived at; conceivably, the expertise of the political scientist may come to serve the irrational purposes of genteel bigotry in domestic policies or of paranoid jingoism and reckless gambling with our chances of survival in foreign policies. If advice-giving social scientists dont feel called on to invest their best

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[4A] Karl Mannheim employs a similar dichotomy of terms, though with different concepts, in his *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction* (New York, 1954), pp. 51–60.

intellectual energies in studying the ultimate ends of our national policies, it is unlikely that anyone else of influence will; most active politicians have, after all, more immediately pressing worries, and these are anyway the kinds of concerns they are best trained to handle.

Intellectual treason, to return to Eulau's phrase, is probably a remote hazard in our profession. For, rather than placing himself in the service "of those whose values he disagrees with," the political scientist usually will by natural, uninvestigated processes come to agree with the prevailing values of his profession, of the major foundations and of his government, at least on the more basic public policy objectives and assumptions. His training and career incentives focus on formal rationality. It is fortunate that many social scientists for other reasons tend to be humane and liberal individuals. We will be far better off, however, if we can make it respectable or even mandatory for many more of our researchers to be guided in their choice of theory and problems by their own articulated values, instead of acting willy-nilly on the supposedly neutral values impressed on them by the conventional wisdom of their profession.

II

In the contemporary political science literature it is by no means unusual to see the articulation of political norms begin and end with a commitment to "democracy" in some unspecified sense. Fifteen years ago a respected political scientist suggested a more critical orientation: "The democratic myth is that the people are inherently wise and just, and that they are the real rulers of the republic. These propositions do have meaning; but if they become, as they do even among scholars, matters of faith, then scientific progress has been sacrificed in the interest of a morally satisfying demagogy."[5] This advice has not been generally heeded. Even today many political scientists are writing as if democracy unquestionably is a good thing, from which unquestionably good things will flow, while at the same time they profess a disinterest in settling value issues. "The only cure for the ills of democracy is more democracy," is still the implicit slogan of quite a few social scientists, who seem unaware of even the *conceptual* difficulties involved in developing generally useful criteria, let alone a rationale, for "more democracy." To put it bluntly, it appears that a good number of otherwise able political scientists confuse a vaguely stated conventional "democratism"[6] with scientific objectivity.

That behavioral research not explicitly related to problems of democracy tends to be vague in its implications for normative democratic theory is perhaps to be expected. It is paradoxical that some of the leading behavioral writers *on democracy* continue to write as if they want to have it both ways: to be rigorously value-neutral and at the same time be impeccable champions of conventional pluralist democracy. To straddle on a sharp issue would not be comfortable; if we want to write as good democrats and as logical positivists, too, it is perhaps necessary to be obtuse on issues like "why democracy?" or "what is democracy for?" and, indeed, "what is democracy?"

For a first example, take the late V. O. Key's most recent book on *Public Opinion and American Democracy*.[7] Here we are presented with an admirably organized survey of what is now known of the characteristics of contemporary public opinion and of the extent of its bearing on American governmental decision processes. Yet for all these facts about public opinion, there is hardly a hint of their implications, in the author's judgment, for any of the relevant normative issues of democracy; what little is said on this score is uninformative indeed. For example, the point is made toward the end that political deviants "play a critical role in the preservation of the vitality of a democratic order as they urge alterations and modifications better to achieve the aspirations of men. Hence the fundamental significance of freedom of speech and agitation" (p. 555). There is no elaboration of this point, which one might take to be an important issue, considering the book's title and general subject. And there is no other discussion of what purpose all this political knowledge should serve. Is it the "preservation of the vitality of a democratic order" as far as we can articulate the criteria for the best possible government, or for trends in the best direction? What does "vitality" mean here, and what aspects of our democracy are most in need of it? Is free speech valuable solely as a means to this rather obscurely conceived end?

Or take the volume on *Voting*, by a team of top-notch political sociologists.[8] One of the book's two themes, we are told (p. x), is the social problem of how political preferences are formed, while the "confrontation of democratic theory with democratic practice is the second implied theme that runs throughout the book." There is much about certain kinds of practices, yes; but democratic theory is limited to a few examples of "impossible" demands of "traditional normative theory" on the role of the citizen: that he should be politically interested, knowledgeable and rational. These investigators find that most voters are indeed politically apathetic, ignorant and far from rational in their political behavior.

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[5] Gabriel A. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York, 1950), p. 4.

[6] The term is from Leo Strauss. See his "Epilogue" in Herbert J. Storing, ed., *Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics* (New York, 1962), p. 326.

[7] New York, 1961.

Given the second theme one might have expected the authors to raise some pertinent questions concerning the sense, if any, in which we nevertheless do have a democracy, or possibly the sense in which we nevertheless *ought* to be able to have a democracy, if what we have now does not fit this concept. Or perhaps an attempt toward reformulating democratic norms in better accord with political realities, if the term "democracy" should be saved for new uses.

Nothing of the sort happens. Instead, the authors make the happy discovery that the *system of democracy* that we have "does meet certain requirements for a going political organization"; indeed, as it is said just before, "it often works with distinction" (p. 312). What is good and bad about the system is left in the dark, as is the question of criteria for "distinction." Instead, we are given a list of dimensions of citizen behavior, and are told that the fact that individuals differ on these various dimensions (*e.g.*, involvement—indifference) somehow is exactly what the modern democratic system requires. It all ends well, then; and in parting the authors leave us with this comforting if question-begging assurance: "Twentieth-century political theory—both analytic and *normative*—will arise *only* from hard and long observation of the actual world of politics, closely identified with the deeper problems of practical politics." (p. 323. Italics supplied.) *Only?*

Turn now to a widely and deservedly praised book with the promising title, *A Preface to Democratic Theory*. Robert Dahl explains his choice of title by asserting that "there is no democratic theory—only democratic theories. This fact suggests that we had better proceed by considering some representative theories in order to discover what kinds of problems they raise . . . "[9] And in the landscape of behavioral literature this work does stand out as an impressive exercise in logical analysis. Excellent critical evaluations of the Madisonian and the populist-type democratic theories are offered; but subsequently Dahl changes his tack to what he calls (p. 63) the descriptive method: under "polyarchal democracy" he seeks to develop empirical criteria for a concept of democracy based on our knowledge of existing species. As we would expect of a competent behavioralist, the author develops some enlightening perspectives on how "the American hybrid" in fact appears to be functioning.

Penetrating as this account of the basic operating procedures of the American democracy is, the author's criteria for evaluating the result are surprisingly inarticulate and *ad hoc.* He will *not* try to determine whether it is a desirable system of government, he assures us toward the end of the book; and then proceeds to do just that, but vaguely:

> it appears to be a relatively efficient system for reinforcing agreement, encouraging moderation, and maintaining social peace in a restless and immoderate people operating a gigantic, powerful, diversified, and incredibly complex society. This is no negligible contribution, then, that Americans have made to the arts of government—and to that branch, which of all the arts of politics is the most difficult, the art of democratic government.

These are Dahl's parting words.

Having subjected the assumptions, hypotheses, implied definitions, and even the presumed value axioms of two theories of democracy to painstaking analysis, the author's ambition not to discuss the desirability of the American system of government would be difficult to understand for someone unacquainted with the currently prevailing fashions among behavioralists. To study the definitional characteristics of this hybrid species of government and of the genus, "polyarchal democracy," is a worthwhile endeavor, to be sure, but would in my opinion assume far greater significance if pursued within a framework of value assumptions, however tentatively presented, from which could be derived operational criteria for judging what aspects of a functioning democracy ought to be valued and strengthened, as against other aspects that should be deplored and, if possible, counteracted. Why does the author never say clearly whether in *his* view democracy is something to be valued in itself, and maximized (as he takes Madisonian theory to assert), or as valuable for some specified ends (for example, for maximizing political equality, after the fashion of populists)?

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[8] Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld and William N. McPhee, *Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1954).

[9] Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1956, p. 1.

In a Preface to democratic theory, and one which demonstrates a high order of rigor in analyzing other theories of democracy, the author's reluctance even to begin to develop operating criteria toward making meaningful the present system, or to provide pointers toward its more meaningful further development, is as astounding as it is disappointing. Reluctantly one concludes that Dahl in this particular context behaves like most political behavioralists: he feels he can permit himself to write normatively about political purposes, it would seem, only if they are stated in terms of "democracy" and are reasonably indeterminate, lest the suspicion should arise that he is pleading for some politically partisan position. Thus, a demeanor of scientific objectivity is maintained, and so is a persistently implied commitment to a certain political bias, which favors democracy roughly as it now exists in the West, or in this country.

III

Leo Strauss charges the behavioralists with a bias toward liberal democracy, and rightly so, in comparison to his position. Yet in some respects the bias of much behavioralist political literature is profoundly conservative, although this is a species of conservatism rather different from Strauss's. Philosophically speaking, this behaviorally oriented conservatism frequently includes an *anti-political* dimension which is not found in Strauss's work.[10] What is anti-political is the assumption, explicit or implicit, that politics, or at any rate American politics, is and must always remain primarily a system of rules for peaceful battles between competing private interests, and not an arena for the struggle toward a more humane and more rationally organized society.

Consider S. M. Lipset's recent suggestion that the age-old search for the good society can be terminated, for we have got it now. Democracy as we know it "is the good society itself in operation." Not that our democracy cannot still be improved upon, but roughly speaking, it appears, "the give-and-take of a free society's internal struggles" is the best that men can hope for. Our society is so good that Lipset welcomes, at least for the West, what he sees as a trend toward replacing political ideology with sociological analysis.[11]

This is an extreme statement, although by a leading and deservedly famous political sociologist. We cannot saddle behavioralists in general with responsibility for such phrasing. But in substance, as we shall see, the same tendency toward affirming the *status quo* and, what is worse, toward disclaiming the importance and even the legitimacy of political ideology, and ideals, is discernible in other leading behaviorally oriented works as well.

Let us note incidentally that all the behavioral works referred to so far wind up affirming that American democracy on the whole works well, while failing to articulate the criteria on which this judgment is based.[12] In fairness it should be added that probably all these writers would make an exception for the place of the Negro and certain other underprivileged groups or categories for whom our democracy admittedly does not work so well; there are flaws, then, but fundamentally all is well or else will become well without any basic changes.

What is more troublesome than this somewhat conservative commitment to a somewhat liberal conception of democracy[13]—whether acknowledged or surreptitious—is the anti-political orientation referred to a moment ago; the failure to see politics as potentially, at least, an instrument of reason, legitimately dedicated to the improvement of social conditions.

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[10] This is not to deny that the Straussian position is more authoritarian and far less respectful of the right to radical dissent, as is to be expected when a corner on objective truth is being claimed. *Cf.* especially Leo Strauss, *What is Political Philosophy and Other Studies* (Glencoe, 1959); and his "Epilogue" in Herbert J. Storing, ed., *op. cit.* See also Walter Berns, "The Behavioral Sciences and the Study of Political Things: The Case of Christian Bay's *The Structure of Freedom*," this REVIEW, Vol. 55 (1961), pp. 550–59.

[11] Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (Garden City, 1960), esp. pp. 403 and 415.

[12] An interesting attempt to evaluate the 1952 Presidential election in terms of five criteria of democratic consent (as opposed to non-rational responses to manipulated processes) is reported in Morris Janowitz and Dwaine Marvick, *Competitive Pressure and Democratic Consent* (Ann Arbor, Bureau of Government, University of Michigan, 1956). The five criteria are chosen somewhat haphazardly, but they are carefully and ingeniously operationalized and brought to bear on available data. The study shows what could just as well be done, in years to come, within a more carefully and systematically stated framework of political objectives and norms.

[13] Though perhaps paradoxical, the statement is not self-contradictory. A democracy that guarantees many liberties to people of most persuasions, and in theory to everybody, may well be considered a liberal democracy. Freedom of speech and related freedoms have a strong appeal to most intellectuals, many of whom may be-

Within a brief space that allows no extensive documentation perhaps the next best thing to do is to consider for a moment a recent example of a behavioralist approach in which, for a change, the underlying assumptions are spelled out with commendable clarity, and then let the reader judge to what extent other literature referred to above may not implicitly rest on similar starkly anti-political premises.

James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock have called their book *The Calculus of Consent*, with subtitle *Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy*.[14] The task set for the book, we are told in the Preface, is "to analyze the calculus of the rational individual when he is faced with questions of constitutional choice"; the authors, both of whom have most of their training in economics, intend to develop what they take to be the rationale for group action in the public sector in a free society—*i.e.*, for political action.

The authors take pains to assert the value-free nature of their approach to the science of politics. True, they choose to go along with "the Western philosophical tradition" in so far as they consider the human individual "the primary philosophical entity" (p. 11). From here on, supposedly, we are dealing with the political processes that flow from the desire of all individuals to try to maximize whatever they may value. "The grail-like search for some 'public interest' apart from, and independent of, the separate interests of the individual participants in social choice" (p. 12) is not the concern of *these* authors.

Only in one limited sense do the authors recognize a sort of collective interest in a free society: "it is rational to *have a constitution*" (p. 21), or a set of rules for deciding how decisions in the public sector are to be arrived at; *constitutional* issues are in principle to be settled by unanimity, while *operational* issues—all other political issues—must be settled according to constitutional provisions. The authors see no rationale for majoritarianism as a way of deciding, unless a constitution happens to require it in given contexts; consequently, constitutions can be changed only by unanimity, according to this "individualistic theory of political process," as one of the authors has lately named the theory.[15]

In his more recent statement, Buchanan recognizes as an "entirely reasonable interpretation" (p. 7) that this approach to political processes can be seen as a model for the defense of the *status quo*. His most important rejoinder is that "analysis must start from somewhere, and the existing set of rules and institutions is the only place from which it is possible to start" (p. 7).

The previously cited writings of leading behavioralists have been less explicit and also less bold in showing the way from assertedly value-free premises toward a conservative and in my sense anti-political orientation. Yet, in all the works given critical attention above, there are normative ambiguities wide enough to make room for a theory such as the one offered by Buchanan and Tullock. This is not to say that Eulau, Key, Berelson *et al.*, Dahl, or Lipset would concur with Buchanan and Tullock in their normative position. But their approach to politics is philosophically similar in its emphasis on prevailing behavior patterns here and now as the thing to study and in its rejection of the legitimacy of normative positions as frameworks for research (except in a normatively *ad hoc* policy science context). Buchanan and Tullock have been able to explicate in considerable detail *one* rationale for an implicit stance that appears to be widely shared by students of politics today.

If a similar orientation were to be adopted in medical literature, its scope would in the main be confined to studying how patients choose to cope or at any rate do cope with their pathologies, while omitting or neglecting fundamental study of conditions for possible treatment and prevention.

IV

Unlike other behavioral literature, modern works in comparative politics almost always focus on real political problems; when political institutions are compared cross-nationally or cross-culturally, pseudopolitical behavior can more readily be seen as dysfunctional in terms of some conception or other of the public good; usually such conceptions are couched in terms of "modernization" or "development," at least

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come staunch conservatives *because* they believe in preserving their liberal democracy. Some, indeed, will become fixated on the need for defense of the social order to the point of ignoring the plight of poverty-stricken fellow-citizens whose formal liberty may seem worthless to themselves.

[14] Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1962.

[15] James M. Buchanan, "An Individualistic Theory of Political Process." Paper prepared for delivery at the 1963 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in Commodore Hotel, New York City.

if comparisons are cross-cultural as well as cross-national. The point is that developmental perspectives and therefore political purposes are ever-present in this literature, even if they are not often well articulated. Yet, what is particularly impressive in some of this literature is its conceptual and theoretical scope, including the stress on psychological as well as social component explanations of political behavior, and on the need for integrating micro-analyses of personalities and small groups with macro-analyses of large collectivities.[16]

Concerned as the modern students of comparative politics have been with substantive problems, they have resisted temptations to pursue their inquiries according to immediately practical considerations such as the availability of operational indices and techniques of measurement.[17] On the contrary, insistent efforts have been made to innovate concepts that would take account of variables which are not as yet accessible to observation and quantification—concepts such as political culture, political socialization, political identity, and political style, for example. The long-term strategy appears to be to start out with concepts broad enough to encompass all significant aspects of political reality, and then work toward parcelling out component concepts which come closer to corresponding to variables that can be observed, perhaps indirectly and by tentative indices at first. Thus the theoretical working hypotheses can gradually, it is hoped, be subjected to increasingly direct and stringent tests. This is a far cry from the piecemeal approach to political (or pseudopolitical) reality in many other works, which almost exclusively pays attention to disparate empirical relationships while neglecting to consider the possible systematic-theoretical reasons we might have for taking an interest in them.

There is also this to be said about the modern comparative politics literature, however, that its conceptual and theoretical innovations have as yet failed to make a significant dent in the same democratic myth that Almond himself—the leader in this field—has warned us against years ago (above, p. 42). The dilemma already discussed, of desiring to support democracy and adopt a stance of value neutrality, too, has not as yet been satisfactorily resolved in this literature, either. And this failure is paradoxical in this particular context, in part because the ostensible chief concern is with "development" or "modernization" as the dependent variable, so that the question of development toward *what* immediately suggests itself. The failure is paradoxical also because these scholars have coined bold new concepts on the independent side of the ledger, and some have written extensively about concepts as far removed from realms of observation as "political culture" and "political identity."[18] Yet a concept such as "human need" has not been touched, and discussions of key terms like "political development" or "modernization" have been hampered, it would seem, by an unwillingness to question whether democratic ways or what kinds of democratic ways are most conductive to satisfying human needs.[19]

In the most extensive recent discussion of these concepts La Palombara begins well with a warning that what many scholars appear to have in mind "when they speak of a modern or developed system is one that approximates the institutional and structural configuration that we associate with the Anglo-American (in any event, the Western) democratic systems" (p. 10). He calls this conceptualization culture-bound; yet in the same and the following chapter he goes to considerable lengths himself in arguing for the use of the same kinds of culture-bound criteria to evaluate development or modernity abroad. While he contributes a useful discussion of different dimensions along which political change can be measured, he never inquires whether in other countries there might be other criteria of development of equal or greater significance than his own essentially Anglo-Saxon criteria. "One of the great dilemmas of many of the developing countries," he writes, "is that they seem to want economic development more than freedom" (p. 41), and the last term he takes as a matter of course to refer to pluralist institutions. "Why should it not be possible to raise a belief in and desire for democracy to the same level?" (p. 58). And in conclusion La Palombara asserts that we Americans must expand our efforts to export not only technical know-how "but our political ideology and reasonable facsimiles of our political institutions and practices as well." Without such an effort, he adds, he is reasonably confident that "the probability of attaining democratic configuration in most of the newer states is very low indeed" (pp. 60–61).

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[16] Some of the milestones in this literature are Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 18 (1956), pp. 391–409; Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1960); Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963).

[17] For contrast, consider this statement on the ways of other behavioralists: "The focus of the political behaviorist, however, does not seem to be a result of the state of political theory. Elections have been intensively studied because they lend themselves to the methodology of empirical research into politics." Morris Janowitz, Deil Wright, and William Delany, *Public Administration and the Public—Perspectives Toward Government in a Metropolitan Community* (Ann Arbor, Bureau of Government, University of Michigan, 1958), p. 2.

[18] *Cf.* Almond and Verba, *op. cit.*, and Lucian W. Pye, *Politics, Personality, and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1962).

[19] Concepts of modernization or development are discussed by James S. Coleman in Almond and Coleman, eds., *op. cit.*, pp. 532–36; by Lucian W. Pye, ed., *Communication and Political Development* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 14–20; and by Joseph La Palombara in his (ed.) *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton University Press, 1963), chs. 1 and 2.

The main difficulty with this reasoning is that men are motivated, also politically, by their immediate needs and wants, and not by foreign orthodoxies. La Palombara speculates "whether it would not be possible to manipulate demands so that goals of political development enjoy a status equal to that of economic change" (p. 30), and suggests the encouragement of private as against collectively oriented enterprise for this end. The answer is surely a flat no: it is *not* possible, in most countries in which most people are economically underprivileged, to create a broad popular interest in pluralist democratic institutions. "Acceptance of the norms of democracy requires a high level of sophistication and ego security," writes Lipset, on the basis of a variety of loosely connected empirical data.[20] An active concern for the public welfare presupposes a liberation both from anxiety neuroses and from realistic fears concerning one's own and one's family's physical sustenance, welfare and security. To put it more succinctly, needs for food and safety take precedence over political interest; no amount of political manipulation could be expected to alter such priorities.

To be sure, individuals can be lured into "the game of politics" as advantageous careers under the right circumstances; but is this the kind of political development that the West should desire? If budding western-democracy-type pluralist institutions turn out to benefit only the middle and upper classes—as in many Latin American countries—then we should not be surprised if idealistic students and others with a passion for social justice, or for politics as distinct from pseudopolitics, may become disposed to reject the forms of pluralist democracy altogether.[21]

Nevertheless, the trend among political behavioralists, including students of comparative politics, appears to be toward a clean break not only with Plato's concern with justice as something above democracy, for the true philosopher; also, it seems that the classical conception of democracy as a system of rational deliberation for settling issues of justice and welfare is on its way out, *even as a political ideal.* Reference has been made to the *ad hoc* attempts of Berelson *et al.* to bring the norms of democracy in better accord with the facts of what I have termed pseudopolitical behavior. In *The Civic Culture* Almond and Verba present and discuss a variety of usefully differentiated survey data collected in five countries (United States, Britain, West Germany, Italy and Mexico). "What we have done in this book," they conclude, "is to spell out methodically the mixture of attitudes that support a democratic system. If it can create a more sober and informed appreciation of the nature and complexity of the problems of democratization, it will have served its purpose."[22] But what kind of democracy? The theoretical point of departure is neither in a conception of human needs nor in the classical theories of democracy, but in such literature as has been discussed above—notably Dahl's *Preface to Democratic Theory* and the last chapter in Berelson's *Voting.* In fact, Almond and Verba emphatically reject the classical "rationality-activist" ideal of democratic citizenship in favor of a more balanced "parochial-subject-participant" orientation; in a healthy, stable democracy as they conceive it (and American political culture comes close even though it does not quite embody this ideal), "the democratic citizen is called on to pursue contradictory goals; he must be active, yet passive; involved, yet not too involved; influential, yet deferential."[23]

Perhaps so, if the ultimate goal is democratic stability. And there is no denying, from my normative position, that democratic stability is valuable, and that many nations ought to have more of it. But is it the most important goal for political development; is it the goal that should serve as the basis for evaluating all other goals (whether wholly, in terms of instrumentality, or partially, in terms of compatibility)? Should we not instead hold, in Eulau's phrase, that "The Goal is Man?"

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[20] *Political Man, op. cit.,* p. 115 and ch. 4.

[21] Fidel Castro's wide following in Latin America can be plausibly explained in these terms.

[22] *Op. cit.,* p. 505 and ch. 15.

[23] *Ibid.,* pp. 478–79 and 440–41.

V

In the study of political behavior, "analysis must start from somewhere, and the existing set of rules and institutions is the only place from which it is possible to start," according to Buchanan. Students of comparative politics have nevertheless demonstrated the feasibility of analysing political developments in some countries in terms of valuable outcomes achieved in others.[24] It remains to be shown that political behavior and institutions can be analysed also in terms of normative assumptions to the effect that the purpose of politics is to meet human needs and facilitate human development.

Contrary to an apparently prevailing assumption among political behavioralists, psychological phenomena are just as *real* as economic and voting behavior phenomena, even though admittedly less accessible to observation and measurement. Some more of the same conceptual boldness displayed in the recent literature on comparative politics is required if political inquiry is to become related to important human wants and needs. For one thing, we need to distinguish more clearly between pseudo-political and more strictly political behavior, if we want to learn how to encourage the latter at the expense of the former.[25]

A major conceptual and theoretical task is to develop a satisfactory theory of human needs and of the relationships between needs and *wants*—here referring to perceived or felt needs. Wants (or, synonymously, desires) and demands can be observed and measured by way of asking people or observing their behavior. Needs, on the other hand, can only be inferred from their hypothetical consequences for behavior or, more manifestly, from the actual consequences of their frustration. Whenever superficial wants are fulfilled but underlying needs remain frustrated, pathological behavior is likely to ensue.

Prior to the development of a viable theory of political development is at least a beginning toward a theory of individual human development. Such a beginning exists in psychological literature, but it has so far been inadequately drawn on by students of political behavior. Let me very briefly suggest the direction of this theorizing, and some of its implications for the study of political behavior.

Basic human needs are characteristics of the human organism, and they are presumably less subject to change than the social or even the physical conditions under which men live. Wants are sometimes manifestations of real needs, but, as Plato and many other wise men since have insisted, we cannot always infer the existence of needs from wants. Wants are often artificially induced by outside manipulation, or they may be neurotically based desires whose satisfaction fails to satisfy needs, or both. Emphasis on a civic-culture type of democracy as the goal for political development may well perpetuate a state of affairs in which human needs as seen by the political-minded (in my strict sense of "political") will remain in the shadow of much-advertised human wants as promoted by pseudo-politicians and other enterprisers whose horizons do not extend beyond their own occupational or career interests and status anxieties.[26]

I say *may*, for I am raising a question rather than adopting a position. In order to investigate the relationship between needs and wants as they pertain to political functions we must start out with a tentative conception of priorities among human needs. The best available point of departure, in my opinion, is in A. H. Maslow's theory of a hierarchy of human needs; this theorizing ought to be drawn on until a more plausible and useful theory becomes available.

Maslow lists five categories of needs in the order of their assumed priority: (1) physical needs (air, water, food, etc.); (2) safety needs (assurance of survival and of continuing satisfaction of basic needs); (3) needs to love and be loved; (4) need for esteem (by self and others); and (5) need for self-actualization and growth. This list presents a hierarchy, according to Maslow, in the sense that the "less prepotent needs are minimized, even forgotten or denied. But when a need is fairly well satisfied, the next prepotent ('higher') need emerges, in turn to dominate the conscious life and to serve as the center of organization of behavior, since gratified needs are not active motivators."[27] Note, however, that whenever in the course of a human life the "higher" needs have become activated, they are not necessarily extinguished as a result of later deprivation of "lower" or more basic needs. For example, some individuals, provided they have once known physical safety, will unhesitatingly sacrifice all of it for love, or for standards of right conduct tied in with their self-esteem, etc.

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[24] See especially Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, *The Political Modernization of Japan and Turkey* (Princeton University Press, 1964).

[25] However, we should not assume without inquiry that *all* pseudopolitical behavior is dysfunctional for all high-priority human wants and needs; not, of course, that all varieties of political behavior are to be preferred to pseudopolitical self-seeking or neurotic striving.

[26] Joseph Tussman also stresses the danger of destroying the integrity of political communication when the modern bargaining approach to politics enters the "forum or tribunal" that a democratic electorate ought to constitute, according to classical theories of democracy. "We teach men to compete and bargain. Are we to be surprised, then, at the corruption of the tribunal into its marketplace parody?" *Obligation and the Body Politic* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 109 and pp. 104–21.

In a recent volume, James C. Davies has suggested the utility of Maslow's theory as a generator of propositions regarding political behavior, and he illustrates the plausibility (without demonstrating the validity) of such propositions with a wealth of historical and contemporary political behavior data. For example, according to Davies's theorizing it is impractical to suggest, with La Palombara, that it might be "possible to manipulate demands" in economically underdeveloped countries so that widespread loyalties to democratic institutions could emerge: "Long before there can be responsible or irresponsible popular government, long before the question of dictatorship or democracy can be taken up, the problem of survival must be solved so that a political community itself can develop, so that people can direct some of their attention to politics."[28] In another context he says, "Propaganda cannot paint a picture which conflicts with reality as it is seen by individuals in the light of their basic needs" (p. 134); the picture can be painted all right, but it will be a wasted effort. And Davies quotes Kwame Nkrumah, whose implicit rejoinder to La Palombara's argument is hard to improve on: "We cannot tell our peoples that material benefits in growth and modern progress are not for them. If we do, they will throw us out and seek other leaders who promise more . . . We have to modernize. Either we shall do so with the interest and support of the West or we shall be compelled to turn elsewhere. This is not a warning or a threat, but a straight statement of political reality" (p. 135).

One shortcoming in Davies's as well as Maslow's work, in my judgment, is that both authors seek to relate events and behavior directly to the elusive concept of "need," without the use of an intermediate and more manageable concept such as "want." Both concepts are badly needed, and their interrelations and their application in hypotheses must be developed if we want to move toward a more adequate knowledge of political behavior. It must be granted that manifest wants are important aspects of our political reality, especially in democracies; what matters is that we also keep remembering, unlike many behavioralists, that there also are genuine needs to worry about, elusive though they may be to the researcher's conventional tools. The volume of competing loudspeakers, if I may use a metaphor, is in a pluralist democracy perhaps more likely to depend on the power of the purse than on the urgency of the need. Even the most democratic governments are likely to come to a bad end—to say nothing of the individuals living under them—unless they learn to become at least as responsive to the basic needs of all their citizens as they are to the most insistent wants of the various articulate and influential interest groups and parties.

Most of Maslow's as well as Davies's discussion is highly speculative; only a beginning has been made. But their theory does lend itself to the production of testable hypotheses. For example, Almond's theory of political "input functions" (political socialization and recruitment; interest articulation; interest aggregation; political communication) and "output functions" (rule making; rule application; rule adjudication),[29] would seem to provide a fertile field for exploring what the participation in or other ego-involvement with each type of function can mean, in satisfying individual personality needs as well as wants. Moving in this direction we can perhaps get away from the customary *clichés* about the value of democracy, toward research-based knowledge on what (aspects of) democratic institutions have what kinds of value for human development.

I have argued elsewhere that the human goals of politics should be conceived in terms of maximizing individual freedom—psychological, social and potential.[30] Democracy and indeed every law and constitutional clause should be judged as a means to this end. A comprehensive treatment of norms of liberty with interrelationships and empirical consequences is necessary for this purpose, and so is a theory of human needs such as Maslow's, which in effect predicts that with increasing satisfaction of sustenance and security needs men's tendency will be to become less anti-social, more capable of respecting and eventually perhaps insisting on respect for the basic needs and liberties of others.

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[27] Abraham H. Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation," *Psychological Review*, Vol. 50 (1943), p. 394 and pp. 370–96. See also his *Motivation and Personality* (New York, 1954).

[28] *Human Nature in Politics* (New York, 1963), p. 28. Davies does not refer to La Palombara.

[29] *Cf.* his introduction to Almond and Coleman, eds., *op. cit.*

[30] *The Structure of Freedom* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1958, and New York, 1965).

The normative research[31] to be recommended can be done with far more precision than was attempted or achieved in the work on freedom just referred to. Perhaps philosophers working with political scientists can be expected to be active on this research frontier in future years. One good example of normative research of this kind, even though its reference to empirical data is for purposes of normative interpretation only, is Naess's study of Gandhi's ethics of conflict resolution.[32]

The burden of this paper, then, is to plead for an expansion and a more systematic articulation of the psychological and the normative perspectives of political behavior research. I propose as a normative basis the proposition that politics exists for the purpose of progressively removing the most stultifying obstacles to a free human development, with priority for the worst obstacles, whether they hit many or few—in other words, with priority for those individuals who are most severely oppressed; as Harrington points out with respect to the poverty-stricken in the United States, they are also the least articulate, and the least likely to achieve redress by way of the ordinary democratic processes.[33] It is argued in this paper that the current preoccupation with pseudopolitical behavior carries conservative and anti-political implications, and that the best hope for a more politically useful reorientation of behavioral research—in addition to and beyond the comparative politics perspective—is to study how the various functions of government bear, and could bear, on the satisfaction of basic needs as well as conscious wants.

Among the questions to ask are these: What kinds of enduring satisfactions tend to be associated, for example, with particular participant and subject roles established by alternate forms of centralized or decentralized decision processes? Under what socio-cultural and socio-economic circumstances are majoritarian decision processes, of given types, likely to produce substantive satisfaction of the basic needs of, in Harrington's phrase, society's "rejects"?

As so often in our human condition, the dimensions of our ignorance appear to grow larger the closer we come to the most enduringly important issues of our social life. Much conceptual as well as basic psychological work remains to be done before our technical proficiency in the study of the relation of political forms to basic needs and to liberty can come to match the current work on analysis of voting patterns. But in this work political scientists should participate; our stakes in its progress are as high as anyone else's.

One particular type of research that should be pushed, as a much needed complement to the large supply of data on pseudopolitical behavior, is work that would focus on just how some citizens "graduate" from the role of pseudopolitical actor to that of political actor. Or, more accurately—for surely there are more pseudopolitical actors in the older age groups, "hardened in the school of life"—how it is that some categories of individuals (or individuals in some categories of situations) manage to remain concerned with ideals and with politics, *i.e.*, with the welfare of their fellow men, all their lives?

A theory of human development is implied in the research approaches here recommended. It asserts that man is likely to become increasingly capable of being rational, or intellectual,[34] to the extent that he no longer needs the services of his beliefs and attitudes for the purpose of keeping his various anxieties in check. Deep-seated neurotic anxieties about one's worth as a human being predispose to right-wing or occasionally leftwing extremism, with glorification of ingroups or individuals, living or dead, along with hatreds against outgroups and deviants. Neurotic status anxieties predispose to eager adherence to whatever views appear expected in one's reference groups. Realistic fears about employment or future career prospects predispose against maintaining the luxury of political opinions at all, unless they are "safe." Only for individuals whose main anxiety problems have been faced and in some way resolved is it generally possible to think of and care about problems of politics in terms of standards of justice or the public interest, independently of personal worries.

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[31] The term "normative research" may be puzzling to some, who think of research exclusively as systematically re(peated) search for empirical data, in the real world or in contrived experimental worlds. And "research" has been one of the empirical social scientist's proud banners in his uphill fight against the sometime supremacy of armchair speculators. In our time a less parochial use of "research" is called for, as a way of recognizing the close interplay between the empirical, normative and logical aspects of inquiry that, as the present paper argues, is necessary for the further development of our knowledge of political as of other human behavior.

[32] Arne Naess, "A systematization of Gandhian ethics of conflict resolution," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 2 (1958), pp. 140–55; and also Johan Galtung and Arne Naess, *Gandhis politiske etikk* (Oslo, Tanum, 1955).

[33] Michael Harrington, *The Other America: Poverty in the United States* (Baltimore, Penguin Books, 1963; New York, 1962).

[34] *Cf.* my "A Social Theory of Intellectual Development," in Nevitt Sanford, ed., *The American College* (New York, 1961), pp. 972–1005, esp. pp. 978 and 1000–1005.

The development of strictly political incentives in the individual, then, depends on a gradual process of liberation from a preoccupation with personal anxieties and worries. Stages in this process can be identified by research, although our concepts and instruments need some improvement before we can with confidence relate specific categories of political irrationality to (repressed or acknowledged) anxieties associated with specific levels in a hierarchy of human needs. Human nature being complex, so is the task of fully comprehending the dynamics of political behavior. My essential argument here is that we must face up to but not complacently accept, as the pseudopolitical outlook does, the fact that most of our citizens live too harassed lives or lack the education or opportunities for reflection to permit them the real satisfactions and the full dignity of democratic citizenship. We must pose the empirical problem of how the more stultifying pressures on adults and pre-adults can be reduced. A premature ruling out of the classic democratic citizenship ideal, with its stress on reason as a crucial factor in politics, would seem particularly inappropriate in our age of rapid technological change; never was the need for politics in the strict sense greater.

It is conceivable that our prospects for developing much larger proportions of political-minded citizens will improve substantially if or when the "cybernetics revolution" does away with our omnipresent worries about making a living.[35] On the other hand, unless educational and cultural resources can be expanded as rapidly, so that more people may be enabled to base their sense of identity and self-esteem on their own attributes or ideals rather than on their occupational roles, status anxieties and despair about lack of purpose in life might remain at present levels, and become aggravated for some. But the over-all prospects surely would be brighter, to the extent that more of the principal *real* worries on which our current anxieties feed were removed.

In any event, let us not as political scientists rule out the possibility that a real *polity* may emerge eventually—a community of people capable of giving some of their energies to political as distinct from pseudopolitical reflection and activity. A less utopian first step that may be hoped for is that many more political scientists will adopt a more political (or a less pseudopolitical) perspective in their theorizing and research. As the horizons of behavior research expand to encompass latent need-behavior as well as manifest want-behavior, our political science will not only produce a new order of intellectual challenge; it may also become a potent instrument for promoting political development in the service of human development.

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[35] W. H. Ferry and 25 associates have recently issued a statement that received front-page attention in the *New York Times* and other newspapers, under the title "The Triple Revolution: An Appraisal of the Major U. S. Crises and Proposals for Action" (Washington: Maurer, Fleischer, Zon and Associates, 1120 Connecticut Ave., 1964). Referring to the revolutions in cybernetics, in weaponry, and in human rights, but particularly to the first of the three, Ferry *et al.* argue that there "is an urgent need for a fundamental change in the mechanisms employed to insure consumer rights" (p. 9), now that the problem of production has been solved and the problem of full employment has become impossible to solve with our present system. "We urge, therefore, that society, through its appropriate legal and governmental institutions, undertake an unqualified commitment to provide every individual and every family with an adequate income as a matter of right. This undertaking we consider to be essential to the emerging economic, social, and political order in this country" (p. 16).

CONDITIONS FOR PARTY LEADERSHIP: THE CASE OF THE HOUSE DEMOCRATS

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Political power in Congress, all observers agree, is highly decentralized. The factors chiefly responsible for this are also well known: weak national parties (in the Congress this results in strong constituency ties and weak leadership sanctions over members) and a highly developed division of labor through the committee system. A leadership endowed with few opportunities to punish and reward, coupled with specialization by policy area, inevitably produces an institution with numerous and disparate centers of power. Just as inevitably the politics of such an institution is compounded of persuasion, bargaining, and logrolling.[1]

As weak as the legislative parties are, however, they still provide the major organizing force in Congress. Roll-call vote analyses have demonstrated this,[2] and a recent study of the House Whip organizations also bears it out.[3] Generally speaking, the single most important variable explaining legislative outcomes is party organization.

The extent of party leadership on the thousands of bills and resolutions which come before Congress each year, nevertheless, is itself variable. Julius Turner has provided us with documentation of this point for the inter-war years.[4] We still sense this variability in leadership control over issues when contrasting the legislative process surrounding such bills as civil rights and poverty.

An appropriate question to ask, therefore, and one heretofore left mostly unanswered, is: under what conditions is party leadership likely to be relatively strong, or relatively weak? Turner has taught us a part of the answer: party control is likely to vary with issues. Class issues generate the sharpest differences between the parties; moral and "neutral" (in the sense of not redistributing wealth) issues cut across them. But the nature of the issue is only part of the story. Even within certain classes of issues party control is likely to vary from one specific issue to the next. Even on the same issue, leadership control is likely to vary from stage to stage in the legislative process. To these considerations this paper is addressed.

BACKGROUND FOR THE STUDY

The data which will be brought to bear upon the question of variability of party leadership control will be a mixture of objective measures (such as roll-call votes) and more casual empiricism. All the data, however, will refer to the Democrats in the United States House of Representatives when in the majority and with a Democratic President.

The identity of the leaders in the House is for the most part institutionally established. Among House Democrats the Speaker, Majority Leader, and, to a lesser extent, the Whip are undeniably leaders in virtually all that goes on legislatively in the House. On specific pieces of legislation relevant committee and subcommittee chairmen and senior members of committees and subcommittees may also become leaders.

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* This is, in every sense, a joint endeavor. Both authors served as interns in the Office of the House Democratic Whip at different times during the 88th Congress, and thereby had access to the House floor. Lewis A. Froman, Jr., wishes to thank the Congressional Fellowship Program of the American Political Science Association and the Graduate Research Committee of the University of Wisconsin for making a year in Washington possible. The authors jointly wish to thank Robert Peabody, Raymond Wolfinger, Leroy Rieselbach, Charles Jones, Theodore Lowi, Nelson Polsby and Richard Fenno for criticisms of an earlier draft. The findings and conclusions are those of the authors and do not purport to represent the views of the Brookings Institution, its trustees, officers, or other staff members.

[1] See Ralph K. Huitt, "Democratic Party Leadership in the Senate," this REVIEW, Vol. 55 (June, 1961), pp. 333–344, and Lewis A. Froman, Jr., *People and Politics: An Analysis of the American Political System* (Englewood Cliffs, 1962), ch. 6.

[2] Julius Turner, *Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress* (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1951); Duncan MacRae, Jr., *Dimensions of Congressional Voting* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1958), I, 203–390; David B. Truman, *The Congressional Party* (New York, 1959), and Lewis A. Froman, Jr., *Congressmen and Their Constituencies* (Chicago, Rand McNally, 1963).

[3] Randall B. Ripley, "The Party Whip Organizations in the United States House of Representatives," this REVIEW, Vol. 58 (September, 1964), pp. 561–576.

[4] Turner, *op. cit.*, pp. 14–15, 69–70.

Conditions are sets of circumstances of two major types: those which promote and those which hinder outcomes desired by the House Democratic leaders. Six conditions have been selected for analysis. A few obvious ones, however, were purposely excluded. One is the relationship of committee chairmen to the leadership. Another is the character and personality of the leaders themselves. Most students of Congress would argue, for example, that even though any set of leaders operates within rather definite institutional boundaries, it makes a difference in legislative outcomes whether there is a forceful and dynamic personality (such as Lyndon Johnson) at the helm, or a more mild, less aggressive personality (such as Mike Mansfield). One of the differences in styles, for example, seems to be that Mansfield has an uncanny knack of cooperating with the enemy and being firm and unyielding with his friends. Hence, when trouble is brewing in the Senate it is often between Mansfield and those with whose position he is usually sympathetic. Lyndon Johnson's style, on the other hand, was to be cooperative when it paid to be cooperative, and firm when it paid to be firm, regarding almost everyone as antagonists (and hence almost everyone as friends).

The conditions we will discuss, then, will not be exhaustive. But they are important and help to provide a picture of the institutional restraints under which leaders operate. Although the conditions are not, themselves, entirely outside the control of the leaders, they are, for the most part, "givens" in the political system of Congress. This paper is an exploration of the limits on leadership in the majority party in the House of Representatives.

FIRST CONDITION: LEADERSHIP COMMITMENT, KNOWLEDGE, AND ACTIVITY

First, success in leadership is likely to vary with the extent to which the leaders themselves are in agreement. It is a rare occasion when the Speaker, Majority Leader, and Whip are not one-hundred percent behind a presidential program,[6] but it happens more often that an important committee member, even the chairman, does not support the President's request. A number of instances come to mind. It was long and widely felt, for example, that until Wilbur Mills, chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, supported some version of the President's medicare bill, no program of the type the President sought would be enacted. So influential is Mills in his own committee that he was able effectively to shunt aside this top-priority program until after the 1964 election returns transformed the situation. Otto Passman provides another example. A consistent opponent of foreign aid legislation, this chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee handling funds for that purpose succeeded in cutting the Administration's program drastically, until early 1964 when he encountered a new full committee chairman who was more sympathetic with the President's wishes. We can say, then, that the more united the leadership behind a program, the greater the likelihood the program will win.

Beyond this rather obvious point, however, leadership commitment is crucial in other ways. Leaders, like other members, have a limited number of resources which they can devote to any given bill. In the 88th Congress two of the most complete commitments were made on the cotton bill in December, 1963, and on the wheat-cotton bill in April, 1964. On these bills the leaders worked long and hard and won narrow victories both times. We may contrast with these the role of the leadership in the defeat suffered by the Administration in March, 1964, on a bill to authorize a United States contribution to the International Development Association. The bill was scheduled in a haphazard fashion at the last minute. No whip poll was started until it was too late to be useful. The Treasury, a partner in this venture with AID, was not even brought in to help lobby for the bill. These factors, along with the unpopularity of the chairman of the committee from which the bill came, helped defeat it. The latter element, however, was not decisive, as was shown two months later when the same bill was brought up again and passed by a comfortable margin, after a careful whip poll and considerably more work by the leadership. We can say, then, that the greater the leadership's commitment of its scarce resources, the greater the chances of success.

Even when the leadership is fully committed to a bill, however, there are limits on what it can do. This problem can be explored in part by reference to data stemming from the polls conducted by the Office of the Democratic Whip in the House. The bills on which these polls are conducted represent nearly all of the legislation on which the leadership is fully committed.[6] The polls sought to ascertain how every Democrat would cast his vote on the pending legislation.[7]

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[6] See, for example, the stir caused when Hale Boggs, the Democratic Whip, attacked one title of the 1964 Civil Rights Bill during floor debate. *Cong. Rec.*, vol. 110, no. 23 (daily ed.), Feb. 7, 1964, pp. 2406–2408.

An effective limit on the results which the leadership can produce even when fully committed is the pattern of reliability among the membership as revealed by the whip polls. This determines, in part, the knowledge of the leaders about the members. That is, if the members report honestly through the whip organization then the leadership can quickly identify weak spots and concentrate their persuasive efforts on those spots. On the other hand, if reporting is not accurate, a good deal of effort can be wasted on members who are either hopelessly lost or already won. An analysis of the 1963 whip polls, compared with the final roll-calls on the issues on which the polls had been taken, offers some evidence on patterns of reliability among House Democrats.

Ten polls were taken during 1963.[8] The leadership won nine of the roll-calls that followed, losing only on the Area Redevelopment Act amendments in June. On each of these ten votes the Democratic Whip's Office attempted to ascertain how 256 Democratic members (excluding the Speaker) would vote. The Whip's Office was successful 90.5 percent of the time in ascertaining exactly whether a member would be present and, if so, how he would vote. In 242 cases, 9.5 percent of all votes, the Whip's Office did not have the correct information on the individual's behavior before he actually voted. These 242 cases deserve further analysis, for clues to patterns of reliability.

The leadership in 1963 always knew how 123 Democrats would vote. One hundred thirty-three (52 percent) of the Democratic members surprised the leadership one or more times.[9] Table I shows the distribution of these surprises.

TABLE I. FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSE DEMOCRATIC VOTING CONTRARY TO WHIP POLL REPORT AND LEADERSHIP EXPECTATIONS ON 10 ISSUES, 1963

Number of times voting contrary to report	Number of members
6	2
5	1
4	7
3	19
2	36
1	68
0	123
	256*

* Total Democratic membership, except the Speaker.

Who were more reliable and who were less? Table II shows the average Presidential Support and Presidential Opposition Scores of the members, according to their degrees of reliability, as well as their Leadership Support and Leadership Opposition Scores.[10]

Evidently, members who were reported inaccurately two times or more exhibited little difference in average support and opposition scores. Those inaccurately reported only once were considerably more consistent in their party support and those who were never re-

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[6] The exceptions include bills that are complex and subject to numerous amendments—like foreign aid authorization and appropriation bills. In these cases it is difficult to frame a question for polling. Another exception was the civil rights bill in February, 1964. This was a complex issue, subject to many amendments, and it was impossible to forecast how the bill would be amended. Furthermore, unlike all of the other issues polled in the 87th and 88th Congresses, this bill could not be won by Democratic votes alone. Republican votes were absolutely indispensable.

[7] See Ripley, *op. cit.*, for a discussion of the role of the polling process in the work of the Democratic Whip organization.

[8] Members were polled on the following issues: (1) the permanent enlargement of the Rules Committee, (2) an amendment adding $450 million to the public works program, (3) a recommittal motion deleting student loan provisions from a Health Professions Assistance Bill, (4) final passage of the Feed Grains Bill, (5) final passage of an increase in the amount of the national debt limit, (6) final passage of a bill giving more money to the Area Redevelopment program, (7) final passage of an extension in time of the debt limit, (8) a recommittal motion on the tax bill tying it to a cut in governmental spending, (9) final passage of another increase in the amount of the debt limit, and (10) final passage of the cotton bill.

[9] "Surprises" can come for a number of reasons, including faulty work by the Assistant Whips. But the vast majority of these surprises occurred because the individual member had changed his mind, without prior notice.

[10] The first index is that used by *Congressional Quarterly*. The second is of our own devising and is based on pro-leadership votes on the ten issues which were the subject of whip polls in 1963.

TABLE II. PRESIDENTIAL AND LEADERSHIP SUPPORT AND OPPOSITION SCORES FOR HOUSE DEMOCRATS BY CATEGORY OF RELIABILITY ON 10 WHIP POLLS, 1963

Number of times reported inaccurately on whip poll	Pres. Support score	Pres. Opposition score	Leadership Support score	Leadership Opposition score
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
6	59.0	36.5	65.0	35.0
5	63.0	31.0	70.0	30.0
4	59.1	26.0	58.6	32.9
3	53.8	29.5	50.5	35.8
2	57.8	26.3	58.3	31.1
1	71.3	15.2	75.7	17.1
0	82.2	5.1	94.4	1.8
Average	72	14	80	14

ported inaccurately were the most loyal of all.

Table III shows the regional breakdown by category of reliability. Southern Democrats were over-represented increasingly in categories containing larger numbers of inaccurate reports. Except for the few members in the most unreliable categories, Western Democrats were represented roughly in accordance with their numbers in all of the other categories. Northern Democrats were relatively under-represented in all categories except the one reflecting complete accuracy and reliability.[11]

TABLE III. REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSE DEMOCRATS BY CATEGORY OF RELIABILITY ON 10 WHIP POLLS, 1963

Number of times reported inaccurately on whip poll	Per cent of all House Democrats		
	Southern (N=95) 37%	Western (N=59) 23%	Northern (N=102) 40%
	(%)	(%)	(%)
6	100.0	0	0
5	100.0	0	0
4	71.4	14.3	14.3
3	79.0	21.0	0
2	58.4	19.4	22.2
1	44.1	26.5	29.4
0	17.1	22.7	60.2

TABLE IV. DISTRIBUTION OF STRONG HOUSE DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL OPPONENTS BY CATEGORY OF RELIABILITY ON WHIP POLLS, 1963

Number of times reported inaccurately on whip polls	No. of all Democrats	No. of strong opponents	Per cent of strong opponents in category	Av. Pres. opp. score of strong opponents
6	2	2	100.0	36.5
5	1	1	100.0	31.0
4	7	5	71.4	30.2
3	19	13	68.5	38.2
2	36	14	39.0	47.2
1	68	14	20.6	49.5
0	123	2	1.6	26.0

Table IV demonstrates that the members most consistently opposing the leadership were more predictable and were reported more reliably and more accurately than the members who had a moderate record of support and opposition. That is, those most difficult to report prior to an actual vote tended to be ideologically uncommitted members who wavered from vote to vote with their perceptions of how much loyalty to the Democratic program their constituencies would tolerate. Table IV shows the average Presidential Opposition Score of the 51 Democrats (one in five) who in 1963 had an Opposition score higher than 25.[12] The concentration of the most consistent Democratic opponents of the President came in categories of fairly great reliability—especially among those where only one or two mistakes were made.

Perhaps the most important conclusion to be drawn from this table is that the strongest opponents of the leadership can be identified and reported accurately, if the leadership wishes it. The most consistent opponents' reports can be taken at face value, if time is limited and can be devoted to only a few members. Identifying the unreliables is an economical first step for the leadership in efforts to persuade them to vote in the desired direction.

We can say, then, that the activity of leadership is limited by a ten percent unreliability in the whip polls on bills to which the leadership is fully committed, and that the unreliables in 1963 consisted predominantly of uncommitted Southern Democrats.

Once the waverers are known, how successful is the leadership in lining up votes? This question is difficult to answer by more than speculation. Data obtained on four issues in 1963, however, support some tentative conclusions. These data are of two kinds—lists of doubtful Democrats whose support for specific legislation was earnestly solicited by the Speaker and lists of those Democrats who were willing to give the Speaker a pledge to vote with him if he absolutely needed them. The four bills were those enlarging the Rules Committee permanently, in January 1963, and those involving the national debt limit in May, August and November, 1963.[13]

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[11] For our purposes the South includes all the States of the Confederacy; the West includes all States west of the Mississippi River except Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas; the North includes the rest.

[12] This comes from *Congressional Quarterly*. An opposition score of 25% means that the members opposed the President on a quarter of the issues on which the latter took a position.

These data show that the Speaker seriously endeavored to change the votes of about twenty Democrats on each of the roll calls. He received varying answers from them, ranging from flat refusals to all-out promises of support. On each of the debt-limit bills he was successful in getting about eight to ten "pocket" or reserve votes, which he could call upon if absolutely needed. The members he approached were generally from the South or from the Border States, with a few lukewarm Administration supporters from the North included. They were not bitter opponents of the Administration but rather members who wanted to support the Administration when they felt their consciences and their constituencies would allow it. The Speaker did not always approach the same men. Between 35 and 40 percent of those contacted on any one impending vote were also contacted on at least one of the other four votes; or putting it the other way around, the majority on each vote was approached directly by the Speaker only on that one vote of the four.

Nor did the Speaker seem to press the same people too often for "pocket" vote commitments. Only three members gave more than one pocket vote to the Speaker on these four roll calls. These men, two Southerners and one from a border state, were among the most unreliable on the whip polls and had records of somewhat greater than average opposition to the Administration. But, apparently their feelings of party loyalty prompted them to cooperate with the party leadership when possible, or else they hoped for some future favor from the Speaker in exchange.

The polls help to identify waverers, then; and when the leadership so desires it can probably change, at the minimum, ten votes. On the cotton bill in December, 1963, for example—a bill which engendered more than a usual amount of opposition—the Speaker seems to have changed as many as 40 votes in the effort to pass the bill. The cotton bill was the first major piece of legislation to come to the House under President Johnson, and the leadership was exceptionally anxious to win.

SECOND CONDITION: PROCEDURAL VS. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

We have already seen that party cleavages are likely to vary with issues. From the data now to be reported, it appears that party cohesion on roll-call votes depends also on whether the issue is procedural or substantive.

Most votes, of course, involve both procedural and substantive questions. Even a motion to adjourn can sometimes be partly a substantive issue, if the motion is directed at postponing action on a bill. For example, a few months before House consideration of the Civil Rights Bill in 1964 the Republicans attempted to bring the bill up for floor consideration under the procedure of Calendar Wednesday. Carl Albert immediately moved to adjourn, a motion that carried along party lines. This was a procedural motion contaminated by substantive considerations. Only at the extremes are issues either purely procedural or purely and identifiably substantive. Other motions may be viewed as on a continuum between the extremes.

The hypothesis offered here is that the Democratic leadership can count on total cohesion among Democrats in the House on the most procedural issue—the election of the Speaker—and relatively low cohesion on the votes that are most specifically and narrowly substantive—those on conference reports and on specific amendments to legislation. But in between these three categories lie at least four other types of votes which present various "mixes" of substance and procedure.

The first of the four mixed categories we have labeled "miscellaneous procedure." This includes maneuvers by the majority leader, minority leader, leaders of disgruntled blocs, and even unhappy individuals, to stall in order to prevent certain substantive actions from being taken or to affect their timing. Some of these procedural motions result merely from pique.[14] Others can be important in determining the fate of legislation, as the Calendar

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[13] Note that the debt limit bills all came from the Committee on Ways and Means. Chairman Wilbur Mills of this Committee is an unusually powerful and influential House member and helped the Speaker contact the doubtful members. On the Rules Committee issue Majority Leader Albert also helped make some of the contacts.

[14] For example, on April 9, 1964, after the Democratic leadership had kept the House in session until almost 1:00 A.M. the preceding day, the Republicans stalled the House for four hours, using various procedural delays.

Wednesday adjournment example has already suggested. The second of the mixed categories comprises roll calls on rules granted by the Rules Committee for the consideration of legislation. The third category is recommittal motions—procedural motions that are almost wholly substantive in intent. Finally, there are roll calls on final passage.

The data on these seven categories of roll-call votes for the years 1961, 1962 and 1963 are presented in Table V. Similar data for the Republicans are also included for contrast. All roll calls taken during these three sessions are included in this analysis except those on which there were less than ten dissenters. Thus, "hurrah" roll calls on matters involving defense and communism—which are taken merely for the purpose of establishing an almost unanimous record of support—are excluded because they involve no party leadership. These few exclusions leave about 100 roll-call votes per session to be examined for these three years.[15]

Analysis of the data in Table V yields both findings and problems—problems because the rank order of party cohesion varied somewhat from year to year. This in itself, however, is a finding of some consequence. For the House Democrats, for example, we find cohesion on the election of the Speaker and on final passage remaining about constant, while on more nearly procedural questions of the "mixed" varieties (miscellaneous procedure, adoption of rules and conference reports) it was increasing, on recommittal motions decreasing, and on amendments low but somewhat variable. In a *post hoc* fashion we can interpret this to mean that over the course of the first three years of the new Democratic Administration the Democrats were able to increase cohesion on procedural questions.

Generally, however, the data bear out our expectations. Taking the average for the three years, as one moves from procedural to narrowly substantive questions, cohesion decreases. Election of the Speaker, adoption of rules, and miscellaneous procedures are generally the highest in cohesion, with final passage, recommittal motions, conference reports, and amendments following in descending order.

Contrasts with the Republicans are also instructive. Generally speaking, substantive alternatives proposed by the Democrats enlist higher degrees of Democratic cohesion. Thus on adoption of rules, final passage, and conference reports, Democrats obtain higher cohesion than Republicans. On the other hand, on

TABLE V. PARTY COHESION ON ALL CONTESTED HOUSE ROLL CALLS, BY CATEGORY, 1961–1963*

Category	Democrats							
	1961	Rank	1962	Rank	1963	Rank	Average	Rank
	(%)		(%)		(%)		(%)	
Election of Speaker	100.0	1	100.0	1	100.0	1	100.0	1
Rules	83.7	4	90.2	2	94.0	2	90.6	2
Misc. Procedure	81.2	5	83.3	5	89.2	3	84.5	4
Final Passage	84.3	3	85.9	3	85.6	5	85.2	3
Recommittal Motions	86.9	2	85.6	4	80.9	6	84.1	5
Conference Reports	77.2	7	82.2	6	89.2	4	82.6	6
Amendments	77.4	6	73.6	7	79.8	7	76.6	7
	Republicans							
Election of Speaker	100.0	1	100.0	1	100.0	1	100.0	1
Rules	80.0	4	75.7	7	79.0	6	77.9	6
Misc. Procedure	91.8	2	87.2	2	97.6	2	91.9	2
Final Passage	77.9	5	77.1	4	78.8	7	78.0	5
Recommittal Motions	87.7	3	85.4	3	89.9	3	87.8	3
Conference Reports	76.1	6	77.0	5	81.8	5	78.1	4
Amendments	72.5	7	75.9	6	89.0	4	77.7	7

* "Contested roll calls" are those with more than ten dissenting votes. The figures in this table represent the percentage of Democrats and the percentage of Republicans voting alike on the roll calls analyzed.

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[15] In 1961 there were 101 votes to be examined, not counting 15 "hurrah" votes. In 1962 there were 100 to be examined and 24 of the hurrah variety. In 1963 there were 105 to be examined and 14 hurrah votes.

Republican proposals of substantive alternatives to Democratic measures, and on miscellaneous procedures, we find Republicans cohering better than Democrats. Thus on recommittal motions (almost always proposed by Republicans, often with instructions incorporating a different program), and amendments (usually making the bill more "conservative") Republicans have higher rates of cohesion. This can be partly explained very simply, we feel, by looking at which party is leading at the particular time. Rules, final passage, and conference reports are motions of the majority party. Recommittal motions and, to a lesser extent, amendments, are motions of the minority party. Generally we can conclude that defections in either party are more likely to occur on motions sponsored by the opposition. On motions sponsored by their own party, defections are less likely to occur. These results may also be partly explained by a selective bias underlying the cohesion scores in roll calls demanded by the minority. The minority leadership may not press for a record vote on motions it offers or sponsors unless the prospects are good that the minority members will make a respectable showing of cohesion, or that the majority forces will be vulnerable to a split, or both.

Successes by the Democratic leadership, then, vary with the substantive nature of the issue. The more substantive the issue, the harder the leadership must work to be successful.

THIRD CONDITION: VISIBILITY OF THE ISSUE

The effects of party leadership may also vary with the visibility of the specific matter under consideration. In general we hypothesize that as an issue becomes more visible to the general public, the chances decrease that the leadership will have its way with the members of the party. This is grounded on the proposition that the influence of party can be relatively great in the absence of contrary pressures. Most members want to support the party. It is only when party pressures run contrary to other pressures that defections are likely to occur. We would expect other pressures to increase as the visibility of the issue increases.

The major qualification that needs to be made is that the President obviously chooses to make some issues more visible than others by including them in his legislative program. He hopes that public opinion will eventually be mobilized behind these proposals and make Congressional passage easier. Whether an issue is part of the President's program or not is probably the single most important factor in determining visibility. The tax cut, civil rights, poverty, education, and other such major bills are visible because the President makes them visible. We are suggesting, however, that inside the House the popular opinion factor does not generally work to the leadership's advantage. Unless there is an overwhelming national consensus on some important proposal (and this is rare) members of the House tend to be timid about voting for something that is both controversial and highly visible. Thus the difficulty of the leadership's task is increased by greater visibility.

A second important factor in determining visibility of issues, a factor which may be independent of Presidential support, is press coverage. For example, although the proposed prayer amendment and the attempts to restrict the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in apportionment cases were not part of the President's program, nor on the list of things that he talked about, they gained wide currency as important issues, primarily because of their nature, but also because of extended press coverage. It is worth remarking, in this respect, the way in which newspapers attempt to foment conflict. Numerous times during both the prayer amendment hearings and the reapportionment question newspapermen would gather around the important figures (such as Emanuel Celler, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, Judge Howard W. Smith, chairman of the Committee on Rules, and others), and attempt to get them to take positions, state them strongly, and then carry these statements to opposing leaders and so "manufacture" a personal as well as an issue conflict.[16]

Another factor affecting the visibility of an issue is its complexity. Generally speaking, simple issues are more visible than complex ones. One of the strategies, therefore, of those opposed to a bill is to oversimplify the issue, or dramatise a single feature of it that will be understandable to the general public. A good example of this was the recent passage of a pay raise for appointed executive officials, civil servants, judges, congressional staff, and congressmen. Only a very small portion of the pay raise bill involved congressional salaries. Yet press coverage and public understanding of the issue tended to focus on this one item to the exclusion of all others. This tended to make that aspect of the bill quite visible and aided the opponents of a pay raise. Of course, the tactic of oversimplification may on occasion be available to a bill's sponsors, too; but ordinarily they carry the broader burden of explaining and justifying it in all its complexity. It is enough for the opponents to find and exploit one visible objection.

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[16] See Bernard C. Cohen, *The Press and Foreign Policy* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 54–104.

Another good example of a superficially simple and visible issue is that of keeping a limit on the national debt. This issue was voted on five times in 1962, 1963, and 1964, three times in 1963 alone. Although the issue is often characterized as "phony," the Democratic leadership had to labor very hard for passage. Making the issue simple and visible tends to work against the leadership and for the opponents.

The leadership can usually do little to control the visibility of an issue. If it strongly wants a bill, that will automatically make it visible. If the bill is part of the President's program it will by its very nature become visible. The leadership can then attempt to make the issue seem complex. In general, however, increasing the visibility of an issue is a potent weapon in the arsenal of those who oppose the leadership.[17]

FOURTH CONDITION: VISIBILITY OF THE ACTION

House procedures guarantee that every major piece of legislation will pass through numerous stages which vary in their visibility to the voting public, the press, the political leaders at home, and even to other members of the House. The hypothesis here is that the Democratic leadership will ordinarily have a greater chance of convincing the "followership" to act in the desired manner on matters that require less visible rather than more visible actions.

The rationale for this hypothesis is similar to the preceding one. Generally speaking, party loyalty is a strong bond. Members prefer, when possible, to go along with the party rather than court the disapproval of leadership. This is not simply a reward and punishment mechanism, primarily because the leadership has few rewards and punishments. It is also a state of mind. To invoke loyalty to the party is a strong sanction in itself.

Although party loyalty is a strong bond, in any given situation it is not necessarily the strongest. For most Southerners, for example, to vote for the civil rights bill is courting disaster at home. However, during the Judiciary Committee's deliberations on the civil rights bill in 1963 one Southerner found himself able to vote with the party leadership in committee at a crucial stage, although he later opposed the bill on the floor. What we are suggesting here is that party loyalty will vary with the visibility of the action which the party leadership expects.

The types of action about which the leaders might make specific requests are numerous. The most visible type of action is voting. But the only fully visible kind of voting is roll-call voting on final passage of measures. Roll calls on most recommittal motions are somewhat less visible because the electorate, at least, is likely to have difficulty in understanding what is involved in such a vote. Roll-calls on specific amendments and on procedural questions usually attract much less attention, being interim moves. The other types of voting (usually in Committee of the Whole)—teller, division, and voice—are still less visible. The possible options for a member who does not wish to vote at all—giving a live pair, giving a regular pair on a legislative question, or purposely absenting himself with no indication of position, as well as promising the Speaker to change a vote if needed—have very low degrees of visibility. Voting in Committee, which often goes unreported, is another largely invisible activity open to leadership requests. Finally, speaking and not speaking on the floor, as well as the general line of argument to be taken there, are less visible activities subject to the requests of the leadership.

The Democratic leaders have to worry most consistently about losing substantial numbers of Democrats on the roll-call votes on recommittal motions and final passage of fairly major pieces of legislation. The reason why recommittal motions may rank relatively high in visibility is that they often carry instructions to the Committtee to report back immediately a lesser bill. Conservative Democrats can thereby get credit for voting for legislation, but for a more modest program than desired by the leadership. Occasionally, the recommittal vote will become the most important House vote on a bill. The two most recent notable examples came in 1962 on the Republican motion to recommit the Trade Expansion bill with instructions simply to continue the existing reciprocal trade program for another year, and in 1963 on the Republican motion to recommit the tax bill and tie the $11 billion tax cut to reduced governmental spending.[18]

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[17] For a similar point, see E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People* (New York, 1960), ch. 1.

[18] The votes on both recommittal motions were substantially closer than on final passage, although the Democratic leadership position was successful on all four roll calls.

On some important votes Democratic leaders can count on a higher level of party support on the recommittal motion than on final passage. This was true, for example, of the 1964 votes on the poverty program. Even members unwilling to vote for final passage will try to retain the good will of the leadership on some recommittal motions.

Division and voice voting, because they happen so quickly, and because few members may be on the floor, or know the nature of the choice being made, are very often simply party votes. Many members scurry from the cloakrooms to the floor to vote in support of their party's side, as defined at the moment by the majority and minority floor managers from the substantive committee in charge of the bill. In informal discussions on the floor overheard by both authors, all that many members wanted to know was the position which the floor manager (usually the committee or subcommittee chairman) was taking.

Teller voting, because it takes longer (and makes it easier therefore to identify members as they queue up to vote), and because members are notified by the bell system, is subject to more strenuous efforts by the leadership to keep members in line. More members are likely to vote on teller votes, and a surprisingly large number of reversals of voice and division votes occurs because the leadership has the time to call members to the floor. These exertions are rewarded by a substantial amount of party unity on most teller votes even by members who, if forced to a roll call, would vote against the Democratic leadership.

In August, 1963, the leadership lost two relatively important teller votes on the foreign aid authorization bill. Rather than risk a rout, the leadership adjourned the House and worked much of the evening and next morning in making sure that sufficient numbers of Democrats willing to vote with the leadership would be present for the resumption of the amending process. The leadership also persuaded many Southern members who did not like the aid programs at least to avoid voting on the teller votes.[19] Similarly, on the Food Surplus bill in August, 1964, the House actually reversed itself on a number of teller votes after an intervening day in which a highly influential member was requested to, and did, change his vote. Again, in early April, 1964, the Democratic leadership held a solid party front against Republican efforts to amend by tellers a bill establishing a permanent food-stamp plan. Even when the Republicans attempted to inject the race question into the amending process the Southerners held firm. They could act with the party if they so chose because their votes would not be known at home.[20]

At times the teller votes of specific members can serve as the cues for the voting of other members. In April, 1963, for example, when the Republicans tried to insert a "Powell-type amendment" requiring non-discrimination as a prerequisite for participating in a program of loans and grants for medical and dental education, the Democratic leaders were successful in getting four of the five Negro Democrats in the House (all except Powell) to vote against the amendment on a teller vote. This made it much easier to keep other Northern, liberal Democrats with the leadership.

The success of the leadership in getting members purposely to absent themselves from the House floor varies with visibility of the action. It is rare when more than two or three Democrats can be persuaded deliberately to miss a final roll call. (Although it did happen, for example, on the second pay bill in 1964—in this case a whole committee, made up largely of opponents of the pay bill, was convinced of the wisdom of taking a trip at that particular time.) But it is not unusual for four to eight members to be so persuaded on a recommittal motion, and for many more to disappear during teller votes.

In the relatively less visible activity of speaking (or not speaking) on legislation on the floor, the leadership can control in part even some of the most recalcitrant members, as well as more moderate "mavericks" from the party position. In December, 1963, the leadership was instrumental in persuading one of the senior Southern Democrats on the Agriculture Committee (and an ultra-conservative) to keep quiet during the debate on the cotton bill because they feared his personal unpopularity in the House would jeopardize the bill (he had planned to speak in favor of the bill). In the fight to defeat the Republican recommittal motion on the 1963 tax bill the leadership was able to persuade George Mahon, then second-ranking on the Appropriations Committee and a highly respected Southerner with a moderate-to-conservative voting record, to speak against the Republican motion. This occurred shortly shortly after the then chairman of the Appropriations Committee, Clarence Cannon, had double-crossed the leadership and spoken for the Republican motion despite an earlier commitment to Wilbur Mills to speak against it. The fact that Mahon spoke, and made such an effective argument, is credited with convincing a sufficient number of wavering Democrats to help carry the vote.

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[19] See the *Washington Post*, August 22, 1963, A1:1, and the *Wall Street Journal*, August 26, 1963, 2:3.

[20] See the *Washington Post*, April 9, 1964, A3:5, and the *Baltimore Sun*, April 9, 1964, 8:3.

In summary, then, the less visible the action, the better the leadership's chances of holding the line against defectors. More visible actions can more easily become contaminated by other pressures which reduce the chances for leadership success.

FIFTH CONDITION: CONSTITUENCY PRESSURES

Perhaps the most important single factor which helps to explain why a member deviates from positions taken by the party leadership is the kind of constituency he represents. Members like to vote with the party, to be sure, but they also wish to be re-elected. For some members, on some issues, voting against the party leadership is perceived as a necessary step to re-election.

For a general measure of the extent of party bolting on roll-call votes, we may start with the 58 roll-calls in the House in 1963 in which a majority of Democrats opposed a majority of Republicans. On these votes, the average Democrat in the House supported his party 73 percent of the time, and opposed the party leadership 13 percent of the time; absenteeism, in its various forms, accounts for the remaining 14 percent. The average, however, does not tell the story; individual members varied widely in the degree of support they gave their party. For example, eight Democrats (mostly from the North) supported the party leadership at least 98 percent of the time, while five Democrats (all from the South) opposed the party leadership at least 65 percent of the time.[21]

Constituency influences show up in characteristic regional and ideological cleavages that result in many departures from the party leadership's line. For example, in 1961 Northern Democrats supported the party 92.7 percent of the time on a series of ten roll-call votes having to do with extending a larger federal role, while Southern Democrats supported these same issues, on the average, only 56.4 percent of the time.[22] A number of demographic factors, more specific to each constituency, such as percentage of owner-occupied dwelling units, percentage of non-white population, and percentage of urban population, also relate to roll-call votes and help to explain deviations from party voting.[23] The well known affinity among conservatives on both sides of the aisle is a further manifestation of constituency influences working against party leadership. For example, of the 58 roll-call votes in 1963 mentioned above, notwithstanding that a majority of Democrats voted against a majority of Republicans, the Democrats won only 47 and lost 11. Out of the eleven lost, eight were lost to the so-called "conservative coalition" (a majority of Republicans and a majority of Southern Democrats voting against a majority of Northern Democrats).

Although the Southern wing of the Democratic party is the most troublesome area for the leadership (and is, as we saw in discussing the Whip polls earlier, well represented among those whom the leadership must aggressively pursue), a significant number of Northern Democrats also, from time to time, bolt the party position. Sometimes this is because they see their constituents as overwhelmingly opposed to the party position. Sometimes they are probably right in this, and sometimes, to their own peril, they are probably incorrect. For example, Congressman John Lesinski, from a relatively blue-collar district in Wayne County, Michigan, was the only Northern Democrat to vote against the Civil Rights Bill; he apprehended that the so-called "white-backlash" might be severe in his district. Congressman Dingell, also a Democrat from the same area, voted for the Civil Rights Bill. As it turned out, the Republican legislature in Michigan reapportioned the state's congressional districts in such a way as to throw Lesinski and Dingell into the same district in the succeeding Democratic primary. Ninety percent of the new district, however, came from Lesinski's former district. In the primary Dingell won handily. Although it is hazardous to attribute defeat to a single issue, a plausible argument can certainly be made that Lesinski seriously overestimated the amount of white-backlash in his district.

We can say, then, that constituency factors, however useful they may be in accounting for inter-party differences, also help to differentiate among members within the Democratic party, and so to explain deviations from party leadership positions. And, since party representation in the House stems from state and local organizations, whenever a member pleads that his district will not allow him to go along with the leadership, the argument is usually understood and accepted. Constituency factors, therefore, are a powerful force in conditioning the extent of party leadership among the House Democrats.

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[21] *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, No. 14 (April 3, 1964), pp. 649–653.

[22] Froman, *Congressmen and Their Constituencies*, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

[23] *Ibid.*, chs. 7 and 9; see also Turner, *op. cit.*, and MacRae, *op. cit.*

SIXTH CONDITION: THE ACTIVITY OF STATE DELEGATIONS

We have lately begun to learn more about the function of state delegations as informal groups in Congressional politics—and hence legislation. Alan Fiellin and John Kessel, for example, sketch out the informal relationships among members of the New York and Washington congressional delegations respectively.[24] Fiellin suggests that informal groups such as state delegations are the principal socializing agencies for the members and provide them with important cues. David Truman, on the basis of an investigation of 23 state delegations, concluded that

> the delegation thus tends to constitute a communication structure whose repeated use results in a heightened consensus and similarity of voting among its members. In short, the state party delegation in the House may be a significant alternative cue-giving mechanism within the legislative party, especially on matters whose political implications are ambiguous. Uncertainty is misery and misery loves company.[25]

One of the implications of this generalization is that state delegations provide important protective mechanisms whereby members of the same state delegation, when voting on an issue ambiguously related to their districts, can partially explain their vote, especially if they perceive their district sentiment incorrectly, as a matter important for the state. "After all," a member might say, "every congressman from this state voted that way."

The support or opposition of state delegations can be of significant help or a hindrance to the leadership. A number of examples will help to illustrate this point.

The first pay bill in 1964 contained a provision for a $10,000 increase in congressional salaries. This bill, on a roll-call vote, went down to defeat in March. The pay bill was again brought up in June with only slight changes, the most significant of which cut the increase to congressmen to $7,500. The California Democratic delegation caucused three times during this interim and voted, in each case unanimously, to oppose the bill unless it retained the original $10,000 raise. Since the California delegation is so large, and since the bill was defeated even with its support in March, to lose the California Democrats on the second bill would be a serious blow to the leadership. A compromise was worked out, however, assuring the delegation that every effort would be made to get the Senate to support a $10,000 pay increase: then the conference might accept the Senate figure. A good deal of time and effort on the part of the leadership was expended in these sets of negotiations.

Another example of the crucial activity of a state delegation occurred just before the voting on the poverty bill, early in 1964. The North Carolina delegation exacted as its price for support of the program a promise from the Administration that Adam Yarmolinsky would not be appointed to help run it. Yarmolinsky, an able and liberal-minded lawyer who had been borrowed from the Defense Department for the purpose, had been one of the President's main lieutenants in working out the details of the program. For a number of reasons, however—mainly having to do with his activity in helping to integrate southern military installations—he was not acceptable to a number of Southerners in general, and to the North Carolina delegation in particular. After the leadership promised that Yarmolinsky would not be appointed, the delegation gave its support to the program.

Much of the discussion within state delegations does not take place in formal caucus. Members from the same state tend to sit near one another on the floor, to travel together, eat together, etc. Moreover, in a situation where the natural inclination of the majority of a delegation would be to oppose the leadership on a particular piece of legislation, the delegation will not generally caucus unless its leaders think there is a chance that they will derive an advantage by voting with the House leadership after exacting some concession. On the 1962 tax bill, for instance, activity within three southern delegations was crucial in changing a possible Administration defeat into victory. One of these same delegations caucused on the farm bills (feed grains) in both 1962 and 1963 and as a result gave the leadership 75 percent of its votes, whereas the normal pattern was for only 12 percent to

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[24] Alan Fiellin, "The Functions of Informal Groups: A State Delegation," in Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *New Perspectives on the House of Representatives* (Chicago, 1963), pp. 59–78, and John H. Kessel, "The Washington Congressional Delegation," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 8 (February, 1964), pp. 1–21.

[25] Truman, *op. cit.*, p. 250.

50 percent of the delegation to support the leadership on most important issues.

At the other end of the spectrum are delegations that almost always support the leadership. They generally do not caucus unless they suspect a substantial feeling among them against the leadership position. The activity of the California delegation on the pay bill just discussed is a good example.

Aside, then, from the usual informal communication and cue-giving which state delegations provide for their members, they are also important as bargainers because in numbers lies strength. If the members of a large delegation can all agree on a position, and all agree on what they are willing to settle for, they may be able to get their price from the leadership in return for their support.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

We have attempted to explore six factors which are likely to influence the success of the House Democratic Party leadership: (1) leadership commitment, knowledge, and activity; (2) the nature of issues (procedural vs. substantive); (3) visibility of the issue; (4) visibility of the action; (5) constituency pressures; and (6) the activity of state delegations.

Generally, we have concluded that leadership victories are more likely to occur when (1) leadership activity is high; (2) the issue is more procedural and less substantive; (3) the visibility of the issue is low; (4) the visibility of the action is low; (5) there is little counter pressure from the constituencies; and (6) state delegations are not engaged in collective bargaining for specific demands. Each of these conditions may range widely from high to low. The number of combinations, therefore, is potentially quite large. And as one moves along the continuum from high to low (or low to high as the case may be), it becomes increasingly more difficult for the leadership to prevail.

For analytical purposes we have considered each factor in isolation. It is not to be supposed, however, that each operates independently of the others. It is appropriate to conclude, therefore, with a few observations about their interrelationships.

The most important of these is that leadership activity is a counter-weight to the other five factors: it is integrative, while the rest are divisive. Accordingly, it will be most needed, and is likely to be evoked most strongly, when one to all of the other five are actively operating against the leadership. This situation obtains when most major bills reach the floor, and continues until the vote on final passage. The leadership intervenes only intermittently prior to floor action on legislation, but floor business is leadership business and it rises to its highest intensity at the stage of recommittal and final passage.

Next, since the leadership is at the greatest advantage in dealing with procedural issues, it can afford to relax when only these are at stake; and if it runs into trouble on one of them, otherwise than from carelessness or ineptitude, the likelihood is that one or more of the countervailing factors is strongly in evidence. If it wins, that will be because fewer factors are working against the leadership than on a substantive issue. Correspondingly, when the visibility of an issue is high, it is likely to be more substantive then procedural, and to entail high activity by state delegations, constituents, and the leadership. Under this condition, the leadership is more likely to win when the visibility of the action is low. When the visibility of the action is high (on a roll-call vote), and is combined with a highly visible, substantive issue (as a major proposal of the Administration's usually is), then it will also be combined with high leadership, constituency, and state delegation activity.

Constituency influences operate irregularly, depending upon the nature and visibility of the issue and of the action. Because constituencies also vary a good deal across the country, few issues will arouse interest in every district. Hence, defections from party leadership on that account will vary considerably from one issue or action to the next. We can say, however, that widespread and intense constituency reactions are symptomatic of high visibility, and with visibility go a number of other problems for the leadership.

Finally, the bargaining power of state delegations—and hence the likelihood of their intervention—is low unless other factors in our review are high. State delegations may be quite active in gaining projects for their states, but on more general bills their appearance is a good deal less predictable. This condition seems genuinely independent of the others.

DEEDS UNDER A DOCTRINE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE 1963 TERM*

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Judged by any standards the 1963 term of the United States Supreme Court was one of momentous importance to the future of the American political system. Most immediately, the Justices once again found themselves embroiled in political controversy, their decisions attacked by the Republican party platform, by the Republican presidential candidate and by many members of Congress.

Among the more notable deeds of the 1963 term were decisions writing into the margins of the Constitution the formula "one man, one vote" as the proper rule for apportioning electoral districts for the House of Representatives and for both houses of state legislatures. The Court also invalidated two acts of Congress, and in the field of criminal justice introduced several new principles while overturning supposedly settled law. In addition the Court again struck down officially sanctioned prayers in public schools.

For its part, Congress seriously considered constitutional amendments to reverse the school prayer decisions of this and previous terms, and to modify the doctrine of the reapportionment cases.[1] The House went so far as to pass a bill to remove from federal courts jurisdiction to hear apportionment suits. After a quasi-filibuster by liberal senators had beaten down a stronger measure, the Senate then adopted a resolution urging federal judges to allow state legislators ample time to redistrict their states. This resolution was adopted as an amendment to the foreign aid bill, but was deleted in conference.

The most personal and perhaps the most stinging congressional rebuke to the Justices came on a money matter. In June 1964 the House passed a general pay raise for federal employees, including $7500 for the Justices. Four days later the Court handed down the bulk of the term's state legislative districting cases. During floor debate in the Senate, Gordon Allott, Republican of Colorado—and Colorado was one of the states whose districting had just been declared unconstitutional—proposed cutting the Justices' raise to $2500. While Senator Allott disclaimed any effort "to slap them in the face, or anything of that sort,"[2] some of his colleagues were more candid about their intention to punish judicial law-making. In any event, the Senate adopted Allott's amendment, 46–40. The conference settled on a $4500 increase, and much to the disgust of some Court foes both houses agreed to the compromise. Three thousand dollars a year poorer because of their work in recent terms, the Justices were reminded of one use for congressional control of the purse strings.

This paper will first summarize the more important deeds of the Court's 1963 term in the field of civil liberties. The second section analyzes the divisions among the Justices on these issues, and the third section examines some of the larger doctrinal implications of recent decisions as well as their possible political effects.

I. DEEDS

As has typically occurred in the last quarter century, questions of civil liberties formed the most significant part of the business of the 1963 term of the Court. These decisions will be analyzed here under three sub-headings, Criminal Justice, Freedom of Political Expression and Association, and Discrimination against Insular Minorities. Reasons for the choice of these categories will be fully explained in Section III of this paper.

Criminal Justice. A large number of cases related to procedural and substantive guarantees in criminal trials, and these were generally decided in favor of the rights of the accused.[3] Two

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* I am indebted to my colleagues, William M. Beaney and Robert K. Faulkner, and my research assistant, Irving Faber, for reading the manuscript and making many helpful suggestions.

[1] For the school prayer amendments see Edward Beiser and William Beaney, "Prayers and Politics: The Impact of *Engel* and *Schempp* on the Governmental Process," 13 *Journal of Public Law* (1965). Among the more important of the proposed amendments to modify the reapportionment decisions were: H. J. Res. 1055 (McCulloch), S. J. Res. 181 (Stennis), and S. J. Res. 185 (Dirksen), all 88th Cong., 2d sess. Within a few weeks of the term's reapportionment decisions, at least 51 modifying constitutional amendments were introduced in Congress.

[2] 110 *Cong. Rec.* 15312 (daily ed.).

[3] The major exceptions were: Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U. S. 528 (1964); Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U. S. 575 (1964); United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964); United States v.

cases reversed convictions because of systematic exclusion of Negroes from juries;[4] another overruled *Stein* v. *New York* and held that, in a state court, the voluntariness of a confession must be determined by the trial judge and may not be submitted to the jury along with the question of guilt or innocence.[5] *Malloy* v. *Hogan*[6] buried the 56-year-old doctrine of *Twining* v. *New Jersey*[7] and applied to the states the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against self-incrimination. On the other hand, six Justices held that protection against double jeopardy does not bar the federal government from retrying a defendant who was earlier coerced into entering a guilty plea.[8]

The Court also rejected Governor Ross Barnett's request for protection of his asserted civil rights. A five-judge majority, over dissents from Warren, Black, Douglas, and Goldberg, reaffirmed the old rule that a defendant accused of contempt may be tried without a jury. However, some of the majority Justices undermined much of the effect of this traditional rule by adding the Delphic qualification that the punishment imposed under such circumstances could not exceed that usually accorded to "petty" offenses.[9] In another contempt case, six Justices found no violation of due process where the judge who presided at the contempt trial was the same judge who had presided over the main trial at which the defendant had been cited for contempt.[10] A third contempt decision held that before trial in a federal court, a defendant was entitled to a hearing on his attorney's allegation that he had been mentally ill during the period in which the contemptuous acts were committed.[11]

In three state search-and-seizure cases, the Justices tried to make it clear that *Mapp* v. *Ohio*[12] imposed on state courts an obligation to follow the same rules as federal courts in denying admission of unconstitutionally obtained evidence.[13] A fourth search-and-seizure decision reversed a conviction obtained in a federal court on the basis of evidence secured by state officials in a search without a warrant.[14]

Two right-to-counsel cases established new protections for defendants. *Massiah* v. *United States*[15] held inadmissible in a federal court incriminating statements voluntarily made by a man under indictment. Federal officers, the majority said, could question a defendant under such circumstances, but they could not use evidence so obtained *against him* unless his lawyer had been present at the interrogation. *Escobedo* v. *Illinois* tried to begin to solve one of the problems raised by *Gideon* v. *Wainwright*:[16] at what stage of a criminal prosecution does the right to counsel begin? In essaying an answer, the majority reverted to a "special circumstances" rule. After stressing that in this case the accused was a young man of Mexican descent with no previous record of experience with the police, the Court said: "We hold only that when the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory—when its focus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confession—our adversary system begins to operate, and, under the circumstances here, the accused must be permitted to consult with his lawyer."[17]

In reversing a series of sit-in convictions,

Healy, 376 U.S. 75 (1964); United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964); United States v. Welden, 377 U.S. 95 (1964).

In this article I have not tried to summarize every civil liberties decision of the 1963 term. Tables I, II, and III below list all of these decisions, at least those decided by full opinion. For a more complete discussion see Note, "The Supreme Court, 1963 Term," 78 *Harvard Law Review* 177 (1964).

[4] Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773 (1964); Coleman v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 129 (1964).

[5] Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). Except for two sentences in White's majority opinion, one might have said that constitutional standards would be met if a state required a jury to return a special verdict regarding the voluntariness of a confession. The two sentences read: "Jackson's position before the District Court, and here, is that the issue of his confession should not have been decided by the convicting jury but should have been determined in a proceeding separate and apart from the body trying guilt and innocence. So far we agree and hold that he is now entitled to such a hearing in the state court." *Ibid.*, at p. 394.

[6] 378 U.S. 1 (1964). See also Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).

[7] 211 U.S. 78 (1908).

[8] United States v. Tateo, *supra* note 3.

[9] So Justice Clark said in his opinion for the Court. United States v. Barnett, *supra* note 3 at 695 n.

[10] Ungar v. Sarafite, *supra* note 3.

[11] Panico v. United States, 375 U.S. 29 (1963).

[12] 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

[13] Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 39 (1964).

[14] Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964).

[15] 377 U.S. 201 (1964).

[16] 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

[17] 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964).

three Justices (Clark, Brennan and Stewart) demonstrated considerable virtuosity not only in avoiding basic constitutional issues themselves, but also in preventing any official Court pronouncement on those issues, even though six of their colleagues wanted the Court to rule on the fundamental questions of constitutional law. In two cases the Court found state action in the form of official encouragement of segregation policies by merchants;[18] in another the Court applied the *ex post facto* prohibition to judicial interpretations of law and set aside the convictions because South Carolina courts had changed their interpretations of South Carolina's criminal trespass law.[19] In still another case from South Carolina the Court again used the *ex post facto* rationale to reverse criminal trespass convictions and found there was insufficient evidence to justify charges of breach of peace.[20] In *Bell* v. *Maryland* the Court reversed other sit-in convictions to permit the Maryland courts to reconsider the cases in the light of subsequent state passage of an equal accommodations law.[21]

Avoidance of fundamental issues did not appeal to the Chief Justice or to Justices Douglas and Goldberg. They joined in the Court's opinion, but in concurring opinions written by Goldberg and Douglas these three put forth an argument that, if ever successful in commanding a majority of the Court, would render redundant the controversial public accommodations title of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Reasoning along lines similar to the first Justice Harlan's dissent in the old *Civil Rights Cases*,[22] Goldberg and Douglas concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids innkeepers to discriminate on the basis of race.

Black, Harlan, and White would also have reached the basic constitutional issues. These Justices dissented in four of the five sit-in cases; three of their dissents were written by Black, one by Harlan. They rejected the theory of the elder Harlan's dissent in the *Civil Rights Cases*, denied that anyone could have been misled by previous state court interpretations of state law, and found no state action in a merchant's obtaining police assistance—absent an official policy commanding or actively encouraging segregation—in removing unwanted persons from his property.

Freedom of Expression and Association. The 1963 term had more than its annual share of voting and speech cases. In the 1962 term, a majority of the Court had held in *NAACP* v. *Button* that an interest group had a First Amendment right to use—and to urge its members to use—the judicial process to accomplish its policy aims.[23] *Brotherhood* v. *Virginia*[24] extended the *Button* doctrine by ruling that a union had a constitutionally protected right to advise its members to seek, in employer liability cases, the counsel of particular lawyers. Three decisions sustained the right of unions to picket in labor disputes;[25] two other decisions, based largely on *Edwards* v. *South Carolina*,[26] upheld the right of Negro demonstrators to protest publicly against state-sanctioned segregation policies.[27] Two cases involving allegations of obscenity and counter-allegations of police censorship found the Justices coming down once more in favor of freedom of expression.[28] But on neither occasion could a majority agree on an opinion for the Court, and one of these cases produced the odd result of Warren and Clark joining in protest against a libertarian decision.[29]

In a series of decisions more directly related to political expression, a unanimous Court once again affirmed the right of NAACP members to freedom of association and for the fourth time reversed Alabama's efforts to prevent the NAACP from doing business in the state.[30] The Court also held that provisions of Washington loyalty oaths were void for vagueness. Where the "sensitive" field of dissemination of ideas was involved, so White wrote for a seven-judge majority, restrictive regulations must meet high standards of definiteness.[31]

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[18] Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964); Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964). The ability of three Justices to impose their will on the other six may be the result of the so-called paradox of voting. See my *Elements of Judicial Strategy* (University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 85–7.

[19] Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964).

[20] Barr v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964).

[21] 378 U.S. 226 (1964).

[22] 109 U.S. 3 (1883).

[23] 371 U.S. 415 (1963). For a full analysis of this case, see Robert Birkby and Walter Murphy, "Interest Group Conflict in the Judicial Arena," 42 *Texas Law Review* 1018 (1964).

[24] 377 U.S. 1 (1964).

[25] Liner v. Jafco, 375 U.S. 301 (1964); NLRB v. Fruit & Veg. Local, 377 U.S. 58 (1964); United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 376 U.S. 492 (1964).

[26] 372 U.S. 229 (1963).

[27] Henry v. Rock Hill, 375 U.S. 6 (1963); Fields v. South Carolina, 375 U.S. 44 (1963).

[28] A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).

[29] Jacobellis v. Ohio, *supra* note 28.

[30] NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288 (1964). This time the Court's decision stuck and the injunction was lifted. *Southern School News* (October 1964), p. 7. For a discussion of the background of this litigation see Birkby and Murphy,

New York Times v. *Sullivan* reversed a libel judgment against the *Times* for publishing an advertisement that accused Montgomery, Alabama, officials of interfering with the civil rights of Negroes. The *Times*, though claiming the advertisement was generally accurate, admitted it contained some false information. Black, Douglas, and Goldberg would have conferred absolute immunity on newspapers to criticize public officials, but the other six Justices would not go so far. In an opinion written by Justice Brennan, the majority held that in order to be outside the protection of the First and Fourteenth Amendments a newspaper's criticism of a public official had to be malicious as well as false. "The constitutional guarantees require," Brennan said, "a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."[32]

In a democratic society, one of the principal uses of freedom of expression and association is to influence electoral behavior, and the Court made the most significant decisions of its 1963 term in this area. The Justices decided eleven districting cases, nine involving apportionment of state legislatures and two congressional districting. Felix Frankfurter had earlier warned that to enter the reapportionment controversy was to throw the Court into a political thicket. His brethren, however, accepted that risk, realizing perhaps that like nine Br'er Rabbits they have historically thrived in that briar patch.

In all nine of the state cases[33] and the one congressional case[34] where the proper apportioning formula was at issue, a six-judge majority—Warren, Black, Douglas, Brennan, White, and Goldberg—firmly endorsed the principle of "one man, one vote." These Justices also interpreted that principle to require substantially equal populations in electoral districts for the national House of Representatives and for both houses of state legislatures. Stewart and Clark preferred a more flexible approach than the one man, one vote formula, but both agreed in four of the nine state cases[35] that the legislatures were sufficiently malapportioned to warrant correction by judicial action. Clark came to this conclusion in two of the other cases.[36] Only Harlan adhered to the view that legislative districting is a political rather than a justiciable matter.

The eleventh apportionment case, *Wright* v. *Rockefeller*,[37] revolved around the question whether New York had gerrymandered some congressional districts. Over dissents from Douglas and Goldberg, the Court held that the plaintiffs had failed to prove deliberate rigging of district lines for forbidden purposes. In a relatively minor decision, *Anderson* v. *Martin*,[38] a unanimous Court ruled that it was a denial of equal protection for Lousiana to require that a candidate's race be indicated on the ballot.

Discrimination against Insular Minorities. The term "insular minority," discussed in Section III below, is not easily defined. Whatever criteria one might use, however, would probably bring under this rubric cases involving Indians, aliens, denaturalized citizens, members of relatively small religious sects holding to controversial beliefs or practices, conscientious objectors to prayers in public schools, procedural rights of alleged security risks, rights of Communists (at least other than those in the First Amendment), and possibly school integration in the Deep South. The 1963 term settled no cases involving the civil rights of Indians, but representatives of each of these other beleaguered minority groups

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op. cit. supra note 23 and my "The South Counter-Attacks," 12 *Western Political Quarterly*, 371 (1959).

[31] Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).

[32] 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). See also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), and Harry Kalven, Jr., "The New York Times Case: A Note on 'The Central Meaning of the First Amendment,' " 1964 *Supreme Court Review* 191.

[33] Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964); Lucas v. Colorado, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Maryland Commission v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); WMCA v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964); Swann v. Adams, 378 U.S. 553 (1964); Meyers v. Thigpen, 378 U.S. 554 (1964); Williams v. Moss, 378 U.S. 558 (1964).

[34] Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).

[35] Davis v. Mann, Reynolds v. Sims, Roman v. Sincock, Williams v. Moss, all *supra* note 33.

[36] Maryland Commission v. Tawes and Meyers v. Thigpen, both *supra* note 33.

[37] 376 U.S. 52 (1964).

[38] 375 U.S. 399 (1964).

had their day—and with only one exception[39] a successful day—in court.

Even when they did not have a day before the Supreme Court, these minorities sometimes won. *United States* v. *Communist Party,* for instance, denied review of a Court of Appeals decision that communist party officers could not be required to register under the Internal Security Act of 1950 because the government had failed to prove that any party official could carry out the registration procedure without incriminating himself under the clause of the Smith Act that makes knowing party membership a crime.[40]

Chamberlin v. *Dade County*[41] upheld the claim of those offended by public prayers, by invalidating Florida's Bible-reading requirements for public schools. *Schneider* v. *Rusk*[42] reversed a denaturalization order, and in so doing held unconstitutional as an unreasonable discrimination against naturalized citizens that section of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 providing for denaturalization of a naturalized citizen who resides in his former country for seven years. In another denaturalization case, a six-judge majority halted the deportation of the notorious Frank Costello. The Court interpreted the congressional statute authorizing deportation of an alien twice convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude as not applying to a denaturalized alien when the criminal acts had been committed while he was a citizen.[43] On a more technical but less obscure point, *Foti* v. *Immigration Service* ruled that Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction to review administrative denials of suspensions of deportation proceedings.[44]

A third deportation case brought back to the Court the troublesome question of when an American national can be held to have lost his citizenship. At issue was the constitutionality of that portion of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 which provides that an American national loses his citizenship by serving in the armed forces of a foreign nation without obtaining authorization from the Secretaries of State and Defense. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had reluctantly ruled that Herman Marks was a deportable alien because he had lost his citizenship by serving as a captain in Castro's army after the revolutionaries had taken over the Cuban government.[45] With Brennan not participating, the Justices divided 4–4 and thereby affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.[46]

The alleged security risk seeking judicial protection was William L. Greene, whose earlier litigation had been the occasion for a 1959 Supreme Court decision that neither Congress nor the President had authorized in the Industrial Security Program a denial of the right of confrontation of hostile witnesses.[47] This time Greene asked that the government be ordered to give him monetary restitution under the regulations in effect when he began his initial action rather than under later and more restrictive regulations. Seven Justices, over dissents by Harlan and White, agreed that Greene was entitled to collect under the earlier regulations.[48]

On the final day of the term, a group of Communist Party officers succeeded in their efforts to strike down the passport provisions of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950. Justice Black would have held the entire act unconstitutional, but the majority invalidated only the passport section. For the Court, Goldberg wrote that in excluding members of communist-dominated organizations from passports and in making it a crime for them even to apply for passports, the statute "too broadly and indiscriminantly restricts the right to travel and thereby abridges the liberty guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment."[49] Clark, Harlan, and White dissented.

Earlier in the term the Justices in a unanimous *per curiam* opinion again emphasized their growing impatience with the slow progress of school desegregation.[50] And in what promises to be one of the last stages of the Prince Edward County case—one of the original school suits brought in 1951—seven members of the Court held that a federal district judge could: (1) enjoin state officials from paying tuition grants to parents of children attending "private" schools established to avoid integration; and (2) order those officials to reopen the county's public schools, closed since 1959. Justices Clark and Harlan dissented against the latter part of the ruling but otherwise agreed with the majority that Virginia was denying Negro children equal protection.[51]

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[39] Mrvica v. Esperdy, 376 U.S. 560 (1964), held that an alien had interrupted his residence in the United States and did not qualify as a permanent resident.

[40] Communist Party v. United States, 331 F. 2d 807 (1964); *cert. den.*, 377 U.S. 968 (1964). *Cf.* Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1 (1961).

[41] 377 U.S. 402 (1964).

[42] 377 U.S. 163 (1964).

[43] Costello v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 376 U.S. 120 (1964).

[44] 375 U.S. 217 (1963).

[45] 315 F. 2d 673 (1963). See John P. Roche, "The Expatriation Cases," 1963 *Supreme Court Review* 325.

[46] Marks v. Esperdy, 377 U.S. 214 (1964).

[47] Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).

[48] Greene v. United States, 376 U.S. 149 (1964).

[49] Aptheker v. Rusk, 378 U.S. 500, 514 (1964).

[50] Calhoun v. Latimer, 377 U.S. 263 (1964).

In *Cooper* v. *Pate* a Black Muslim in the Illinois state penitentiary tried to sue the warden for denying him his civil rights. The Muslim claimed that he was in effect segregated from the rest of the prisoners, and while they were allowed religious literature he was not permitted to obtain a copy of the "*Quran.*" Illinois replied that the Muslims were more than a religious group: they were also a political organization dedicated to "Black Supremacy." More particularly their record in instigating prison riots justified special treatment. The district court and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with state officials and dismissed the case as not stating a cause of action. In ruling that there had been no abridgment of civil rights, both courts relied heavily on what they described as sociological evidence—a study by the Chicago police department linking Muslims to prison disorders.[52] In a terse and unanimous *per curiam* opinion the Supreme Court reversed and sent the case back for a trial on the merits.[53]

II. DIVISIONS

The decisions of the 1963 term were overwhelmingly libertarian. Whatever the number and range of factors the Justices weighed in making their decisions, they usually managed to tip the scales in favor of the claim of civil liberties, as the data in Tables I, II, and III demonstrate. Of the 64 cases[54] involving civil liberties claims, 56 (over 87 per cent) were decided in favor of the claimant, and 21 of these 56 decisions (37 per cent), were unanimous.

In recent years Black, Douglas, Warren, and Brennan have tended to vote together. In 1962 Arthur Goldberg came to the Court and immediately joined the libertarian wing. Even on the more difficult cases, this group of five Justices was often able to pick up an additional vote from Stewart or White and not infrequently from Clark. Thus in more than half of the decisions that divided the Court, there were six or more votes for a libertarian result.

No matter what the specific nature of the case, Justice Douglas voted for the civil liberties claim in all but two instances and Justice Goldberg in all but three. In contrast, in all but two of the cases that divided the Court, Justice Harlan found a compelling reason—considerations of federalism or the doctrine of political questions, for example—for voting against a libertarian result.

The data in Tables I, II, and III also qualify any characterization of Justice White as being relatively unsympathetic to civil liberties. In criminal justice and insular minority cases only Harlan was less apt to decide for the claimant; but in cases involving freedom of expression or association, White voted for a libertarian result as often as Black or Brennan and more often than Warren.

One of the more interesting sidelights of these voting records is Hugo Black's relatively frequent votes for what is here classified as a nonlibertarian result. Part of the problem, of course, as with all schemes of classification, lies in categorizing a particular vote as for or against civil liberties. In many instances a vote may clearly fall within one or the other category; but in other instances the choice is not so obvious. The issue may not be for or against civil liberties, but rather for or against one of two competing claims to personal freedom.[55] The most salient examples of the latter situation were the sit-in cases. There Black several times voted against Negroes' claims to freedom

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[51] Griffin v. Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964).

[52] Cooper v. Pate, 324 F. 2d. 165 (1963).

[53] 378 U.S. 546 (1964).

[54] Marks v. Esperdy, *supra* note 45, is not counted here since it was a 4-4 decision, nor is Dresner v. Tallahassee, 378 U.S. 539 (1964), because it was not a decision on the merits, only a determination that there had not been a final decision by the highest state court. The cases in these three tables may be found in volumes 375–378 of the U.S. Reports. I have not listed here those decisions listed under "Memorandum Cases" by the Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Co. This classification does not always coincide with that used by the official reporter of the Supreme Court.

[55] In Jackson v. Denno, *supra* note 5, for example, I have counted Black as voting for the civil liberties claim even though he filed a dissenting opinion. I did so because Black said he would have ruled the confession inadmissible because it was obtained under inherently coercive circumstances. Black also dissented from the majority view that a judge would be a better protector than a jury, in such cases, of the civil rights of a defendant. He took a similar position on the question of whether the judge or the jury should determine the existence of a clear and present danger. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).

TABLE I. CRIMINAL JUSTICE CASES

Case	Vote	Do	Go	Wa	Br	Bl	St	Cl	Wh	Ha
Coleman v. Alabama	9–0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Arnold v. No. Car.	9–0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Preston v. U.S.	9–0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Smith v. Pa.	9–0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Leonard v. U.S.	9–0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Nagelberg v. U.S.	9–0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Michaels v. U.S.	9–0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
U.S. v. Behrens	9–0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Murphy v. Commission	9–0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Robinson v. Florida	9–0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Fallen v. U.S.	9–0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Stoner v. California	8–1	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	–
Corey v. U.S.	8–1	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	–
Hardy v. U.S.	8–1	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	–
Panico v. U.S.	7–2	+	+	+	+	+	+	–	+	–
Aguilar v. Texas	6–3	+	+	+	+	–	–	–	+	+
Massiah v. U.S.	6–3	+	+	+	+	+	+	–	–	–
Bartone v. U.S.	6–3	+	+	+	+	+	+	–	–	–
Bouie v. Columbia	6–3	+	+	+	+	–	+	+	–	–
Barr v. Columbia	6–3	+	+	+	+	–	+	+	–	–
Bell v. Maryland	6–3	+	+	+	+	–	+	+	–	–
Griffin v. Maryland	6–3	+	+	+	+	–	+	+	–	–
Jackson v. Denno	6–3	+	+	+	+	+	–	–	+	–
Fahy v. Connecticut	5–4	+	+	+	+	+	–	–	–	–
Malloy v. Hogan	5–4	+	+	+	+	+	–	–	–	–
Escobedo v. Illinois	5–4	+	+	+	+	+	–	–	–	–
Rugendorf v. U.S.	4–5	+	+	+	+	–	–	–	–	–
Barnett v. U.S.	4–5	+	+	+	–	+	–	–	–	–
Ungar v. Sarafite	3–6	+	+	–	–	+	–	–	–	–
U.S. v. Tateo	3–6	+	+	–	–	+	–	–	–	–
U.S. v. Welden	2–7	+	–	–	–	+	–	–	–	–
U.S. v. Healy	0–9	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Pro civil liberties in non-unanimous decisions:		20–0	19–1	17–3	16–4	14–6	10–10	7–13	6–14	1–19

+ = Vote for civil liberties claim.
– = Vote against civil liberties claim.
0 = Took no part in decision.

from discrimination in eating places open to the public and in favor of the freedom of restaurant owners—in the absence of statutory prohibitions—to select their own clientele.

There is room for reasonable men to differ about which result in the sit-in cases was truly libertarian. Through Black's dissents in these cases, however, runs a theme of deep concern for the effect on public order if a state could not enforce criminal trespass laws against civil rights demonstrators who remain on private property after being told by the owner to leave. Usually when demands of public order have clashed with demands of freedom of expression—and basically these sit-ins are political expression cases, though the majority of the Court did not choose to treat them as such—Black has finally voted in favor of freedom of expression.[56] Moreover, Black's insistence on the primacy of private control

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[56] See his position in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951); and Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949). See also "Justice Black and First Amendment 'Absolutes': A Public Interview," 37 *New York University Law Review* 549 (1962).

TABLE II. POLITICAL FREEDOM CASES

Cases	Vote	Go	Do	Bl	Br	Wh	Wa	St	Cl	Ha
Liner v. Jafco	9–0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Anderson v. Martin	9–0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
N.Y.T. v. Sullivan	9–0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Henry v. Rock Hill	9–0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
NAACP v. Alabama	9–0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Steelworkers v. NLRB	8–0	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Roman v. Sincock	8–1	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	–
Davis v. Mann	8–1	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	–
Williams v. Moss	8–1	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	–
Reynolds v. Sims	8–1	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	–
Md. Comm. v. Tawes	7–2	+	+	+	+	+	+	–	+	–
Meyers v. Thigpen	7–2	+	+	+	+	+	+	–	+	–
Baggett v. Bullitt	7–2	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	–	–
Books v. Kansas	7–2	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	–	–
NLRB v. Packers	6–2	+	0	+	+	+	+	–	+	–
Trainmen v. Virginia	6–2	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	–	–
Wesberry v. Sanders	6–3	+	+	+	+	+	+	–	–	–
WMCA v. Lomenzo	6–3	+	+	+	+	+	+	–	–	–
Lucas v. Colorado	6–3	+	+	+	+	+	+	–	–	–
Jacobellis v. Ohio	6–3	+	+	+	+	+	–	+	–	–
Wright v. Rockefeller	2–7	+	+	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Rabinowitz v. Kennedy	0–9	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Pro civil liberties in non-unanimous decisions:		15–0	14–0	14–1	14–1	14–1	13–2	7–7	7–8	0–15

+ = Vote for civil liberties claim.
– = Vote against civil liberties claim.
0 = Took no part in decision.

TABLE III. INSULAR MINORITY CASES

Case	Vote	Do	Bl	Go	Wa	Br	St	Cl	Wh	Ha
Calhoun v. Latimer	9–0	+	+	+	+	+	–	+	+	+
Cooper v. Pate	9–0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Foti v. Immigration	9–0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Griffin v. Pr. Edw.	9–0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Chamberlin v. Dade	8–1	+	+	+	+	+	–	+	+	+
Greene v. U.S.	7–2	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	–	–
Costello v. Immigrat'n	6–2	+	+	+	+	+	+	–	–	0
Aptheker v. Rusk	6–3	+	+	+	+	+	+	–	–	–
Schneider v. Rusk	5–3	+	+	+	+	0	+	–	–	–
Mrvica v. Esperdy	3–6	+	+	+	–	–	–	–	–	–
Pro civil liberties in non-unanimous decisions:		6–0	6–0	6–0	5–1	4–1	4–2	2–4	1–5	1–5

+ = Vote for civil liberties claim.
– = Vote against civil liberties claim.
0 = Took no part in decision.

over property open to the public does not evidence the same sort of value hierarchy as did his opinion for the Court in *Marsh* v. *Alabama*.[57]

Black's votes in earlier cases tell a story of a consistent preference, one that makes his sit-in votes seem somewhat strange. But Black's votes do not reveal the entire man; nor do his published opinions. Apparently there has been for some time a strong tension within his jurisprudence. For instance, in *Martin* v. *Struthers*,[58] the 1943 Jehovah's Witness case involving the constitutionality of an anti-doorbell ringing ordinance, Black originally voted to sustain the ordinance. At conference and in the opinion he first circulated—as senior majority Justice, Black had assigned to himself the task of writing the opinion of the Court—he stressed that the case involved a conflict of rights, and that the ordinance was a valid means of protecting the privacy of the home. At conference he had emphasized the necessity of guarding the integrity of private property and had expressed fear that the Witnesses would soon be invading Catholic churches to distribute their literature—with predictable results. Black later had second thoughts, withdrew his opinion, and switched his vote. Stone then graciously allowed him to write a new opinion for the Court, this one vindicating Stone's position at conference that the ordinance was an abridgment of freedom of speech.[59]

III. DOCTRINES

Protesting against what he felt was too rigid a solution to problems of legislative districting, Potter Stewart charged that the majority Justices were pursuing a particular political theory.[60] Undoubtedly Stewart was correct, though candor should have required him to add that he, too, was following a political theory, albeit a different one from the majority's. The great difficulty, given the vagueness of many Supreme Court opinions on fundamental principles of jurisprudence and political theory, is to discover the precise nature and implications of doctrines currently dominant within the Court.

Thus it should be said at the outset that problems of evidence require a cautious approach to any jurisprudential interpretation of Supreme Court decisions. The student of judicial behavior is at least as apt to impose his own categories, substitute his personal judgments, and construct subjectively attractive causal links between concepts when he is analyzing opinions as when he is classifying votes. Determining the significance of a pattern of dicta is no less difficult than categorizing, for example, the reapportionment decisions as basically involving questions of protection of "minority" rights or of free access to the political processes. The willingness of the Justices to compromise their views—and occasionally to change their votes[61]—to gain in intra-Court bargaining or to cope with matters of power politics complicates both kinds of analysis, as do problems of literary style and the pragmatic approach to legal issues that American judges so often take.

One might even go so far as to question whether Supreme Court Justices have a jurisprudence in the academic sense of that term. Perhaps "doctrine" would be less pretentious as well as more descriptive, but as Cardozo once observed, each judge is subject to "a stream of tendency, whether you choose to call it philosophy or not, which gives coherence and direction in thought and action."[62]

Insofar as the majority Justices of the Warren Court, more particularly Black, Douglas, Warren, Brennan and Goldberg, can be said to have accepted any jurisprudential doctrine, it is a revision of that of Harlan F. Stone.[63] Widely known as the Preferred Position Theory, Stone's ideas were first articulated in a footnote to the *Carolene Products* case in 1938.[64] The doctrine was originally drafted by Stone's clerk, Louis Lusky, and edited and amended by Charles Evans Hughes.[65] In later cases Stone elaborated his ideas; and after his death, his biographer, Alpheus T. Mason, brought the Justice's thoughts together into a more coherent theory than Stone had had an opportunity—or an inclination—to do during his own life.[66]

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[57] 326 U.S. 501 (1946).

[58] 319 U.S. 141 (1943).

[59] The Frank Murphy Papers, Michigan Historical Collections, University of Michigan.

[60] Lucas v. Colorado, *supra* note 33 at p. 748.

[61] See my *Elements of Judicial Strategy*, *supra* note 18.

[62] *The Nature of the Judicial Process* (Yale University Press, 1921), p. 12.

[63] Arthur Miller contends that it is the political theory of Thomas Hill Green that is now triumphant on the Court. "An Affirmative Thrust to Due Process of Law," 30 *George Washington Law Review* 399, 416–19 (1962). While I do not agree with Miller on this point, I would like to express my general intellectual debt to this very suggestive article.

[64] United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938).

[65] The details are given in Alpheus T. Mason, *Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law* (New York, 1956), ch. 31.

As published in 1938, Stone's doctrine listed three kinds of cases in which the Court would relax its usual presumption that challenged legislation is constitutional: (1) where a statute appears to fall within the specific prohibitions of the Bill of Rights itself or as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) where a statute restricts access to the political processes; (3) where a statute is directed against specific religious, national, or racial groups, or against any "insular" minority so subject to prejudice that it could not have a meaningful voice in the political process.

The civil liberties decisions of the 1963 term can be viewed as falling under these three categories, and they were so arranged in the first section of this paper, though the titles of the categories were somewhat changed. Not only can the decisions be placed in the pattern prescribed by Stone, but much of the language of recent opinions is reminiscent of the Roosevelt Court in its libertarian prime. In the 1962 term *NAACP* v. *Button* spoke of First Amendment freedoms as "supremely precious" as well as "delicate and vulnerable" and therefore demanding and deserving the most careful judicial protection.[67] In the 1963 term *Baggett* v. *Bullitt*,[68] in striking down Washington's loyalty oaths, emphasized the sensitivity of "basic First Amendment freedoms." In *Wesberry* v. *Sanders*, Black paraphrased his earlier panegyric[69] of the First Amendment to describe the right to vote: "No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws. . . . Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined."[70] In *Schneider* v. *Rusk*, Douglas quoted with approval the statement by a lower court judge—who in turn was quoting Justice Goldberg speaking for the Court—that citizenship is "a most precious right."[71]

There appears to be either some confusion about which rights are most precious or overgenerous use of the superlative. Moreover it is difficult to distinguish rights under the first eight amendments (category 1 of Stone's doctrine) from First Amendment rights under freedom of access to the political process (category 2).[72] Perhaps the Justices could reduce the problems if they never again used the misleading title "Preferred Freedoms" (to my knowledge the Warren Court Justices have not used it in recent years) and if they restated Stone's doctrine along the following lines:

> First, as the highest tribunal in the nation the Supreme Court must be alert to maintain the integrity of the judicial process, to insure that, where officials from other branches of government undertake to use the judicial process to achieve policy aims, judges will proceed with a scrupulous regard for procedural fairness.
>
> Second, if judges are to presume constitutional legislation affecting economic arrangements, they have a heavy obligation to insure the truly democratic nature of the political process by which such laws are enacted. Courts must thus play a special role in guarding the right to vote and more broadly ensuring that freedom of communication—speech and press—as well as freedom of association are available equally to dissidents as to those espousing currently popular causes.

This rephrasing eases rather than eliminates problems.[73] Stone's third category, for instance, is the vaguest of the three. How does a judge determine that a group in a highly pluralistic society is an insular minority? Numbers alone would hardly constitute an adequate criterion of insularity. The du Ponts, Harrimans, Rockefellers, and Kennedys taken together form only the tiniest fraction of the population; yet from time to time they give evidence of being able to stand on their own feet politically.

Race may not be a very useful criterion either. At one time it might have made sense to put most of the Negro cases under this third rubric. Since 1954, however, much racial litigation could just as logically be classed under the Court's role of protecting the democratic nature of the political process. Indeed, one authoritative commentator has suggested that the basic justification for judicial action to end publicly sanctioned segregation can be found under Stone's second category: free access to political process can have no real meaning in a society where government authority imposes caste lines among citizens.[74]

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[66] See especially Alpheus T. Mason, *The Supreme Court from Taft to Warren* (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1958), chs. 5–6, and *The Supreme Court: Palladium of Freedom* (University of Michigan Press, 1962).

[67] *Supra* note 23.

[68] *Supra* note 31.

[69] Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 317 U.S. 287, 302 (1941).

[70] *Supra* note 34 at p. 17.

[71] 377 U.S. 163, 167 (1964). Goldberg had made this statement in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 159 (1963).

[72] The reason for this overlap is explained in Mason, *Harlan Fiske Stone*, ch. 31.

[73] For a perceptive critique of Stone's doctrine, see George Braden, "The Search for Objectivity in Constitutional Law," 57 *Yale Law Journal* 571 (1948).

Some of the difficulties of this third category could be lessened if it were rephrased to read:

> Courts have a third special obligation, that of making sure that regulations affecting social or political freedom, particularly where the freedom of specific groups is immediately involved, meet the highest standards of equal protection of the law. In applying these standards the Court will be obliged to look carefully at the actual impact of a regulation, as *Yick Wo* v. *Hopkins*[75] so eloquently promised.

There are still other problems inherent in any rejuvenation of Stone's doctrine. First, it does not provide a set of objective standards to guide decision-making. Even those who accept the doctrine may differ fundamentally about important kinds of decisions it requires. Stone, for instance, was adamant in insisting that courts should keep out of the apportionment controversy. At the conference discussion of *Colegrove* v. *Green*,[76] so Justice Murphy recorded in his notes, Stone said that judicial intervention in legislative districting "would create confusion in each state. It isn't court business." Again according to Murphy's notes, Justices Black and Rutledge at first agreed with Stone. The original vote on *Colegrove* was 6–1, with Murphy "passing," Jackson not participating and Douglas dissenting alone.[77] Black and to some extent Rutledge later changed their minds. Stone did not live to do so.

A jurisprudence is not, to be sure, a rigid set of formulae designed to supply quick answers to specific and complex social conflicts. It is to a large extent a means of ordering values —and hopefully shaping attitudes and behavior—in terms of ends that are justified by relatively abstract, morally desirable, and intellectually defensible principles. Nevertheless one may charge that, even as restated here, Stone's doctrine is still defective: insofar as it orders values it does so more in terms of desired procedures than of general goals. If this is a defect, it is one shared by much of American political thought.[78]

A more practical difficulty is that Stone's doctrine offers a role for the Court in only one part, although an important part, of its work. The doctrine offers no help at all in fields where the questions do not involve basic constitutional issues, where for example Congress has formulated only vague general statements of policy and left it to judges or administrators to fill in the wide policy gaps. Does deference to Congress require the Court to make such policy, or does self-restraint require the Justices to override congressional judgment? A complete role theory would have to offer guidelines here, for this kind of problem arises rather often, and it goes to the heart of the function of the Court in the political system.[79]

Whatever the shortcomings of Stone's doctrine, if the Justices have decided to accept it, scholars can do little beyond writing critical articles and books in an effort to steer the Court onto more promising jurisprudential paths. Other public officials, however, may make the Justices pay a high price for following Stone's doctrine, for it prescribes a very controversial role for the Court, one beset with political no less than with intellectual pitfalls.

Most responsible people would concede that protecting the integrity of the judicial process is a proper task for an appellate tribunal, though there might be—and with the Supreme Court there often is—deep and widespread doubt that a particular court is playing that role properly. On the other hand, there is more widespread and far deeper doubt that protecting the democratic character of the political process is a proper role for the judiciary. Moreover, protection of unpopular and insular minorities—however insular is defined—is by definition likely to be itself an unpopular task. By embarking on a libertarian course that to many people appears to be unduly technical in protecting the rights of persons accused of crime, by being solicitous of the political rights of "radicals" and "subversives," and by being acutely sensitive to the civil rights of minorities who wish to rise above their "place" in society, the Justices may invite, as they did in 1954–58, the formation of a powerful coalition determined to overturn a number of individual decisions if not to curb the very authority of the Court.[80]

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[74] Mason, *The Supreme Court from Taft to Warren*, chs. 5–6.

[75] 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886).

[76] 328 U.S. 549 (1946).

[77] Murphy Papers and the Harold H. Burton Papers, the Library of Congress, Washington, D. C. I am indebted to Mr. Edward Beiser of Princeton for this latter reference. My interpretation of Murphy's notes was that he first voted with Stone; but Burton's docket book records Murphy as passing and Burton's conference notes report Murphy voted with Douglas. These discrepancies indicate the difficulties the Justices must face in determining their colleagues' views, and serve also as a warning about the historical value of notes jotted down during a lively debate.

[78] Yves Simon, *The Philosophy of Democratic Government* (University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 123, says that in a democratic society "deliberation is about means and presupposes that the problem of ends has been settled."

[79] See Martin Shapiro, *Law and Politics in the Supreme Court* (New York, 1964); and my "Congressional Reliance on Judicial Law-Making," a paper delivered at the 1963 meetings of the American Political Science Association.

One might speculate, therefore, that a libertarian Justice or group of Justices might recognize the dangers confronting their doctrine and might decide that the most prudent course would be to alter the political climate within which the Court operates. In a sense every judicial opinion is an effort to create or maintain a favorable climate of opinion by offering a reasoned explanation for a given decision. The Justices have open to them other means of influencing public opinion,[81] but they might also decide to strike directly at their opponents. Thus a brash observer might see the reapportionment cases as both a part of the Court's general libertarian orientation and as a means to translate that orientation into viable public policy. The majority Justices, this observer might reason, have decided to alter in a drastic way the power of the people most likely to oppose the Court's policies. That is, by their reapportionment decisions, the Justices may have deliberately set out to revamp the political processes and to change the character of the interests and segments of opinion that a majority of legislators are likely to represent.

First of all it must be said that the direct evidence in support of this power-politics interpretation is just about nonexistent. It is true that the reapportionment decisions endorsing the one man, one vote formula occurred only after Warren, Black, Douglas, and Brennan had experienced severe difficulties with Congress and state legislatures and had seen their majority within the Court on some civil liberties issues temporarily wither away. It is also true that as men of considerable political experience—and acumen—the majority Justices must have been aware of the hostile attitudes of many other public officials toward recent libertarian decisions and aware as well of the potential effect of the reapportionment decisions on the structure of political power in this country.

Nevertheless, experience and awareness are not sufficient of themselves to prove or even strongly indicate intent. There is also a time problem here. For years before the Warren Court's problems with other public officials, Black and Douglas had been urging the Court to decide reapportionment cases on their merits.[82] And for some time the Chief Justice and Justice Brennan had been indicating that they, too, thought the Court should be hearing such cases.[83] Furthermore, Justice White, who joined in the reapportionment decisions and in most of the other political freedom rulings, was much more often than not opposed to a libertarian result in non-unanimous criminal justice and insular minority cases. One would not, therefore, expect him to be anxious to join in an effort to weaken the chances of some of his own views becoming viable public policy, unless of course those particular views were relatively unimportant to him.[84]

While this power interpretation has no direct evidential support at this time, it is worth pursuing because considerations of political power can never be very far removed from analysis of Supreme Court decisions. This explanation has at least the merit of directing attention to the impact of judicial decisions on public policy and more particularly to the ability of a court to change the nature of the political system within which it operates. That change may be no less significant because the judges did not think through the implications of their decisions and did not deliberately plot a revolution by judicial fiat. No serious student of public law has ever doubted the immense power of the Justices, but this power has usually been viewed in terms of a capacity to limit the authority of other public officials or, less frequently, of increasing their authority by validating controversial courses of action.[85] These are significant exercises of power, but hardly as significant as the capacity of the Court to change the character of our entire system of representation.

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[80] See my *Congress and the Court* (University of Chicago Press, 1962).

[81] See my *Elements of Judicial Strategy.*

[82] For example: Colegrove v. Green, *supra* note 76; MacDougal v. Green, 325 U.S. 281 (1948); and South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950). The other decisions are summarized in Jo Desha Lucas, "Dragon in the Thicket," 1961 *Supreme Court Review* 194.

[83] Hartsfield v. Sloan, 357 U.S. 916 (1958).

[84] It is very possible that in the sit-in cases White's values in the criminal justice field clashed with his values in the political freedom field. White voted to affirm the sit-in convictions in each decision that divided the Court.

[85] See Robert Dahl, "Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker," 6 *Journal of Public Law* 279 (1957); and Charles Black, *The People and the Court* (New York, 1960).

Without denying the potentially revolutionary effect of the reapportionment decisions—again whether intended or not—one might question whether that effect may not be so gradual as to be evolutionary rather than revolutionary. At the outset, one cannot say with any degree of certainty what immediate impact these cases will have. No doubt urban and suburban areas currently are badly underrepresented in Congress as well as in most state legislatures. But how much and exactly how these areas will gain politically depends on how electoral lines are redrawn. Linking of suburban and rural areas in the same districts could have a very different effect from linking suburban and urban areas, or from carving new districts from within urban or suburban regions.

It must also be remembered that new electoral lines will be drawn by legislators chosen under the old—and unfair—system. And it is possible to gerrymander districts of equal population. Indeed, given a pluralistic society, it is probably impossible to construct any representation lines that do not give advantages to one party or to one kind of interest over another. How judges can distinguish inevitable advantage from subtle deliberate rigging, and what they will be able to do about gerrymandering if they detect it, remain to be seen. Here, certainly, is an area in which there are few established judicial standards of judgment.[86] *Gomillion* v. *Lightfoot*[87] did invalidate a crude effort by Alabama officials to gerrymander Tuskegee, but in that situation race was the sole criterion for districting used by the state. When legislators are less crass, judicial difficulties will increase, as indicated by the Court's refusal to grapple with gerrymandering in *Wright* v. *Rockefeller*.[88]

Second, insofar as the Justices have increased urban political power, they may have weakened or at best have done nothing to increase political support for civil rights. Put quite simply, support for the welfare state does not automatically carry with it respect for the rights of dissenters or tolerance toward other minorities. Available evidence, while hardly conclusive, indicates that although urban working classes may be economically liberal, they are hardly libertarian.[89] They may be somewhat more so than farmers; but by being more exposed to political communication, blue collar workers may also be more vulnerable to rabble-rousing and may choose representatives who are less sympathetic to civil liberties than rural conservatives would be. Cries like "Wipe out crime in the streets!" may strike closer to home in the cities and are not likely to generate support for libertarian decisions in the criminal justice field. The Court's decision in *New York Times* v. *Sullivan*,[90] while it did free the *Times* from what was clearly political oppression, formulated a general doctrine of constitutional law that will make it more difficult to control political smears and reckless campaign charges. In fact one of the first uses of the *Times* decision was to reverse a libel judgment growing out of an irresponsible campaign slur. Washington state representative John Goldmark had obtained a $40,000 verdict against a group who had called him a subversive during the 1962 campaign, but the superior court judge ordered a new trial on the ground that the instructions to the jury had not conformed to the standards laid down in the *Times* opinion.[91]

On the other hand, it is probable that the reapportionment decisions will also increase the political influence of the suburbs, perhaps more so than that of the old urban centers. In the middle and upper income groups that populate the suburbs, the Justices may well find greater support for libertarian decisions, especially for those whose impact does not immediately occur next door. But the Justices are also children of the New Deal—in one or two cases the relationship is avuncular—and economic liberalism is almost as much a part of their background as is devotion to civil liberties. Insofar as the reapportionment decisions increase the political influence of the suburbs, their effect may run counter to economic liberalism in many respects. Suburbanites are apt to back government spending policies from which they benefit, such as improved highways and subsidies to commuter railroads. It is questionable how these people will react to other aspects of the welfare state.[92]

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[86] State courts have applied such standards as contiguity and compactness to districting, but these would hardly seem to make gerrymandering very difficult. See Anthony Lewis, "Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Courts," 71 *Harvard Law Review* 1057, 1066–70 (1958). For an analysis of some of the more commonly used apportioning formulae and suggestions for improvement, see: Alan L. Clem, "Measuring Legislative Malapportionment: In Search of a Better Yardstick," 7 *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 125 (1963).

[87] 364 U.S. 339 (1960).

[88] *Supra* note 37.

[89] Much of the available evidence is summarized in Seymour M. Lipset, *Political Man* (New York, 1960), ch. 4.

[90] *Supra* note 32.

[91] *New York Times*, December 10, 1964, 23: 1. See also Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960), invalidating a Los Angeles ordinance requiring that handbills disclose the name of the publisher and the distributor. For discussions of the serious nature of the problem of securing intelligent and thoughtful political debate, consult the two books by Stanley Kelley, Jr., *Professional Public Relations and Political Power* (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1956), and *Political Campaigning* (Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1960); and Frank Jonas, "The Art of Political Dynamiting," 10 *Western Political Quarterly* 374 (1957).

Third, it does seem very probable that Negro political influence will be increased, particularly in the South, since it is apparently more difficult to discriminate against Negro voters in urban areas.[93] This change may to some extent cut down the incidence of race-baiting, though alone it will by no means end such demagoguery. And while increased representation in southern state legislatures will not automatically bring about the collapse of resistance to integration, such representation will at least turn these legislatures into a forum in which both sides will be heard.[94]

Increased Negro political influence will certainly help ease some racial problems; but, judging from past experience, it is not at all improbable that Negroes will be as callous toward the rights of other minority groups as whites have been toward those of the Negro. Perhaps more significant than scattered indications among Negroes of anti-semitism[95] and more overt hostility toward Puerto Ricans, is the past behavior of white ethnic groups. A recent status as a member of a lower caste group does not appear to have made whites more tolerant of newer immigrants into American society. Irish resentment of Poles and Italians has been as bitter as Yankee disdain for the Irish; and outside the South, white opposition to civil rights legislation—though obviously not against Lyndon Johnson—seems to have its strongest emotional base in working class neighborhoods of first and second generation Americans.[96]

Fourth, it is naive to think that changing the nature of electoral districts will immediately change the nature of the legislative process. Because of public ignorance and apathy on many issues, legislators have considerable leeway in voting for or against measures and far wider freedom in allowing themselves to be placed in a position not to vote at all. The fundamental fact here may be that a legislature is a social system as well as a political institution, a social system in which the character of constituents is an important factor, but only one of many operative factors.[97]

Furthermore, although dramatic civil liberties issues are occasionally fought out in the legislative arena, probably the more usual context for these problems, whether of discrimination against minorities, criminal justice, or political freedom, is within the jurisdiction of local police and local prosecutors. It is true that these officials may be applying statutes formally passed by state legislatures or ordinances that technically owe their legality to legislative sufferance; but these regulations typically allow broad administrative discretion, and it is difficult to see how they could be otherwise drawn, given the complexity of the problems with which they deal. Ordinary breach of the peace regulations provide ample discretion for local officials to do a thorough job of curtailing civil liberties.

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[92] See James Q. Wilson and Edward C. Banfield, "Public-Regardingness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior," this Review, Vol. 58 (Dec. 1964), pp. 876–887.

[93] See *1961 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights Report* (Washington, D.C., G.P.O., 1961), Bk I.

[94] Georgia, for instance, in 1962 elected to its state legislature the first Negro since Reconstruction. Albert Saye, "Revolution by Judicial Action in Georgia," 17 *Western Political Quarterly* 10 (1964).

[95] The New York office of the Anti-Defamation League has a thick file of newspaper reports and analyses of anti-semitism among Negroes. While this evidence is not conclusive in proving the widespread existence of anti-semitism among Negroes, it is still disconcerting to those who had hoped that the Negro would learn and profit from the experience of his white brethren. These reports would come as no surprise to those who accept the thesis of E. Franklin Frazier in his *Black Bourgeoisie* (New York, 1957).

For discussions of Negro-Jewish relations, see especially: Kenneth B. Clark, "Candor about Negro-Jewish Relations," 1 *Commentary* 8 (Feb., 1946); James Baldwin, "The Harlem Ghetto: Winter 1948," 5 *Commentary* 165 (Feb., 1948); Nathan Glazer, "Negroes and Jews: The New Challenge to Pluralism," 38 *Commentary* (Dec., 1964); and R. C. Hertz, "Rising Tide of Negro-Jewish Tensions," 20 *Ebony* 117 (Dec., 1964).

[96] Direct evidence here is lacking. I say "seems" and base this statement on numerous newspaper stories in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post and Times-Herald* during the fall of 1964 and on my own experience in working for the U.S. Civil Rights Commission in New Jersey.

[97] See John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy Ferguson, *The Legislative System* (New York, 1962).

It is also true that strong legislative support for or against certain actions may influence police and prosecutor decisions. This influence, however, may trickle down rather slowly, and a few strategically placed legislators who are hostile to libertarian judicial decisions may encourage police to persist in practices of which judges disapprove.

IV. TOWARD A NEW JURISPRUDENCE

The work of the 1963 term reveals a libertarian majority solidly in control of the Court. Insofar as these Justices have adopted a revised version of Stone's jurisprudence, they are applying it in a more positive fashion than Stone envisioned.[98] Instead of merely checking governmental action—though they are doing that in many instances—the Justices are also pushing and shaping governmental action to cope with the problems of twentieth century American society. They have accepted the necessity of big government to help run the complex economy of an urban, industrialized society. But as intellectual heirs of a liberal tradition, the Justices have not lost their fear of government as an oppressor of personal freedom. Nor have they lost their fear of the dangers to personal freedom from non-governmental action.

Edward S. Corwin once showed that historically the basic doctrine of American constitutional law had been one of vested rights[99] —a doctrine that eventually asserted an almost unrestricted liberty to use, dispose of, and contract for property and labor. That doctrine died in 1937. Since then the Justices have been formulating, not always deliberately or perhaps even consciously, a new jurisprudence for the welfare state. This new jurisprudence has many facets, but its core, I believe, is composed of two concepts: freedom and social equality. "Freedom" here has been modified to mean political not economic freedom, for the Court has encouraged—not merely tolerated—government regulation of the economy.[100] For its part, the concept of equality includes but goes far beyond the old common law standard of equal justice within the courtroom between rich and poor. The new concept is much broader in scope and more activist in effect. It requires judges as well as other government officials to foster equality within society as a whole.[101] The Justices have deemed this aspect of constitutional law so important as to incorporate the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause into the Bill of Rights.[102]

The old jurisprudence was subject to serious tensions, and judicial inability to adjust the doctrine of vested rights to a mass, industrialized society led to its downfall. The new jurisprudence, too, is not without its tensions, as the discussion of the possible impact of the reapportionment decisions tried to illustrate. A more fundamental tension, despite a recent denial by Mr. Justice Goldberg,[103] is that between social equality and political freedom. In a society of men of unequal talent, ambition, and character, political freedom may be as dangerous to social equality as economic freedom was. This is not to deny that the Justices may be able to find a way that will allow much of both values to become operational, only to caution that their mutual existence may depend on a delicate process of reconciliation.

The Justices may lack a fully articulated theory of politics to explain and justify their role, or their variety of roles, in the American political system. They may also lack a coherent philosophy of law to balance liberty against equality and to direct governmental action into socially beneficial channels with a minimum of flooding onto the plains of personal freedom. Yet the Justices do not seem to lack a sense of political direction. Their positive approach to problems of law and policy may mean that they are making different kinds of law than they were thirty years ago; they are hardly making less important law—or less important policy.

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[98] For a related but somewhat different thesis, see Miller, *op. cit., supra* note 63.

[99] "The Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Law," 12 *Michigan Law Review* 247 (1914).

[100] For example: American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90 (1946); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 331 U.S. 682 (1947); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).

[101] See, for example: Steele v. L. & N. Rr., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Tunstall v. Brotherhood, 323 U.S. 210 (1944); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Graham v. Brotherhood, 338 U.S. 232 (1949); Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Brown v. Board, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

[102] Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).

[103] "Equality in Governmental Action," 39 *New York University Law Review* 205 (1964). At one point Goldberg stated that he believes the framers of the Constitution "naturally assumed that [equality] was encompassed within the concept of liberty." *Ibid.*, p. 207. On this point, Philip Kurland, "Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of Government," 78 *Harvard Law Review* 143 (1964), has angrily lashed back at Goldberg in particular and the recent work of the Court in general.

MAO TSE-TUNG'S REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY AND PEKING'S INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR*

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Despite its political implications, the recent explosion of an atomic device has not greatly altered China's present military position *vis-à-vis* the West. By all standards except population and size, Communist China is still not a first-rate power. But she has nevertheless proceeded to engage the two superpowers simultaneously in a contest from her position of military and economic weakness. What is equally undeniable is that the success of Peking's foreign policy in the struggle with both superpowers, though limited and perhaps only temporary, has considerably exceeded anticipations based on her military and economic strengths. It is the contention of this paper that an explanation of these two striking facts must be sought in the nature of Mao's revolutionary strategy in the Chinese internal political-military struggle and his belief in the applicability of this strategy to the international arena and to other countries, particularly those in the underdeveloped areas. Mao dared to challenge the militarily and economically strong United States because his revolutionary experience proved to his own satisfaction that his integrated and comprehensive strategy would enable him presently to score political gains from a position of military inferiority, and ultimately enable him to achieve highly ambitious objectives with initially meager means in a protracted struggle. This conviction also explains in part his willingness to challenge the Soviet policy of "peaceful coexistence" even at the cost of losing Soviet economic aid and at the risk of an open split in the international communist movement.

The key to the understanding of Communist China's foreign policy lies, accordingly, in Mao's revolutionary strategy and its projection abroad. This paper begins with a brief examination of the various factors facilitating the Chinese Communists' projection of their revolutionary strategy abroad and with the enumeration of some items of evidence of this relationship between international behavior and revolutionary strategy. It then seeks to define the nature of Mao's revolutionary strategy by an end-means analysis and to show how the various elements of that strategy form a unified and intelligible structure. This reconstruction of Mao's revolutionary strategy on the basis of his writings and his actions is carried out with the hope that it might serve as an initial step in, and a provisional guide for, intensive research on the Chinese Communist revolution. It might also help in future attempts to interpret Peking's foreign policy. This interpretation, if correct, will in turn raise certain theoretical questions about the foreign policy of revolutionary regimes and perhaps even about the international behavior of nations in general.

I. REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY AND INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR

All violent political revolutions start with a group of men who are initially weak in numbers and strength. But in the modern world, no other group of successful revolutionaries was confronted with greater odds, waged a more protracted armed struggle, and survived greater defeats than Mao Tse-tung and his comrades. In his tortuous road to ultimate victory, Mao followed a pattern of action and adopted a set of principles which, on many occasions, helped him to achieve political gain from a position of military weakness and which, over a period of time, enabled him to bridge the enormous gap between his highly ambitious goal and his early military-political impotence.

This pattern of action and set of principles followed in time and in logical sequence Lenin's substitution of the conquest of political power for socialism as the end-in-view of the Communist movement and his use of military analogy for the analysis of the revolutionary situation and for the development of a theory of political strategy. This military analogy obliterated the analytic difference between political and military forms of the class struggle and called attention to the relevance of military analysis as a method of formulating programs to deal with political conflict.[1] But unlike Lenin, Mao was engaged in an intermittent civil war over a period of more than twenty years before the seizure of power. Thus, Mao went beyond Lenin in his emphasis on the importance of military power, laid down precepts for coordinating its use with political policies, developed the doctrine of protracted war, pursued a military strategy of surrounding the cities from the countryside, and exemplified in his strategies and tactics a combination of prudence with revolutionary enthusiasm. While Mao's doctrines and precepts are by no means profound, they were perfectly adapted to the objective conditions confronting him[2] and were in the best tradition of *Realpolitik* and the age-old military-political wisdom of China. They helped the Chinese Communists to win the most bitter and most protracted internal war in the twentieth century.

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Furthermore, the Communists' theory of revolution, as Janos pointed out, is the theory of world revolution. To them the analytic categories relevant to domestic and international politics are identical.[3] From their viewpoint their revolution to overthrow the Kuomintang government was, among other things, a fight against the lackeys of Western imperialism, particularly American imperialism in the last few years of the struggle; and they have seen their attacks on the West, particularly on the United States, after their capture of power as merely a continuation of their previous struggle. The precarious balance of power in the Far East and Southeast Asia within a world-wide context of American military superiority must have seemed to them analogous to the situation during the larger part of the civil war, when over-all Nationalist superiority was juxtaposed to local Communist strength in particular areas. Moreover, these long-standing principles which brought about ultimate success have a sacrosanct quality. They are immune from challenge by most of the now largely discredited traditional rules. They are not checked by any principles of the newly established social order, which they themselves helped to bring into existence. Their projection into the international arena is also helped by the relatively short but highly traumatic experience of China as a member of the family of nations. This experience militates against wholehearted acceptance of the system of national states and the rules governing nations in that system. The moral unanimity among the leaders who claim to know the absolute and universal truth reinforces the proverbial Chinese ethnocentrism and strengthens the tendency to view the foreign scene in the Chinese image and to judge alien things by Chinese standards. Thus, it is not surprising that many of Mao's principles and precepts of political-military actions have underlain Peking's policies, strategies, and tactics in the international arena and in each specific encounter with other nations.

As early as August, 1946, Mao set down four theses on the international situation which, with some modifications, continued to guide his foreign policy. First, an all-out war between the United States and the Soviet Union in the immediate future was improbable. Second, the struggle in the immediate future between the socialist and imperialist camps would take place in "the vast zone" separating the United States and the Soviet Union which included "many capitalist, colonial and semi-colonial countries in Europe, Asia and Africa." This thesis was the origin of the controversial concept of the intermediate zone. Third, the atomic bomb is a "paper tiger" because "the outcome of a war is decided by the people, not by one or two new types of weapons." Fourth, all reactionaries, including "the United States reactionaries" are paper tigers. "In appearance, the reactionaries are terrifying, but in reality they are not so powerful from the long-term point of view."[4] These four theses in what amounted to Mao's first independent assessment of the global situation confronting the international Communist movement[5] reflected his unified strategy in the Chinese revolution, particularly in the period between 1937 and 1945, which will be described later. This assessment of the global situation constituted Mao's justification of his acceptance in July, 1946 of all-out war with Chiang from the viewpoint of the international Communist movement as a whole and placed his revolutionary war within the context of the struggle between two camps.

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[1] Andrew C. Janos, "The Communist Theory of the State and Revolution," in *Communism and Revolution*, ed. Cyril E. Black and Thomas P. Thornton (Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 32–6.

[2] Thomas P. Thornton, "The Foundations of Communist Revolutionary Doctrine," *ibid.*, p. 66.

[3] Janos, *loc. cit.*, p. 40.

[4] Mao Tse-tung, "Talk with the American Correspondent Anna Louise Strong," *Selected Works*, IV (Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1963), pp. 97–101. Hereafter cited as Mao, *Selected Works*, IV (Peking), in order to distinguish it from the fourth volume of Mao's selected works published by Lawrence and Wishart which covers the period from 1941 to Aug. 9, 1945.

[5] Prior to that time, Mao's pronouncements on international questions generally followed the twists and turns of the Soviet line. See Tang Tsou, *America's Failure in China* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1963), pp. 209–16.

Soon after the establishment of their regime, the Chinese Communists began to apply Mao's political-military strategy outside of China. In November, 1949, Liu Shao-ch'i, already the second ranking leader in the Chinese Communist Party, declared that the peoples of various colonial and semicolonial countries should follow the "path taken by the Chinese people in defeating imperialism and its lackeys." He specifically identified this path as consisting of Mao's three magic weapons: the united front, armed struggle, and party building.[6] In defeating General MacArthur's drive to the Yalu, the Chinese Communist forces successfully carried out Mao's strategy of retreating deep into one's base area, waiting for the enemy to commit mistakes and fighting a battle of quick decision as a prelude to a general counter-offensive.[7] In Indo-China, the Viet Minh applied to its own revolutionary war those Chinese methods and precepts suitable to Vietnamese conditions, perfected some new tactics of its own, and ultimately defeated the modern, fully trained, and excellently equipped French Expeditionary Corps.[8] In the Quemoy crisis of 1958, a timely retreat, an early offer to negotiate, and a unilateral declaration of cease-fire kept the military risks and political cost to a minimum and achieved some political gains.[9] In the military clash over the border with India in 1962, China inflicted a stinging defeat on Indian forces, and then declared a unilateral cease-fire, thereby exhibiting Mao's strategy of limited victory and restraint. The strategy and tactics of the Pathet Lao both in the coalition government and on the battlefield remind one of Mao's principles and precepts. Whether or not the Chinese Communists have given aid and advice to the rebels in the Congo, they certainly believe that their revolutionary experience holds important lessons for the Congolese.[10] Several documents issued in the dispute between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China show that Mao is pursuing the global, long-term strategy against the West of encircling the developed areas from the underdeveloped areas, which is a projection abroad of his strategy of surrounding the cities from the countryside in the Chinese civil war.[11]

The Chinese Communist leaders are highly self-conscious of their revolutionary mission. The late Marshal Lo Jung-huan told the cadres in the Political Academy in October, 1960: "At present, revisionism is spreading. The world revolution relies on the thought of Mao Tse-tung . . . [The thought of Mao Tse-tung] belongs not only to China but also has its international implications."[11a] Another recent official analysis of the international situation contains the following prognosis: "Peaceful coexistence [with many countries other than the United States] or coexistence through stalemate [with the United States] is a transitional form. So is pacifist neutralism. The life of imperialism will necessarily come to an end; socialism will one day be realized throughout the world."[11b] Marshal Yeh Chien-ying declared:

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[6] "Opening Speech by Liu Shao-ch'i at the Trade Union Congress of Asian and Australian Countries," *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*, December 30, 1949, p. 14; H. Arthur Steiner, *The International Position of Communist China* (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1958), pp. 8–15; A. M. Halpern, "The Foreign Policy Uses of the Chinese Revolutionary Model," *The China Quarterly* (July–Sept., 1961), pp. 1–16.

[7] For Mao's doctrine on this point, see Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of China's Revolutionary War," *Selected Works*, I (London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1955), pp. 210–53. On the actions of the Chinese Communist forces in Korea, see Roy E. Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu* (Washington, G.P.O., 1961), pp. 667–776; S. L. A. Marshall, *The River and the Gauntlet* (New York, 1953). For an interpretation, see Allen Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu* (New York, 1960), pp. 130–50.

[8] George Modelski, "The Viet Minh Complex," in Black, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 207–209; George K. Tanham, *Communist Revolutionary Warfare, the Viet Minh in Indo-China* (New York, 1961), pp. 23–8.

[9] Robert W. Barnett, "Quemoy: the Use and Consequences of Nuclear Deterrence" (mimeographed) (Cambridge, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1960); Alice Langley Hsieh, *Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1962), pp. 119–30; Donald Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956–1961* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 213–215; John R. Thomas, "Soviet Behavior in the Quemoy Crisis of 1958," *Orbis* (Spring, 1962), pp. 38–9; Tang Tsou, *The Embroilment of Quemoy: Mao, Chiang, and Dulles* (Salt Lake City, University of Utah Press, 1959).

[10] Editorial, *Jen-min jih-pao*, June 24, 1964, p. 1.

[11] Tang Tsou, "Mao Tse-tung and Peaceful Coexistence," *Orbis* (Spring, 1964), pp. 36–51. For an interpretation of the struggle for power in China, see Tang Tsou, *America's Failure in China*, pp. 48–56, 127–141, 186–92, 300–311, 401–40.

[11a] *Kung-tso t'ung-hsün* [*Work Correspondence*]

> No other nation in the world has more experience [in fighting a war] than we . . . . The nations which have not yet been liberated also want to overthrow imperialism and feudalism . . . and to wage armed struggle. They very much need our experience. Therefore, we should sum up our experience to hand it down to posterity and to present it to our friends.[11c]

As this experience is most relevant to the struggle of the "national liberation movement" in the underdeveloped areas, Peking accords a high priority in her foreign policy to the support of these movements. A military journal explained it this way:

> Toward national liberation movements in colonial and semi-colonial countries, there are two different attitudes. One makes the improvement of relations with the West a primary concern and does not support or gives small amount of support to the national liberation movements. The other makes support for national liberation movements a primary concern. It permits some proper dealings with the Western countries but considers this a secondary question. Our country adopts the latter attitude, firmly supporting the national liberation movements and opposing colonialism and imperialism. We may have dealings with Western countries but do not bargain away our support for national liberation movements.[11d]

So Peking's policy is actively to cultivate close relationships with countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, but not the Western countries, particularly the United States. In 1961, Africa was regarded as the center of the anti-colonial struggle. "When the time is ripe, a revolutionary upsurge will engulf the African continent."[11e] Even the Taiwan question is viewed in the broad context of the world-wide struggle against the United States in which "one incautious move will cause the loss of the game."[11f] If Communist China, "a newly emerging socialist country," should yield to the United States and allow imperialist forces to hold her territory, Taiwan, "her international prestige will drop ten thousand feet."[11g] By refusing to compromise on the issue of Taiwan and by keeping Sino-American relations in a stalemate, "we can keep the anti-imperialist banner, freely support the national liberation struggle in the colonial and semi-colonial countries, preserve our ability to attract political support, and stimulate our morale.[11h] Marshal Chen Yi, the Foreign Minister, summed up Peking's approach to international affairs neatly when he affirmed in September, 1964, that Mao's strategical and tactical thinking, together with the policies and general lines of the Party center, were the principal guides for Communist China's analysis of international problems in the past fifteen years.[11i] It is clear that Mao's revolutionary strategy in the struggle in China is a recurrent element in Peking's international behavior.

II. THE BALANCE OF FORCES IN CHINA

To understand Mao's doctrines and precepts of political-military action in the civil struggle, one must begin with Mao's firm grasp of the contrast between his highly ambitious goal and his initially meager means—a contrast which is relevant to our analysis of his foreign policies, strategies and tactics. This highly ambitious goal of seizure of power as a first step toward the eventual establishment of a communist society was defined for him by ideology. But he was realistic enough to recognize that for a long time to come, the balance of social forces would not be in his favor. He described the Chinese society as having "a shape bulging out in the middle while tapering off towards the two ends."[12] In more concrete terms, this imagery meant that the proletariat, on the one hand, and the "reactionary big landlords and big big bourgeoisie," on the other, formed a small minority of the population, while the peasantry, urban petty bourgeoisie and the other intermediate classes constituted the

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no. 8 (Feb. 2, 1961), pp. 16, 17. The *Work Correspondence* is a secret journal, designed for reading by the cadres of the People's Liberation Army at the regimental level and above. Hereafter cited as *Work Correspondence*.

[11b] *Ibid.*, no. 17 (April 25, 1961), p. 20.

[11c] *Ibid.*, no. 12 (March 10, 1961), p. 4.

[11d] *Ibid.*, no. 17 (April 25, 1961), p. 22.

[11e] *Ibid.*, p. 23.

[11f] *Ibid.*, p. 20.

[11g] *Ibid.*, p. 25.

[11h] *Ibid.*, p. 24.

[11i] Chen Yi, "Commemorating the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Publication of the *Shih-chieh chih-shih*," *Shih-chieh chih-shih*, Sept. 10, 1964, p. 1.

[12] Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, III (London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1954), p. 239.

vast majority.[13] Within this social structure, the balance of power between the "two ends" favored the "landlord class and big bourgeosie," with the intermediate classes under the influence of the counterrevolutionary forces.[14] Thus, two of the characteristics of China's revolutionary war in its early stages were the "great strength of the enemy" and "the weakness and small size of the Red Army."[15]

But in spite of its military strength and its cunning, the enemy had its congenital weakness which was political, social and economic in character. Based on a frail capitalist system and a preponderantly "semi-feudal" economy, it could not effectively mobilize its resources. Presiding over a vast territory, it could not effectively govern every part of the country. Rent by numerous internal contradictions, it was split into factions perpetually fighting one another. Monopolizing political power, it could not win the cooperation of non-Kuomintang political groups. Exploiting the masses, it could not enlist popular support. Thus, it was vulnerable to the challenge of the revolutionary forces.

III. AN INTEGRATED STRATEGY TO ACHIEVE AMBITIOUS GOALS WITH MEAGER MEANS

In making this successful challenge, Mao's genius consisted in combining an ability to face reality squarely and a determination to change that reality. On the one hand, he fully realized the gap between his goal and his means, harbored no illusion about the relative strength of the Kuomintang and the Communists, and correctly detected the contrast between the Kuomintang's military might and political weakness. On the other hand, he gradually evolved a set of doctrines, principles and precepts governing his political-military actions which would in the first instance enable him to survive the attack of the vastly superior Nationalist forces, then to expand his own power, and finally to transform the balance of social forces in his favor, and to attain ultimate victory in the revolution.

He stressed the indispensability of military power to achieve political purposes and implement political policies. He emphasized the primacy of political purpose and policies to provide military power with the necessary foundation and direction and to exploit the political weakness of the Kuomintang in order to compensate for his own military inferiority. As his grand strategy, he evolved the concept of surrounding the cities from the countryside. Concerning the duration of his revolution, he formulated the doctrine of protracted war. Concerning the form of military operations, he developed a doctrine of guerrilla warfare and its gradual transformation into mobile warfare. In military tactics, he followed the idea of retreat and dispersal of forces to avoid defeat, but concentration of forces to win battles of quick decision. As his objective on the battlefield, he subordinated the aim of defending or gaining territory to the goal of annihilating the enemy's effective strength and preserving his own forces. For evaluating the decisive factor in military success, he advanced the notion of the importance of men over weapons. For appraising the strength of the enemy, he proposed the principle that with regard to each particular struggle the Communists should not underestimate their enemies, while with regard to the whole situation the Communists should not overestimate them. He stressed the need to combine prudence with the revolutionary spirit. To avert irreversible defeat, he turned the united front doctrine into a rationale for seeking peace with the Kuomintang. To expand his influence while avoiding an all-out conflict, he practiced limited war. To transform military gains into legitimate authority, he sought political settlement through negotiations in a favorable climate of opinion created by astute propaganda and a moderate political program. To clinch final victory when the balance of forces could be changed in his favor by large-scale fighting, he accepted an all-out war. These doctrines, principles, precepts, and practices were consistent with one another and formed a coherent whole. They were in accord with the political, military, and psychological demands of the objective situation. They helped the Communists to overcome tremendous difficulties and eventually to bridge the gap between the bold objective of seizing power and the modest means in the hands of the revolutionaries.

IV. THE INDISPENSABILITY OF MILITARY POWER

Mao realized at an early stage of his career that military power was an indispensable means to attain his revolutionary objective. To Mao, "a revolution is an uprising, an act of violence whereby one class overthrows another." It is, he warned, "not the same as inviting people to dinner, or writing an essay, or painting a picture, or doing fancy needlework; it cannot be anything so refined, so calm and gentle, or so mild, kind, restrained and magnanimous."[16] Chiang's ruthless suppression of the Communists in the spring of 1927 and the failure of the Communists to arm themselves against his sudden attack dramatized the fact that sheer survival, if nothing else, depended on the possession of military power. After he established his bases in Kiangsi, he came to recognize that revolutionary violence in China would take the form of armed insurrections and protracted civil war,[17] and that the existence of a regular Red Army of adequate strength was a necessary condition for the survival and expansion of the Red political power.[18] He characterized the formation and development of the Red Army, the guerrilla units, and the Red areas as "the highest form of the peasant struggle under the leadership of the proletariat in semi-colonial China."[19] After having fought a series of campaigns against encirclement and annihilation by the Kuomintang forces, he arrived at the view: "In China war is the main form of struggle and the army is the main form of organization. Other forms such as mass organization and mass struggle are also extremely important and indeed indispensable and in no circumstances to be overlooked, but their purpose is to serve the war."[20] Mao urged every Communist to grasp the truth that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."[21] He pointed out that

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[13] *Ibid.*, p. 260; *id.*, IV, p. 25.

[14] Mao, *Selected Works*, I, 88–9, 164.

[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 195–6.

> having guns, we can create Party organizations, as witness the powerful Party organizations which the Eighth Route Army [*i.e.*, one of the two Communist military formations during the Sino-Japanese War] has created in northern China. We can also create cadres, create schools, create culture, create mass movements. Everything in Yenan has been created by having guns. All things grow out the barrel of a gun.[22]

Looking beyond the horizon of China, he said: "Experience in the class struggle in the era of imperialism teaches us that it is only by the power of the gun that the working class and the labouring masses can defeat the armed bourgeoisie and landlords; in this sense we may say that with guns can the whole world be transformed."[23] From this, he concluded: "The seizure of power by armed forces, the settlement of the issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution. This Marxist-Leninist principle of revolution holds good universally for China and for all countries."[24]

V. THE PRIMACY OF POLITICS

To seize power by armed force required a military power superior to the Kuomintang. But the Kuomintang's greatest strength was precisely its military power, while its weaknesses were political, economic and social. To develop a military power in the service of the revolution, it was necessary to adopt certain policies to exploit the political chaos, economic stagnation, social ferment, and nationalistic sentiments fostered by foreign encroachments. These policies, directed at the vulnerable chinks in the Kuomintang's armor, would provide the Communists with a political foundation on which to build their military power and compensate for their military weakness with their political influence. Thus, necessity and political expediency reinforced the imperatives of a revolutionary ideology in stressing the paramount importance of the political purpose and policies which military power was employed to achieve.

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[16] Mao Tse-tung, "Report of an Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan," *Selected Works,* I, p. 27.

[17] Mao, "The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains," *ibid.,* p. 100; "Tactics of Fighting Japanese Imperialism," *ibid.,* pp. 164–165; "Problems of China's Revolutionary War," *ibid.,* pp. 192–9.

[18] Mao, "Why Can China's Red Political Power Exist?" *ibid.,* p. 67.

[19] Mao, "A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire," *ibid.,* p. 117.

[20] Mao, "Problems of War and Strategy," *Selected Military Writings* (Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1963), p. 269.

[21] *Ibid.,* p. 272.

[22] *Ibid.,* pp. 272–73.

[23] *Ibid.*

[24] *Ibid.,* p. 267. These two sentences are followed by a paragraph in which Mao discusses the application of this principle to capitalist countries. He expresses the opinion that it is the task of the parties of the proletariat there to build up their strength through a long period of legal struggle, and thus to prepare for the final overthrow of capitalism in an insurrection and civil war. This paragraph is omitted in the English version of Mao's selected works published in England in 1958. See Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works,* II (new edition, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1958), p. 223. For the Chinese version see Mao, "Chan-cheng yü chan-lüeh wen-ti" ["Problems of War and Strategy,"] *Hsüan-chi* ["Selected Works"], II (Peking, Jen-min ch'u-pan she, 1952), p. 529. The omission in the version published in England in 1958 seems to have been related to the debate between him and Khrushchev over the question of peaceful transition, which was the subject of a statement given by the Chinese Communist Party to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, expounding the former's dissenting view. See *Peking Review,* July 26, 1963, p. 28.

At the beginning of the first civil war with the Kuomintang, the political purpose, or in Marxist terminology the content of the revolution, was defined as the overthrow of the rule in China of imperialism and warlords, the completion of the bourgeois-democratic, national revolution under the leadership of the proletariat, and the carrying out of the agrarian revolution so as to eliminate the feudal exploitation of the peasants by the landed gentry.[25] "The Chinese Red Army," Mao wrote, "is an armed force for carrying out the political tasks of the revolution."[26]

The political purpose gave direction to the armed struggle, differentiated the real friends from the real enemy, legitimized the political leadership of the armed forces, and pointed to the political foundation on which military power must be built. "Without a political goal," Mao warned, "guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and their sympathy, cooperation and assistance cannot be gained."[27] "Any tendency . . . to belittle politics, to isolate war from politics, and to become advocates of 'war is everything,' is erroneous and must be corrected," Mao wrote.[28] A strong Communist party, in theory the party of the proletariat, must take command of the army.[29] The agrarian revolution must be deepened to secure the support of the peasants.[30] A workers' and peasants' political power must be established in the base areas, to carry out social and economic reforms, to mobilize the masses and to give support to the army. During the Sino-Japanese War, nationalism was used as a powerful tool to mobilize the masses.[31] For its part, the army must not only fight to destroy the enemy's military strength, but also "shoulder such important tasks as agitating the masses, organizing them, arming them, helping them to set up revolutionary political power and even establishing organizations of the Communist Party.[32] In this manner, Mao created the political foundation for his military power, which was in turn his chief weapon in his political revolution. This chief weapon must, however, be employed in conjunction with other instruments and only to gain political objectives within the framework of the balance of military and political forces.[33] Thus, the use of military power must be subordinated to political policy, and military action could succeed only when the political policy was correct. As Li Wei-han, the Director of the United Front Work Department points out in an authoritative article, "to win a war we must rely first on politics and we must first win the political war."[34]

While the political strategy of the Chinese Communists to win the political war went through many twists and turns, its essence was to "develop the progressive forces, to win over the middle-of-the-road forces, and to isolate the die-hards."[35] Or to use Li Wei-han's formulation,

> the working class must, on the basis of the consolidation and expansion of the worker-peasant alliance, win over all the forces that can possibly be won over and unite with over 90 per cent of the country's population; only so can it establish a strong, over-all leadership, keep the enemy completely isolated and win victory for the revolution.[36]

Once the intermediate classes were won over and the arch-enemy isolated, the revolutionary forces would enjoy such overwhelming popular support that their military power could be progressively developed and the balance of military power would be tipped in favor of the revolution. Mao's mobilization of the peasants and his attempt to win over the

[25] Mao, "Why Can China's Red Political Power Exist?" *Selected Works*, I, p. 64.

[26] Mao, "On the Rectification of Incorrect Ideas in the Party," *ibid.*, p. 106.

[27] Mao, "On Guerrilla Warfare," trans. Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith (New York, Praeger, 1961), p. 43.

[28] Mao, "On Protracted War," *Selected Works*, II, p. 158.

[29] Mao, "Problems of War and Strategy," *ibid.*, p. 228.

[30] Mao, "The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains," *Selected Works*, I, pp. 74, 80; "A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire," *ibid.*, p. 117.

[31] Chalmers Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1962).

[32] Mao, "On the Rectification of Incorrect Ideas in the Party," *Selected Works*, I, p. 106.

[33] See Alice Langley Hsieh, *Communist China and Nuclear Force* (RAND Corporation, P-2719-1), p. 9.

[34] Li Wei-han, "The Chinese People's Democratic United Front: Its Special Features," *Peking Review*, Aug. 25, 1961, p. 17.

[35] Mao, *Selected Works*, III, p. 194.

[36] Li Wei-han, "The Struggle for Proletarian Leadership in the Period of the New Democratic Revolution in China," *Peking Review*, Feb. 23, 1962, p. 5.

intermediate classes drew new groups into the political arena, extended the base of political participation, and eventually created a coalition of social forces larger and stronger than the political elements supporting the Kuomintang. In turn, military success helped him to win over those who wanted to join the victorious side.

VI. FROM THE COUNTRYSIDE TO THE CITIES IN A PROTRACTED STRUGGLE

While political policies could provide the foundation for the development of military power and give it general direction, they furnished no specific guidance as to how this military power could be used. In the course of his struggle for survival and power, Mao evolved a series of strategic ideas in the light of the objective conditions confronting him. He built his first base area in the border region between two provinces, Hunan and Kiangsi, where the peasants were aroused to revolutionary actions during the Northern Expedition of 1926 and 1927. The terrain being mountainous, it was easy to defend. Being far away from the big cities, the centers of Nationalist power, it was situated at one of the weakest points of local control. Wedged between two provinces, it enabled the Communists to exploit the clashes of interests between provincial authorities. When a split took place within the ruling class and civil war developed among the Nationalist generals, Mao would consider the feasibility of "a strategy of comparatively venturesome advance and expand the independent regime over a comparatively large area by fighting."[37] When warfare among the Kuomintang leaders stopped and when peace and stability prevailed in one or several provinces, he would adopt only a strategy of gradual advance while concentrating his personnel to consolidate his political power and military position in the central districts in the red border area. He would pursue a defensive strategy in Hunan where the ruling power was strong, but an offensive strategy in Kiangsi where the ruling class was comparatively weak. In all his military operations during this period, guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare of a guerrilla character were the main forms. The location of his base area, his selection of targets, and the form of military operations enabled him to use his inferior armed forces to his maximum advantage by exploiting the political weakness of the Kuomintang.

On the basis of his experience in the early successes of the Red Army and the lessons learned from the defeat in the Kuomintang's fifth campaign of encirclement and annihilation, Mao systematized his views into the strategy of surrounding the cities from the countryside and the doctrine of protracted war.

Some of these views he had adopted or advocated in opposition to the Li Li-san line of organizing armed uprising in major cities and concentrating the Red Army's forces for attacking them.[38] Others stood in conflict with the policy inaugurated by Ch'en Shao-yü and followed by Ch'in Pang-hsien, which in September, 1931, again called for the seizure of major cities by the Red Army to win victory first in one or several provinces and which during the Kuomintang's fifth campaign of encirclement and annihilation led to a decision to fight the Nationalist forces in positional warfare instead of guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare.[39] Since both the Li Li-san line and the policies of Ch'en Shao-yü and Ch'in Pang-hsien had the support of the Communist International and were based in part on Soviet experience, Mao found it necessary to point out that mechanical application of Soviet military doctrines would lead to defeat. He urged the Chinese Communists to cherish the experience of China's revolutionary war because of conditions special to the Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Red Army.[40] His simple yet effective military doctrine was a systematization of his experience in fighting the civil war in which his instinct for survival, earthly wisdom, and the long tradition of Chinese military thinking were his principal guides. It was a product of progressive refinement of his initially rudimentary views formulated in the day-to-day military struggle. It was the realm in which Mao first "creatively applied Marxism-Leninism to China" and declared his independence from the Soviet Union. It is also a basic source of his dispute with the Soviet Union today.[41]

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[37] Mao, "The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains," *Selected Works*, I, p. 71. See also "Why Can China's Red Political Power Exist?" *Ibid.* pp. 67–8.

[38] "Resolution of Some Questions in the History of our Party," appendix to Mao, *Selected Works*, IV (London, 1956), p. 179; Benjamin Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1952), pp. 141–4; James P. Harrison, "The Li Li-san Line and the CCP in 1930," *China Quarterly* (April–June, 1963), pp. 173–94; (July–Sept., 1963), pp. 140–59. For an account of the disagreement between Mao and the Comintern in 1927, see Stuart R. Schram, "The Military Deviation of Mao Tse-tung," *Problems of Communism* (Jan.–Feb., 1964), pp. 51–2.

[39] Mao, *Selected Works*, IV, p. 204.

[40] Mao "Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War," *Selected Works*, I, pp. 177, 192.

In Mao's view, a basic characteristic of the Chinese revolutionary war distinguished it from revolutions in capitalist countries, including the October Revolution in Russia. In these the first step was to seize the cities, and then advance into the countryside. In China, the reverse was the correct sequence.[42] Mao's strategy was "to employ our main forces to create rural bases, surround the cities from the countryside and use the bases to expedite the nation-wide revolutionary upsurge."[43] The rationale of this strategy he explained in these words:

> Since powerful imperialism and its allies, the reactionary forces in China, have occupied China's key cities for a long time, . . . they [the revolutionary forces] must build the backward villages into advanced, consolidated base areas, into great military, political, economic and cultural revolutionary bastions, so that they can fight the fierce enemy who utilizes the cities to attack the rural districts, and, through a protracted struggle, gradually win an over-all victory for the revolution.[44]

The vast rural areas were the "home of the broad masses of peasants" where the Kuomintang's control was weak. Devoting themselves "mainly to rural work,"[45] the Communists exploited a fatal weakness of the Kuomintang and gradually developed their own military strength to defeat the Nationalists.

Mao realized that the strategy of surrounding the cities from the countryside could not soon defeat the Kuomintang. Thus he developed his doctrine of protracted struggle, of which protracted war was one form. As Mao envisaged it in 1936, this would take the form of the prolonged alternation between the Nationalist campaigns of "encirclement and annihilation" and the Communists' counter-campaign.[46] This pattern, Mao predicted, would come to an end when the Red Army became stronger than its enemy, because the Kuomintang lacked the political prerequisites for fighting a successful counter-campaign against the Communists' campaign of encirclement and annihilation. This forecast was borne out in late 1948 and 1949.

The notion of a protracted war was applied to the Sino-Japanese War with some modifications to fit the new domestic and international situation. Instead of a prolonged alternation between the enemy's campaigns of encirclement and annihilation and the defenders' counter-campaigns, the protracted war would, Mao predicted in June, 1938, pass through three stages: first, Japan's strategic offensive and China's strategic defensive; second a prolonged strategic stalemate; and third, China's counter-offensive. In the first stage, mobile warfare should have been the principal form for the Chinese forces to adopt, with guerrilla and positional warfare the secondary forms. In the second stage, guerrilla warfare should be raised to the principal position, supplemented by mobile warfare and positional warfare. In the third stage, mobile warfare would again be raised to become the principal form, supplemented by positional warfare and guerrilla warfare.[47]

In the all-out civil war which began in the second half of 1946, Mao again envisaged a protracted struggle, in which the Communist forces would annihilate the Kuomintang's attacking forces one by one over a number of years.[48] He discarded the strategic principle, adopted during the larger part of the Sino-Japanese War, that the dispersal of forces for guerrilla warfare should be primary and the concentration of forces for mobile warfare should be secondary—a principle which had given due credit to the mobility and strength of the Japanese forces and had taken advantage of the strategic stalemate created largely by the confrontation between the Nationalist and Japanese armies. He reverted to the rule, developed during the latter part of the first civil war with the Kuomintang, that the concentration of forces for mobile warfare should be primary and the dispersal of forces for guerrilla warfare should be supplementary.

This uncomplicated doctrine of protracted war was developed out of simple principles regarding military tactics and battlefield objectives. Once developed, it gave the latter greater operational significance. Mao's original military tactics were governed by the now famous formula: "The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy halts, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue." He cautioned: "Fight when we can win and run away when we cannot." He admitted that "few people run away as much as we do." He urged that "a belated retreat causes more damage than a premature retreat."[49] The battlefield objective implicit in this tactic was the priority given to the preservation of his own forces over the defense of territory under his control.

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[41] Tang Tsou, "Mao Tse-tung and Peaceful Coexistence," *Orbis* (Spring, 1964), pp. 36–51.

[42] Mao, *Selected Military Writings*, p. 268.

[43] Mao, *Selected Works*, IV, pp. 178, 193–4, 197.

[44] Mao, "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party," *Selected Works*, III (London, 1954), p. 85.

[45] Mao, *Selected Works*, IV, pp. 190–5.

[46] Mao, "Problems of China's Revolutionary War," *Selected Works*, I, pp. 198–203.

[47] Mao, "On the Protracted War," *Selected Works*, II, pp. 128, 139, 180–1.

[48] Mao, *Selected Works*, IV (Peking), pp. 89–92, 103–6, 113–25.

As the guerrilla bands grew into regular units, a greater stress was put on the annihilation of the enemy forces. Mao's formula was to execute a strategic retreat deep into the base areas in order to facilitate the concentration of his forces and to create an opportunity to defeat the enemy there in a battle of quick decision followed by a strategic counteroffensive.[50] In the second civil war, the Kuomintang army had acquired new and more powerful weapons from the United States but its numerical superiority over Communist forces declined. Mao now laid special stress on the method of concentrating a superior force in each engagement to wipe out the enemy forces one by one and placed less emphasis on the need for strategic retreat deep into his base areas.[51] Complete annihilation of Nationalist units in battles of quick decision enabled him to seize American weapons and capture Nationalist soldiers to replenish his own forces. In less than three years, it transformed the five-to-one Nationalist superiority into overwhelming Communist superiority.

The doctrine that men are more important than weapons fully reflected the nature of guerrilla war in which popular support was the essential ingredient of military success. It was in full accord with the needs of a struggle in which politics played an important role in deciding the final outcome. It was in perfect harmony with the strategy of mobile warfare in which a poorly equipped army sought to defeat an opponent with vastly better weapons by concentrating locally a numerically superior force to annihilate the latter's units piecemeal and seize its weapons.

This doctrine required a complementary set of attitudes. The psychological complement had to cultivate realism in estimating the enemy's present strength, but at the same time bolster confidence in its ultimate vulnerability. It had to foster patience in the face of current difficulties but at the same time sustain high morale in the course of the revolution. It had to inhibit impulsive actions leading to defeat but at the same time kindle courage to seize every available opportunity to win a local victory. It had to nourish prudence during the prolonged period of military weakness but maintain the revolutionary spirit which in the long run argued for a basically offensive strategy. It had to promote cool calculaton in the choice of means, but at the same time inspire revolutionary enthusiasm in the pursuit of goals. In short, a synthesis of two constantly opposed attitudes had to be achieved before the doctrine of protracted struggle could be successfully applied.

From the very beginning, Mao's programs of action showed that he realized this necessity. But the synthesis was not easy to attain. Realism, patience, restraint, prudence, and cool calculation are frequently incompatible with the ultra-revolutionism of young idealists and rebels with a cause. Mao had to oppose his cautious military strategy and tactics to what he called "adventurism." His strategic and tactical views did not govern the program of the Party until the " 'Left' line of reckless action" under Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai's leadership, the strategy of concentrating the Red Army to attack the major cities under Li Li-san's leadership, and the strategy of waging positional warfare to defend the Soviet area under the leadership of the Returned Student group all led to disastrous defeat.

But prudence must not be equated with a tendency to conservatism. The purpose of acting cautiously was to create conditions for a series of local victories until the over-all balance of forces shifted in the Communists' favor. Mao asserted:

> . . . a revolution or a revolutionary war is an offensive yet has also its defensive phase and retreat. To defend in order to attack, to retreat in order to advance, to take a flanking action in order to take a frontal action, to be devious in order to go direct—these are inevitable occurrences in the process of development of many things, and military movements cannot be otherwise.[52]

He synthesized the prudential and the aggressive elements in his program of action in 1948 as follows:

> If, with regard to the whole, we overestimate the strength of our enemy and hence do not dare to overthrow him and do not dare to win victory, we shall be committing a Right opportunist error. If, with regard to each part, each specific prob-

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[49] Mao, *Selected Works*, I, pp. 124, 222, 244.

[50] *Ibid.*, pp. 203–48.

[51] Mao, *Selected Works*, IV (Peking), p. 105.

[52] Mao, *Selected Works*, I, p. 202.

> lem, we are not prudent, do not carefully study and perfect the art of struggle, do not concentrate all our strength for battle . . . we shall be committing a "Left" opportunist error.[53]

Later, in 1957, he stated this thought concisely in these words: "Strategically we should take all enemies lightly, but tactically take them seriously."[54]

VII. ARMED STRUGGLE AND POLITICAL STRUGGLE—THE QUESTION OF WAR AND PEACE

1. Changing One Form of Struggle to Another

The strategy of surrounding the cities from the countryside and the doctrine of protracted war provided only guidance on the prosecution of war. But the overriding questions of political-military policy in a protracted struggle were when to seek peace, when to fight a war, and what form the war should take. In his revolutionary struggle with the Kuomintang, Mao was confronted with three different political-military situations and adopted three different policies which, in a sense, parallel the usual choices of a state in the international system under analogous circumstances: to seek peace, to fight a limited war, or to accept an all-out war. But on a deeper level of analysis, Mao's policies can be shown to be quite different. The peace he sought meant merely the cessation of an all-out war and did not preclude limited armed clashes. Conversely, his limited war was waged under the concept of "peaceful struggle." The threat or use of force on a limited scale as one of several instruments of policy was a fairly constant feature of Mao's practice rather than a last resort when nonviolent measures failed.[55] In his all-out war, political, economic and psychological measures played a much more important role in deciding the outcome than in conventional war between states in the past.

Mao analyzed the question of war and peace with the Kuomintang in terms of the notions of "unity" and struggle and the concepts of "peaceful struggle" and "armed struggle." During the period of the united front with the Kuomintang against Japan, Mao wrote:

> An important part of the political line of the Chinese Communist Party is to unite with as well as to struggle against the bourgeoisie . . . Unity means the united front with the bourgeoisie, struggle means the "peaceful" and "bloodless" struggle waged along ideological, political and organizational lines when we unite with the bourgeoisie, a struggle which will turn into an armed struggle when we are forced to split with the bourgeoisie. If our Party does not understand how to unite with the bourgeoisie in certain periods, it cannot advance and the revolution cannot develop; if our Party does not understand how to wage a resolute and serious "peaceful" struggle against the bourgeoisie while uniting with the bourgeoisie, it will disintegrate ideologically, politically and organizationally, and the revolution will fail; and if our Party, when forced to split with the bourgeoisie, does not wage a resolute and serious armed struggle against the bourgeoisie, it will also disintegrate and the revolution will also fail.[56]

Mao's thought and practice have since been succinctly explained by Li Wei-han in the following words:

> In order to defeat the enemy we must . . . be adept at choosing the most advantageous forms of struggle. The working class party must arm itself to the teeth . . . with all the means and methods of struggle so as to be able to make timely changes in the form of struggle to suit changes in the situation. The forms of the struggle can be divided into main or secondary, and which should be the main and which should be secondary, differs under different historical conditions in different countries. The working class and the Communist Party must be good at mastering the main form of struggle under the historical conditions of the time and properly coordinating it with other forms of struggle; only by so doing can they deal the enemy effective blows or firmly maintain the leadership of the revolution.[57]

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[53] Mao, *Selected Works*, IV (Peking), pp. 181–2.

[54] *Comrade Mao Tse-tung on "Imperialism and All Reactionaries are Paper Tigers"* (Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1961), pp. 25–6.

[55] Alice Langley Hsieh, *Communist China and Nuclear Force*, p. 9.

[56] Mao, "Introductory Remarks to *The Communist*," *Selected Works*, III, pp. 59–60.

[57] Li Wei-han, "The Struggle for Proletarian Leadership in the Period of the New-Democratic Revolution in China," *Peking Review*, March 2, 1962, p. 12. The first instalment of this article appears in the Feb. 23, 1962 issue of the same journal. This is one of the most significant, as well as one of the most revealing articles published in recent years by the Chinese Communists on their revolutionary strategy and tactics. For two other revealing articles by Li, see "The United Front—A Magic Weapon of the Chinese People for Winning Victory," *Peking Review*, June 9, 1961, pp. 13–6; June 16, 1961, pp. 17–21; "The Chinese People's Democratic United Front: Its Special Features," *ibid.*, Aug. 18, 1961, pp. 11–5; Aug. 25, 1961, pp. 12–8; Sept. 1, 1961, pp. 10–4. For

Taking the twenty-two years from 1927 to 1949 as a whole, armed struggle, as Li points out, was the main form of struggle against the Kuomintang and all other forms were meant to serve it. But, as Li goes on to explain, "This does not exclude cases where peaceful political struggle became the main form of struggle in a certain field and in a certain period."[58] From 1927 to the establishment of the second united front in 1937, the main form of struggle was armed struggle, which was originally an instinctive response to the Kuomintang's policy of suppressing the Communists by force. From 1937 to July, 1946, it was "peaceful political struggle." In the transition from armed struggle to "peaceful political struggle" as the main form, Mao's policy and initiative played a large role, as we shall see. From July, 1946 onward, it reverted to armed struggle. This reversion was mainly a response to the Kuomintang's policy of driving the Communists from the strategically important regions and using relentless military pressure to force the Communists to accept a political-military *fait accompli*. But the Kuomintang's policy was itself a response to Mao's strategy of employing limited military actions to expand the territory under his control. Mao accepted all-out war when his policy of seeking a favorable settlement failed and when he saw a good chance of defeating the Kuomintang in a prolonged war despite the superiority of the Nationalist forces in number and arms. Limited war escalated into all-out war. The transitions in both 1937 and 1946 marked the culmination of a series of fluctuating events and Communist moves over a fairly long time during which Mao was preparing for the next main form of struggle.

In Mao's thinking, politics is one form of class war, while open warfare or armed struggle is another. "Politics is war without bloodshed," Mao said, "while war is politics with bloodshed."[59] The transition from one to another was one of the numerous manifestations of the dialectical principle of the identity of contradictions. To Mao, this principle means not only that two contradictory aspects of a thing can coexist in an entity, but also that each "tends to transform itself into the other, to transfer itself into the opposite position." "War and peace," he wrote, "transform themselves into each other," "because in a class society such contradictory things as war and peace are characterized by identity under certain conditions."[60]

2. Coordinating One Form of Struggle With Another

Waging both political and military struggles to win "peace," 1935–1937. Mao was not only adept in alternating the main form of struggle in the light of changing conditions to advance his revolution, but also very skillful in integrating the two forms and blending force and diplomacy in dealing with the Kuomintang. The coordination of two forms of struggle to achieve a political objective is one corollary of the general rule that military power is an indispensable means to accomplish a political purpose and that conversely, political purpose must govern the use of military power. It also meant that force was one of the constant instruments to be used in conjunction with other measures. In the period between 1927 and 1937 when armed struggle was the main form, political struggle—in the specific form of appeals and agitations for the cessation of the civil war—was intensified and broadened as the military fortunes of the Communists ebbed or as the possibility of total defeat drew progressively closer.[61] In this political struggle, the task of the Communists was facilitated by the political conditions in China created by Japan's aggressive actions: the rising Chinese nationalism demanding internal unity in order to oppose foreign aggression, the opposition of non-communist groups to Chiang's policy of suppressing the Communists first before resisting Japan's aggression, and the divisions within the Kuomintang over policy toward Japan.

During the Long March when the fortunes of the Red Army were at their lowest ebb, Mao in August, 1935, called for the cessation of the civil war. He appealed not only to the Kuomintang armed forces but also to all political groups in China to join with the Communists to form a broad united front against both Japan and Chiang. While Mao's declaration was in perfect accord with the policy of establishing popular anti-Fascist fronts throughout the world proclaimed formally by the Communist

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the relevance of this doctrine to the situation in the Congo, see *Jen-min jih-pao*, editorial, June 24, 1964, p. 1.

[58] Li Wei-han, "The Struggle for Proletarian Leadership in the Period of the New-Democratic Revolution in China," *loc. cit.*

[59] Mao, *Selected Military Writings*, p. 227.

[60] Mao, *Selected Works*, I, pp. 329–30. See Vsevolod Holubnychy, "Mao Tse-tung's Materialistic Dialectics," *China Quarterly* (July–Sept., 1964), pp. 3–37.

[61] Mao, *Selected Works*, I, pp. 153–74, 354–7, 368–74; Charles B. McLane, *Soviet Policy and the Chinese Communists, 1931–1936* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1958), pp. 64–5.

International at the Seventh Congress in August, 1935,[62] Mao could not have failed to realize that his policy would appeal to the nationalistic sentiments of many political groups and individuals who were not sympathetic to Chiang's policy of "internal pacification before resistance to foreign invasion." If successful, it would help the Communists to break out of their military and political isolation and to neutralize the Kuomintang's military power by political means. Before the year was over, it scored its first success when more than ten thousand students in Peiping took part on December 9 in a demonstration in opposition to the Kuomintang's policy of fighting a civil war and appeasing Japan.[63]

At the time when he intensified his political maneuvers to end the civil war, Mao also sought to use his military power to bring about the same result. In February, 1936, he made an intriguing military move. He ordered a strong contingent to cross the Yellow River into Shansi province with the aim of driving into Hopeh to engage the Japanese troops directly. This maneuver can plausibly be interpreted as an attempt to trigger a war between China and Japan which would automatically terminate the civil war. It was foiled by Chiang when he dispatched a strong force to block the Communists' eastward drive and ordered his other armies to attack the Shensi-Kansu Red area from the south and the west. Confronted by the overwhelming strength of Chiang's forces, Mao withdrew his contingent to the west of the Yellow River. To derive political advantage from his military retreat, he covered up his withdrawal with clever propaganda and accompanied it with a political offensive. In a circular telegram on May 5 addressed for the first time to the Kuomintang government as well as to other groups, Mao announced the "voluntary" withdrawal of the Red forces, giving as its reason the Communists' desire to avoid fratricidal strife and to keep intact China's strength for national defense.[64] He called for the cessation of the civil war and offered to hold cease-fire and peace negotiations with the Kuomintang army units attacking the Red Army. He abandoned the anti-Chiang slogan and merely urged Chiang to change his policy. Thereby he greatly facilitated the Communist efforts to influence the Nationalist leaders who wanted to stop the civil war and to fight the Japanese. The capability of the remnants of the Red Army to prolong the civil war and to inflict losses on the Kuomintang armies—thus weakening the over-all strength of the nation in the face of Japan's threat—was a strong argument for the establishment of the united front. Beginning in June or July, secret contacts were established between the Communists and Chang Hsüeh-liang and other high commanders of Manchurian and Northwestern armies of the Kuomintang forces surrounding the Communist area. In the field, the Communists conducted an intensive campaign to win over the Nationalist soldiers by using the slogan, "Chinese should not fight Chinese."[65]

Mao's peaceful offensive and propaganda succeeded in inducing Chang Hsüeh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng, respectively the commanders of the Manchurian and Northwestern armies, to accept the idea of forcing Chiang to change his policy. Political support for peace and unity was thus engendered to compensate for Mao's military weakness, and political influence was transformed into military power. This political-military maneuver culminated in the detention of Chiang by Chang and Yang in the Sian Incident.

The respective roles of Moscow and Mao in obtaining the release of Chiang and effecting a peaceful settlement of that incident have not been clearly established by available evidence.[66] In any case, the Chinese Communists themselves subsequently took credit for its peaceful settlement, just as Moscow did. It is described by Li Wei-han as "a great victory for comrade Mao Tse-tung's thinking regarding the united front at a decisive moment in history."[67] In analyzing the reasons for the ensuing cessation of the ten-year civil war, Mao attributes it not to "the appeals of public figures throughout the country who desired peace and feared war" but to "the *armed demands* of the Communist Party of China and the *armed demands* of the Northeastern Army under Chang Hsüeh-liang and the Northwestern army under Yang Hu-cheng."[68] The implication is that the civil war was stopped and peace was achieved not through polite appeals or pressure of public opinion but through military strength and armed struggle, although the political struggle in mobilizing political opinion to oppose the continuation of the civil war did contribute to the staging of the "armed demands." This appraisal of the Sian Incident forms a part of Mao's teaching on the transition from military struggle to "peaceful" political struggle as the main form of struggle and on the coordination of the two forms.

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[62] McLane, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

[63] For the role played by Liu Shao-chi in organizing this demonstration, see Mao, *Selected Works*, IV, p. 200.

[64] Mao, *Selected Works*, I, p. 371.

[65] *Ibid.*, p. 140. In August, Mao made further concessions. See Edgar Snow, "Interviews with Mao Tse-tung, Communist Leader," *The China Weekly Review*, Nov. 14, 1936, p. 378. In this interview, Mao said that the Chinese Communists held the same attitude toward Korea and Formosa. " . . . if the Koreans wish to break away from the chains of Japanese imperialism, we will extend enthusiastic help in their struggle for independence. The same thing applies to Formosa." *Ibid.*

[66] For two different versions see McLane, *op. cit.*, p. 62, and Edgar Snow, *Random Notes on China* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 1–2. For a contemporary report on the Sian Incident, see Edgar Snow, *Red Star over China* (New York, 1961), pp. 431–78.

[67] Mao, *Selected Works*, I, p. 259; Li Wei-han, "The Struggle for Proletarian Leadership in the Period of the New-Democratic Revolution in China," *Peking Review*, March 2, 1962, p. 13.

Waging military struggle within the framework of "peaceful political struggle," 1937-1946. After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in July, 1937, the informal truce between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists that followed the Sian Incident developed into the anti-Japanese united front. It was formally established in September, 1937. To outside observers, relations between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists deteriorated so rapidly after August, 1938, and particularly after the armed clashes in Hopei and Shantung in late 1938 and 1939 that a united front as the layman understood the term no longer existed. But to the Communists, their policy toward the Kuomintang was still that of maintaining the anti-Japanese united front. Even after the military clashes flared up in the famous New Fourth Army Incident in 1941, Mao continued to affirm the policy of a national united front. This policy found expression in the call in 1944 and 1945 for the formation of a coalition government. In theory, it was in existence until Japan's surrender.[69] The key to this paradox lies in an understanding of Mao's policy of the united front in his own terms and of his practice of coordinating and integrating armed struggle with "peaceful political struggle."

The united front meant, on the surface, unity or alliance with the Kuomintang against the Japanese invaders. But for Mao, unity or alliance with the Kuomintang did not signify wholehearted cooperation with or unconditional obedience to the authority of the Nationalist government. Instead, it was an alliance based on the principle of the "independence and autonomy" of the Chinese Communist Party.[70] The absolute leadership and exclusive control by the Chinese Communist Party over the Communist units and base areas were always strictly maintained. The Communist armies were instructed from the very beginning to carry out a guerrilla warfare on their own initiative and independently of the Nationalist government.[71] Moreover, Mao's policy of the united front did not exclude "struggle against the Kuomintang." On the contrary, it called for an intense struggle within its framework. In the over-all relations with the Kuomintang, this struggle took the form of " 'peaceful' and 'bloodless' struggle waged along ideological, political and organizational lines."[72] In specific situations, it took the form of limited armed struggle, as for instance in the clash between the Communist general, Ho Lung, and the Nationalist general, Chang Yin-wu, in 1938–1939 and the activities of the New Fourth Army in 1940.

Thus, the united front meant merely that "peaceful political struggle" was for the time being the main form of struggle and armed struggle the secondary or subordinate form. Behind it a series of limited armed conflicts ensued which nevertheless did not lead to an all-out war. This policy of expansion by limited conflicts without provoking all-out war was in full accord with the demands of the objective conditions. While the Kuomintang was strong enough to win an all-out war, the Sino-Japanese War rendered an all-out Nationalist attack improbable, though not entirely impossible. Thus, limited conflicts did not raise serious risks of all-out war for the Communists. Whatever the risks, they could, in Mao's view, be minimized, on the one hand by a policy of carefully controlling his own military actions and on the other by relying on his developing strength and limited retaliations to deter the Kuomintang. The limited armed struggles were justified by Mao "as a means to prolong the die-hards' resistance to Japan and the cooperation with us, thereby averting the outbreak of a large-scale civil war."[73] However, it did not always exclude the intensification of limited armed struggle. Indeed, it sometimes called for a greater military effort because the strengthening of his bargaining position by military means and the preparation for the possible outbreak of an all-out war were two other features of the political-military struggle.

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[68] Mao, *Selected Works*, IV (Peking), p. 44. Italics added.

[69] *Ibid.*, IV, p. 240; Li Wei-han, "The Role of the United Front in the Chinese Revolution," *Peking Review*, June 16, 1961, pp. 17–8.

[70] Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, II (new ed., London, 1958), pp. 67, 69, 218–22. For a discussion of this principle in its historical context, see Tang Tsou, *America's Failure in China, 1941–1950*, *op. cit.*, pp. 137–41.

[71] Mao, *Selected Works*, II, p. 67.

[72] See note 56, above.

[73] Mao, *Selected Works*, III, p. 198.

At the same time, Mao consistently practiced what is now known in the West as a policy of unilateral arms control. In doctrine, the defensive nature of the limited armed struggle was stressed. The concept of "justifiability" imposed a restraint on the frequency of armed clashes. The requirement of gaining an advantage in every engagement restricted the scale of the armed conflict, since the Communist troops could not fight a large Kuomintang force with assurance of victory. The aim of picking out the "most reactionary section" of the "die-hards" to strike at first, limited the targets of attack. The injunction to seek "truce" after the achievement of victory in a limited armed clash controlled the duration of each specific engagement. The policy of taking the initiative to seek unity and conclude a peace agreement with the opponent sometimes punctuated the intermittent armed conflicts with periodic negotiations and sometimes made talks at the conference table a form of political struggle paralleling the armed struggle on the dispersed battlefields.[74] The four-fold objective of negotiation for a political settlement was to prevent the escalation of the limited conflict to an all-out war by holding out the possibility of a political settlement; to seek formal recognition of some of the gains already achieved by the force of arms; to influence public opinion; and finally to win time and political support for an all-out civil war, if it did come.[75] Political bargaining was an intrinsic part of the military and political struggle. This policy of seeking a political settlement while using military power to strengthen one's bargaining position and preparing for an all-out war was continued during the period between the summers of 1945 and 1946.

Supplementing armed struggle with political struggle, 1946-1949. The Communists' shift to armed struggle as the principal form can be traced to the inner-party directive of July 20, 1946, drafted by Mao, in which the Central Committee called on the Communists to smash Chiang's offensive. Mao obviously placed little hope on the negotiations in Nanking between Chou En-lai and Chiang with Marshall as the mediator. He wrote: "Only after completely smashing Chiang's offensive in a war of self-defense can the Chinese people *regain* peace."[76] In contrast to the military conflicts in the period of the anti-Japanese united front, the present fighting was no longer defined as "waging *struggles* against the die-hards," but as "a *war* of self-defense." In August, the Chinese Communists ordered a general mobilization.[77] In September, Mao called on the Communists to concentrate superior force to destroy the enemy units one by one in battles and campaigns of quick decision under the general strategy of a protracted war.[78] In so doing, he reverted to the overall strategic concepts he had developed during the first civil war to deal with the Kuomintang forces and during the first and third phases of the Sino-Japanese War to deal with the Japanese. These concepts had been fashioned and applied when armed struggle was the principal form of struggle. Now that armed struggle again was the main form and he was confident of ultimate victory, Mao abandoned the principle of truce he had laid down during the period of the united front when "peaceful political struggle" was the main form. He no longer asked the Communists to "stop at the proper moment" and bring a "particular fight to a close," after repulsing the Nationalist attack. He no longer entertained the idea of seeking on his own initiative a truce and then a peace agreement with the Kuomintang. Instead, he anticipated the possibility that after having halted the Nationalist offensive and recovered part of the lost territory, the Communist forces would seize the strategic initiative and go over to the offensive, and that the destruction of additional Kuomintang units one by one over a period of time would bring about a tremendous change in the relative strengths of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. When this momentous change in the military situation materialized after the Communist victory in the Liaohsi-Shenyang campaign in Manchuria in November, 1948, he contemptuously dismissed the Kuomintang's overtures for peace and issued a call "to carry the revolution through to the end" by advancing south of the Yangtze River, overthrowing Chiang's regime, and establishing a new government.[79] Thus, armed struggle as the principal form meant protracted and all-out war.

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[74] In a highly significant passage, Mao wrote: "[W]e must pay attention to the following principles in waging struggles against the die-hards. First the principle of self-defense. We shall never attack unless attacked; if attacked, we shall certainly counterattack. That is to say, we must never attack others without provocation; but once we are attacked, we must never fail to return the blow. Herein lies the defensive nature of the struggle. As to the military attacks of the die-hards, we must resolutely, thoroughly, utterly and completely smash them. Secondly, the principle of victory. We do not fight unless we are sure of victory; we must on no account fight without preparation and without certainty of the outcome. We should know how to utilize the contradictions among the die-hards and must not deal blows to many sections of them at the same time; we must pick out the most reactionary section to strike at first. Herein lies the limited nature of the struggle. Thirdly, the principle of truce. After we have repulsed the attack of the die-hards and before they launch a new one, we should stop at the proper moment and bring that particular fight to a close. In the period that follows we should make a truce with them. Then we should on our own initiative seek unity with the die-hards and, upon their consent, conclude a peace agreement with them. We must on no account fight on daily and hourly without stopping, nor become dizzy with success. Herein lies the temporary nature of every particular struggle. Only when the die-hards launch a new offensive should we retaliate with a new struggle. In other words, the three principles are 'justifiability,' 'expediency' and 'restraint.' Persisting in such justifiable, expedient and restrained struggles, we can develop the progressive forces, win over the middle-of-the-road forces, isolate the die-hard forces and make the die-hards chary of heedlessly attacking us . . . or heedlessly starting a large-scale civil war. And we can in this way win a favorable turn in the situation." *Ibid.*, p. 199.

[75] This use of negotiations gave rise to the familiar pattern of "fight, fight—talk, talk."

[76] Mao, *Selected Works*, IV (Peking), p. 89. Italics added.

[77] *New York Times*, Aug. 20, 1946, p. 4.

[78] Mao, *Selected Works*, IV (Peking), p. 101.

Yet even armed struggle as the main form was not incompatible with negotiations, provided they could be turned to the Communists' advantage. In the four months following the shift to all-out war in July, 1946, the negotiations between the Communists and the Kuomintang with Marshall as the mediator continued. Mao's objectives in these negotiations were to put the onus of starting the civil war on the Nationalists, to show the partiality of the United States toward the Chinese government and to rally the minor parties and groups around the Communist Party in opposition to the Kuomintang.[80] Even after the "total national split" occurred in November, 1946, the Communists did not refuse the Kuomintang initiative to reopen negotiations. But they shrewdly attached unacceptable preconditions to the resumption of talks, thus making the Kuomintang appear responsible for the continuation of the civil war.[81] After military defeats in Manchuria, North China and Central China forced Generalissimo Chiang to step down from the presidency in January, 1949, Mao took up Acting President Li Tsung-jen's overtures for peace and turned the negotiations to his own purpose of imposing his own terms, dividing the opponents, weakening the morale of the Nationalist forces, and winning over those who were ready to cooperate with the victor in the civil war.[82] Negotiations were accompanied by active preparations for crossing the Yangtze. After Li rejected Mao's terms, the Communist forces swept across the river, fully prepared for the task. These negotiations were obviously one form of "peaceful political struggle" waged simultaneously as the secondary form to supplement armed struggle, the main form.

Another form of political struggle was to induce defections by establishing secret contacts and understandings with Kuomintang officers.[83] The government's fear of defection of its troops became, as the American White Paper on China noted, "a restraining influence in the planning of operations and tended to constrict government forces even more deeply in their defensive positions."[84] One variation of this form was to secure surrender by negotiating separate peace agreements with local commanders. Another variation was the vigorous application of the long-standing policy of giving lenient treatment to prisoners of war and inducing them to join the Communist forces. In the two years after July, 1946, the communist army absorbed into its ranks some 800,000 former Kuomintang soldiers, which amounted to one third of the total number of new recruits.[85] Still another form of political struggle was to incite anti-war, anti-government, anti-American sentiments among the population in the enemy's territory, as in the case of the movement "against hunger, against civil war, against persecution" in May, 1947, and the movement in opposition to the alleged American policy of supporting Japan in May and June of 1948.[86] Mao had no illusions that these measures in the political struggle would by themselves enable him to defeat the Kuomintang; they could bring results only if he could win victories on the battlefield. But to a degree difficult to ascertain, the various forms of political struggle played a part in enabling the Communists to conquer the Chinese mainland much more quickly than their initial estimate of five years of hard fighting.

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[79] *Ibid.*, pp. 114, 299–306.

[80] In discussing the events from July to October, Mao asserted, "More and more people now realize the truth that Marshall's mediation is a fraud and that the Kuomintang is the arch enemy." *Ibid.*, p. 117. See Tang Tsou, *America's Failure in China op. cit.*, pp. 421–436.

[81] Mao, *Selected Works*, IV (Peking), pp. 123, 127. Department of State, *U.S. Relations with China* (Washington, D.C., G.P.O., 1949), pp. 230–2.

[82] Mao, *Selected Works*, IV (Peking), p. 372. For the negotiations between Mao and Li and their proposals and counter-proposals, see Liang Sheng-chün, *Chiang-Li tuo-cheng nei-mo* ["The Inside Story of the Struggle between Chiang and Li"] (Hong Kong, Union Asia Press, 1954), pp. 69–104. This book was written by a confidant of Acting President Li.

[83] Mao, *Selected Works*, IV (Peking), pp. 75, 79.

[84] *U.S. Relations with China*, p. 318.

Fundamentally the political struggle in this period of civil war consisted in building up a "very broad united front of the whole nation" against Chiang's government. This united front was to be developed by winning over "all those who can be won over." It was to consist of 90 per cent of the people and isolate a small group of reactionaries. It was to be led by the Communist party.[87] In line with this policy, he resisted every tendency on the part of some cadres to follow an ultra-left and adventurist line in relying too exclusively on the poor peasants, in neglecting the task of winning over other elements in the population, and in taking actions which would damage their interests or alienate them. Instead, he endeavored to win over all social elements with the exception of "the feudalists and the bureaucratic capitalists, the Kuomintang reactionaries and their accomplices."[88] Beginning in early 1948, the land reform program which had mainly benefited the poor peasants was moderated, its target of attack was narrowed, and its tempo was slowed down.[89]

This policy of winning over more and more social groups was adjusted to the progress of the war. In its first year, the Communists had to attract a hard core of fighters, mainly from poor and lower middle peasants, who had received economic benefits through land redistribution. But as the military situation changed and an economic crisis developed in the Kuomintang areas, various groups that had chosen to side with the Kuomintang or had been vacillating became disaffected with the government and turned toward the Communists. To exploit this change in sentiment, the Communists broadened their appeal to an ever larger number of groups. In announcing its large-scale counter-offensive in October, 1947, the People's Liberation Army declared that its first policy was:

> to unite workers, peasants, soldiers, intellectuals and business men, all oppressed classes, all people's organizations, democratic parties, minority nationalities, overseas Chinese and other patriots; form a national united front; overthrow the dictatorial Chiang Kai-shek government; and to establish a democratic coalition government.[90]

As the counter-offensive moved forward, these categories of social groups were given broad definition. " 'Businessmen' means all the national bourgeoisie who are persecuted and fettered, that is, the middle and petty bourgeoisie," Mao told his cadres in an inner-party directive. "Other patriots" referred "primarily to the enlightened gentry." "The category of working people" included not only "those engaged in manual labor," but also "those engaged in mental labor who are close to those engaged in manual labor and are not exploiters."

The inclusion of the enlightened gentry as a group to be united is particularly interesting because it consisted of landlords and rich peasants—two groups which were the targets of attack during the period of land reform from May, 1946, to the fall of 1947. Now a political criterion was explicitly introduced to differentiate the enlightened gentry from the rest of the landlords and rich peasants. The enlightened gentry were "ordinary landlords and rich peasants with democratic leanings." Emphasis was now placed on winning them over to support land reform, instead of forcing them to accept it. The political motive in this change in emphasis is made clear by Mao's remark that if some of the enlightened gentry support land reform,

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[85] Mao, *Selected Works*, IV (Peking), p. 271.

[86] *Ibid.*, pp. 120, 125; *U.S. Relations with China*, pp. 906; Tsou, *America's Failure in China*, pp. 451–2, 477–8.

[87] Mao, "The Present Situation and Our Tasks," *Selected Works*, IV (Peking), pp. 171–2. This report by Mao to the Central Committee in Dec., 1947, was widely publicized. It was published in the U. S. under the title *Turning Point in China* (New York, New Century Publishers, 1948). See also Mao, *Selected Works*, IV (Peking), pp. 187, 183, 238, 369, 417. For the changes in the public position of the Communists on the question of Communist leadership, see Tsou, *America's Failure in China*, pp. 184 n. 27, 186 n. 33; Mao, *Selected Works*, IV, p. 116.

[88] Mao, *Selected Works*, IV (Peking), p. 407.

[89] *Ibid.*, pp. 175, 183, 194, 201–2, 236–7, 251, 337–8.

[90] *Ibid.*, p. 150.

> it will help win over the intellectuals (most of whom come from landlord or rich peasant families), the national bourgeoisie (most of them have ties with the land) and the enlightened gentry throughout the country (who number several hundred thousand) and help to isolate the chief enemy of the Chinese revolution, the Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries.[91]

This re-emphasis on the role of the enlightened gentry, the intellectuals, and the national bourgeoisie was obviously related to the intensified effort made in early 1948 to enlist and solidify the support of the small parties and groups, and the dissidents in the Kuomintang. In January, the Democratic League, which had been dissolved by the Kuomintang in October, 1947, was re-established in Hong Kong; and the Nationalist dissidents formed the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang. Both groups voiced their support for the Communist Party. By the time when the Communists were making preparations for convoking a new Political Consultative Conference to organize a central government, Mao could declare with some justification that "The Chinese revolution is a revolution of the broad masses of the whole nation. Everybody is our friend except the imperialists, the feudalists and the bureaucrat-capitalists, the Kuomintang reactionaries and their accomplices."[92] He had long ago called the united front, armed struggle, and party-building the three magic wands of the Communists in the Chinese revolution. There is little doubt that the united front helped him defeat Chiang in armed struggle. At the same time, the broadening and deepening of the "revolutionary united front" was made possible by the success in armed struggle.

In waging political struggle as a supplement to military struggle, Mao was also preparing for the transition once again from war to peace or from armed struggle to political struggle as the main form. The united front during the period of armed struggle rallied support for the Communists, enlisted non-Communist participation in the regime, helped to retain Kuomintang personnel in running various agencies, reassured the business men and industrialists, and limited economic and administrative dislocation to a minimum. It played a part in bringing to China in the next few years a political stability and solidarity unprecedented in the modern era.

VIII. COMMUNIST CHINA AND THE SYSTEM OF NATIONAL STATES

A salient feature of international politics in the past fifteen years is Communist China's impact, greater than a nation with similarly limited military and economic resources would normally have outside its immediate borders. It is quite true that her influence has been bought with great sacrifices and at the cost of many setbacks. But there have been enough successes to sustain her in the belief in the applicability of Mao's revolutionary strategy and tactics to the international arena. Furthermore, the doctrine of protracted struggle cannot be proved invalid by the mixed record of Peking's foreign policy or by the disproportion between costs and gains. The "thought of Mao Tse-tung," having as its basic injunction the "creative adaptation" of universally valid principles to concrete situations, permits flexibility in strategy and tactics while at the same time facilitating the attribution of failure to its incorrect application.

Thus, a basic problem in the evaluation of Peking's foreign policy is the extent to which the revolutionary experience of the Chinese Communist Party constitutes a useful example for other revolutionary movements to emulate. This depends in part on whether the objective conditions which made Mao's success possible exist or will emerge in other countries. One of these conditions is the political weakness of the government in power. There is little doubt that the existing regime in many underdeveloped countries is weak. But as the Nationalist government in China prior to 1937 shows, a politically weak government can still progressively consolidate its rule because of the feebleness of its opponents. What undermined the foundation of the Nationalist government in China and enabled the Chinese Communist Party to build up sufficient strength to defeat the Kuomintang was the Sino-Japanese War. Thus, a prolonged external war, a national liberation war, or a civil war between two non-Communist groups will enhance the applicability of the Maoist model. This is perhaps the reason why the Chinese Communists profess to detect a progressive intensification of the contradictions everywhere in the non-Communist world: the conflicts among the capitalist countries, the conflicts between the newly independent nations and the Western powers, the conflicts between the colonial and semi-colonial countries and the imperialist powers.

A much less important but by no means totally negligible factor contributing to Mao's victory was the acquisition of the captured

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[91] *Ibid.*, pp. 207, 209–10.

[92] *Ibid.*, pp. 220, 225–6, 407.

Japanese arms from the Soviet forces in Manchuria after Japan's surrender. Here the geographical contiguity of the revolutionary forces to other Communist states comes into play. In a small country like Vietnam, this factor has a strong impact on the outcome. Finally, American policy placed very few obstacles in the way of Mao's march to power. In South Vietnam from 1954 to 1963, the United States placed too much emphasis on conventional military power and is learning only too late the paramount importance of the political factor in counter-insurgency warfare; we have so far failed to fashion a workable program for gaining popular support for a government assisted by the United States. But the absence of these four conditions will render it difficult for China to apply Mao's strategy successfully.

If one looks beyond individual nations to the global situation, there are other formidable obstacles which Mao must overcome or face eventual failure of his foreign policy. Unlike the Kuomintang, his two chief antagonists at the present time, the United States and the Soviet Union, represent two dynamic forces in the world arena. Both are politically and militarily strong. Mao's military strategy and tactics were developed for guerrilla and mobile warfare with conventional weapons. They are totally inapplicable to an all-out war in the nuclear age even for the defense of the Chinese mainland. Official Chinese doctrine has been modified to take account of nuclear weapons and in particular the nuclear threat from the United States. Some Chinese military leaders, however, have argued that this adaptation has not gone far enough.[93]

But the most basic source of the difficulties confronting Mao's attempt to apply his political-military strategy to the international arena is the system of national states itself. The confrontation between the international movement and the nation-state system, which in the first place produced Mao's "creative application" of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete conditions of China, has now resulted in his insistence on the correctness of a revolutionary strategy for the Communist camp which is based largely on his experience in the Chinese revolution. This in turn has disrupted the unity of the camp. Nationalism which helped Mao to power in China will become a formidable obstacle to Mao's ambition when the fear of Chinese influence and domination grows with the increase in Chinese power. Mao has worked out a program to turn nationalism against the West in general and the United States in particular. But nationalism can also be turned against him. National borders sometimes coincide with cultural, linguistic, and racial boundaries. The further Mao tries to move beyond the area of traditional Chinese cultural hegemony, the more formidable will be the difficulties imposed by cultural, linguistic, and racial differences.

Thus, the projection of Mao's revolutionary strategy into the international arena constitutes a factor which, quite apart from the Marxist-Leninist ideology, complicates Peking's adjustment to the system of national states. Peking's leaders are undoubtedly aware of the necessity for Communist China to live with the international system for a long period. But their tendency to understand the international situation and to fashion their program abroad in the light of their revolutionary experience cannot but make it difficult for them to understand the rules and customary conduct governing national states. For their revolutionary strategy was developed in a civil war in which the contending groups were not separated by any international boundary. Actions, strategy, and tactics employed in a civil war or political conflict within a nation are not always acceptable in the international arena, no matter how moderate or cautious they are. Frequently, the same strategy or tactics have quite different implications and consequences in the two spheres of political conflict. The tendency to project their revolutionary strategy abroad prevents the Chinese Communists from drawing a sharp line of demarcation between two types of actions and two spheres of activities. They do not fully realize the incompatibility between the rules governing national states and their revolutionary strategy.

Many of the discrepancies between Peking's profession and actions arise not so much from hypocrisy as from this conflict between the need to live with the system of national states and the tendency to project Mao's revolutionary strategy abroad. Thus, on the one hand, Peking proclaims loudly that revolution cannot be exported and on the other hand, gives diplomatic support or advice and aid to "national liberation movements" everywhere. On the one hand, she proclaims the "five principles of peaceful coexistence" which embody the generally recognized rules of the system of national states and on the other hand her actions constantly violate the spirit and the letter of these principles. The Chinese Communists challenge the two superpowers simultaneously instead of playing the one against the other. Their understanding of war and peace is filtered through their revolutionary experience, their concept of armed struggle, and their propensity to use force as a constant instrument of policy.[94] Peking denounces solutions of international issues based on the concept of spheres of influence, even if Communist China is given her share.[95] It thus rejects a widely used method of resolving conflicts within the nation-state system.

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[93] Morton H. Halperin, *China and the Bomb* (New York, 1965), pp. 24–82. See also Alice Langley Hsieh, *Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Age* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1962); David Charles, "The Dismissal of Marshal P'eng Teh-huai," *China Quarterly* (Oct.–Dec., 1961), p. 65.

The Chinese Communists' projection of their revolutionary strategy abroad is a more systematic and self-conscious expression of the general tendency of many peoples to project their way of life abroad, to judge foreign things by their own standards, and to understand alien affairs in terms of their image of themselves. This general tendency usually creates disturbances in international politics and has at one time or another brought about difficulties of some sort for the originators themselves. In the nineteenth century, Western traders and missionaries, backed by their governments with forcible measures, projected their way of life into China and disrupted the Confucian order. The total disintegration of the traditional social and political system in China doomed all Western hopes of seeing the emergence of a China fashioned after the image of a Christian, democratic nation in the West. Instead, a hostile, totalitarian regime issued from the social, political and economic chaos. While a fundamental force of social progress, cultural diffusion in any of its forms has its political and human costs. The tendency of a successful revolutionary elite to project its way of life abroad, to view alien things in terms of its self-image, is even more pronounced. Such an elite often finds adjustment to its international environment difficult. It frequently creates disturbances in the system of national states, and especially in the balance of power. The Chinese Communist Party is no exception to this rule. Mao's revolutionary strategy as reinforced by China's traumatic experience with the system of national states will make Communist China a disturbing influence in international politics for a long time and will render her adjustment to the international system a more protracted process than in other examples that come to mind. Meanwhile, Communist China will be a formidable force to reckon with and Mao's strategy will pose a serious challenge to world order.

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[94] Marshal Lo Jung-huan claimed that no better discussion of the question of war and peace is to be found than in a speech by Mao in 1945 which dealt with CCP-Kuomintang relations and the civil war in China. *Work Correspondence*, no. 8 (Feb. 6, 1961), p. 17.

[95] *Ibid.*, no. 17 (April 25, 1961), p. 19.

RESEARCH NOTES

THE ILLUSION OF JUDICIAL CONSENSUS: ZONING DECISIONS IN THE MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS

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In some American courts of last resort, dissent is free and frequent; in others the judges vote unanimously for months, even for years at a time—a difference in judicial behavior which tempts inquiry and speculation. Although social scientists generally focus on dissenting courts and feed the human and scientific appetite for open controversy, the operation of every type of court is clarified by an examination of the ways and pitfalls of ostensible consensus among the judges. The purpose of this study of one supreme court and one body of law—zoning law in the Maryland Court of Appeals—is to demonstrate that under certain conditions unanimity in voting is illusory.

I. FINDINGS

Of the fifty-one high courts in the American system of government, the Supreme Court of the United States, with a reputation for airing crucial differences, is fittingly the most measured and probed. Dissent is less frequent in all the remaining fifty. In half, dissent is noted no oftener than in one case in twenty, on the average, as contrasted with expressed disagreement, often with several dissenting opinions, in some two-thirds of the cases decided with full opinion by the federal high court in recent years. Occasionally, behavioral analysis has been directed at the courts of the states and notably the Supreme Court of Michigan,[1] which exhibits a level of dissent well below that of the Supreme Court of the United States yet high enough to invite study. The voting in such courts shows statistically significant individual, bloc, and coalition patterns. But in a majority of the courts of last resort, dissent is so rare that the usual analysis of aye and nay voting fails. A sampling of recent cases (Table I) clearly indicates this infrequency of dissent. The average rate of dissent for the states as a whole is only one case in ten.[2] The Maryland Court of Appeals, with no dissents in the cases sampled, is unlike the Michigan and United States Supreme Courts.[3] It is one of those at the peaceful end of the range.

TABLE I. FREQUENCY OF DISSENT IN THE FIFTY-ONE SUPREME COURTS: CASES WITH ONE OR MORE DISSENTING VOTES IN SAMPLES OF TWENTY-FIVE*

Number of Cases with Dissent	Jurisdiction
0	Ala., Ariz., Del., *Md.*, Mass., Nev., N.C., R.I., S.C., Tenn., W.Va.
1	Ga., Id., Ill., Ky., Me., Minn., Miss., Mo., N.M., N.D., Vt., Wash.
2	Conn., Fla., Ia., Neb., N.J., S.D., Va., Wyo.
3	Ark., N.H., O., Ore.
4	Col., Kans., Mont.
5	Alaska, Okla.
6	Hawaii, Ind., N.Y., Ut., Wis.
7	Calif., La.
8	*Mich.*
9	Tex.
10	Pa.
....	
17	*United States*

* For each court, the 25 most recent cases from the most recent regional reporters and the *United States Reports*, as of May, 1964, less unsigned orders and memorandum opinions, advisory opinions, reprimands of counsel, and suspensions from the bar. Decisions with full *per curiam* opinions included. 373–4 U.S.; 193–4 N.E. 2d; 190–5 A. 2d; 377–86 P. 2d; 369–72 S.W. 2d; 157–8 S. 2d; 131–3 S.E. 2d; and 122–5 N.W. 2d. State frequencies significant ±5 at the .05 level or beyond.

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[1] Glendon Schubert, "The Michigan Supreme Court," in *Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Behavior* (New York, 1959), pp. 129–142; and S. Sidney Ulmer, "Leadership in the Michigan Supreme Court," in Glendon Schubert, ed., *Judicial Decision-Making* (New York, 1963), pp. 13–28.

[2] At the .01 level, 10.6 ± 2.6 per cent.

[3] Schubert, *Quantitative Analysis*, p. 134, contrasts rates of dissent in 1956–57: .79 in the United States Supreme Court and .16 in the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Whatever the dissimilarities then and now, these two courts may be said to share a penchant for lively dissent, never a characteristic of the Maryland Court of Appeals.

The reasons for consensus and dissensus are buried in the political culture of each jurisdiction, to be unearthed with respect for the endless uses of law. Still, it is possible *a priori* to sketch some of the broad alternatives. In courts such as Michigan's the judges express some or all of their legal disagreements in the voting, and often in the authorship of opinions as well. In courts acknowledging little or no dissent, however, either substantial agreement actually prevails or there is disagreement not evident in the record of voting. In the latter event, at least two possibilities suggest themselves. Both sacrifice the expression of the real feelings of judges who find themselves in a minority on a particular issue, for the sake of the collectively felt needs for maintaining the prestige of the court and for gaining the advantages of collective bargaining, by presenting the outward appearance of a solid front. One possibility is that the court operates like a caucus, with an informal understanding that, except for the most exigent reasons, all the judges will be bound by the unrecorded vote of a majority, taken *in camera.* Such an understanding admits of variations in degree. Where a practice of this sort prevails, consistency in the disposition of cases is on the whole maintained until the majority viewpoint changes, by the replacement of judges or otherwise. But the outcome of zoning cases in Maryland cannot be reconciled with this explanation, as will presently be seen.

Another possibility is a log-rolling understanding that the entire court will go along with the judge assigned to write the opinion in a particular case, coupled with a system of rotating case assignments from member to member. The effective result then is one court acting as several one-man courts.[4] The court, by division of labor, is in the hands of the judge who writes the opinion rather than the members who subscribe their perfunctory concurrence. Such is the case in Maryland.

Since the passage in 1960 of a constitutional amendment reorganizing its judiciary, Maryland has had the equivalent in another way of several Courts of Appeals with overlapping memberships. The amendment increased the number of judges from five to seven and provided that:

> Five of the judges shall constitute a quorum, and five judges shall sit in each case unless the Court shall direct that an additional judge or judges sit for any case. The concurrence of a majority of those sitting shall be sufficient for the decision of any cause. . . .[5]

But this overt division of the Court has had less practical impact than the informal division which remains hidden by the rarity of dissent.

What of the possibility that the members of the Court of Appeals are in genuine agreement? They have little of the diversity of background, philosophy, and temperament of the justices of the United States Supreme Court. A common outlook on zoning would not seem implausible. Case by case, the opinions of the state judges reiterate a body of law composed of familiar leading cases; the judges defer to the Court of yesterday by upholding precedent and to their colleagues of today by concurring.

Maryland judge-made zoning law is not only stable, it is distinctive. The judicial gloss on the state enabling acts and local zoning ordinances has followed the other states with respect to the meaning of the basic mechanisms of zoning—original zoning, special exceptions, variances, and nonconforming uses—but it has assumed an unusually strong stand against rezoning (zoning amendment) by attaching strict conditions to the enactment of rezoning ordinances. According to the Maryland view, imitated in a few other courts,[6] proponents of a rezoning ordinance must show an error in the original zoning or a basic change in neighborhood conditions.

A second theme in this body of judge-made law is judicial restraint, boldly advanced in concert with the error-or-change rule with which the Court undertakes the review of the merits of a large segment of the legislative decisions of local zoning authorities. The theme takes the form of a disclaimer of responsibility to intervene so long as there is room for debate. Stated the other way, the Court feels justified in imposing its own judgment only when the action of a zoning body is deemed

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[4] It was ostensibly against such a possibility, threatened by Franklin Roosevelt's court reorganization plan, that Chief Justice Hughes argued in a letter to Congress in March, 1937, "The Constitution does not appear to authorize two or more Supreme Courts or two or more parts of a supreme court functioning in effect as separate courts." U. S. Senate, *Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary,* 75th Cong., 1st sess. (1937), S. Rept. 711, p. 40. The real disagreement was over the Court's policy, of course, not its procedure.

[5] *Laws of Maryland,* 1960, Ch. 11, ratified the same year.

[6] See, for example, the citations in Arden H. Rathkopf, *The Law of Zoning and Planning,* 3d ed. (New York: Clark Boardman Co., 1962), vol. I, sec. 27, p. 15.

"arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, and illegal."

Protestations notwithstanding, the tools of activism are well honed and ready at hand in Maryland. The frequency of their use refutes the Court's claim of judicial restraint and the distribution of their use refutes the claims of unanimity and consistency. The probability that a rezoning or other local zoning action will be struck down rises and falls from the mean as the assignment of the writing of opinions rotates from one judge to another. At the extremes of probability, zoning actions are practically certain to be upheld by Judge Hall Hammond and to be voided by Judge William Henderson. Concurrences prove illusory; what matters is the authorship of the opinions of the Court.

The stark polarity of these positions is obscured by two groups of cases in which the unanimity of the judges is real and not merely nominal. First, all the judges are reluctant to direct a local authority to grant a zoning dispensation, as contrasted with their willingness to reverse an affirmative local action. Appeals from denials of zoning actions are therefore relatively noncontroversial. Second, a number of cases each year are decided on procedural grounds, such as timeliness of appeal, unrelated to substantive questions of zoning. The disparity between word and deed occurs in the remainder: appeals on the merits from local grants of zoning amendments, special exceptions, variances, and permits for nonconforming uses. Since its first in 1926, the Maryland Court of Appeals has decided 211 zoning cases,[7] including only nine dissents. Of this number, 69 have been appeals from denials of zoning action by local authorities, decided 52 to 17 in favor of the zoning authority. Another 53 have been decided on procedural grounds, leaving a core of 89 cases: 42 upholding and 47 reversing the local zoning body.

Twenty-one of the 89 core cases in this period of nearly four decades have been decided by the two most divergent members, Judges Hammond and Henderson. Each has a record of opinions which deviates significantly from the average for the Court: Judge Hammond has written opinions of the Court nine to one in favor of sustaining the local zoning action[8] and Judge Henderson has recorded nine cases to two against the local authority.[9] If cases have been assigned to the two judges at random, the disparity in the outcomes cannot be attributed to chance alone. It appears that the two judges simply have different inclinations in zoning matters—one favoring flexibility and the other stability—and that the difference is reflected in the pattern of their opinions. A heavy work load may not permit the two and their brethren to conform to the model suggested by the state bar association in cooperation with members of the Court:

> At the conferences on opinions each opinion is read in its entirety by the judge preparing it and only after comment, discussion, criticism and revision is it finally released as the opinion of the Court. Thus the opinions are truly opinions of the Court and not "one-man opinions."[10]

Another possible explanation for the divergence between Judges Hammond and Henderson, that cases are assigned not at random but with such selectivity that Judge Hammond has received a set in which the zoning authority has acted with manifest good sense and Judge Henderson a set of patently bungled cases, is at variance with the semi-official assurance that "opinions are assigned essentially on a rotation basis."[11]

The Court of Appeals has acquiesced in a system of decision which rests on the vicissitudes of case assignment rather than the consensus of a majority.

II. DISCUSSION

Two implications of this judicial behavior may be noted, one practical and one theoretical. Practically, it suggests the value of testing for divisions of labor beneath the surface consensus of state supreme courts—for judges who tend to find the written opinions of their colleagues more persuasive than the records of the cases at bar. The proposal is more radical than it might seem. Courts in their opinions and the professional digesters who furnish anonymous case headnotes and summaries to the legal community keep alive a presumption against the significance of judicial individuality. The usual summaries of opinions of the United States Supreme Court are equally impersonal, but in this instance an abundance of offsetting commentary circulates in the law reviews, the press, and in the opinions of the Court themselves. In the states, by contrast, the law reviews and the press as often reinforce the presumption of impersonality. To the press, mention of authorship of opinions of the Maryland Court of Appeals apparently is as unseemly as it is appropriate for the reporting of activities of the United States Supreme Court, the Maryland General Assembly, or a county council. A vital bit of data is withheld from lay and professional readers alike.

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[7] To April, 1964. Tables of cases are available from the author.

[8] Significant at the .01 level.

[9] Significant at the .05 level.

[10] Maryland State Bar Association, "Report of Committee to Study the Case Load of the Court of Appeals," *Transactions* (Baltimore: Maryland State Bar Association, 1958), p. 307.

[11] *Ibid.*

If there is a division of labor, the litigant in particular has an interest in knowing details of its operation in order to take advantage of the variations from one judge to another. Judge-shopping is an ancient if not altogether honored legal stratagem. But the Maryland Court of Appeals frustrates the effort by taking care that the rotation of assignments is "varied from time to time so that it is not possible to determine in advance just which judge will write the opinion in a particular case"[12]—an unnecessary precaution unless the assignment is crucial to the outcome.

The second implication of this pattern of decision is more in the nature of an asset than a liability, and more theoretical: a collegial court functioning as a plural court provides a new and different test of the determinacy of legal rules. Good tests for courts other than the United States Supreme Court are in short supply. With that court as its prime example, American jurisprudence has passed through the stages of asserting absolutely and denying absolutely the efficacy of general propositions in application to hard facts, and has abandoned the quest for the *experimentum crucis* in favor of a cautiously empirical middle position. There is fair agreement that judges, some conscious of their power and some not, have broad discretion within the rules of law and of their constitutions, statutes, and precedents—Holmes's "play in the joints"—and students of the United States Supreme Court know now the mechanics of rationalizing virtually any judgment pro or con in constitutional law, an exercise in which they have had ample instruction from the opinions of the Court. But whether a given court in a given area of law is judging with consistency and in some recognizable relation to the rules of positive law is an empirical question for which more refined operational phrasing for courts exhibiting little or no dissent is elusive.

The feasibility and form of a test of the efficacy of general propositions depend on the make-up and the performance of the court or courts under observation. In the case of a single court with a single judge, no direct test is readily available. The court affirms rules of law and disposes of cases. It may be unclear, comparing one case with another, whether similar decisions involve the consistent application of the rules to similar facts or an inconsistent application to dissimilar facts, and conversely whether dissimilar decisions are attributable to the facts or the process of applying the rules. Indirect tests are possible in theory, but impracticable to the degree that they require long time series or experimental retrying of the cases by the observer.

In the analysis of more than one court applying the same rules to equivalent facts, the efficacy of the rules can be tested simply and successfully. A significant difference in the decision patterns of two courts which is not traceable to differences in the facts of the cases before them can be attributed only to the indeterminacy of the rules of law.

The best known situation is the collegial court with two dimensions of expressed disagreement: dissenting opinions and the overturning of precedent. Since the facts available to the majority and the dissenters are identical, there is no need for statistical inferences or investigations of the comparability of the facts; and when a majority overrules old interpretations it of course is openly demonstrating to that extent the indeterminacy of the underlying legal propositions.

A court such as the Maryland Court of Appeals—collegial, nearly free of dissent, and inconsistent internally in so far as members concur in decisions they would decide differently on assignment—is functionally more akin to a system of courts applying the same rules than to one court like the United States Supreme Court. Observers of judicial behavior will find it profitable to watch for the possible operation of indeterminacy in this unlikely context. Overlooking concurrences, tabulating the authorship of opinions in a defined field of law, and testing for significant deviations from the average, they can contribute a note of realism to the literature of the law. Focusing on one field of law is necessary for accuracy, but it need not imply triviality of subject matter. Zoning decisions in the Maryland Court of Appeals, for example, often have made momentous differences in land use.

III. SUMMARY

The opinions of the judges of the Maryland Court of Appeals reflect an uncomplicated faith in legal rules and their literal application by traditional judicial methods. Whatever their private views, the judges do not recognize a need to interrupt their flow of work with a basic examination of the role of the judiciary.

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[12] *Ibid.*

Maryland has been untouched by the logical skepticism that has disturbed and divided some courts for several decades: the idea that "general propositions do not decide concrete cases"[13] or that rules are only predictions of "what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious."[14] Neither has it been touched by the psychological skepticism suggesting that legal principles sometimes function as defensive incantations—that ritual protestations of judicial restraint in activist opinions, to take one instance, may serve to reassure judges who value the principle of restraint while they also feel obliged to depart from it.

At least in their zoning decisions, the members of the Maryland Court of Appeals have striven for consistency of doctrine rather than consistency of decision. Because of the rotation of assignments for the writing of opinions and the automatic nature of concurrence in these cases, their nearly unanimous acceptance of a remarkably stable set of rules has resulted in a low level of determinacy and predictability from the point of view of the litigant, whose interest is in results.

It is entirely possible for a detectable consistency of decision, procedural or substantive, to be associated with a given set of rules and to lend predictability to the operation of courts of law. Procedurally, for example, a court may approach predictability by genuine judicial restraint in the manner of Felix Frankfurter, to whom other forms of consistency seemed either illusory or presumptuous, and substantively it may adopt the policy of activism in a known direction, as the United States Supreme Court has at different times in the areas of property and civil rights.

Compared to the Maryland high court, the Supreme Court of the United States is highly consistent in the general run of its business, because the tendencies of each of its members are known with some accuracy and the prediction of majority positions often follows by simple arithmetic. But the positions of members of the Maryland Court of Appeals are not additive and the position of the Court as a whole in a zoning case therefore is set by one man at a time.

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[13] Holmes, dissenting in Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 at 76 (1905).

[14] Holmes, "The Path of the Law," *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 10 (1897), p. 461, reprinted in his *Collected Legal Papers*.

DOES A "DIVISIVE" PRIMARY HARM A CANDIDATE'S ELECTION CHANCES?

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It is a rare election year when the nation's attention is not focussed on at least one party primary where the struggle for the nomination is highly competitive and the result a matter of doubt until the last precincts are reported. In many such cases the other party has settled on its own standard-bearer and thus sits back contentedly while the opposition wages its internecine battle before a rapt public. In recent years as varied personages as Estes Kefauver, Richard Nixon, and Charles Percy found themselves engaged in a hard-fought primary campaign to secure their nomination or renomination for state office.

Nixon's subsequent defeat in the 1962 race for the California governorship, and in a lesser degree Percy's 1964 experience in Illinois, served to illustrate the conventional view that the party whose candidate is obliged to fight a hard primary campaign has an important strike against it upon entering the general election. Common sense, if nothing else, suggests that the very existence of such a primary produces or symbolizes fissures among a party's supporters. The supposition also arises that those who backed the primary loser in the Spring may be less than enthusiastic about aiding his vanquisher in the Fall. And there is reason to believe that voters who are committed to neither party may wonder whether the party that needed to go to the polls to resolve its own leadership problems is fit to hold public office.

The validity of these common sense assumptions can be tested by juxtaposing the experience of candidates in their primary and general elections. The period to be considered here runs from 1956 through to 1964, and the offices contested are those of governor and senator.[1]

Not all of the 50 states are sufficiently competitive to warrant inclusion in this analysis. If a single party dominates the election for state offices then the occurrence of a divisive primary within the already weak second party will hardly be the efficient cause of its going down to defeat in the November election. In such states the opposition party has little or no chance of winning either the governorship or a Senate seat anyway, so a primary fight within its own meager ranks makes little difference.

Accordingly, the following 15 states will, for present purposes, be considered "one-party" states and so excluded from the ensuing calculations: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, and Virginia. This list has been drawn notwithstanding that many of these states have had vigorous two-party competiton for their Presidential electoral votes. It also acknowledges that Oklahoma has elected a Republican governor, Texas a Republican senator, Vermont a Democratic governor, and Alabama and Mississippi Republican congressmen in recent years. Nevertheless 14 of these states are quite solidly Democratic; and if Vermont is no longer a safe Republican enclave, its shift to the two-party column is a relatively late development in the 1956–1964 period. Finally, four states—Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, and New York—hold no primaries for senatorial and gubernatorial nominations. The remaining 31 states are left to form the basis for this study.

Some of these 31 states are, of course, more competitive than others. Republican candidates for statewide office usually seem to be on the losing end of a near-miss in Nevada and Washington; and only two Democrats have been able to win a majority in Utah in the last eight years. Moreover some states have meaningful two-party competition for the governorship while their Senate seats do not change partisan hands. In Kansas, Nebraska, and Iowa Republicans invariably won the Senate race during this period, and in New Mexico that office is pretty much a Democratic monopoly. Nevertheless these states are sufficiently competitive to deserve inclusion in the two-party category.

I. "DIVISIVE" PRIMARIES

A "divisive" primary is here defined as one where the winning candidate received less than 65 per cent of the total votes cast. In "token" primaries, correspondingly, the winner received 65 per cent or more of the ballots cast, or ran as a single candidate unopposed. This arbitrary cut-off point was decided upon as most appropriate for purposes of this study after first trying various alternative percentages. Put the other way around, in a "divisive" primary at least 35 per cent of the voters who participated cast their ballots for someone other than the candidate who ultimately won the nomination.

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[1] This study starts with 1956 because that was the year for which Richard Scammon began to collate primary figures in his *America Votes* series (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958, 1960, 1962, 1964). Most of the primary and election statistics for 1964 were obtained from *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports* and, in a few instances, by personal correspondence with state officials.

Between 1956 and 1964 there were 220 elections for senator and governor in the 31 states. In 94 of these both candidates had token primaries; in 27 both had divisive primary contests; and in 99 one candidate had only token opposition while the other had a divisive fight in the primaries. Lumping together the first two categories, it may be assumed that in 121 of the 220 elections, at least so far as their primary experience was concerned, the candidates entered the general election on an equal footing. These elections can be used as a "control" group, and it will be referred to again in the concluding section. But in order to analyze the influence of a divisive primary, our attention should first be directed to the 99 elections where one of the two candidates had had only a token primary.[2]

In these 99 cases, the opponent who underwent a divisive primary was the loser in the general election in 68 instances and the winner in only 31. Thus in almost 70 per cent of these elections it was the candidate who had to fight for his nomination who went down to a November defeat. From these figures it is easy enough to jump to the conclusion that the candidate emerging from a divisive primary stood a better than two-to-one chance of being defeated at the general election. On the other hand it appears that almost one-third of the divisive primary candidates managed to pick up the pieces and emerge victorious over an opponent who had had little or no trouble at the primary stage himself. Hence some inquiry must be made into the conditions under which some candidates with a divisive primary behind them went on to subsequent victory while others suffered defeat.

In dealing with almost 100 elections spanning almost a full political decade it is obvious that a wide range of causal factors are operative, many of them not amenable to measurement. When one candidate wins and another loses the reasons may have to do with such matters as personality, campaign organization, party swings, or other peculiarities of time and place. What is being undertaken here is, for all intents and purposes, an empirical exercise in model-building. The major variable is the primary experience of the candidate, and this factor will be held constant while surrounding and accompanying conditions are ranged against it.

II. THE OFFICE

Senatorial and gubernatorial elections differ in just about as many respects as they are similar. It is well understood, for example, that an incumbent senator stands a far better chance of re-election than does an incumbent governor. The senator can make his public reputation on national and international issues; most of his enemies on these have no vote in his state. The American governorship is a highly visible and vulnerable office locally, and the man who occupies it is often the scapegoat for all manner of parochial political grievances when he is so temerarious as to request a renewed vote of confidence. Of the 68 incumbent governors seeking re-election between 1956 and 1964, only 42 (or 62 per cent) succeeded in this bid. In contrast, of the 85 senators up for re-election no fewer than 71 (or 84 per cent) were returned to Washington. The high visibility of the governorship is also made evident by looking at the 75 occasions when the voters in a state happened to cast ballots for both senator and governor at the same time. In these 75 twin elections the total votes cast were higher in the gubernatorial contest on 60 (or 80 per cent) of the occasions. While the differences were seldom appreciable it is significant that, much more often than the other way around, some voters made a choice for governor and then left the senatorial places on their ballot unmarked. Moreover, in these twin contests no fewer than 31 (or 41 per cent) of them found a majority of the electorate choosing one party's candidate as governor and the other's as senator. It is clear, at any rate, that many voters are careful to distinguish the two statewide offices from each other.

Looking at their previous primary experience it develops that a gubernatorial candidate who

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[2] Thus the total number of hard-fought primaries amounted to 153, of which 54 arose from the 27 occasions when both candidates had to struggle for their nominations, and 99 from the cases where only one of the two candidates had a strenuous fight. This figure is only 35 per cent of 440, the total number of November major-party candidacies in this period. In other words, almost two-thirds of the senatorial and gubernatorial candidates in 1956 through 1964 were either unopposed or received only token primary opposition in their quests for the nominations.

TABLE I. OFFICE AND ELECTION OUTCOME

Fate of "divisive" candidate	Senator (N=49)	Governor (N=50)	Total (N=99)
	(%)	(%)	(%)
Lost	73	64	69
Won	27	36	31
	100	100	100

fought a divisive primary stood a better chance of winning the general election than a senatorial candidate with a similar fight behind him. In absolute numbers this means that 18 candidates won the governorship even after a hard-fought primary whereas only 13 senatorial candidates survived to victory. What is noteworthy, and this will be amplified later on, is that no less than eight of the winning governors were challengers facing incumbents, while this was the case with only 3 of the senatorial aspirants. In other words the experience of a divisive primary behind a gubernatorial candidate can be compensated for, at least in part, by the fact that his opponent is an incumbent governor who, despite his own token primary, stands a good chance of being defeated just because he is governor.

III. THE STATE

A variety of schemes and systems have been used to classify states by party, each with its own criteria and merits.[3] To classify the 31 states here being studied as either "Democratic" or "Republican" it was simply asked how many of the statewide elections between 1956 and 1964 were won by each party's candidate in each state. If a majority of these elections were won, say, by Republicans then the state was listed as "Republican." This was the case with eleven states, and the "Democratic" label was assigned to 16 others. Four states were, for present purposes, put to one side since both parties there won an equal number of statewide contests.[4]

Using this classification the candidates may be categorized as running in "friendly" or "hostile" territory. Any Democrat campaigning in Utah, for example, obviously has an uphill road to travel, no matter what kind of primary experience he had; and the same is true for any Republican aspirant in Washington or Nevada. Of the 99 elections being examined, ten took place in the four states where the parties struck an even balance, leaving 89 to be analyzed here.

What is most striking in Table II is that only eleven percentage points separate the electoral outcomes of candidates running in friendly as opposed to hostile states. It is not surprising that three-quarters of the candidates who had survived divisive primaries then went down to defeat in a general election in unfriendly territory—the surprise here is rather that as many as 25 per cent of such candidates won at all. However, 61 of the 89 candidates were running in states already sympathetic to their party and this presumed advantage did not prevent almost two-thirds of them from being defeated anyway. Apparently, then, the advantage of running in a friendly state is not sufficient to compensate for having undergone a divisive primary. It should be noted, further, that of these candidates who lost in friendly territory about equal proportions were aspirants for the governorship and a seat in the Senate.

The key difference between those who won and those who lost in friendly states lies in

TABLE II. STATUS OF STATE AND ELECTION OUTCOME

Fate of "divisive" candidate	"Friendly" (N=61)	"Hostile" (N=28)	Total (N=89)
	(%)	(%)	(%)
Lost	64	75	67
Won	36	25	33
	100	100	100

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[3] The best known are Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall, "The American Party Systems," this REVIEW, Vol. 48 (1954), pp. 477–485 and Joseph A. Schlesinger, "A Two-Dimensional Scheme for Classifying the States According to Degree of Inter-Party Competition," *ibid.*, Vol. 49 (1955), pp. 1120–1128. For a recent summary and criticism of the major classification systems, see Richard I. Hofferbert, "Classification of American State Party Systems," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 26 (1964), pp. 550–567.

[4] *The "Republican" states are:* Arizona, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming. *"Democratic" states:* California, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. *"Evenly Balanced" states:* Colorado, Maine, Montana, and Nebraska.

whether or not the candidate was an incumbent. Table III, computed in absolute figures rather than percentages as the numbers are small, makes this clear. (Only 67 elections are tabulated as the other 22 did not involve an incumbent.) Thus the losers, whether they ran in friendly or in hostile states, were chiefly challengers who were running against incumbents. This condition of incumbency, or its lack, will be examined next. It only remains to remark that primary contests are twice as apt to occur in a party situated in friendly territory. Only on 28 occasions out of the 89 did the underdog party, already at a disadvantage in terms of popular appeal, have a divisive primary.

IV. INCUMBENCY

It is a rule of thumb that in elections where a challenger faces an incumbent the latter begins the race with an advantage. Thus if the survivor of a divisive primary is subsequently defeated the reason may have less to do with his primary experience than with the status of the opponent he faced at the general election. An incumbent was involved in 75 contests, and Table IV indicates how the candidates who had had "divisive" primaries fared in these. Most of these candidates were challengers and most of them went down to defeat. Indeed only eleven of these aspirants, faced with the double disadvantage of a divisive primary and of running against an incumbent, managed to win at all. In contrast, most of the 15 incumbents who had had divisive primaries won. It has already been noted that being or not being an incumbent has more to do with a candidate's electoral chances than the friendliness or hostility of the state in which he is running. By the same token there may be some value in inquiring whether the office involved makes any difference in the security apparently offered by incumbency.

For the same reason as before, absolute numbers will be used. What emerges from Table V is that of the six incumbents who lost five were sitting governors and only one was a senator. At the same time, of the eleven double-disadvantaged challengers who won, only three were senators and eight were aspirants for a governorship. This of course goes far toward underlining the volatile character of the office of governor: if it is relatively easy for a challenger to come by, it is also quite easy to depart from once he is there.[5]

TABLE III. STATUS OF STATE, STATUS OF CANDIDATE, AND ELECTION OUTCOME

Fate of "divisive" candidate	Number of candidates			
	In "Friendly" States		In "Hostile" States	
	Incumbents	Challengers	Incumbents	Challengers
Lost	2	29	4	12
Won	7	7	2	4
	9	36	6	16

TABLE IV. STATUS OF CANDIDATE AND ELECTION OUTCOME

Fate of "divisive" candidate	Incumbent (N = 15)	Challenger (N = 60)	Total (N = 75)
	(%)	(%)	(%)
Lost	40	82	73
Won	60	18	27
	100	100	100

TABLE V. OFFICE, STATUS OF CANDIDATE, AND ELECTION OUTCOME

Fate of "divisive" candidate	Number of candidates			
	Incumbents		Challengers	
	Senators	Governors	Senators	Governors
Lost	1	5	30	19
Won	5	4	3	8
	6	9	33	27

V. THE PRIMARY

Some primaries are more competitive than others; some are a veritable free-for-all while others are well structured contests between two prominent contenders. There were, for example, no less than nine aspirants for the Kansas Republican gubernatorial nomination in 1964, and the front-runner received less than 30 per cent of the primary vote. In contrast the Illinois Republican gubernatorial primary ballot that year had only two names and the winner, Charles Percy, secured more than 60 per cent of the votes.

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[5] By the same token a gubernatorial aspirant who had had a divisive primary even in a friendly state had less than a 50-50 chance of success. While a state's voters may be sympathetic to one of the parties, their friendship does not always extend to supporting that party's choice for governor. Thus of the 31 candidates running for governor in friendly territory, only 14 managed to win. On the other hand, 22 of the 30 similarly situated senatorial candidates did win.

Hence it might be thought that candidates who gain their nomination by securing a majority of the primary vote would fare better at the general election than their counterparts who won the candidacy with only a plurality. (None of the 31 states except Idaho had a run-off primary.) This, however, was not the case. Of the candidates who won their nominations with a majority vote in the primary, 71 per cent went on to lose in the general election; whereas of those who secured only a plurality in the primary, 68 per cent lost their general election. The difference, only three percentage points, is insignificant and it suggests that there are equal disadvantages in either leading a large field by a small margin (which shows that no one has a commanding popularity) or in running ahead of one or more competitors by a relatively larger margin (which, if the margin is less than 65 per cent, shows a polarized opposition).

Rather more interesting is the influence of the extent of voter turn-out in the primary on subsequent election results. The absolute number of people turning out to vote is not a very meaningful measure due to the differential standards of Presidential and mid-term years. Moreover local or national personalities and issues can be the cause of high primary participation; once in the booth, voters will usually go ahead and cast a ballot in any senatorial or gubernatorial contests that are in progress at the same time, even though these alone might not have brought them out. What can be evaluated, however, is the relation between the number of voters participating in a party's primary and the number who vote for that party's candidate in the general election. Thus the November vote may be used as a norm against which to measure the size of the primary turn-out in the preceding spring. Voting in the general election, to be sure, varies markedly as between Presidential and other years. However, of the 99 elections being examined here, half were in each category: 45 took place in 1956, 1960, and 1964, while 44 were in the intervening years.

Turn-out at a primary was classed as "high" if the total number of primary voters—regardless of which contender they voted for in the primary—was over 50 per cent of the primary winner's subsequent election showing. A "low" primary turn-out consisted of fewer than 50 per cent. Thus if the total vote for all the names entered in a party's primary was 120,000 and if that party's candidate got 200,000 votes in the election, then the primary turn-out was 60 per cent, and hence rated "high." The figures in Table VI reveal that candidates who survived divisive primaries where the turn-out was high actually went on to do better in the general election than those who won in primaries having low participation. Over a third of those in the high turn-out primaries fared well, compared with just about a quarter of those who emerged from primaries with low turn-outs. This may seem curious, as a higher turn-out might suggest a greater degree of interest and therefore the potentiality of greater intra-party tensions.

TABLE VI. PRIMARY TURN-OUT AND ELECTION OUTCOME

Fate of "divisive" candidate	"Low" Turn-Out (N = 35)	"High" Turn-Out (N = 64)	Total (N = 99)
	(%)	(%)	(%)
Lost	74	66	69
Won	26	34	31
	100	100	100

As a matter of arithmetic, a high primary turn-out of, say, 70 per cent may simply denote that the party's candidate did very poorly at the general election. If the 70 per cent stands for 70,000 primary voters in relation to 100,000 general election voters—while the opposition party was getting, say, 200,000 votes at that election—then a highly participative primary is not very impressive. But the point is that 34 per cent of the high primary candidates did in fact win, so the high turn-outs in their primaries are to be measured against what were majorities at the general election. At all events it appears that a high primary turn-out, despite the divisive character of that balloting, is a better augury for a candidate than one that is sparsely attended. For despite the struggle taking place in the primary a high turn-out seems to indicate wide interest in the party's fortunes and thus some likelihood that this interest will be translated into support of the primary winner.

Finally it should be noted that turn-outs are higher in gubernatorial than in senatorial primaries. The average participation in contests for Senate nominations was 55.1 per cent whereas when the candidacy for a governorship was at stake the primary turn-outs averaged 64.0 per cent. Even when we allow for the years in which these races took place—for a slightly higher proportion of the Senate elections were in Presidential years—the contest for the governorship still aroused more public interest in the primaries. Indeed the difference of nine percentage points just noted remained steady in both Presidential and off-years.

TABLE VII. TYPES OF ELECTIONS AND OUTCOMES

	Elections With One Candidate Having a "Divisive Primary"	Elections With Both Candidates on Equal Terms
	(%)	(%)
A. Office Contested		
	(*N=99*)	(*N=121*)
Governor	51	48
Senator	49	52
	100	100
B. Status of State		
	(*N=89*)	(*N=104*)
Winner in "Friendly" State	69	68
Winner in "Hostile" State	31	32
	100	100
C. Status of Candidate		
	(*N=75*)	(*N=78*)
Winner the incumbent	77	72
Winner the challenger	23	28
	100	100

This is more evidence of the governors' higher visibility, and it shows that he is a figure of interest at the primary stage no less than at the general election.

VI. A CONTROLLED CONCLUSION

Does a divisive primary place a candidate at a disadvantage as against an opponent who had smooth sailing in securing his nomination? The record as thus far reported would seem to suggest that a prior experience of a hard-fought primary is a handicap. For in the 99 elections examined, 68 were lost by the candidate with a divisive primary behind him. The tabulations, to be sure, showed that gubernatorial candidates, candidates running in friendly states, candidates who won their nominations in primaries with high turn-outs, and—most particularly—candidates who were incumbents, were all more apt to win. The winners, however, constituted only 31 per cent of the group being studied whereas, *ceteris paribus*, they would have constituted about 50 per cent.

It is therefore in order to compare these 99 elections with a parallel set of such contests where "other things" were, as near as may be, equal. These are the 121 elections where both candidates were at an equal advantage, at least so far as their experience in the primary was concerned. In this group, either both candidates had undergone a divisive primary or both had had token primaries. Table VII compares the status of the winners in the two groups of elections. It should, first of all, be indicated that an approximately equal number of senatorial and gubernatorial elections were in both groups. In the group of 99 where one candidate was presumably disadvantaged, 51 per cent of the elections involved the governorship; and among the 121 where neither candidate was handicapped, 48 per cent were gubernatorial elections. This difference of three percentage points is relatively insignificant.

More important is the fact that in the 89 and 104 contests taking place in states that could be classified as being either friendly or hostile to the respective candidates, the records are virtually identical. Therefore it would appear that the sympathies of the state constitute a persisting influence that remains unaffected by what occurred or did not occur at the primary.

Respecting the influence of incumbency, we have 75 elections pitting an incumbent against a challenger in the group with one presumably handicapped candidate, and 78 elections in the group where both candidates were on a par. While the challengers won in only 23 per cent of the former contests they managed to win in 28 per cent of the latter. This gap of five percentage points is not strikingly high, and it is difficult to know how much importance to ascribe to it. On the whole, it seems fair not to make too much of this difference.

Accordingly, it appears that a divisive primary, in and of itself, bears little relation to a candidate's prospects at the general election. The sorts of candidates who win and lose are much the same in contests where one or neither or both of the contenders have first undergone a divisive primary. Every election inexorably produces one winner and one loser. The conditions associated with victory and defeat are chiefly the traditional ones of incumbency and the party-orientation of the state in which the election is held. This study has sought to throw some light on which candidates who have had divisive primaries are more likely to win or to lose. But its chief conclusion is that their prospects would have been much the same even if they had had no difficulties at all in securing their nominations.

CONTESTED ELECTIONS AND VOTER TURNOUT IN A LOCAL COMMUNITY: A PROBLEM IN SPURIOUS CORRELATION

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This paper presents an attempt, in a case study, to infer causal relationships between contests for local elective office and voter turnout—an attempt which required, in turn, the use of a recently developed mathematical technique for identifying and eliminating spurious correlations. The method no doubt has wider applications.

The case study involves a small New England town and its annual February town elections over the period 1947–1963. The town was chosen as one of the six affected by the newly established Cape Cod National Seashore. The time period was chosen to cover the interval during which the town was faced with the rapid increase in tourism which transformed it from a declining agricultural town to a service-based town. The policies and methods by which the town dealt with this basic change in its economic structure were of immediate interest, especially in the latter years when the National Park Service became involved in the problems the Cape has faced in this postwar period.[1]

The study raised the question of who was making the various types of governmental decisions that could be made locally. Qualitative interviews, supported by archival data, indicated that the Board of Selectmen and usually a Selectman made and carried out the town's necessary decisions, although it was generally recognized that this ability was restricted by prior decisions, decisions made elsewhere (public and private), and lack of technical knowledge. This decision making process was evidently not too taxing a burden prior to World War II, as the town and its agricultural base declined. But following the war, the dynamic growth in tourist use of the town and its facilities necessitated a broadened scope of town government activity. This was especially true in such problem areas as town services to the summer folk, land-use regulation and building codes. In early and partial response, the town meeting established a Planning Board in 1946, to plan and implement regulatory measures in these latter two fields. In other areas, existing governmental units were strengthened in various ways and temporary committees and governmental units were made permanent. To outward appearance, the town responded during the whole period by maintaining its basic governmental structure and relationships and by adding functions or enlarging units only where there was a felt need.

If this were true, then the members of the Board of Selectmen should still retain their high position as the decision makers in the town notwithstanding changes, trends or outside influences. However, the town's initial response in establishing a Planning Board and the obvious land-use thrust of the National Seashore issue, 1957–63, suggested the possibility that the Planning Board had become an important decision maker in the community, equal to or even supplanting the Board of Selectmen. This possibility was further heightened by the conflict over the National Seashore, which found the Board of Selectmen approving the concept, at least, of a National Seashore, while the Planning Board, almost from the day of the initial proposal, acted as its most ardent antagonist. What body, then, really made the town's decisions? Qualitative interview data gave mixed answers on the role of the Planning Board in this process, depending on the respondent's viewpont. Those with pro-Seashore feelings saw the Planning Board as obstructionist and weak, while those with anti-Seashore feelings saw it as constructive and having some power in making and directing decisions. More objective data and other techniques were needed to test the hypothesis that the Planning Board was an important decision maker in the community and was so recognized by citizens of the town.

One of several quantitative checks available,[2] voting behavior in the annual town election, was used to measure the relative turnout in the voting for various offices, and thereby presumably the prestige in which they were held. These town elections involve all the elected offices in the town which are open for contest in that particular year and are held in February, at town meeting time. Because of the date, it seemed unlikely that extraneous state or national "noise" would interfere with the voting results. Also, so far as could be ascertained, these offices have not been overtly contested on a partisan basis.[3] Therefore, the national, state and party variables would not seem to be possible "outside" intruders capable of causing any systematic bias in the February town elections. These elections should show what offices attract most attention.

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[1] The data for this study were obtained in conjunction with the author's unpublished dissertation, "The Cape Cod National Seashore: A Study in Conflict" (University of Illinois, 1963). The author wishes to acknowledge special indebtedness to Professors Phillip Monypenny and Bernard Lazerwitz of the University of Illinois and Professor Hubert M. Blalock, Jr. of the University of North Carolina.

[2] Another possible quantitative check involves the warrant articles which form the agenda for the town meeting. Ascertaining who backed the

I. THE DATA

The specific variables related were "voter turnout," or the per cent of the eligible voters who actually voted, and "office contests," or the winning candidate's percentage of the total vote cast for the candidates for that office. Five "office contest" categories were distinguished—four of them specific offices (Board of Selectmen, Moderator, School Committee and the Planning Board) and a fifth residual category for all "other elective" offices. The working hypothesis used to relate the variables was that the greater the contest for an office—the nearer the vote for it came to an even tie—the higher the voter turnout would be.[4] If this proved to be so, and the filling of any one office was consistently contested and thereby created a higher voter turnout for it, this finding should indicate which office was perceived as most important in the town by those who run for office as well as by those who vote.

Table I presents the data on which the following analysis is based. Table II is a matrix that presents the interrelationship of the variables. A multiple correlation run with "voter turnout" as the dependent variable and the five "office contests" as the independent variables produced a correlation coefficient of .87. This means that the variations in the office contests explain over 75 per cent of the variation in the voter turnout—which further substantiates the assertion that little "outside noise" was impinging on these data.

In analyzing the matrix to ascertain which contest variable was causing the most changes in voter turnout, the data indicated that Board of Selectmen contests (+.84), "Other office" contests (+.49) and Moderator contests (+.38) correlated most closely with increases in voter turnout, while School Committee contests (+.13) affected voter turnout only slightly and Planning Board contests (−.52) actually correlated with a decrease in voter turnout. In the face of these results—particularly the high correlation between the Board of Selectmen contests and "Other office" contests (+.63), a spurious correlation seemed more than a possibility. The Board of Selectmen contests, that is to say, were perhaps causing covariation between voter turnout and "Other office" contests, which made the latter two variables appear to be highly related. It seemed possible also that Board of Selectmen contests were causing a spurious negative relationship between the Planning Board contests and voter turnout (−.52), since the former were related inversely to the Planning

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articles and how these articles fared over time should give some indication as to whose will tends to prevail. This approach would focus directly on the Board of Selectmen since most articles funnel through their office as they make up the final warrant. Thus it would tend to be a test of the ability of the Board of Selectmen to get their way and not an equal test of all town institutions, official roles, groups or individuals. A further question arises, which seemed unanswerable: what about those articles that did not make the final warrant? Incomplete records as to article sponsorship and non-warrant articles allowed too great a chance for error in the findings by this route of inquiry.

[3] This assertion is based on examination of nomination papers for candidature for local office, newspaper accounts during the period, and the overwhelming dominance of the Republican Party in the Town. To demonstrate the last point two sorts of evidence are at hand. First, between 1947 and 1963 there were 100 candidates for local public office, defining candidature arbitrarily as anyone who received more than five votes for a particular office. The party registration of these candidates was: Republican 72; Democrat 7; Independent 18; Unknown 3. Of the seven Democrats who ran, only two were successful. Second, the town's per cent Republican vote for the gubernatorial candidate during the period was: 1946—92.7%; 1948—84.8%; 1950—83.7%; 1952—89.7%; 1954—88.9%; 1956—85.2%; 1958—83.1%; 1960—81.7%; 1962—78.5%. While there is a decline in the Republican percentage over the period, it remains high enough to classify the town as one-party, Republican.

[4] Alvin Boskoff and Harmon Zeigler, *Voting Patterns in a Local Election* (Philadelphia and New York, J. B. Lippincott, 1964), p. 18 and Robert E. Lane, *Political Life* (Glencoe, 1959), pp. 308–11.

TABLE I. TOWN ELECTIONS, 1947–1963

Year	Voter turnout[a]	Per cent of office vote cast for winning candidate for: Board of Selectmen	Moderator	School Committee	Planning Board	Other offices
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
1947	41.2	100.0	100.0	100.0	62.3[b]	100.0
1948	49.6	86.7	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1949	40.0	100.0	100.0	80.4	100.0	87.8[c]
1950	74.2	42.3	100.0	100.0	53.5	53.2[d]
1951	67.9	65.0	100.0	38.3	52.4[e]	100.0
1952	17.8	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1953	72.6	49.0	100.0	95.9	38.7	100.0
1954	21.3	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1955	54.3	74.6	82.3	100.0	100.0	100.0
1956	54.3	71.5	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1957	15.5	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1958	75.8	78.5	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1959	80.7	47.0	24.6	100.0	72.7	52.1[d]
1960	52.9	68.5	100.0	100.0	44.4	57.8[f]
1961	41.7	76.7	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1962	67.3	32.2	100.0	49.1	100.0	71.8[g]
1963	32.3	100.0	100.0	51.1	100.0	100.0

[a] Per cent of eligible voters who voted.

[b] Average of five contests; winning candidates' votes ranged from 52.9 to 67.4 per cent.

[c] Office of Constable.

[d] Office of Tree Warden.

[e] Two contests; one with 100.0 per cent winning vote, one with 52.4 per cent.

[f] Office of Recreation Commissioner.

[g] Office of Library Trustee.

Board contests (−.43) and highly positively to voter turnout (+.84). How could these surmises be confirmed?

II. THEORETICAL BASE

In order to test whether these apparent interrelationships were actually spurious, the author turned to a technique currently being developed in statistical analysis. The technique has developed in part from attempts to reduce the possibility of spurious correlations. Initially, these efforts were concerned with a

TABLE II. TOTAL CORRELATION MATRIX

	Voter turnout	Board of Selectmen contests	Moderator contests	School Committee contests	Planning Board contests	Other office contests
Voter turnout	—	+.84	+.38	+.13	−.52	+.49
Board of Selectmen "office contests"	+.84	—	+.33	+.18	−.43	+.63
Moderator "office contests"	+.38	+.33	—	−.16	−.46	+.49
School Committee "office contests"	+.13	+.18	−.16	—	+.01	−.04
Planning Board "office contests"	−.52	−.43	−.46	+.01	—	−.56
Other "office contests"	+.49	+.63	+.49	−.04	−.56	—

two-variable relationship (x, y), in which some unexplained covariation appeared—unexplained in the sense that no logical connection between the two variables was evident, or, though some logical connection did exist, there was reason to suppose that both might be effects of some unknown cause (t). In either case, a third or test variable (t) was suspected of causing the covariation measured in the two-variable relationship (x, y) under investigation. The test variable (t) was therefore introduced into the system to measure accurately its relationship to the rest of the system.

If the relationship in the two-variable system (x, y) is indeed spurious, and the test variable is its cause, the original relationship will disappear (*i.e.*, be reduced to zero) by the introduction of the test variable (t). Conversely, genuine relationship in the two-variable system will be reflected by the fact that it will be more clearly specified according to the test variable.[5] Simon presented the mathematical foundations of this procedure and thereby laid the basis for expanding it to include more than three variables.[6] Blalock has extended the procedure to include analysis of the relationships of four and five variables in a predictive system.[7]

The initial step in carrying out this analysis is the intercorrelation of all variables in the system under study, with no assumptions as to any possible causal arrows. In the six-variable system, there are 15 pairs of relationships or 30 possible interrelationships.[8] (See Table II.) At this point several assumptions are needed. The first underlies ordinary correlation analysis and assumes the relationships involved are linear. The others are more specific to the problem under study: there is a time precedence in the variables involved and all other "outside" or "extraneous" variables are random in their effect on the particular variable system under study.[9] With these assumptions, the number of possible causal arrows is reduced and the system becomes a potentially predictive model in which the relationships between variables can be derived from the original correlation matrix.



FIGURE 1. Diagram of relationships in six-variable system.

In this particular six-variable case, one further assumption was made in order to test the interrelationships for possible spuriousness. This is that "voter turnout" was the dependent variable and that the causal relationship or arrow, if any, was uni-directional, from the several independent "office contest" variables to the dependent "voter turnout" variable. This was derived from the working hypothesis specified above.

The original system, containing 30 relationships between the six variables, was reduced to 25 when the uni-directionality of the influence of the independent variables on the dependent variable was assumed (Figure 1). By suggesting that one office contest variable may be causing spurious relationships between the remaining contests variables and voter turnout, the possible relationships are reduced to 5 (Figure 2). In this case, it appeared that the Board of Selectmen contests were the possible cause of spurious correlation, but to fully test the hypotheses of spuriousness each of the other office contest variables (t, x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4) was also placed in the causal position, in turn.

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[5] Paul F. Lazarsfeld, "Interpretation of Statistical Relation as a Research Operation," Lazarsfeld and Morris Rosenberg, eds., *The Language of Social Research* (Glencoe, 1955), pp. 115–125.

[6] Herbert A. Simon, "Spurious Correlation: A Causal Interpretation," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, Vol. 49 (September, 1954), pp. 467–479.

[7] Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., *Social Statistics* (New York, 1960) and *Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research* (Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 1964).

[8] For the purposes of simplicity and clarity, the following symbols are used in this portion of the presentation: Board of Selectmen contests (t); voter turnout (y); Moderator contests (x_1); School Committee contests (x_2); Planning Board contests (x_3); and, "Other office" contests (x_4).

[9] If it becomes apparent that a specific "outside" or "extraneous" variable is not random in its effects, this variable should be brought into the system of variables to aid in explaining the relationships under investigation. Simon, *op. cit.*, pp. 471–473 and Blalock, *Social Statistics*, pp. 339–340.



FIGURE 2. Diagram of source of spurious relationships.

The model of spuriousness (Figure 2) yields the following predictive equations:

$$r_{(x_1y)} = r_{(tx_1)} \cdot r_{(ty)}$$
$$r_{(x_2y)} = r_{(tx_2)} \cdot r_{(ty)}$$
$$r_{(x_3y)} = r_{(tx_3)} \cdot r_{(ty)}$$
$$r_{(x_4y)} = r_{(tx_4)} \cdot r_{(ty)}$$

Table III contains predictive equations and computations based on the correlation coefficients in Table II.

III. ANALYSIS OF DATA

The model of spurious correlation which introduced the Board of Selectmen contests as the test variable into the original relationship

TABLE III. OFFICE CONTEST VARIABLES AS TEST VARIABLES

Model	Office contests variable being related to voter turnout	Correlation between contests variable and voter turnout*	Predicted correlation by test variable†	Correlation not predicted by test variable‡
A. *Test Variable is the Board of Selectmen contests*				
	Moderator	+.38	+.28	+.10
	School Committee	+.13	+.15	−.02
	Planning Board	−.52	−.36	−.16
	Other	+.49	+.53	−.04
B. *Test Variable is the Moderator contests*				
	Board of Selectmen	+.84	+.13	+.71
	School Committee	+.13	−.06	+.19
	Planning Board	−.52	−.17	−.35
	Other	+.49	+.19	+.30
C. *Test Variable is the School Committee contests*				
	Board of Selectmen	+.84	+.02	+.82
	Moderator	+.38	−.02	+.40
	Planning Board	−.52	.00	−.52
	Other	+.49	−.01	+.50
D. *Test Variable is the Planning Board contests*				
	Board of Selectmen	+.84	+.22	+.62
	Moderator	+.38	+.24	+.14
	School Committee	+.13	−.01	+.14
	Other	+.49	+.29	+.20
E. *Test Variable is "Other office" contests*				
	Board of Selectmen	+.84	+.31	+.53
	Moderator	+.38	+.24	+.14
	School Committee	+.13	−.02	+.15
	Planning Board	−.52	−.27	−.25

* These correlation coefficients are taken directly from Table II.

† These correlation coefficients are derived from the predictive equations as related to each of the models. The reader may check these computations by fitting the correlation coefficients from Table II to the formulas involved.

‡ This represents the difference between the values in column 1 and column 2.

(Model A in Table III), did produce very close predictions in two of the relationships—between the School Committee contests and voter turnout (+.13 *vs.* +.15), and between "Other office" contests and voter turnout (+.49 *vs.* +.53). In these relationships it can therefore be asserted that the Board of Selectmen contests caused a spurious statistical relationship between both the School Committee and "Other office" contests and voter turnout. In other words, any apparent effect of these contests on the turnout was almost entirely due to the relationship of all three to the Board of Selectmen contests. Reasonably close predictions were also produced in the other two relationships between the Moderator contests and turnout (+.38 *vs.* +.27), and between the Planning Board contests and turnout (−.52 *vs.* −.36). In these cases too, the Board of Selectmen contests caused a spurious statistical relationship in a major portion of the original relationships observed among these three variables.

The alternative hypotheses of spuriousness (Models B, C, D, E in Table III), were not able to predict the original correlations to the extent Model A did and so these were eliminated as alternative hypotheses and Model A is retained as the best explanatory model which fits the data. It is not the only possible model of explanation because it is impossible to rule out all other logical alternatives, such as an intervening model (Figure 3). But it is, at this point, the best explanatory model tested.



FIGURE 3. Alternative model of intervening variable.

IV. CONCLUSION

From the foregoing analysis, it is evident the hypothesis that the Board of Selectmen contests were the cause of spurious correlation between the remaining office contests and the level of voter turnout in the February town elections was upheld. In more general terms, contests for the office of the Board of Selectmen will cause variations in voter turnout, while contests for the other elected offices in the town will not significantly affect the voter turnout unless in interaction with a contest for the Board of Selectmen.

It must be concluded the Board of Selectmen was the office perceived as most important in the town by those who ran for office and by those who voted. It appears the Planning Board did not become the focus of decision making power, as measured by people contesting the election of Planning Board members and by these contests in turn increasing the turnout of voters. While the postwar problems raised the possibility that the opposite might have happened, evidently the main decisions were still being made by or at least through the Board of Selectmen. Further, while the Planning Board's area of interest was extremely important and the focus of much activity during the period, it was evidently only part of the total problem facing the town for which the Board of Selectmen had greater responsibility. When the Planning Board acted as the most vocal and ardent antagonist of the National Seashore, it again spoke as and for a relatively narrow segment of interest as opposed to the Board of Selectmen, who spoke from a broader viewpoint. The use of the Simon-Blalock methodology aided in eliminating possible explanatory hypotheses derived from qualitative data which might have led to incorrect though plausible conclusions.

TYPES OF PRIMARY AND PARTY RESPONSIBILITY

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A chief criticism of the American party system is the lack of party responsibility. In the view of some students, one characteristic of our political system that contributes to this irresponsibility is the practice in some states of allowing individuals to vote in primaries without regard to their partisan allegiances. In such an open primary Republicans may, if they wish, vote in the Democratic primary, and *vice versa*. The contrasting, and more common, practice is the closed primary, in which participation is restricted to party "members."[1] Some political scientists think that the closed primary, by subjecting legislators to the presumed discipline of periodic scrutiny by their party's members, induces a greater measure of party regularity than the open primary, in which the official has to satisfy a more motley clientele.[2] This position was taken in the best-known statement of the "party government" school, the 1950 report of the APSA Committee on Political Parties:

> *The closed primary deserves preference because it is more readily compatible with the development of a responsible party system.* . . . on the other hand, *the open primary tends to destroy the concept of membership as the basis of party organization.*[3]

Other political scientists have expressed doubts about this presumed relationship between primaries and party responsibility,[4] but there has been no systematic empirical evidence on the point. This paper will examine the relationship between primaries and party responsibility by comparing the party regularity of senators from open primary and closed primary states.

The Book of the States lists the type of primary operative in each state: seven states use the open primary, four states nominate their senators by convention, and twenty-six states use the closed primary, outside the South. The Southern states (all of which use the closed primary) are excluded from the comparison, or are tabulated separately, because southern Democrats tend not to go along with northern Democrats on many issues, thus beclouding the final results. That is, apparent differences between senators from both types of primary systems may be masking other differences due to special conditions in the South. Alaska and Hawaii are also excluded; they gained statehood at the end of the period covered.

The computations in the following tables are based on the Party-Unity Index in the *Congressional Quarterly*,[5] which records each individual senator's roll-call votes cast with

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[1] "As a matter of fact, membership in a political party has none of the usual characteristics of membership in an association. In most states the party has no control over its own membership. Any legal voter may on his own initiative and by his own declaration execute legal formalities before a duly designated *public* official making himself a registered member of the party. The party as such is not consulted. It does not accept the application; it does not vote the applicant into the association; it may not reject the application; and, finally, there is usually no recognized and authoritative procedure by which the party may expel a member." E. E. Schattschneider, *Party Government* (New York, 1942), pp. 55–56.

[2] This proposition is based on an assumption about the electorate's information level that does not appear to be confirmed by voting behavior research, which indicates that most voters do not even know their Congressman's name, much less his voting record. See Donald E. Stokes and Warren E. Miller, "Party Government and the Saliency of Congress," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Winter, 1962), pp. 531–546.

[3] *Towards a More Responsible Two-Party System* (New York, 1950), p. 71.

[4] The initial impetus for this study came from an article by Austin Ranney, "Towards a More Responsible Two-Party System," this Review, Vol. 45 (June, 1951), pp. 488–499. The article was a critique of the then recently published report by the Committee on Political Parties, and notably, of the Committee's recommendation that only one major reform was needed in the primary laws of the United States—the abolition of all primaries except the closed variety. On this proposal Professor Ranney commented in a footnote: "Is there any evidence to suggest for example, that Senator Knowland (from a cross-filing state) and Senator Magnuson (from a blanket-primary state) disagree with and stray from the programs and positions of their respective parties more than say, Senator Morse, Senator Tobey, or ex-Senator Elmer Thomas (all from closed-primary states)?" (p. 490).

[5] Computations taken from the following volumes of the *Congressional Quarterly:* Vol. 2, p. 786; Vol. 4, pp. 38–39; Vol. 6, p. 59; Vol. 8, p. 67; Vol. 10, p. 72; Vol. 12, p. 126; Vol. 14, p. 126; and Vol. 16, p. 142.

TABLE I. COMPARISON OF PARTY-UNITY INDEX FOR SENATORS FROM OPEN AND CLOSED PRIMARY STATES, 1945–1960

Congresses	Non-Southern States				Southern States	
	Open primary Index %	N*	Closed primary Index %	N	Closed primary Index %	N
79th	82.7	12	79.6	52	65.2	21
80th	91.1	14	83.9	52	72.8	22
81st	83.4	14	78.1	52	77.3	22
82d	85.9	14	77.9	52	75.1	22
83d	87.8	14	84.3	51	70.0	20
84th	76.9	14	74.6	50	63.3	21
85th	76.9	13	67.0	51	65.7	20
86th	75.5	14	68.5	50	52.0	22
Mean	82.5		76.7		68.9	

* Total number of senators upon which the percentage is based; the maximum number of senators from open primary states is fourteen, and from closed primary states fifty-two. States which nominate by convention (New York, Connecticut, Delaware, and Indiana) are excluded.

TABLE II. COMPARISON OF PARTY-UNITY INDEX OF REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC SENATORS (EXCLUDING THE SOUTH) 1945–1960

Congresses	Open primaries		Closed primaries	
	Republicans %	Democrats %	Republicans %	Democrats %
79th	75.2	88.0	79.9	82.9
80th	91.8	89.5	83.9	86.6
81st	80.1	89.4	75.3	82.4
82d	85.0	88.0	76.0	82.1
83d	86.9	89.4	87.0	77.7
84th	71.3	84.5	73.6	74.1
85th	74.0	79.4	65.0	70.5
86th	71.7	76.5	69.6	66.7
Mean	79.5	85.6	76.3	77.9

and against the majority of his party. Eight Congresses (1945–1960) were examined to determine the effect of party unity over a period of time. Coincidentally, the survey covered four Congresses under a Republican President (the 82d, 83d, 84th and 85th), and four under a Democratic President (the 79th, 80th, 81st and 86th). From Table I it appears that over a fifteen-year period a slightly but constantly higher percentage of party unity is evidenced by senators from open primary states than from closed primary states. This would indicate that the closed primary does not improve party responsibility in the Senate. In no Congressional session do the open primary senators display less party unity than their closed primary colleagues. Table II confirms this conclusion by showing that controlling for party does not affect the results—open primary senators still exhibit a greater degree of party responsibility.

This paper is addressed to a simple but still significant question: "Do open primaries tend to produce more irresponsible legislators?" Our conclusion is that whatever the causes of party irresponsibility among United States senators, the type of primary does not appear to be among them.

COMMUNICATION

THE USES OF NEUTRALISM

To the Editor:

There is an historical experience which needs to be put alongside Francis Low-Beer's article (this Review, June, 1964), "The Concept of Neutralism." It is the experience of the old Swiss Confederation before the French conquest of 1798. Political parallels are dangerous, yet surely any successful experience in building inter-state peace is worthy of study in a world threatened by mutual nuclear annihilation. As sovereign political units, the early Swiss cantons easily bear comparison with the nation-states of today. Each canton issued its own currency, levied its individual duties on commerce, and controlled its own military organization. The group was held together by a complicated series of treaties and by frequent sessions of the Diet—in reality, a council of ambassadors.

Swiss *external* neutrality has been examined and discussed at length, but very few—even among political scientists—are familiar with the phenomenon of *internal* neutrality: that is, the assumption of a neutral or non-aligned role by certain states or cantons *within* the Confederation, in order to facilitate peaceful settlements of disputes among themselves by means of conciliation, mediation and arbitration.

In the Pact of Lucerne (1332), the three original rural cantons (which had sworn eternal mutual support in the famous ceremony of 1291) enlisted a peacemaker. In the case of disputes among the original cantons (and there had already been many) Lucerne was bound by the terms of the pact to work for an understanding through conciliation and mediation. During the two centuries that followed, the device of permanent neutrality was applied more widely, and had some failures but more successes, with the result that a more definite and comprehensive commitment to neutrality plus active conciliation and mediation was applied in the treaties by which Basel, Schaffhausen and Appenzell joined the Confederation in 1501–13.

Swiss government representatives were so convinced of the relevance of their country's experience that in 1920 they alluded to this active neutrality clause in asking for a similar role of neutrality within the League of Nations (the request was refused by the Allies). . . .

The recurrent danger of conquest by neighboring empires showed the Swiss that peace between the cantons was a matter of survival for their independence. Thus active peacemaking served the long-range interests of the adversaries in a dispute between cantons, as well as the interests of the conciliators.

Nuclear weapons now mean that preventing general war is a matter of survival for all countries. Thus conciliation and mediation by the non-aligned can similarly serve the long-range interests of the people of the United States, of the USSR, and of the non-aligned nations.

Low-Beer holds, as I understand it, that in a great-power dispute form and content cannot be separated, and therefore that the claim of the non-aligned to be concerned not with the merits of the dispute but with finding a peaceful settlement must fall to the ground. But if and when "form" reaches the stage of mass obliteration and social disorganization, it becomes more important than "content"; this logically supports the case of the non-aligned.

Insofar, moreover, as two or more "blocs" might succeed in dragooning non-aligned nations into their respective camps, they would be violating the principle of self-determination for the latter. Therefore non-alignment, although seemingly indifferent or even opposed to some immediate policies of the West, helps to safeguard the long-range Western value of national independence.

If one recognizes that the great problem of world affairs is to combine substantial stability with peaceful change, then one must, it seems to me, concede that non-alignment can perform an extremely valuable function: that of offering to new nations bristling against injustice another avenue for seeking change besides aligning themselves with the communist bloc. World society is too complex for its future evolution to be handled adequately by an oversimplified struggle between black and white. Thesis and antithesis are important, but synthesis is vital.

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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL CONTRIBUTION

FOREIGN LOCAL GOVERNMENT: A BIBLIOGRAPHY*

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The past few years have witnessed a steadily increasing interest on the part of political scientists in the comparative study of local government, although productive research is still rather limited in scope. The scholar contemplating study in this field commonly faces serious difficulties even in determining what work has been done to date, as well as in finding that the writings are widely scattered and extremely variable in nature. Much can be gained in the broader and more realistic understanding of politics through comparative study at the local level, and the customarily parochial treatment of local government in American college classrooms can be improved by a greater injection of the experience of other peoples.

This compilation is an attempt to pull together for the first time the most comprehensive possible bibliography of writings—books, articles and some documents—in English dealing with the organizational structure and functioning of local government in countries other than the United States and the United Kingdom. This would appear to be a logical starting point, providing an indication of areas where work needs to be done and the types of study in short supply, as well as a guide to basic information on many countries. Most writing up to this time has in fact focused on governmental organization and operation, which quite naturally precedes more behaviorally oriented studies. A sizeable body of literature also deals with certain specialized aspects of foreign local governments, notably finance and physical planning, but that is in sufficient quantity for a separate specialized bibliography.

This particular bibliography is confined to publications in English to keep it within manageable scope, and on the assumption that anyone investigating deeply into the experience of an individual country will of course need to develop his own bibliography of publications in the language of that country. Materials on the United Kingdom are not included because of their vast scope, ready availability and more general familiarity. Items dealing with colonial periods of areas that have recently become independent countries have also been excluded except in a few instances where they make a definite contribution to an understanding of the present. Textbooks on comparative government and general studies of the government and politics of individual countries, which often touch briefly upon local institutions, are not cited. The time span of publications covered is from 1950 to the present, in recognition of the need to keep the listings reasonably contemporary and the fact that the great bulk of the writing on this subject has been published within the last dozen years.

For easy use the bibliography, after some general listings, is arranged by major areas of the world, and then by countries within those areas. The geographical classification is arbitrary, purely for convenience. In the case of each of the broad areas there is first an indication of publications having general significance for that region or items that deal with more than one country, followed by the materials concerned with individual nations. Books and pamphlets are listed first, then periodical articles. Items are classified as "most useful" and "generally useful." There are obviously serious problems in value classifications, since "usefulness" is relative to the special needs of the researcher; the term is used here as relative to the above-mentioned purposes of this bibliography. Each set of categories applies only to the materials on the country under consideration, with no attempt at comparative evaluation between items dealing with different countries. A considerable amount has been written on certain countries, very little on others. For some there have been no publications in English, and not uncommonly very little in the language of the country itself.

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BOOK REVIEWS, NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

Blalock, Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research. WILLIAM H. FLANIGAN . . . 138

Eckstein, ed., Internal War. DAVID A. WILSON . . . 138

Peabody, Organizational Authority: Superior-Subordinate Relationships in Three Public Service Organizations. ROBERT T. GOLEMBIEWSKI . . . 140

Eldersveld, Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis. AVERY LEISERSON . . 141

Sorauf, Political Parties in the American System. STEPHEN K. BAILEY . . 142

Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process. MURRAY EDELMAN 143

Russett et al., World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators. ARTHUR S. BANKS . . . 144

Ward et al., Studying Politics Abroad: Field Research in the Developing Areas. WILLIAM JOHN HANNA . . . 146

Stoessinger et al., Financing the United Nations System. GERARD J. MANGONE . . . 147

BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY . . . 149

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS . . . 158

COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND CROSS-NATIONAL RESEARCH . . . 184

COMPARATIVE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION . . . 211

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW AND ORGANIZATION . . . 212

OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED . . . 229

BOOK REVIEWS

Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research. By Hubert M. Blalock, Jr. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1964. Pp, xiii, 200. $5.00.)

This is a highly instructive book in a field where political scientists need instruction. Blalock takes us well beyond the considerations introduced in ordinary statistics texts by concentrating on several difficult and important problems in quantitative social analysis. His emphasis is on the development of more rigorous procedures for rejecting causal arguments and on a variety of complications in the use, collapsing and combining of variables and controls. The arguments presented are drawn from a number of articles that have appeared mainly in sociology journals during the past few years.

Blalock is interested in developing more systematic procedures for evaluating causal models, and he argues that mathematical or statistical procedures are too flexible in their present condition for this discrimination. But somewhat more restrictive assumptions about relationships permit deductions that offer arguments for rejecting particular chains of causal relationships. These procedures and restrictive assumptions—what will probably be called the Simon-Blalock technique—are not applicable to most fields in political science where quantification of relevant variables has not been achieved.

The controversy that has developed among social statisticians over these techniques hinges on a disagreement over the extent to which these arguments provide a basis for causal inferences—a contention which Blalock would not support. A more critical question for social scientists is how much confidence we would have in a conclusion that a particular causal argument is inferior to another, i.e., how readily would we reject a causal argument dear to us? It is impossible to anticipate what qualms and considerations might occur to us if we were to regularly test our causal arguments with the technique advocated by Blalock, but it would promote analytic sophistication to face up to these problems whether we accept the conclusions of the Simon-Blalock technique or not. Described very briefly the technique depends on two points, our willingness to assume that among a given set of variables not all possible interrelationships are causal, and the argument that with a given set of correlations among the variables not all lines of causal relationship are equally convincing.

While doubtless the possibilities of more rigorous evaluation of causal models are of great consequence over the long run, for the immediate needs of political science Blalock's many observations on the effects of collapsing variables may be of greater assistance. Especially as we move into the early phases of quantification in various areas of political analysis we can expect to be forced into unhappy compromises in developing variables, and Blalock reveals a staggering array of pitfalls associated with grouping and collapsing dimensions. By generating artificial data with appropriate characteristics, he shows the impact on measures of association of grouping by high and low scores and of changing the unit of analysis or clustering units with respect to random and related third factors. The problems of interpreting relationships controlled or partialed by such variables are especially severe. While Blalock usually confines himself to artificial data, there is no reason to believe that these criticisms could not be applied throughout the quantitative analysis in social science with devastating impact.

Blalock takes for granted a sophisticated dissatisfaction with quantitative techniques but an unquestioned perseverance which may be missing in political science. If one were to rewrite the book for political scientists, far greater emphasis on the analytic weaknesses of unsystematic causal arguments would be appropriate, but Blalock addresses a more limited and specialized audience. The immediate application of this volume is limited to those areas of analysis where quantification permits the correlation of all or most relevant variables. Beyond this it joins that very small list of books that provide worthwhile background for courses in quantitative analysis and scope and method.

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Internal War. Edited by Harry Eckstein. (New York: The Free Press of Glenoce, 1964. Pp. 339. $6.50.)

Harry Eckstein has presided over one of the most exasperating books to face a reviewer in some time. The title, *Internal War*, is intriguing because it suggests a serious and timely subject. The roster of contributors—Gabriel Almond, William Kornhauser, Lucian Pye, Alexander Gerschenkron, Marion J. Levy, Jr., Talcott Parsons, S. M. Lipset, Karl W. Deutsch, T. P. Thornton, Sidney Verba, Arnold Feldman, and

Andrew Janos—constitutes a dazzling constellation of authoritative commentators. The volume is a product of a research project of some years standing at Princeton's Center of International Studies. The writers were assigned the task of writing papers for a symposium "on the application of contemporary social theories for the study of internal wars . . . " (p. 4). In short the reader infers a promise of penetration, illumination and substantial enlightenment on a pertinent and difficult matter. There is noticeable shortfall.

Moreover, I am disarmed by the editor's splendid candor in saying: "Whatever their merits in other respects, there is no use pretending that the essays here achieve the end intended. Some of them avoid any direct confrontation of the subject, others attack it, but without any considerable use of social science theory" (p. 5). I can only agree to that.

The editor faced with this situation and constrained to publish the results of a symposium has written an agile introductory essay on a novel subject—namely pre-theorizing. Since it is not within my power to discuss twelve very disparate essays in the present space I will attend principally to this introduction. The editor arrives at his topic by asking himself: What went wrong with the symposium? He poses the issue in this manner: There have been in the world a variety of events—*coups d'état*, terrorist campaigns, revolutionary wars, strikes and riots with political motives, and so forth—which we feel must have some relationship to each other in the realm of social behavior. If there is validity in social theory, then these phenomena must be susceptible to common theoretical management. At the same time here are the efforts of a number of the most notable social theorists of our time and these efforts have not achieved theoretical illumination. The possible faults might be found in the theorists as men, the theories, or the phenomena. In other words (1) the theorists may in fact be lazy or inept, or (2) the theories may be closed to these kinds of phenomena, or (3) the relationship between the various events which are grouped in the category may be so obscure and tenuous as to confound even the most brilliant and hard working of theorists, or (4) there may be no relationship among the events, theoretically or otherwise. Professor Eckstein cordially opts for the third alternative which lets everyone off the hook but him. He could, of course, have opted for the fourth alternative and given it up as a bad job. I, as will appear further on, am inclined toward the second.

Professor Eckstein then plunges into a discussion of pre-theoretical concerns. What he is actually talking about is theorizing, but since he restricts theory to the proposing of "testable (that is, falsifiable)" (p. 8) hypothetical generalizations, we can accept "pre-theoretical" as sufficient. This kind of work we are to understand involves four "operations."

1. Delimitation, which is a combination of definition and identification of the phenomenon.
2. Classification, which is the same as delimitation, only in a more refined way.
3. Analysis, which is the identification of elements that combine in the classes of events.
4. "Problemation," an "ugly" neologism which means stating what it is you want to know in terms of what is (in some way or other) knowable.

All this obscures the issues aroused by juxtaposing contemporary social science theory to the occurrence of political violence. These issues capsulate the drama of scientific thought. There are theories but they fail to explain the new data. In such a situation, what do we do? We can amend the theories to accommodate the new data or we can discover new theories which explain the old and new data. What we must not do is rework the data until they fit into the old theories. In Professor Eckstein's situation I would have been more sceptical about the theories.

The dominant themes of contemporary social science theory are structural functionalism and systems analysis with emphasis on equilibrating or homeostatic activity. The fact that the tendency of this theory is to draw attention to stability rather than change, and to order rather than conflict has become a commonplace criticism of it. But the fact remains that this body of theoretical material is, at least in its present state, confounded by the event of organized political violence, by major transformation processes, by persistent conflict, and by permanent and pervasive disorder. I suspect that the difficulty which the contributors to this volume experienced in penetrating theoretically the events of social violence is to be found in a pre-fabricated blindness to the phenomena.

It is striking that the articles which approach the subject *ad hoc*—for example Lucian Pye on "Roots of Insurgency" or Thomas Thornton on "Terror as a Weapon"—are the more successful in confronting issues involved in political warfare. These successes are not cited as arguments in favor of *ad hoc* theorizing but are adduced as symptoms of general theoretical deficiency. This deficiency is genuine and should be recognized.

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Organizational Authority: Superior—Subordinate Relationships in Three Public Service Organizations. By Robert L. Peabody. (New York: Atherton Press, 1964. Pp. 163, $5.50.)

Robert L. Peabody's *Organizational Authority* reinforces the usefulness of behavioral analysis in public administration, which makes it a valuable addition to a slim literature. And the study supports a multiple-factor approach to authoritative relations, thereby contributing to a body of contemporary efforts with a similar point.

The volume presents major difficulties, however. Its methodology and design are troubled; the presentation suffers in many particulars; and the interpretations of results are problematic.

Methodologically, *Organizational Authority* does not respect its own promises. The study is exploratory, and proposes to utilize a sample of 76 employees from three small public agencies to test the usefulness of conceptual and operational definitions of authoritative relations derived from an analysis of the literature. Four reasonable "types of authority" are chosen for nominal and operational definition and for empirical testing: authority of position; authority of competence; authority of person; and authority of legitimacy.

The types of authority do not get the proposed natural-science treatment, however. The case is clearest for codings of interview responses as "authority based on legitimacy." An analytical flow-chart reveals the volume's characteristic approach. The variable is barely mentioned on p. 49 as "developed from responses by organization members." On p. 119, a brief and very general discussion appears. On p. 126, a table lists without comment four sub-classes of "authority of legitimacy," one of which is "generalized legitimacy." None of this gives specific information about the conventions for coding interview responses as one type of authority or another. Indeed, the few examples given suggest considerable overlap of responses scored as "legitimacy" and "position."

The treatment of "authority of legitimacy" reflects little conceptual and operational care, then, and this datum stands in puzzling contrast to the volume's public purposes. At least the demands of space do not explain the slippage between intention and execution. Thus, some 30 pages of a short book are devoted to elementary descriptions of the local police force, the school, and the welfare office from whose members interviews were obtained. These descriptions add little to the analysis. Moreover, much of the extensive review of the "authority" literature takes the form of a sketchy annotated bibliography organized around (for example) the various institutional contexts within which authoritative relations have been studied. The misallocation of resources is multiple. Conceptual and operational problems are neglected. Moreover, the volume's early chapters are but weakly related to the study's empirical focus. Similar and more exhaustive reviews also are available.

The interpretations of the results in *Organizational Authority* also are problematic. This is a function of both presentation and design. In presentation, for example, verbal conclusions often are unsupported by the sparse data offered. Consider Table 5, p. 90. It reveals no obvious differences by "eyeball inspection" between data from three agencies, except in one case where N = 1. But the reader is assured on p. 91 that, in general, "expected differences did occur." No judgmental criteria are specified. Nor were statistical tests run. Table 4 presents similar difficulties, but the issues are broader. In addition, the curious N chosen as the base for the calculations in Table 10 inflates the percentages reported as the major findings by some 50 to 75 percent.

The volume's underlying research design also discourages clear-cut interpretations. Basically, the four kinds of authority were used only to classify interview responses to this very open-ended question: What does authority mean to you? At best, the design permits showing that some of the types of authority were useful for coding some aspects of some of the interview responses of some proportion of the sample of low-level operatives in small public agencies. This is a very limited design, even for an "exploratory study."

The results obtained do not somehow overcome the design limitations. Some 22 percent of the respondents could not be scored as mentioning even one of the four kinds of authority. The remaining 59 interviews contributed in unspecified ways only 122 scored responses, moreover, if we calculate from the data presented. Peabody concludes that this establishes the usefulness of the four kinds of authority. The data permit many interpretations, however, and particularly since little is reported about the scoring procedure. Three hundred and four responses would have been scored if each respondent had touched on each of the four kinds of authority in his interview and if double-counting were not allowed. The paucity of responses actually scored may indicate that the four kinds of authority have a limited usefulness in the analysis of all populations. Or the data may simply indicate that the design posed the wrong question to the wrong people in one particular case.

The design limitations of *Organizational Authority* reflect the neglect of the crucial point that the usefulness of the four kinds of authority can be established only by the test of hypotheses derived from them. Some "working hypotheses" are "advanced" on p. 49 of the volume, but they never reappear. Even so, conceptual unclarity prevails. Thus it is proposed that: "Authority of position is strongest when supported by both authority of competence and authority of person." The meaning is obscure. Since "authority of position" is said to inhere in hierarchical office, two similar formally-defined positions are neither "stronger" nor "weaker" given other conditions. The incumbents of these similar formal positions may be more or less effective or authoritative. Thus a more useful hypothesis would be: When authority of position is reinforced by high rank on (for example) competence, formal superiors will be more likely to have subordinates who are high producers and/or who are more satisfied at work. Such a hypothesis has been tested many times, in fact, with positive results. Very little additional data would have been required to test such a hypothesis in *Organizational Authority*.

The mention and subsequent neglect of the several awkward "working hypotheses" in *Organizational Authority* testify that the volume has not conceptually integrated the several types of authority as multiple co-varying factors in authoritative relations. The mention and neglect also illustrate how the development of suitable operations in the volume was complicated by conceptual inelegancies. Indeed, these inelegancies may reflect a detachment from the very elements upon which useful operations depend.

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Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis. By Samuel J. Eldersveld. (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1964. Pp. viii, 613.)

Congressman Neil Staebler, Chairman of the Michigan State Democratic Committee once said that Samuel J. Eldersveld gave up a promising political career when he left the mayor's office of Ann Arbor to return to his researches into party membership and organization in Michigan, the Netherlands, and elsewhere. The present volume gives the author's academic colleagues, at least, ample reason to approve his choice. Although the data of the study are confined to Detroit and Wayne County, its theoretical perspective and analytical categories are applicable to almost any political system. They consist of interviews with 70 county and congressional district leaders of the Democratic and Republican parties, 149 precinct leaders, and 596 residents drawn from a stratified sample of 87 precincts out of 2007 in the county's six congressional districts. The study design explicitly focuses upon the characteristics, perceptions, attitudes, communications and intra-organizational relationships between the county-district and precinct leaders of the two parties, as well as the mutual impact of these two levels of party organization upon the adult citizen public in the Detroit metropolitan area.

Part I investigates four attributes of political party organization: membership policy, the group affiliations of party members and officials, the effective authority relationships between levels of party structure, and the social origins and career patterns of party activists throughout the organization. Part II presents what is by all odds the most thoroughgoing analysis of local party leaders' political orientations to be found anywhere in the literature, classified by (a) awareness of party organization goals, (b) public policy preferences, (c) personal motivations, (d) personal, intra-party role perceptions, (e) environmental and value perspectives toward the political system as a whole. Part III analyzes the personal interactions of local party leaders and activists as an organizational system from the standpoint of three operational requirements: (a) efficiency as a *task group*, (b) the frequency, direction, style and content of the *communications network*, (c) patterns of participation and consent in *organizational decision-making*. Part IV analyzes the functional-dysfunctional effects of party activity in satisfying: (a) *individual needs* inside the party organizations (political socialization and recruitment), (b) the *parties' organizational needs* (consistency of voter perceptions, identifications with and support of the party), and (c) the *needs of citizens generally and the larger political system*. The latter are revealed by measures of popular belief and confidence in the system, by the extent of political interest, involvement and information among the voters, and by individual incentives (careers) and group rewards (benefits in public policies) to persons who come to realize their stake in the larger political system through their interactions (support, bargaining, alliances) with the party association.

Specialists will particularly appreciate the degree to which Eldersveld consistently employs the concepts of contemporary empirical theory. The book will have to be read to appreciate the progress it represents in systematic development and testing of hypotheses about party voters, members, officers and leaders. Generalists will be interested in what he does to advance the "general theory of parties" for which M. Duverger pleaded so eloquently a decade ago. Here, apart from the title, the book is modest and unpretentious. It claims to be no more than a study in depth of the American party system in one metropolitan area; its concepts and research tools are only *potentially adaptable* to comparison with parties in a wide variety of cultural and demographic contexts. Secondly, its focus is on the local electoral party organization; it has very little to say about the relations of local and national parties, or about the relations of electoral party personnel with those in legislative and executive policy-making, either locally or nationally. Thirdly, the study contains almost no data on the actual selection (nomination) of candidates or the control of elected representatives by party organization officials. In short, Eldersveld has produced an analytical model for American electoral party organization, not a complete picture of "political parties in the modern state."

He explicitly recognizes that his conception of party closely approximates that of Merriam and Gossell in their work of 1923. But whereas their contribution was literary rather than quantitative, insightful rather than demonstrative, unique rather than connectible, Eldersveld's model will be understood and respected by theorists everywhere, regardless of their commitments or preconceptions. It is not a mere deviant case of Michels' elitist hierarchy, Weber's mirror of the society's particular form of social domination, Selznick's combat group, Duverger's bureaucratized, mass-educational movement, or Downs' team-coalition of individuals in complete agreement on party goals and election policies, acting in full knowledge, perfect communication and complete involvement with organizational decisions. Eldersveld's image of the party is best set forth in his own words (pp. 525–28):

> an open, clientele-oriented structure, permeable at its base as well as its apex, preoccupied with the recruitment of deviant as well as established social categories, willing to provide mobility and access for political activists into the major operational and decisional centers of the organization. It is a "stratarchical" rather than an elitist command structure, with power and decision-making devolved to and autonomized at lower levels. Deference is not exclusively upward, but reciprocal. The party must also be visualized as a tenuous alliance of socio-economic subcoalitions, having a mutually exploitative relationship to the party, with varying degrees of cohesion, identification and interaction, and with varying potentials for disloyalty and disaffection. Finally, the party is not a hierarchy of subelites whose admission, power and status are closely determined by the top leadership group, but an aggregate of differential career types with highly varying aspirations and rates of mobility and turnover . . . [sic]

AVERY LEISERSON

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Political Parties in the American System. BY FRANK J. SORAUF. (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown & Co., 1964. Pp. xiii, 194.)

This is a sophisticated, literate, and succinct survey of the American party system. It is far more than a paraphrase of the works of others. It is a creative and, on the whole, successful attempt in brief compass to make sense out of the American political kaleidoscope. The author is skilled in analytic theory building. He is extremely wise about political motivations. He is versed in comparative political systems. He writes with enviable clarity.

The book begins with a definition of party based upon function and role. According to the author, the primary job of the American party is to organize, inclusively, for the winning of elections. The overriding party function, however, operates within a social system and an historical tradition which shapes and conditions the party role. Federalism, separation of powers, economic and social pluralism leave American parties decentralized, only intermittently organized, and largely pragmatic and non-ideological in character.

By far the most brilliant parts of the book are Chapters V & VI: "The Structure of Incentives," and "The Contest for Office." I do not know whether Mr. Sorauf has ever been actively engaged in practical politics. No matter. He understands the carrots and sticks of politics, who wields them, and why. He also understands what he calls the art and craft of campaigns.

It is no real criticism of the book to point out that the Goldwater candidacy has been as embarrassing to political scientists as it has been to the Republican Party. (e.g. "The voices of the far right in American politics—some of whom *do* disagree on the fundamentals of the economy, the Constitution, and social equality—have been muted by the electoral majoritarianism of the two major parties" p. 31.) Who of us has not been thrown off base by this political aberration?

It *is* a real criticism of the book to say that the final three chapters are in part unfair, simplistic, and contradictory. Mr. Sorauf's disdain for the "party responsibility" boys leads him to erect a series of straw men and to consume the straw with the fire of his scorn. It causes him to overstate the pluralism of American politics; to underplay the role of reformers in establishing the climate of opinion in which structural changes in our political system occur (e.g. the currency of ideas surrounding the apportionment decisions in the Supreme Court; the institutionalization of the two national committees; or the Kennedy "packing" of the Rules Committee); to ignore an important part of the political logic of the nationalization of American politics; and to defend the proposition that "major changes and reform within political parties most often take place as a response to the changing environmental circumstances" while accepting a view of that environment which is closer to the world of Calhoun or Coolidge than to the world of Lyndon Johnson.

Reformers out of phase with their times make little immediate sense. But they often construct a series of ideas and procedural options which assume growing importance as environmental conditions change the necessities of an age. A review of the *Congressional Quarterly* proves a clustering of legislative party votes over time which, although not rigorously disciplined, is far more ideological and programmatically consistent than Mr. Sorauf's book admits. There is far more dependence of state and local organizations upon national political activity and finance—especially during a Presidential election—than Mr. Sorauf suggests. In a world of nuclear war and national and international economic interdependencies, questions of survival and security become ubiquitous and frequently override more limited regional and parochial interests. The party that forgets this is doomed to fail in its electoral function. Reapportionment and the impending death or retirement of some old timers in Congress are bound to affect the partisan structure and behavior of the legislative branch.

America will not end up adopting in toto the recommendations of the American Political Science Association committee on a more responsible two-party system. But the Committee's recommendations are less out of tune with the observable present and the foreseeable future than Mr. Sorauf implies.

Perhaps it is time that analytically oriented and normatively oriented political scientists had an ecumenical conference. The extreme positions have been defended so long and so outrageously that a new sorting out of where we are and where we should be going may well be in order. The normative fellows must be prepared to deal with the brilliant analysis of the first two-thirds of Mr. Sorauf's book. The analytic fellows must be prepared to wrestle with the structural and behavioral implications of observable and predictable changes which have emerged in American national politics since World War II.

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The Politics of the Budgetary Process. BY AARON WILDAVSKY. (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1964. Pp. xi, 216.)

To deal with budgeting is to deal with the concrete payoffs of the political process, and this book analyzes budgetary policy-making in political terms. It is a sophisticated study of the political system that the direct participants in federal appropriations decisions comprise: of the simplifying devices they employ to make possible a modicum of rationality in handling decisions too complex to be tackled whole; of the aids used in calculating budgetary demands and grants; of the interlocking system of roles and the differing perspectives and strategies to be observed in bureaus, departments, the Bureau of the Budget, and the appropriations committees.

The author makes a strong case for the thesis that by and large the system serves the nation fairly well and that the most popular targets of its would-be reformers are precisely the devices that make it work with an acceptable measure of rationality and self-correcting feedback. Reform proposals are typically based upon concern that the entire budget is never examined as a whole and that decisions about specific programs are accordingly made without a weighing of their relative merits. But this view ignores the fact that there is no consensus on a ranking of programs; that an organic budget would therefore inevitably mean an explicit and visible triumph of particular values in a way that is not now necessary; that a program budget emphasizes ideological differences and makes agreement more difficult. In short, these reform suggestions are really prescriptions for political conflict and for a change in the values realized through politics and not merely prescriptions for a change in the methods of budgeting.

The present system, moreover, does produce more opportunity for alternative views to be expressed and greater assurance that major errors in calculation will be corrected than any alternative proposed. In an area in which the limits of rational decision making are fairly quickly reached decision-makers must satisfice, considering only a small number of alternatives at one time, paying most attention to changes from the last budget, and assuming that interests they ignore or underestimate will make themselves felt at some other point in the balkanized budgetary process. To pretend that budget makers can consider all possibilities is bound to be illusory and to amount to propaganda for a particular result.

The study is especially perceptive in demonstrating that the various roles of the agencies involved in budgeting ("the agency as advocate, the Budget Bureau as Presidential servant with a cutting bias, the House Appropriations Committee as guardian of the Treasury, The Senate Appropriations Committee as responsible appeals court") permit each one to reduce its burden of calculation because it can assume that it can play its own role militantly, confident that others will balance it by playing the other politically necessary roles.

Any book that makes a significant contribution to conceptualization is bound to raise questions as well as answer them, and the Wildavsky study leaves this reader wondering whether something systematic can now be learned about some issues with which he deals only casually.

Can something more rigorous be said about the political and social correlates of decisions about incremental changes from previous budgets? Wildavsky deplores the unwillingness of budgetary reformers to face the larger political implications of their suggestions, but insofar as he takes the role of advocate of the current system he sometimes falls into the same trap. It is not self-evident that all significant bodies of opinion, particularly the advocates of drastic change, are represented by the role-players, and to ignore the possibility they are not is to advocate the status-quo by indirection. If there is anything systematic about the way in which the system responds to, slows down, or speeds up social change, we should know it.

Second, can something systematic be learned about the relative effectiveness of the strategies the author has identified? Any statement of social phenomena in terms of an inventory of influences falls short of explanation, though it is possible that anything more than an inventory is impossible at this time. When this question is explored, it will almost certainly be tied to rates of social change as well.

Wildavsky's book is encouraging evidence that our increased exposure to organization theory, game theory, and social psychology is producing a more powerful and explanatory political science.

MURRAY EDELMAN

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World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators. BY BRUCE M. RUSSETT, HAYWARD R. ALKER, JR., KARL W. DEUTSCH, AND HAROLD D. LASSWELL. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964. Pp. x, 373. $10.00.)

Not many years ago, the study of comparative government in most American universities consisted largely of serial, descriptive appraisals of the "major foreign powers"—usually European, with occasional reference to non-European powers such as India, China, and Japan. By the mid-1950's, responding to the ever-lengthening membership of the United Nations and to strictures against the "traditional approach" by Roy Macridis and others, both researchers and class-room instructors began shifting their attention to generalized types and components of political *systems*. More recently, thanks to the increasing availability of "hard data" of the sort collected and disseminated by the Statistical Office of the United Nations, wholly *quantitative* cross-national comparison has become both feasible and fruitful. The acknowledged leader of the "quantitative revolution" in comparative studies has been Karl Deutsch, who, in association with Harold Lasswell and others, was instrumental in organizing the Political Data Program at Yale University. The *World Handbook* is the first major product of the program. Principal author of the *Handbook* is the Program's Director, Bruce M. Russett, with important methodological contributions in a concluding section by Hayward Alker, Jr.

The greater bulk of the *Handbook* consists of 75 data series "selected with reference to existing theories of international and comparative politics" and representing, in each case, "an attempt to operationalize a variable central to several important theories of political or social change" (pg. 2). The series are grouped into "Distribution Profiles" under the following headings: Human Resources, Government and Politics, Communications, Wealth, Health, Education, Family and Social Relations, Distribution of Wealth and Income, and Religion. Summary measures accompanying each series include the range, mean, median, standard deviation, case and data deciles, and modal decile.

It should not detract from the importance of the *Handbook* to note that few of the data series represent original compilations. As the authors themselves point out, "our data-gathering efforts have been unavoidably influenced by availability. . . . We tried, however, to go considerably beyond the original sources in processing the data in order to bring out important characteristics of the distributions" (p. 4).

Since the primary criteria for selection of the data series are stated to have been "theoretical importance," "accuracy," and "availability," one may be permitted to cavil at certain of the more obvious omissions. Why, for example, were Telephones Per Capita or Energy Consumption not included?

The full case list for the *Handbook* embraces 141 independent nations and dependent territories. The number of cases for each series, however, ranges from a low of 12 to a high of 133. (The authors state, incorrectly, that their basic list is composed of 133 countries, with the number of countries represented in each table "varying between 11 and 134.") The mean is 74.9, or 53% of the possible maximum. The fluctuation in case content and size will present problems for those using *Handbook* data for certain types of multivariate analysis. "Missing data" computer programs exist, however, for simple linear correlation purposes and such a program was evidently used by the authors in assembling the correlation matrix included in Part B: The Analysis of Trends and Patterns.

The compilers of the *Handbook* are to be commended for their painstaking and instructive handling of the "reliability" problem. It is somewhat surprising therefore that a spot check reveals far more errors of their own commission than one might wish for. One may scarcely be accused of nit-picking in taking Table 9 (Percentage of Population in Cities Over 20,000) as an example. The figures given for at least 15 out of the 120 cases on this list either are not to be found in the sources cited or fail to agree with the figures given therein.

Another *type* of error, illustrative of the difficulty of relying on secondary sources which *themselves* rely on secondary sources, is also exhibited in Table 9. Much of the data offered in this table is taken from Norton Ginsburg's *Atlas of Economic Development*, rather than from UN sources. Much of *Ginsburg's* data, in turn, is taken from an "unpublished manuscript" by Leo F. Schnore, with the notation that "Data are from 1955 except as otherwise noted." But it may easily be demonstrated that a sizeable proportion of the items from Schnore (identified as being 1955 data) are actually of earlier vintage. The authors simply accept Ginsburg's assertion (who presumably accepted Schnore's) that "Data are for 1955" without checking into its accuracy.

A somewhat less serious difficulty concerns the use of transformations to help normalize excessively skewed distributions. Increasingly, quantitative data analysts are recognizing the need for such transformations, but few indulge in other than logarithmic manipulation of their data. Thus the present authors, while transforming somewhat over a third of their variables before computing correlation coefficients restrict themselves exclusively to logarithms. Now it happens that many (though by no means all) of the data series relevant to contemporary cross-national research are of a "right skew" character, viz., a "bunching" of scores at the lower end of the scale, with progressively fewer entries as one moves to the higher values of the scale. Under such circumstances a logarithmic transformation *may*, indeed, be appropriate (a square root transformation may, however, be even more appropriate, depending on the exact configuration of the skew). For an extreme *left* skew, on the other hand, a square or cubic transformation will usually be called for. Additional transformations may be required for other distributional patterns.

For purposes of this review, a Chi-Square distribution analysis was performed on the data for Tables 8, 9, 51, and 64, four distributions that the authors did not transform but which, from their graphs, seemed to be somewhat non-normal. Distributions 8 and 9 are both right skewed, but a square root rather than a logarithmic transformation proved appropriate in each case. Distribution 51 (left skewed) proved to be relatively normal (Chi-Square = 7.1) but with an outlier (South Africa) at −3.6 S.S. A cubic transformation resolved the problem of the outlier, while reducing the Chi-Square value to 1.8. In the case of Distribution 64, an arcsin square root transformation improved the distribution somewhat, though admittedly not much.

It would, in this writer's opinion, have added immensely to the final product if analyses such as the foregoing had been performed for each data series, with the Chi-Square value for each raw distribution (based on 0.1 probability regions or deciles of the normal curve), together with the most appropriate transformation (if any) specified in each case.

The purist might wish to take issue with a number of "side" comments. For example, the authors state (pg. 292) that "percentage Roman Catholic seems not to be highly correlated at the worldwide level with anything (except percentage Christian), not even . . .

negatively with economic development or development rates or achievement motivation as the famous Weberian 'Protestant ethic' theory would indicate."

The obvious reason for this finding is the prevalence of Catholicism as the dominant religion in Latin America, which tends, by and large, to exhibit "transitional" developmental status. If, on the other hand, predominantly Catholic countries and predominantly *Protestant* (or Mixed Christian, or Muslim) countries are compared along various "developmental" dimensions, more truly "Weberian" patterns *will* be seen to emerge.

In an interesting discussion of " 'Stages' of Economic and Political Development," as defined by *Handbook* data, the authors frankly acknowledge the perils of indulging in diachronic inference on the basis of synchronic or "cross-sectional" evidence. They rightly point out that "a more direct and dependable method for examining stages [of development] would be to look at . . . data for many countries over long periods of time." But the necessary "hard" data are most assuredly lacking, and this reviewer is inclined to agree that it may indeed be useful in the *absence* "of better longitudinal data, to use the cross-sectional data we have as if they in some way applied to development over time" (p. 299).

An informative presentation of curvilinear regression is included under the topic "Changing Relationships Between Variables," and the more sophisticated reader will find the discussion of "Regionalism Versus Universalism in Comparing Nations" highly stimulating. A large number of the *Handbook* series are in the form of percentages, and Alker displays considerable finesse in coming to grips with the problem of ecological correlation.

If the Russett-Alker *Handbook* does not wholly measure up to what it may become in succeeding editions, it is nonetheless a most impressive beginning. This is not intended as damnation by faint praise. Pioneering efforts are seldom perfect. Despite its flaws, the *World Handbook* is unquestionably one of the more significant publications of the year in political science.

ARTHUR S. BANKS

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Studying Politics Abroad: Field Research in the Developing Areas. BY ROBERT E. WARD, FRANK BONILLA, JAMES S. COLEMAN, HERBERT H. HYMAN, LUCIAN W. PYE, AND MYRON WEINER. (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1964. Pp. vii, 245. $2.50 paper.)

Sponsored by the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council, this book is addressed particularly to political scientists who are embarking on research projects in the developing areas. Although the authors want to interest younger scholars in doing field research in the developing areas, their primary concern is efficiency and effectiveness in the field. They hope to sensitize the prospective field researchers to likely methodological and practical problems, to suggest some of the ways previous researchers have coped with the problems, and to assure novices that the problems are not "the result of some peculiar malevolence" toward them and their projects (p. 2). The level on which the authors propose to accomplish these tasks is the strategic, which is said to lie between general theory and specific tactics.

Lucian Pye begins these efforts by recommending a cross-disciplinary approach and a return to the fundamentals of theory-building and data-collection. Here and elsewhere in the book, the need for flexibility in the planning and data-collection stages of research is stressed. The chapter concludes by identifying some of the characteristics of most developing political systems and suggesting consequent research needs. The characteristics include cleavage, ambivalence, fragmented identities, personality politics, omnifunctionality, and instability. The theoretical bases for selecting the characteristics and the research which has already been completed are not noted.

The opening sentence of Robert Ward's contribution leads one to hope for an analysis of the social system of research. "The relationship between scholars, their working environment, and the type and quality of their research output," he writes, "is complex and poorly understood" (p. 26). However, separate topics are taken up in his two chapters. These include different conceptions and statuses of scholarship and scholars, linguistic and design preparations, the advantages of a straightforward and comprehensible identification of self and project, disruptions of the researcher's time schedule, nonprofessional involvements, and suitable payment of debts.

The book's introduction indicates that documentary research, interviews, survey research, and observation will be the methods of data-collection examined. All but the last of these are covered. In the chapter on documentary research, written by James Coleman of UCLA, a realistic assessment of document availability (existence and use policy) is made and access strategies are suggested. In addition, several types of studies which could profitably use documentary research are noted and, in five valuable appendices prepared with Gülgün Karal, facilities, sources, and bibliographies are identified.

Myron Weiner begins his chapter on political interviewing by commenting on the influence the researcher's background and training have upon the conduct of inquiry. Perceptively, he states that the researcher "may all too often compare the *practice* of government abroad with the *theory* of government at home" (p. 109). Other matters discussed include the use of interpreters, reconstructing an event through interviews, access, evaluating responses with the respondents' purposes in mind, and group interviewing.

The chapter on survey techniques, written by Frank Bonilla, begins with an examination of three fundamental issues: Does "public opinion" exist in developing countries? If so, what are its functions? What methods are appropriate for its study? The author indicates the desperate need for analyses of interviewer-respondent interaction and the meaning of cross-cultural comparisons, and he comments on some problems of field administration and public relations. Unfortunately, the prospective field researcher is not assisted with probability sampling in uncharted areas with unenumerated populations.

The concluding chapter, by Herbert Hyman, includes descriptions and evaluations of research designs related to comparison and the study of change. The scientific reason for comparison is also given: "Actual cross-national comparisons, based on equivalent methods, provide an accurate empirical norm for evaluating a descriptive finding from one country" (p. 172).

Studying Politics Abroad is, for the most part, successful in what it sets out to accomplish. It interests, sensitizes, suggests, and assures; in addition, it makes some attempts to provide the student with a necessary technical background. Most important, professors will no longer have to spend hours with departing field researchers passing on the folklore of research in the developing areas.

In two ways, this book reflects the underdeveloped condition of political *science*. The first is that the presentation is at the level of common sense. Unfortunately, the dangers of common sense are present: explanations and justifications are often not given for suggestions, and many of the boundaries between application and non-application are not specified. The second reflection of political science underdevelopment is the assumption the authors implicitly make throughout the book that the prospective field researchers have virtually no background either in the politics of the developing areas or in field research methods. But can it be that students are being dispatched from American pillars of higher education to do research in developing areas without having read Almond, Pye, and Riggs? Can it be that students will plan to interview without having read Hyman, and Kahn and Cannell? An equivalent question could be related to each of the chapters in the book. Therefore, if the pillars of higher education are doing their job, a short sensitizing-suggesting-assuring booklet would have been sufficient. If the pillars are failing, we desperately need a more complete book, at least the equivalent of the *Handbook of Social Psychology*.

WILLIAM JOHN HANNA
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✓ *Financing the United Nations System.* BY JOHN STOESSINGER AND ASSOCIATES. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1964. Pp. 348. $6.75.)

The noble ideas embedded in the United Nations Charter, as well as its crisp constitutional structure, often make the breathless enthusiast for world peace forget that the UN is a political system. Money is both the root of all evil and the goad to much good. This excellent book cogently and coherently puts the problem of financing the United Nations into political perspective by examining the dilemma of apportioning the costs of the Organization among states with conflicting national policies and by analyzing possible sources of new international revenues.

Ten distinguished scholars of United Nations affairs have collaborated with the author in producing a remarkably lucid study, considering the intrinsically tedious matter of statistical compilations, and the skewering of gross national products usually intended to deny art and exalt science. Indeed, Dr. Stoessinger has kept the sprawling materials of international organization research within neatly hemmed boundaries, leading in logical order from a first chapter postulate that the present "financial crisis" of the UN is in reality a political crisis over the role of the Organization as translated by divergent national policies of member states to a conclusion that international political consensus must be nurtured with all the crafts of statesmanship in order to invigorate the financial health of the United Nations.

Between the sheets of this sensible approach to the construction of world order lies a short historical examination of the fiscal problems of the League of Nations and contemporary regional organizations, details on the costs of UN membership, and a description of the procedures to estimate, assess, and appropriate the regular budget of the United Nations. Quite rightly almost a third of the book is devoted to the financial impact upon the United Nations of the peace and security operations in Korea, the Middle East, the Congo, and other peace-keeping interventions, for these political activities, not the studies, conferences, and recommendations of the UN in economic, social, legal affairs—really account for the fiscal "crisis."

The heart of the problem of UN solvency does not lie in the magnitude of the costs or in the poverty of the membership, but in the unwillingness of states to support UN peace-keeping operations that they find politically unwelcome. Failing to find international consensus to back the costs in the Middle East and the Congo, some members of the UN pressed for a legal opinion to bolster a political point of view and one chapter of this volume deals with a World Court advisory opinion of 1962. By a fractured majority of 9-5 the Court found that the expenditures authorized by the General Assembly resolutions for UNEF in the Middle East and the UN Congo Force constituted "expenses of the Organization" under Article 17, but, as the authors note, the political import of the opinion was reflected in each of the ten different statements made by the judges as they labored to apply legal tools to a controversial political issue.

In succeeding chapters that treat the fiscal problems of the UN voluntary programs, such as UNICEF, the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, and the Special Fund, the shift of the budgetary battle lines is emphasized, for tension generally lies between aid-giving and aid-receiving states, marking the perennial rift between debtors and creditors. The amounts of money involved are relatively small and quite voluntary for every state. No problem of assessment exists although there are other problems of increasing donations and collections. Attention is drawn to the proposals to merge some of the programs or incorporate them into the regular budget of the United Nations, with the authors wisely coming down on the side of developing a vigorous consensus for support of the programs rather than expecting some procedural alteration to transform their image or effect.

Similarly, the budgets of the Specialized Agencies are examined, with their receipts from assessed governmental contributions, grants for carrying out EPTA and Special Fund projects, and donations. The lament for a lack of funds to cover needed programs and the complaint of arrears mark the budgeting problems, but the Agencies face no serious plight as they trim their plans to fit revenues. For eighteen years criticism has been vented upon the lack of coordination between the specialized agencies and the UN, with inconclusive findings and little action. Nothing remarkable has been added to the debate here, while the World Bank and its affiliates, together with the International Monetary Fund are perforce treated in a few pages.

Finally, the authors turn to the possibility of raising revenues for the United Nations outside the present assessment-of-states system and the voluntary donations by states to certain economic and social programs. Their conclusion that private contributions can only provide a very modest increment to UN activities seems correct, perhaps understated in light of the record of private contributions coming almost entirely from the United States, except for specific refugee and humanitarian programs. UN levies on international activities, such as mail, canal, sea, and air traffic, and UN exploitation of Antarctica, the seabed, and communications in outer space are examined succinctly to determine their potential for raising money for the UN, but the general conclusions are that the proposals are either too controversial to be accepted, too small in their yield to be worthwhile, or too remote in return to meet the present demands for the development of the UN system. There can be no substitute for the failure of states to meet their financial obligations to the UN here and now.

Overall the combined work of the authors of this tidy volume, so pertinent to the contemporary financial impasse and the future expansion of international organization activities, deserves high marks for a judicious investigation of an important public issue. Calm balance marks its character. Policy makers dealing with UN affairs will have much fact and figure to digest, while ordinary men will be reminded that all organizations, even those designed to achieve the most noble aims of mankind, can move no further and faster than the political consensus that binds them.

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BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in America. By Daniel J. Boorstin. (New York and Boston: Harper Colophon Books, 1964. Pp. iv, 315. $1.75.)

First, this is a most entertaining book, written with wit, sparkle, and a knack for the quotable phrase. "What ails us is not what we have done with America, but what we have substituted for America." "The great forward strides of American civilization have blurred the edges of reality." "We imagine ourselves masters of a plastic universe." "How surprising if men who make their environment and fill experience with whatever they please could not also make their God!" "The wonderful pliability of human nature, in a society where anyone can become a celebrity." *Second,* the book creates concepts which should become by-words as much as Riesman's "other-directedness": (a) the "pseudo-event" which, unlike the genuine, spontaneous event, is planted for reporting purposes, stands in an "ambiguous relation to the underlying reality," and tends toward a self-fulfilling prophecy; (b) "well-knownness" which is replacing fame. Once there was admiration for the "flash of divinity" in a great man, now people are "known for their well-knownness." (c) "Celebrity" substitutes for the hero, but the concept is not confined to people. "A best seller is a celebrity among books." (God) "is the Celebrity Author of the World's Best Seller." (d) The "image" takes the place of the ideal. Unlike the American "dream" which "was here to be reached for and not to be lived in," "images" are synthetic, passive, and ambiguous. *Third,* Boorstin as good as asserts that this unreality is all of our life. His third chapter, "From Traveler to Tourist," pushes the scope of the study from mass communications into a sketch of our entire existence. "We are threatened by a new and peculiarly American menace, . . . the menace of unreality. The threat of nothingness is the danger of replacing American dreams by American illusions." *Fourth,* Boorstin has something to say about the causes of this danger which roots in the "Graphic Revolution," i.e. electronic and photographic technology. He has almost nothing to say, though, about the consequences of living in unreality; no word about foreign or domestic policies, or family relations, ethics, education. This may be because of his bluntly admitted inability to "describe reality," even though he keeps referring his "pseudo-events" to what he calls an "underlying reality." More than once he suggests that our "dreams" are real while our illusions are not. At other times, he attributes the modern American "menace" to "our strengths" rather than our weaknesses.

This book is not a study of life, it merely describes the *doxa* that stand between us and reality. It is a good to call attention to them, and a courageous look into their blurred face may have a healing effect. Boorstin, however, has confined himself to the relatively amiable self-delusions of the public relations world. He has passed over, in silence, the far more dangerous deceptions of the modern ideologies, as, e.g., Positivism, Historicism, Marxism, Racism, which put a contrived "Second Reality" between man and the knowledge of his own condition. These "dreams" of man's self-creation, self-redemption, self-perfection cause indeed a "thicket of unreality" that intervenes between our policy makers and the real situation. One can only shout "Amen" as Boorstin counsels, at the end: " . . . each of us must prepare himself to receive messages from the outside." Boorstin himself, however, does not help much as long as he can manage no more than "suspect that there may be a world out there, beyond our present or future powers to image or imagine." The scientist, after all, is called to penetrate through the *doxa* to *aletheia.*—Gerhart Niemeyer, *University of Notre Dame.*

Jeremy Bentham: An Odyssey of Ideals. By Mary P. Mack. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963. Pp. xiii, 482. $7.50.)

If a statuary Hall of Fame in political theory were to be created, Jeremy Bentham's likeness would no doubt be assigned a modest niche in a secondary wing. This volume—the first of a projected 2-volume work by an historian—is dedicated to the cause of moving Bentham's statue at very least out into the main hall. The author tells us that she began her study of Bentham troubled by the usual interpretation of him as a shallow "rationalist," a "comic philistine," and a "trivial and defective thinker." She concludes—although part of the supporting evidence and argument are yet to come in the second volume—that the usual interpretation is dead wrong: Bentham was in fact a "great man who has often been misunderstood and therefore undervalued" (p. xi).

The evidence and the argument of this first volume are divided into three parts: Part I sets the familial and intellectual background (1748–1769); Part II outlines the fundamentals of Bentham's Utilitarian "science" (1768–1782); and Part III shows Bentham venturing, somewhat hesitantly to be sure, out into the political world to test and refine his science. The volume ends in 1792, just after Bentham became a "democrat," as a result of, among other things, his enthusiasm for the first stages of the French Revolution; and just after old Jeremiah Bentham died, leaving Jeremy and his brother Sam a fortune sufficient to permit them to indulge in certain projects based on Jeremy's science.

The author's claim that Bentham has been grossly and unjustly undervalued rests essentially upon three points. The first is that no one can justly judge Bentham's thought without fully digesting the apparently considerable mass of his unpublished writings, as well as the numerous volumes which have already seen the public light. (The author computes that "almost every day of his adult life, from 1770 to 1832, he wrote about fifteen folio pages" [p. 5].) The second point is that nearly all the critics have imputed a sterile, narrow and static "doctrine" to Bentham, when in fact he was the "creator of a general method"; the core of that method was "a 'logic of the will' that covers every human action and not merely a limited ethical or political theory" (p. xi). The third, and really crucial, point is that Bentham's system is never judged properly because it is never seen as an *uncompleted* system, the key portions of which center upon the unfinished "logic of the will." The argument, here, reduced to its bare elements, is as follows: Utilitarianism, as a "method," required the mass of men to adopt a totally new vocabulary to replace their conventional, and therefore hopelessly ambiguous, language. Bentham sought to supply that new vocabulary by the creation of ponderous Greek-root neologisms. But when he found, early on, that his readers refused to accept this new vocabulary, he began, about 1782, to write in two different ways: private analyses of the logic-of-the-will variety; and public works of a polemical and popular kind. And what is most crucial, his disappointment at the rejection of the early specimens of the new vocabulary caused him never to complete—indeed, says the author, he never really *wrote*, let alone published—his "most important work" (p. 162). In short, the vital middle of Bentham's whole system—the "logic of the will," meant to serve as a bridge between the principle of pleasure (an "empirical generalization") and the principle of happiness (a "normative injunction")—failed to be completed because the mass of his contemporaries refused to accept the first morsels they were asked to digest (p. 223).

We are led, then, to this conclusion: Benthamite Utilitarianism cannot possibly be rejected as unsound because it has never been tried. But in order for it to be tried, two things would be necessary: first, the vital middle, the "logic of the will," would have to be available in completed form; and second, the mass of men would have to be willing to be converted by it. Since the first of these conditions cannot, in the nature of things, ever be realized exactly as Bentham intended it—unless we are to suppose that he might come back to earth to complete that which he left undone—the second seems to be irrelevant. The author might object, of course, that someone *else* might complete the vital, missing part; in which case Bentham would be given credit for providing the inspiration and outlining the method. Possibly. But we would still want to see whether the necessary conversion is any more likely now, or in the future, than it was when Bentham provided his own first public samples. I have my doubts; but perhaps Miss Mack will silence them in the second volume of this work, the first of which is, in spite of my skepticism regarding substance, a valuable complement to the texts considered by the political theorist.—RICHARD H. COX, *State University of New York (Buffalo)*.

Three Tactics: The Background in Marx. BY STANLEY MOORE. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1963. Pp. vii, 96. $2.25.)

Discussions of Marxism, as of theology, have generally been conducted better in Europe than in North America. But time has wrought changes, and whatever the situation may be in theology, so far as Marxism is concerned, contemporary American writing on the subject sometimes equals the best that Europe can produce.

This slight book, *Three Tactics*, is a case in point. The author obviously knows his material and can plunge straight into a theoretical discussion and sustain it at a sophisticated level. I would judge the author is sympathetic to Marxism, yet he is free of dogmatism and asks shrewd and important questions.

The general question which he sets out to answer is whether, corresponding to the conflicts in the Marxist movement, there is a similar conflict of principles in the writings of Marx himself. He finds there is such a correspondence and that Marx in fact enunciated three theories for the ending of capitalism and never committed himself wholly to one.

In his earlier days Marx talked of the permanent revolution. This was a prescription for a conspiratorial minority revolution, allegedly in the interest of the majority. This Marxist aberration became Leninist orthodoxy, but today is adhered to only by the Chinese.

The second, or main line, of Marxist theory stressed increasing misery and a majority proletarian revolution. This was the "iron law" of historical materialism, which guaranteed the overthrow of capitalism. Tactical support has not been drawn from the doctrine from the time of Lenin's *Two Tactics* in 1905, until the Russians tried to revive it about 1960.

The third theoretical model may be called that of competing systems. As feudal society became penetrated by capitalist institutions, so capitalist society becomes permeated by socialist institutions. Piecemeal reform takes the place of revolution. This strain of thought ante-dates Marx and has a mixed ancestry. It was expressed in the tactics of the Revisionists. Although Marx gave it little support, Engels backed it more heavily.

Since three competing models can be found in Marx and Engels, it is not surprising that the Communist movement should be divided on tactics. Today the Russians have dropped the Leninist orthodoxy and have moved to a tactical position somewhere between that and Revisionism. Fortunately, this tactic is more suited to co-existence in the atomic age, and has the advantage of being in the mainstream of Marx's writings.

The author conducts his discussion lucidly, and with an economy of words, although there is a certain caution and inconclusiveness about his work. Yet the book as a whole sharpens the conflicting theoretical and tactical tendencies in Marxism, and may usefully be recommended to students.—H. B. MAYO, *University of Western Ontario.*

The Politics of Conscience: T. H. Green and His Age. BY MELVIN RICHTER. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1964. Pp. 415. $7.50.)

One of the more curious aspects of nineteenth century English history is the profound political and social influence exerted by Green and Idealism. For despite the almost impenetrable character of Green's writings and his uncompromising lecture presentation, he had a considerable impact on Liberal thought. Richter's study seeks to discover the factors which made Green so influential and, also, to account for the rapid decline of that influence.

Richter contends that Green's thought, as well as that of other Liberal reformers, was a reaction to the severe attacks on his traditional Methodist religion. Green was faced with a "great crisis of faith precipitated by science and scholarship. . . . an acute crisis of conscience which troubled those Christian believers who at the same time regarded themselves as thinking men." Higher biblical criticism and Darwinian evolutionary theory made it necessary to give to religion "a compelling restatement in the style of abstract thought respected by the educated" or to abandon religion to the lower classes where it would never exert "the full force upon the whole society that comes from uniting faith with a creed formulated by first-rate minds on the highest intellectual level" (pp. 15–16). While rejecting the dogmas of Methodism, Green sought to save its ethical teaching and above all its "philanthropic humanitarianism" by turning to Idealism. Thus *a priori* philosophy was to provide "the secure base on which to build a new structure of belief embodying the essentials of Christianity" (pp. 310, 180). This "unassailable foundation" would withstand any further advances in empirical knowledge. Methodism with its emphasis on individual responsibility, social activism, voluntarism, and reform was wed to Idealism with its concepts of the progressive unfolding of history and the self-realization of the individual. Self-realization was to mean the active life of the good citizen working toward the betterment of his society. "In politics as in theology, the doctrine of citizenship and reform developed by Green can best be understood as a surrogate faith appealing to a transitional generation" (p. 19).

But Idealist philosophy soon proved to be radically insufficient. It became evident that Green's *a priori* arguments were certainly not the necessary conclusions of any thinking man. Moreover, two apparently opposing tendencies quickly added to the decline of Idealism. On the one hand, the statism latent in Idealism began to assert itself, especially in Bosanquet. Green's own common sense and his commitment to freedom and voluntarism had protected him from taking the steps which some of his (perhaps more consistent) followers could not resist. On the other hand, the principle of voluntarism itself was undermined, just as was the Liberal party, by the rise of the Labor party and Labor's increasing demands for positive governmental action. Indeed, Richter maintains persuasively that Green was certainly not a precursor of the modern welfare state.

Many of the merits and demerits of Richter's study may be traced to his methodological approach. His study is designed to demonstrate the usefulness of studying political and social thought by combining the method of sociology of knowledge with that of the history of ideas. The former approach "is highly suggestive" but "contains many discrepant hypotheses not always supported by convincing evidence," while the latter approach "tends in practice to be meticulous in detail, but insignificant and mechanical in general theory" (p. 10). Just as Green must be admired for seeking to steer between the Charybdis of moral relativism and the Scylla of dogmatism so frequently associated with Idealism, Richter must be admired for his endeavor to combine two such different and demanding methods. Yet it cannot be said that he has always avoided their dangers nor succeeded in thoroughly harmonizing them. Richter claims that the "emphasis" of his "book falls, not upon what was personal, striking or eccentric about its subject, but upon those patterns of piety, of family and social life, of politics, education and voluntary association which formed Green and others like him." But in the sequel he insists that he sought "to read with care all of Green's texts; to accept provisionally the meaningfulness of his problems and the validity of his method" and only to turn to "non-intellectual considerations—sociological, economic, psychological . . . in certain instances" (pp. 9, 11). Accordingly, the chapters on Green's background tend to overgeneralize while those on his ideas tend to be "meticulous" and sometimes repetitious. Throughout it is difficult to know whether Richter is maintaining that Green consciously attempted to blend Idealism and Methodism or whether he was subconsciously reacting to the crisis of his time.

But whatever the limitations Richter's study nevertheless demands our attention for it is a significant contribution to the understanding of an important man and his times. Richter's orderly and intelligent presentation indicates a considerable mastery of some rather difficult material.—JAMES STEINTRAGER, *University of Texas.*

Individualism, Collectivism and Political Power. BY ERVIN LASZLO. (Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague, 1963. Pp. 172. 19.80 guilders.)

This book is divided into two parts: (1) a philosophical analysis of "sociopolitical principles" and (2) a description and analysis of political power, as embodied in Democratic individualism and Communist collectivism. The subtitle, "A Relational Analysis of Ideological Conflict," suggests that Laszlo intended to show the interrelations between the social and political principles described in Part I, and the uses of political power in the individualist and collectivist systems covered in Part II. Laszlo identifies "theories built upon an ontology of being" with "the *individualist* idea of society"; and "theories built on the ontology of existence" with "the *collectivist* idea of society" (p. 28). This is as close as he comes to uniting the two parts of the book. This study falls short of its apparent intention in two ways. First, the two sections of the book are too separate and quite unrelated; there is almost no application of the principles described in Part I to the two basic political systems discussed in Part II. Second, the author is concerned in Part II almost entirely with "the impact of Soviet ideological collectivism on the evolution of contemporary political thought" (p. 151), and Democratic individualism is brought in only here and there and is used as a foil to describe and analyze Communist collectivism in theory and practice, rather than being given consideration in its own right. The author is aware that "institutionalized collectivism is a relatively novel phenomenon on the scene of civilization," and that "the tradition of all people has had more of an individualist than a collectivist content . . . " (p. 152). The title and structure suggest that this study is concerned with a comparison of these two basic systems in their struggle for supremacy. But almost the whole of Part II is concerned with the origins and development of Marxian Communism, and with the present status and appeal of Soviet ideological collectivism in theory and practice throughout the world.

Laszlo clearly states his intention and thesis in Part I: "Our intention is to deal merely with the cognitive processes which play a predominant role in the ontological evaluation of societal (and by implication, of general) reality, and which may thus be shown to have influenced the political thought of our contemporaries" (p. 20). "Our thesis is that there are two types of concepts ascribable to every apprehended object, resulting from two different modes of comprehending it" (p. 21). His main purpose—"to investigate the genesis and qualification of the patterns of ontological concepts"—is pursued from "the sceptical epistemological position of conceptual nominalism" (p. 21). In brief, the author is painfully aware of all the complex philosophical problems and practical difficulties confronting political science from the time of Locke to the view of the universe propounded by Einstein, which he accepts as his own. Unfortunately, this leads him to adopt an esoteric, technical, complex and needlessly abstract philosophical vocabulary, centered in "epistemology" and "ontological concepts." Together with his discursive style, this diction makes much of the first section of his book a series of semantic problems in abstract and wordy phrases, which at their worst are almost meaningless cant and jibberish. Much of Part I reads like a satirical parody of modern political theory written in unreadable doublethink. By "empirical factors of differentiation among social strata" (p. 146), the author means private property. Surely sentences such as the following could have been written in more concrete and concise language: "Finally collectivist states have shown a tendency to explicate their ontological principle by defining a particular set of heuristically functioning theoretical concepts serving to reinterpret concepts of being in the light of a dominant ontology of existence" (p. 52). This example can be matched by others on almost every page of Part I. Almost the only clear writing in the first section is the comparison between Fascism and Communism, and the description of totalitarian dictatorship (pp. 52–56).

In Part II a remarkable change is evident in the style of the book. The author's description and analysis of the historical origins and development of the structure of Communist ideology is concise and clear. He presents an excellent summary of how Marx and Engels adapted Feuerbach's materialism and Hegel's philosophy and dialectics. He subjects Communist dialectics and its institutionalized theory to a very perceptive analysis. His chapter on popular political thought under Communism is especially well done. The chapter on national revisionism includes perhaps the best account to date of the nature and spirit of the Hungarian revolt of October, 1956, from the viewpoint of non-Soviet Marxism. Laszlo's thesis is that the revolt was not for "freedom" as understood in Western constitutional Democracy, but for "freedom" under Hungarian national socialism; that it "was not counter to the collectivist principles of Communism" (p. 134), but only against Russian dominance of Hungarian national unity (pp. 130–136). The thesis is too simple, but if the rest of the book were as well written as this section even sceptical readers would find much of value for understanding and insight.—PETER J. STANLIS, *University of Detroit.*

In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West. BY BENJAMIN SCHWARTZ. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964. Pp. xx, 298. $5.95.)

More than a decade ago Professors John Fairbank and Ssu-yu Teng wrote in a pioneering volume (*China's Response to the West*), "the field of modern Chinese intellectual history has lain fallow far too long." Until "trained and competent Asian and Western scholars . . . spend long periods of time in translation and research . . . we shall never know what has really happened in China since the opening to the West."

They might have added the responsibility for penetrating thought and reflection to the burdens of translation and research. All these functions have combined to produce the brilliant study under review in which Mr. Schwartz, a Harvard colleague of Professor Fairbank's, opens a broad new vista into "what really happened" as China confronted and reacted to Western ideas. In the process he has both enlightened and challenged us with the highest standards of scholarship in this field. Plainly only a scholar with a command of the relevant Chinese literature plus a seasoned knowledge of Western philosophic thought could have undertaken so successfully a comparative analysis of Eastern and Western intellection.

Students of 19th century European liberalism will find this as absorbing a study as will those of modern Chinese thought and social development. Yen Fu's life-long struggle to reassess central Chinese issues in the light of Western thought holds a mirror to still unresolved questions in the West regarding the real roots of liberalism and the causal relations between liberalism and modernization.

The primary focus, however, is upon the relation between these Western speculations and the questions that dominated Yen Fu's consciousness: What was the secret of Western wealth and power? What did the West have that China lacked? Where did the crucial difference between the two lie?

Why Yen Fu and why these particular questions? Professor Schwartz traces the crystallizing of these concerns in late 19th century China as Confucian, pseudo-Legalist, and inchoate nationalist sentiments coalesced in a new amalgam of ideas among the literati. These notions were a response partly to rising domestic forces, more directly to impinging Western and Japanese power. Thoughtful Chinese were inclined, by the turn of the 20th century, to acknowledge that wealth and power were no longer inconsistent with traditional values. Indeed, power was indispensable to their perpetuation. But how were these dynamic forces in their alien Western forms to be analyzed and understood, much less appropriated? Following the humiliation of 1894–95 these questions stood somewhere near the forefront of the Chinese mind.

Yen Fu emerged, by a set of fortuitous circumstances, as one of the first literati to penetrate to the core of these questions. With a rare combination of classical training and the English language, acquired at the Foochow School of Navigation, he was sent to England (1877) for advanced naval training. But naval science was already incidental to his greater concern over the spectre of China's weakness in the face of Western aggressive dynamism and overwhelming vitality. His two years in England set the direction of his career as essayist, translator, and publicist extraordinary. Convinced, now, that the secret of Western wealth and power lay hidden in the writings of English social philosophers, he undertook a program of prodigious investigation and, later, translation. Herbert Spencer—whose *A Study of Sociology* he read in 1881—became his intellectual lodestar. He went on to Adam Smith, Montesquieu, Huxley, John Stuart Mill, and others, translating major works of each and interlarding them with copious commentary. With Professor Schwartz' complete command of this literature and his obvious appreciation of philosophic subtleties in both the Eastern and Western traditions, he takes us step by step through Yen's relentless search for the key to Western strength. His reflections center, of course, on social Darwinism, individualism, equality of opportunity, scientific social engineering, the essence of freedom—all considered as instrumental values contributing to the overarching Western achievement, in Yen's view, of releasing vast human intellectual and physical energy. Chinese cultural norms, by contrast, had never stirred the "energy of faculty" and China would remain weak, Yen concluded, until it learned to trigger these dormant vitalities. The great sages "shrank back from the actualization of men's potentialities, settling for peace, harmony, and order on a low level of human achievement." They had "succeeded in their attempt to freeze the process of evolution at a given stage of social equilibrium." Here, in the last analysis, was the crux of the difference between East and West.

Professor Schwartz describes the changing cast of Yen's declining years (to the end he was excluded from the inner circle of governmental authority) and concludes with a penetrating comment on the wider implications of his findings. The enduring influence of Yen's career on his own and the succeeding generation will have to be traced in other studies. Such studies and all future work in modern Chinese intellectual history, however, will be deeply indebted to Professor Schwartz for so searching and lucid an analysis of this crucially important bridge-figure standing between the intellectual gropings of the expiring Ch'ing on the one hand and British liberalism on the other.

Professor Louis Hartz comments in the Introduction on the significance of this work for students of modern Western political and social thought.—Melville T. Kennedy, Jr., *Bryn Mawr College*.

A Dictionary of the Social Sciences. Ed. by Julius Gould and William L. Kolb. (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964. Pp. xvi, 761.)

A one-volume dictionary emphasizing concepts, with contributions by such scholars as Samuel Finer, Wilfrid Harrison, Robert McKenzie, Edward Banfield, David Easton, Clyde Kluckhohn, Theodore Newcomb, and David Truman.

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University of Kentucky

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5. Johns Hopkins University
6. University of Chicago
8. University of California, Berkeley
9. Queens College, New York
10. University of California, Santa Barbara
11. University of Wisconsin
12. Yale University
13. University of California, Davis
14. University of London
15. Stanford University

17. University of Texas
18. Queen's University, Ontario
19. Technion, Israel Institute of Technology
21. Fort Hays Kansas State College
22. University of California, Los Angeles
23. North Texas State University
24. Bowling Green University
25. West Virginia University
26. Victoria University of Wellington
27. Oklahoma State University
28. University of Florida
29. Boston University
30. Postgraduate Center for Psychotherapy, New York City
31. University of Colorado
32. Sandia Laboratory, Albuquerque, New Mexico
35. Duke University
36. Cornell University
37. Florida State University
38. Mary Baldwin College
39. State University of Iowa
40. California Lutheran College
42. University of North Carolina
43. University of Nebraska
44. University of Cincinnati
45. University of Hawaii
46. University of Washington
47. Harvard University
48. University of Kentucky
49. University of Michigan

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

See How They Run: The Making of a Congressman. By Paul Allyn and Joseph Greene. (Philadelphia: Chilton Books, 1964. Pp. xv, 176. $4.50.)

Upon finishing this little book, the reader has the uncomfortable feeling that he has been hoodwinked. Surely *See How They Run* must be some kind of spoof—perhaps a satire on recent political novels like *Convention.* No serious effort could possibly be so bad. It must have been done tongue in cheek. The use of pseudonyms by the authors would tend to confirm this hypothesis. On the dust jacket, the reader is solemnly informed, "Like the characters in their book, Allyn and Greene are real, though their names are fictional." Yet somehow the gnawing suspicion persists that the authors are in earnest. The preachy pronouncements on congressional reform in the prologue lend credence to this idea. And further substantiation is provided by the thirty-two pages of appendices containing a brief history of the nominating process reprinted from a National Municipal League publication, excerpts from a *Democratic Congressional Campaign Manual,* and lengthy quotations from *Wesberry v. Sanders* (which has no discernible relevance since the story concerns electoral contests wholly within a single congressional district).

If the authors are playing it straight—as most of the evidence seems to indicate—they are the most unintentionally hilarious bunglers outside of the fictional character, Police Inspector Jacques Clouseau, so deftly portrayed by Peter Sellers in *A Shot in the Dark.* Indeed, the book reads as if written by the good inspector himself. Pompous phrases with vaguely ominous overtones and trite metaphors abound. In the prefatory materials, every effort is made to create an atmosphere of suspense, as this excerpt from the jacket blurb exemplifies:

> In real life, as in this book, the election of a Congressman is the final scene—the anticlimax, in fact—of a suspenseful drama that begins long before Election Day. It is a drama with a large supporting cast, including not only the voters, but also the Congressman-makers, whose work is largely done behind the scenes. This book takes you backstage to show you how this drama is produced.

Then the authors promptly proceed (on the second page of the prologue) to rob their "real-life drama" of any suspense whatsoever by divulging which candidate wins the congressional primary subsequently depicted.

Mere description is inadequate to convey the style in which this book is written. It must be savored to be fully appreciated, as in this representative passage:

> Then the telephones jangle again and, as in a kaleidoscope, the room is alive with motion. Always there is tension: waiting for a phone to ring, waiting for the message, waiting for another ring.
>
> No one feels the tension more than Walt Morin. Twenty-eight years old and an attorney for four years, he wore his patience and his shoe leather thin for the party, doing canvasses, distributing campaign literature, chauffeuring candidates and their aides, even going out for coffee and crullers to nourish the campaign strategists. (p. 5.)

Characterizing the substance of this book is less difficult. As the authors avow at the outset, "What you are about to read is not a novel." (p. ix.) Actually, it is a greatly elongated version of the "Mr. Smith Runs for Congress" mythical case study which is a standard ingredient of the chapter on political campaigns in most introductory textbooks on American government.

Firmly subscribing to the principle that any appraisal should be balanced, I searched every page for a redeeming feature. This proved to be a futile quest. But it did afford a plausible explanation of why the authors chose to remain anonymous: to protect their reputations as writers.—KENNETH KOFMEHL, *Purdue University.*

Voting Patterns in a Local Election. BY ALVIN BOSKOFF AND HARMON ZEIGLER. (Philadelphia and New York: Lippincott. 1964. Pp. 153. n.p.)

The local election examined is a bond issue election in Georgia's DeKalb County, a part of the Atlanta metropolitan area. Until recently a predominantly rural county, DeKalb has more than doubled its population since 1950. Moreover, the modern world has invaded the county in the form of considerable industrial growth. Yet it is no mere bedroom suburb. Many of its residents are employed in the county, and thousands of Atlanta residents "commute" to work in DeKalb.

This is a study of voting behavior in the tradition of the studies of Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and the Michigan Survey Research Center. The authors call attention to the declining emphasis on ecological determinism in studies of presidential voting since socio-economic status may be less determinative of voter choice in some presidential elections than others. In recent studies of presidential elections, greater stress has been placed on the psychological basis of group or individual voting decisions, but this psychological emphasis has not yet appeared in studies of local elections. The authors seek to bring this approach to the study of a local election.

The authors chose an election in which the voters supported by a two-to-one majority a bond issue to finance a number of services which are standard for a rapidly urbanizing county, e.g., an incinerator plant, expanded library service, more fire stations, parks, water mains, sewers, and roads. The authors classify voting districts into high and low support districts, then subdivide each category into urban, suburban, and rural. Within two weeks after the election, interviews were conducted in each of these twelve voting districts with a systematic sample of respondents chosen from among persons who had actually voted. The total number of persons interviewed in DeKalb County was 136.

Income, perceived socio-economic status, and the 40–60 year age bracket appear to be the factors most closely associated with support or rejection of the bond issue. In terms of type of precinct, the greater support came from the suburban and urban areas, especially the suburban areas, and the greatest opposition came from the low-income, rural fringe. When asked their chief reason for supporting the bond issue, the "yes" voters referred to "progress" or asserted the need for a particular expanded public service. Opponents either denied the need for the services or registered a hostile attitude toward county government, often making dark references to graft.

Although support for the bond issue was highest among a socially homogeneous group of upper-income suburbanites, the authors insist that status did not directly effect the voting decision. Rather they feel that they have isolated

> . . . strong and pervasive differences in *outlook* between two categories of county residents. On the one hand was found a willingness to face, and finance some solutions to, problems of growth and expanded service. This attitude is most clearly found in residents of . . . suburban areas, in middle and high income categories, among professionals, large proprietors and managers, among relatively recent residents, and among persons forty to sixty years of age. An opposing viewpoint approaches county government . . . as a necessary evil that should neither be changed nor trusted. This attitude stems fundamentally from an inability to accept the dramatic changes fostered by increasing industrialization, population expansion, and the spread of urban values. Consequently, its adherents have understandable apprehensions about the future and a reluctance to "invest" in a world they have not made and do not admire. (pp. 72–73)

"Civic responsibility" is the term applied to this willingness to face and finance solutions to the county's problems. This attitude was not inculcated by a propaganda campaign; communications could not alter voters' basic predispositions. Possibly this civic responsibility can be traced to the socialization process which transmits conceptions of community needs to particular social groups. The authors conclude cautiously that other studies would be necessary to reach a firm conclusion that civic responsibility could not emerge from a different kind of status group.—DONALD S. STRONG, *University of Alabama.*

Congress: The Sapless Branch. BY SENATOR JOSEPH S. CLARK. (New York: Harper and Row, 1964. Pp. xviii, 268. $4.95.)

It is heartening to note that members of the United States Congress suddenly have discovered the book-reading public. As in many other things, the late John F. Kennedy led the way. His *Profiles in Courage* was so successful—whether judged in literary, financial, or political terms—that many of his former colleagues on "The Hill" have been emboldened to try their hands, and the hands of their staff assistants, at writing books. A recent count by the *New York Times Book Review* found Senators Clark, Dodd, Douglas, Ervin, Fulbright, Goldwater, Hartke, Humphrey, Jackson, Javits, Keating, Kefauver, McCarthy, Muskie, Mundt, Pastore, Proxmire, Tower and Young either awaiting their first royalty checks or putting the final touches on book manuscripts. Members of the House, while fittingly less prolix than Senators, include quite a number of actual or fledgling authors: the late Clem Miller, John Brademas, Fred Smith, Jim Wright and others. "Publish or perish" seems to be becoming a rule of congressional as well as academic life.

Judging by Senator Joseph S. Clark's *Congress: The Sapless Branch* this extraordinary development is not likely to result in many books of value to political scientists. Perhaps it is unfair to judge this book, and those to follow, by such a standard: they are being written for a general, not a professional, audience. But it would be even more unfair to the readers of this REVIEW to apply any other measure of value.

Senator Clark's book is a mixture of autobiography, institutional history, and polemics. On the first count, the book is a failure. Perhaps no incumbent politican should be expected to bare his soul to the world—and thereby to his constituents and future political rivals. But Senator Clark carries prudence to the point where almost nothing is revealed about Joseph S. Clark, the man. Political scientists interested in the recruitment and motivation of legislators will have to look elsewhere for data. Senator Clark is justly famous as a Senate maverick, but the book tells us nothing about why the chamber's methods for socializing new members did not work in his case.

As history, the book is trivial. We are told, in all seriousness, that "the assassination of President Garfield by a disappointed job holder forced Congressional action" on civil service reform. Over twenty years of history are dismissed with the words "Van Buren, Harrison, Tyler, Fillmore, Pierce and Buchanan abode their destined hours and went their way." We are informed that " . . . the so-called Jazz Age produced nothing from Congress save two really bad tariffs, a long inconclusive squabble over farm legislation and a long-delayed investigation of the Teapot Dome Scandals, as a result of which former Senator Albert B. Fall went to jail. . . . " These thumbnail clichés add little to anyone's historical perspective.

But Senator Clark's main objective is to argue the case for Congressional reform. Both his critique of Congress as it now operates and his prescriptions for it ills are familiar. Senator Clark pays our profession the ultimate compliment; he seems to have read what we have written on congressional reform and to have adopted much of it as his own. The Congress is not sufficiently responsive to the "will of the majority"; it is controlled by an "irresponsible," conservative, bi-partisan "Establishment"; it is a stumbling block to Presidents seeking to implement "progressive" national policies. Disciplined, programmatic, national parties; an end to the filibuster; a dilution of the seniority system; a revamped Rules Committee; a large increase in presidential influence over Congress; these and other well-worn reforms are needed if Congress is to adapt to the exigencies of the twentieth century.

This is not the place for a full scale discussion of the merits of this package of reforms. In recent years, however, many political scientists have become disenchanted with these one-time articles of faith. Senator Clark chooses to ignore this new mood in the scholarly literature on Congress. But the record of the 88th Congress is harder to overlook. During two years, the creaky and juiceless old branch on Capitol Hill has written an historic Civil Rights Act, a nuclear test ban treaty, a college construction act, land conservation and wilderness bills, a mass transit act, and an anti-poverty program into the statute books. Viewed in the light of these major legislative accomplishments and the change in professional opinion, Senator Clark's charges and proposals seem strangely outdated.

But perhaps the fault is as much ours as his. While disillusionment with old "solutions" is rife among us, few political scientists are willing to embrace the congressional *status quo*. As a profession, we need to supply Senator Clark with new and better ammunition.—DONALD R. MATTHEWS, *Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences.*

The Democrat's Dilemma. BY PHILIP M. CRANE. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1964. Pp. xiv, 376, $4.95.)

The implicit thesis of this book is that a small band of dedicated persons have captured control of the Democratic party. The overt thesis is that ideas first popularized by the Fabian Society in Great Britain and the Intercollegiate Socialist Society in the United States have become the new orthodoxy.

Either of these propositions would require better marshaled evidence than Mr. Crane presents before they could be fully accepted. He has written a history of socialist thought which barely mentions Karl Marx. He has written an account of the Democratic party which ignores the South except for a suggestion that C.O.P.E. is about to become the dominant political force in that region. His characterization of his protagonists is usually limited to hints that they are untrustworthy. (His total description of Graham Wallas: "Wallas was one of the most intemperate of the lot in his attitude toward religion. He left Highgate School, where he had been teaching, after refusing to lead the boys to chapel.") Mr. Crane often avoids even a hint of a consecutive time base, treating as one "simultaneous" event a number of occurrences which vary in significant respects. On pages 136 and 137, for example, he moves from 1927 to 1929 to 1925 to 1946 to 1948 to 1947 to 1955 to 1959 to 1960 to 1953 to 1960 to 1948 to 1925. And he reintroduces essentially the same data in slightly different guises in chapter after chapter.

Nonetheless, *The Democrat's Dilemma* is important to political scientists. Mr. Crane has gathered considerable information about what the late V. O. Key called "a partisan cluster of interest groups." He discusses many organizations associated with the liberal-trade union coalition which constitutes the left wing of the Democratic party: the A.D.A., the Fund for the Republic, the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, the Rand School of Social Science, the New School for Social Research, the A.F.L.-C.I.O., C.O.P.E., the I.L.G.W.U., and Group Research, Incorporated. Mr. Crane is an historian, and apparently unfamiliar with David Truman's concept of overlapping membership or Lester Milbrath's use of communication networks to analyze the activities of lobbyists. The political scientist, however, will find many hints of ways in which these concepts can be applied. Certainly the massive political activity of labor unions is one of the most important features of the current American political scene. They have some 4,000 publications of their own, and spent $2,278,000 on the 1960 election. We do need to know more about their political enterprises.

Another reason for the importance of this book is that it typifies feelings which had important political consequences in 1964. Philip Crane is a militant young conservative. He has a firm commitment to "the free enterprise system, national sovereignty, republican government, individual liberty, and natural rights." *The Democrat's Dilemma* apparently was written to sound an alarm about what he and his colleagues regard as a perilous threat to these values. It was industry resulting from such passionate belief which enabled militant conservatives to gain control of the Republican party. Hence a careful examination of their attitudes deserves a high place on the agenda of political science.—JOHN H. KESSEL, *University of Washington.*

Lawyers in Politics: A Study in Professional Convergence. BY HEINZ EULAU AND JOHN D. SPRAGUE. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964, pp. xii, 164, $1.95.)

Though the disciplines of Law and Political Science are old partners with overlapping interests, the roles of lawyers and bar groups in the political process have never been subjected to adequate empirical or theoretical analysis. Happily, this void in the literature is being filled and this volume represents an important—though modest—step in that direction. Professors Eulau and Sprague are concerned generally with the "consequences of a professional group's presence for the functioning of a political system." Using interviews carried out for *The Legislative System* project, the authors present some very interesting data on the comparative backgrounds and role perceptions of lawyers and non-lawyers in the legislatures of New Jersey, Tennessee, Ohio, and California.

They conclude that despite the numerical dominance of lawyers among occupational groups represented in these legislatures, lawyer-legislators do *not* differ significantly from non-lawyer-legislators in their perceptions of the legislative-political role or (as has been shown in other studies) in their actual role behavior. Where lawyers *do* seem to differ from non-lawyers in the legislative setting are in those few roles which emphasize lawyers' pre-political occupational skills and experiences. Or to put it differently, only where lawyer-legislators are recognized as such, rather than simply as legislators, can their perceptions and behavior be differentiated.

The strength and utility of this volume lies in the clear and cogent manner in which the information is presented. Though limited in scope and by the fact that they were originally collected for other purposes, the data shed new light on the potential influence of occupation on legislative role behavior. Furthermore, they should prove to be a viable stimulus to further hypothesis testing.

But perhaps even more interesting than these basic findings—and certainly likely to be more controversial—is the authors' attempt to generalize from their data to a middle range theory of the relationship between law and politics. If the road they traverse is the correct one, presumably it will also lead to explanations of other occupational impacts on legislative behavior.

Professors Eulau and Sprague accept the notion that the polity constitutes "an autonomous system of role relationships" which, in turn, makes for values and styles of behavior which distinguish the political from other social systems. And they further accept the influence of the political culture in socializing all practitioners regardless of background. But since they assume as well that occupational background is a critical determinant of political behavior, they must create a theoretical formulation which will both accept this notion and still account for data which does not demonstrate its applicability to lawyer-legislators.

Briefly, they hypothesize the existence of a convergence, or isomorphism, between the professions of law and politics. Members of these professions are said to acquire similar skills and to play roles which can be described as functionally equivalent and potentially interchangeable. Law and politics "are distinct and structurally independent of each other as professions," but similar in role structure because of a continuous process of convergent development. An isomorphism between the two professions is said to exist when professional membership ceases to differentiate any important aspect of behavior. As this takes place, and as the two professions become increasingly integrated into the political system, "their members find opportunities that facilitate the actual interchange of institutional positions, careers, and professional roles more than is the case with other occupations."

The reason, therefore, why lawyer-legislators do not demonstrate identifiably distinct role perceptions is that the roles they must play as legislators do not differ greatly from those which they have learned as lawyers. Consequently, they bring few new perspectives and have little impact, *as lawyers*, on the legislative process.

It seems to me, however, that this theory is not entirely satisfactory for several reasons. It purports to explain similarities between lawyers and non-lawyer legislators by reference to a functional equivalence of occupational roles. But the data in the book do show *some* differences, and these are *also* explained, though in less theoretical terms (p. 121), on the basis of the prepolitical skills which lawyers bring with them to the legislature. This discrepancy could be rationalized by saying that it represents the difference between the perfect convergence of the model and the imperfect convergence in reality of law and politics. But this would detract, proportionately, from the explanatory power of the model.

A second criticism stems from this same discrepancy. In positing the functional (or role) equivalence of the professions of law and politics —which seems quite plausible—the authors may be overlooking the crucial fact that in many *other* respects the lawyer-politician is alienated from the dominant norms of the legal profession. There are, of course, very few available data on which to base a comparison of lawyers in and out of politics. But what information we have surely supports the notion that the gap between "professional" and "political" lawyers over adherence to the basic values and perspectives of the legal profession is important if not unbridgeable. Lawyers in a legislative setting are not likely to be prototypes of the "typical" lawyer; and within that setting there is a possibility that differences among lawyer legislators will be equally acute. If this is true, then the question of *where* these *particular* lawyers learned the appropriate roles becomes critical. It is possible that this learning came after they joined the legislature. If so, then they may be viewed in the same light as other occupational groups, whose members were socialized within the political culture.

The fact of the matter is that these data permit of several interpretations. The authors have chosen one, but others could and should be explored.—Joel B. Grossman, *University of Wisconsin.*

The Cause is Mankind: A Liberal Program for Modern America. By The Hon. Hubert H. Humphrey (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. Pp. 172. $4.95.)

Having appeared in 1964, this volume must be taken as a campaign tract. Nevertheless, it tends to reveal the man who is now Vice-President of the United States. It was composed by the publisher from recent speeches by the candidate on a wide variety of subjects. There is no point in reviewing all the subjects. Since the book sets out to be a personal, popular exposition of modern liberalism, the interesting question is whether a consistent theme can be found in it, to which this reviewer's answer is affirmative.

The latent theme is that "liberalism" rightly has two aspects, intellectual and spiritual. Its proper intellectual method is flexible and eclectic in service of the moral content, which is liberation and enlargement of human potential. These two sides of liberalism are applied to a number of subjects, beginning with some textbook historical perspective in which two current academic emphases appear: that Americans have never before had as much freedom as widely generalized as they presently enjoy; and that the early, relatively easy advent of popular government in America helped produce a flexible liberalism free of rigid European doctrines. Thus implicitly are liberalism and democracy related.

In this volume some topics seem to be covered dutifully, others enthusiastically. The more dutiful subjects are "groupy" and distributive—the "mixed economy" and the roles of public intervention and welfare expenditures; largeness and smallness in economic enterprise; the history, contributions, and deserts of labor, agriculture, and business. The enthusiasm shows most clearly in discussion of substantive policy to promote human potential, rather than of political, social, and economic structure. In domestic policy, this means civil rights, of course—and 1964 was an appropriate time for recognition of Humphrey's national role in this issue since 1948. But the enthusiasm now runs well beyond civil rights and social welfare legislation to newer problems and policies: technology and manpower, public aid to education and training, where economic and benevolent aspects seem to meet in complementary ways. Similarly, in foreign policy Humphrey's emphasis is on ways in which it deals directly with people: economic and technical aid, Public Law 480, world trade, and the Peace Corps —again merging commercial and humanitarian concerns in an apparently conscious adaptation of older liberalisms. Individual education and training—public investment in human resources—is the link relied upon.

Those who know the author—as many political scientists do—will recognize his consistent interests in this speech material, including his legislative sponsorship of many of the current policies on which he comments. In doctrine, the equation of liberalism and popular democracy, the emphasis on positive freedom and the spiritual—even spirited—side of liberalism are also characteristic. This is not a mind happy or content with antinomies; the man would obviously rather broaden opportunities than scan priorities. If there is still room for crabbed, academic concern with issues of planned priority, public accountability and private control in federal subsidy of education, investment in human development, and "manpower policy," Humphrey is likely to leave these for academic analysis and, as politician, press for action. This seems a better division of labor than one in which professors are activists and politicians are conservatives; though fortunately a rough balance seems to hold in both fields. And political scientists who read this book or know its author may reflect that group pluralism, governmental structure, legal rules all surround the core principle of individual opportunity and development which, if a vague political standard by itself, is perhaps the least dispensable standard of any and is Hubert Humphrey's usual, ebullient, instinctive concern.—Charles E. Gilbert, *Swarthmore College.*

The American South in the 1960's. Edited by Avery Leiserson. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1964. Pp. xiii, 242. $6.00.)

This symposium volume represents a quick reprinting, under auspices of a commercial publisher, of the 25th anniversary issue (February, 1964) of *The Journal of Politics*, to which has been added a brief introduction by Alexander Heard. As occurs frequently with symposia, the title is overlarge (nine of the eleven articles deal with orthodox political science subjects) and the contributions are uneven. The chief virtue of the work —and presumably this fulfills its major intent—is to provide guideposts or benchmarks in portraying dominant political trends in the South since 1948, the date of the last symposium on the South conducted by *The Journal of Politics*. Even so, several articles are rather surface surveys, and there is much overlap among chapters of attention and speculation on such themes as legislative reapportionment, greater Negro voting, and developing Republicanism. The volume is further weakened in its thematic strength by the absence of any chapter seeking to pull the main points together and in its reference utility by the omission of an index. (One might also question the difference of $4.05 between the publisher's hardback and paperback editions, and deplore the substandard physical appearance of the book, especially as to skimpiness and unevenness of margins.) In sum, the symposium succeeds better in communicating the importance of current changes and ongoing continuity than it does in presenting an orderly, cumulative, or complementary appraisal of those factors.

In the lead chapter, Leslie W. Dunbar argues that race relations and attitudes comprise the critical elements in Southern change. In his view, the character of white response to the irreversible fact that the initiative in shaping race relationships has passed from white to Negro hands will determine the South's ability to align itself with the rest of the nation and yet to maintain a constructive regional identity as well.

Four chapters rely on a broad overview approach. O. Douglas Weeks sets forth the several paths of regional resistance in national politics and Samuel DuBois Cook treats, with some heat, of the activities of segregationist and conservative organizations in the post-1954 period. William H. Nicholls details both the extent to which the South has advanced economically the past few decades and the important gaps that remain between the Southern and non-Southern economies. Nicholls, too, is sensitive to the adverse impact on economic growth of regional, racial and rural traditions. George W. Spicer assesses the initiatory role played by federal judicial action, through a review of case law and subsequent patterns of compliance and resistance. While noting that delays in effectuating educational desegregation derive in part from the procedural and substantive weaknesses in the Supreme Court's implementation decree of 1955, he concludes by justifying judicial intervention in this area because of the marked unwillingness or incapacity of the more overtly political branches and levels of government to handle the problem.

Political overviews with a more particularized focus are offered by Malcolm E. Jewell and Coleman B. Ransone, Jr. In the former's chapter, state legislative patterns are examined, with special reference to the implications of reapportionment for urban, Negro, and Republican strength and to associated trends toward heightened legislative factionalism and conflict. Ransone concentrates on political factors sustaining gubernatorial power in the Southern states, but this once again leads to an emphasis on the nature of rejuvenated Republicanism and on the effects of the arousal of racial anxieties.

Two other chapters apply more specialized perspectives. Lawrence Logan Durisch advocates the necessity and desirability of far greater planning and development programs, within each of the Southern states and among them as a region. Robert H. Connery and Richard H. Leach present a case for preventive planning and advance action so that Southern metropolitan areas can develop effective governmental forms adequate to deal with their emerging needs before the latter become virtually unsolvable problems.

The two remaining chapters, involving competent narrower empirical investigations, are among the volume's stronger contributions. Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro apply sample-survey methods to uncover the image of the major parties held by Southern whites and Negroes. Their findings and commentary are helpful to the problem of assessing the durability and strength of Republicanism and in determining its group basis of support. Alfred Clubok, John De Grove, and Charles Farris report on several community situations where the Negro vote has been encouraged and manipulated by whites. Their discussion serves to remind that there need be no automatic correspondence between Negro possession of political rights and Negro securing of political benefits, a viewpoint often lost sight of in the current stress on the centrality of Negro suffrage for Negro advance. In much the same way the Matthews-Prothro article, in common with several of the other chapters, reminds that a strengthened presidential Republicanism need not be rapidly or inevitably reflected in competitive two-partyism at the state/local levels. The South *is* changing, but neither as swiftly nor as discontinuously with its past as conservatives fear or liberals hope.—ALLAN P. SINDLER, *Duke University.*

The Futile Crusade: Anti-Communism as American Credo. BY SIDNEY LENS. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books. 1964. Pp. 256. $5.00.)

The Futile Crusade is a sensible or a naive book, depending on whether you are a softboiled or a hardboiled egghead. The postwar stance of American foreign policy, Mr. Lens argues, has been almost exclusively negative. Not only have we failed to develop a positive alternative to communism, but we have sanctimoniously judged other nations on the basis of their outlook towards the Soviet bloc. The result has been a propping up of governments that pass our test of purity and the alienation of new states wishing to sit out the Cold War.

Most of what Mr. Lens has to say is familiar, much of it is consciously exaggerated, and hardly anything he says will persuade the reader who is not already convinced. While the book is chiefly about our problems in the international arena, the most revealing parts deal with the ideological schism besetting liberalism right here at home. Mr. Lens has a soft spot for the "soft" liberals: for those who are, in a word, soft on communism and other of the more ruthless regimes of our time. To understand is to excuse; and Mr. Lens is nothing if he is not understanding. We may be told that Sukarno and Nkrumah have quashed opposition parties, that Algeria and the United Arab Republic are a far cry from being democracies, that Cuba and China are dictatorships pure and simple. Mr. Lens' reply is:

> All of this is true for the most part, yet it is only an episodic phase of the world revolution. No revolutionary nation can fulfill its promise without great difficulties, without setbacks, without spurts and spasms. (p. 223)

And then follows the not surprising reminder that our own revolutionary birth was succeeded by a Shays Rebellion, Alien and Sedition Laws, and acts of disorder and oppression.

The real villains of this tract are not to be found on the right. If Dulles' policy was negative and unimaginative, that is what you might expect from a Republican with a Wall Street background. And if McCarthy and likeminded politicians capitalized on a nation's anxieties, this was simply the know-nothing mentality at work. Mr. Lens, rather, reserves his harshest criticism for the liberals who opted to take a hard line on communism. This was the *trahison des clercs.* Each must do his bit to help defend the Republic in time of crisis, and the egghead felt called upon to contribute his talents no less than others. The result was the erection of an intellectual apparatus justifying our foreign policy. Philosophers would discourse on the "nature of communism," showing it to be unsullied evil. Social scientists would demonstrate that Marxism was a tissue of logical errors: that America had a mixed economy, a pluralist polity, and more symphony orchestras than anyone else. *Time* magazine, in a cover-story featuring Jacques Barzun, welcomed the long-lost intellectual back into the fold.

If most liberals moved from a soft to a hard position there are two possible explanations. The first is that they were correct in their reassessment of communism and its threat to the West. The second is that they sensed that their own advancement and survival in a difficult era depended on accommodating to the dominant outlook of society. Mr. Lens does not explore either motives or motivations here. It would have been a fascinating exercise had he done so. For the scholar, at least in America, leads an exposed and dependent existence. Just how far this vulnerability affects his intellectual posture is a nice problem in the sociology of knowledge. But if being a liberal has been tolerable it is chiefly because most liberals have managed to make it clear that they are, in their own way, as hard-minded about communism as the Rotarians across town.

Can American policy be anything other than negative, reacting and responding to ever-arising communist initiatives? Mr. Lens has his eight-point program calling for aid to those new nations that show signs of encouraging land reform, setting up village development plans, and widening the ambit of allowable political dissent. But he also wants us to turn positive, and here lies the real dilemma. For this raises the question as to whether we possess or can develop a social and ideological alternative to communism. It may well be that we are already middle-aged, that our time in history is running out, that the American model and American guidance can no longer excite the world. And if the national imagination is incapable of adjusting to the conditions Mr. Lens describes, then retaining our bases in an autocratic Spain may be a better hope than sending tractors to a doubtful Nigeria.—Andrew Hacker, *Cornell University*.

Herbert Hoover: A Biography. By Eugene Lyons. (Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1964. Pp. xii, 442. $5.95.)

When Herbert Hoover accepting the Republican nomination for president observed, "I was Quaker born," he epitomized plenty. A native of Iowa he lost his father at six and his mother at nine and was then sent to Oregon to be reared by Quaker relatives. His was a rural rearing and schooling in a home somewhat short of poverty but always in the Republican tradition which was to be challenged in the very convention that nominated him and by a delegate soon to be nominated as his running mate. Still in his teens he went to the just emerging Stanford University entering the day it opened. He was soon the leader of the "Barbs" determined to prevent domination of the campus by the Greek-letter fraternities.

Under the intellectual stimulus of Dr. Branner, Herbert made the most of his opportunity to develop his aptitude for geology. During summers he built up a tough physique on geological surveys. Graduating from Stanford in 1893 he set out hunting a job with forty dollars in his pocket which were soon spent. Then, as he put it in his *Memoirs*, he "experienced the bottom levels of despair . . . the ceaseless tramping and ceaseless refusal of employment." One day he tried at the office of Louis Janin, a famous California mining expert, to hear that the only vacancy was for a typist, whereupon Hoover astonished Janin with "I can type. When do I start?"

Before long Janin, having discovered what a remarkable secretary he had, and utilizing a bold ruse, got the young man an assignment with an English mining company which took Hoover through London offices to the wilds of Australia and a miserable mining camp manned by carousing dregs of humanity. Here Hoover's extraordinary competence promptly won him the designation "The Chief." Next he was in Peking, China with his particular colony there soon surrounded by the Boxer rebels. It fell to this competent Quaker virtually to take charge as commander-in-chief until American marines came to the rescue. He was frequently under fire and once rescued a Chinese child in the line of fire. But when the episode had been written up and submitted to him for possible publication he tore the paper to shreds with the comment, "I'm no Teddy Roosevelt."

By successive assignments Hoover's far-flung mining activities became almost world-wide in range. Then came the sudden outbreak of World War I with tens of thousands of panic stricken American tourists unable to get home. Now back in London Hoover took charge and soon had the refugees home.

Next, Belgian relief fell to him and with perfect self confidence he assumed personally an obligation for twelve million dollars for food. Then followed the relief of civilians within the belligerent countries with the military in each desperately bent on crushing the enemy regardless of starving civilians. But with an astonishing command of the vast problem, and using the threat of arousing the wrath of neutrals, Hoover bent the stubborn will of ministers, monarchs, and dictators to his determination to relieve the starving. Now he became the Great Humanitarian as ancient parks, streets and squares were renamed for him. Returning home President Harding appointed Hoover Secretary of Commerce, whereupon that department was suddenly invigorated as it had never been. Without lifting his hand he was nominated by the Republican party and elected President. Here was something else to challenge this man of extraordinary talents. As President he learned to find occasional emotional relief from frustrations with such quips as, when a grand daughter was born, "Thank God she won't have to be confirmed by the Senate." Such is the essence of the story of Herbert Hoover as told in his biography by Eugene Lyons.

At this point rises a question: Why is it that whoever has read the three volumes of Hoover's *Memoirs* and later reads the book under review, gets to wondering whether the Hoover of this biography can be the man who wrote the *Memoirs*. What transformed the great liberal of the biography, the humanitarian sympathetic with labor and the less fortunate everywhere into a ludicrous symbol of conservatism and reaction? Of course he had the misfortune to have proclaimed his hopes for an approaching end of poverty before his dream was to be shattered by the Great Depression. His phobia of what came to be called creeping socialism unquestionably hampered his adaptation of available means for alleviating the overwhelming distress. Later the New Deal's encroachments on private enterprise he held due to European ideologies not the pressure of events. The Great Depression itself he held due to "the European economic hurricane that swept over us" rather than stock market speculation. Had he been reelected "we would quickly have overcome the depression." He could break out in wrath as when a favorite project of his was opposed by a "conglomeration of professors and intellectuals tainted with mixed socialist, fascist, and antique ideas." Capitalism, assumed to be the ultimate in economic evolution, would apparently be standing firm when Gabriel trumpets forth the Judgment Day.

But why does this fascinating biography skip such human foibles? Doubtless because it is, after all, a literary work of art in the sense that art is an idealized representation of nature. There are those who will long for citation of authorities and an index.—Wilfred E. Binkley, *Ohio Northern University.*

The Politics of Water in Arizona. By Dean E. Mann. (University of Arizona Press, 1963. Pp. xviii, 317. $6.50.)

Problems of water scarcity have been acute in the Southwest since the region was first settled. They are becoming of increasing concern in many other parts of the nation.

This study describes the water problems of Arizona, the most arid of the fifty states. Its seventeen chapters present in detail how water policies developed from territorial days until today. As in all arid states, government was deeply involved in water problems. But the author makes it clear that long range planning and long range decisions have proved politically impossible. Thus Arizona has not faced up to the inherent limitations on growth and development resulting from water scarcity. Federal programs have generally been tied to local interests and have been dominated by local goals, so that while providing some immediate assistance, federal action has not contributed significantly to the solution of longer range problems.

For those seeking rationality in public decision-making, Dean Mann's study will prove disillusioning. The record is one of frequent rejection of technical advice and of ready response to short range pressures serving local or individual advantage. From the time of settlement, the pattern of government action has been a patch work of decisions stimulated by self-seeking or misinformed groups. And the result, as the author suggests, leaves one uneasy as to the future.

Clearly, water problems will continue to be sources of tension and conflict in Arizona, and this book by Dean Mann will be a basic source of information wherever and whenever Arizona water problems are considered. It would probably be useful to have similar studies for every state.

But it is perhaps unfortunate that the author has not added more to our understanding of politics and the political process as it operates in the allocation of scarce resources. Except in war, our political system has not generally had to face resource allocation problems. Only in the arid regions in the handling of water has the system had to deal on a continuing basis with resource allocation problems. Yet there is reason to expect that allocation problems (initially with respect to water) will become of increasing political significance throughout the nation. It would have been useful, therefore, if the author had gone beyond description to suggest some hypotheses and generalizations with respect to the way in which our political system is likely to respond in this relatively unfamiliar but increasingly important context.—Norman Wengert, *Wayne State University.*

The States Rights Debate: Antifederalism and the Constitution. By Alpheus Thomas Mason (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1964. Pp. 206. Cloth—$5.00.)

The publication at this time of Professor Mason's excellent book on the roots of American federalism is fortunate, for the tempo of states rights arguments has grown recently and political scientists around the world are taking a new look at federalism. This study extends from America's late colonial period to the adoption of the Bill of Rights. As one follows the arguments of Hamilton, Wilson, Lee, Jefferson, Martin, Seabury, Madison—particularly Madison—and others, one is impressed with the current application of much of what was written a long time ago. This is of particular interest since the Constitution was only then coming into being and the drive for and against the adoption of a Bill of Rights had become a basic issue. At that time many persons had hoped that the incorporation of these rights into the Constitution would set a limit to a potentially dangerous central government; others feared that these proposed amendments, if adopted, might seriously limit the powers of a necessarily strong national government. Thus, these words of early American statesmen, with few exceptions, touch on many issues that confront the United States in the 1960's.

Eighteenth century constitutional theory with regard to federal-state relations had about as little to do with what was written and spoken concerning states rights as has that which is being written and spoken concerning that subject today. Rather, men were guided by personal opinions and personal interests. In fact, very few eighteenth century voices of national importance argued for the assimilation of state powers into an all-powerful national government merely because they considered unitary government to be theoretically preferred. There are possibly about as many—or rather as few—who have defended the proposition that the great centers of power in a plural nation should be vested in the constituent units merely because they believe that the result would be particularly conducive to life, liberty, and a widespread pursuit of happiness. Madison, the principal participant in this early drama, was no more consistent in the furtherance of a particular dogma than were many of his contemporaries. He took a number of stands that at times conflicted with views he expressed at other times. He was guided to ideas and doctrines, or from them, by a deep concern with political events and developments that either encouraged or disturbed him. His concern was not always a naked theory but, rather, a practical goal.

This stimulating volume does not deal specifically with all the implications that readers (in addition to this reviewer) might read into it. But Professor Mason, in the valuable essays with which he opens each chapter, has made clear how early political leaders reacted to constitutional problems of federalism that were far more difficult for them to solve than those that we face today, and he has indicated how they discovered which side of any issue was "right." These arguments of the 1780's that set forth the "proper" role of the state within the Union bear serious consideration today, and they sound surprisingly familiar. If this be so, there is satisfaction in such a discovery, for federalism is not dying; it may change a bit from time to time, but it survives.—CHARLES AIKIN, *University of California (Berkeley)*.

The Republican Party, 1854–1964. BY GEORGE H. MAYER. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. Pp. ix, 563. $9.75.)

The author has written a political history of one of the two major parties in the United States. His major sources are the papers of the principal actors, and biographies and Ph.D dissertations. It tells more than anyone reasonably could want to know about the Republican Party, how it came to be, the strategies of the protagonists in the varying nominating conventions down through 1960, and how successive Republican administrations have fared. It is well researched (if one accepts a tendency to overlook the literature of political science) and, excepting for a few sections which deal with complicated issues such as the Kansas-Nebraska Act in more detail than may seem relevant to the book's major purpose, it is felicitously written and enjoyably informative. In all, it is a nostalgic experience for anyone who has read in the history of American politics, and a handy compendium of facts for him who must prepare lectures in the field.

The author's emphasis upon collections of private papers as sources, coupled, perhaps, with his candidly avowed position that the "golden age" of politics "reached its peak in the decade of the '50's when the Republican party was born, and expired with the nineteenth century" has led him to slight if not disparage the Republican politics of the 1950's and 60's.

He is not interested so much in analysis or hypotheses, as in presenting facts. If any general formulation of a theory concerning parties in the United States is to be found, it is implicit for the most part. There is, for example the comment on Dewey: "As titular leader of the minority, Dewey had avoided interference in congressional politics, although the tactics of the legislative leaders distressed him." Well, what of this notion of congressional and presidential parties, not to mention the concept of titular leadership? How do the two relate (that is, if there is but one "party" in Congress for each presidential party)? These questions are but suggestive of a large number which the reader will find himself wishing to put to the author.

Professor Mayer offers a prefatory admonition against "the misleading impression that the party exists nine months in every four years to conduct a campaign for the Presidency." In what sense or how many senses does it exist? There are tidbits of information on the history of party organization, which might be taken to be one form in which those amorphous entities called parties are objectified, but this serves merely to whet the reader's appetite.—CORNELIUS P. COTTER, *Wichita State University*.

Power and Politics in Labor Legislation. BY ALLAN K. MCADAMS. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964. Pp. xiv, 346. $7.50.)

This book, which is a refurbished doctoral dissertation in economics, details the legislative history of the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959. In a field as sharply polarized as labor-management relations where the very concept of neutrality is suspect, the author achieves a remarkable degree of objectivity. It would be hard to tell which side he favors. Utilizing research techniques highly suitable to his subject (interviewing and examination of documents), he succeeded in getting generous access to key sources. Moreover, by his discreet manner of handling the information gathered, he displays commendable responsibility for preserving "the great reservoir of good will toward scholars" upon which such access depends.

Regrettably, the author flaws his otherwise admirable work by adopting an inappropriate thesis and by not devoting sufficient attention to the internal power structures of Congress. In his own words, "The major thesis of the study is that the public, in ways which were sometimes direct and sometimes indirect, decided the outcome of the battle over labor reform legislation in 1959." As blunt an instrument as even an aroused public opinion could hardly determine the particulars of as complicated a measure as the Landrum-Griffin Act. To his credit, the author disavows this interpretation as his narrative unfolds. However, to make the point that a widespread demand for strong labor legislation helped some of the contending forces would hardly warrant such an elaborate presentation. And focusing on this proposition inevitably restricts his perception and analysis of the factors involved. Fortunately, he does not steadfastly pursue his central theme. Throughout the study he includes materials which do not substantiate and sometimes contradict his thesis—but without making explicit the significance of such considerations to the extent necessary for a balanced exposition of how this measure came into being.

In particular, he fails to recognize the factor most responsible for the form in which the legislation finally emerged: the formal and informal power structures within Congress. Although he touches on the role of the over-all leaders in the two chambers, he does not adequately consider the nature of their authority and function. He does not go into the intricate network of criss-crossing obligations, commitments, and understandings among the majority and minority leaders, chairmen and ranking minority members of the legislative, rules, and appropriations committees, and the deans of the state delegations upon which their power depends. Hence, he does not appreciate the impact on Speaker Rayburn's ability to control the Rules Committee when Halleck displaced Martin as Minority Leader in the House. And he only hints at the erosion of the Speaker's power resulting from Rayburn's diminishing vigor.

While the author accords at least a cursory treatment to the conservative coalition in the House, he does not even mention the corresponding liberal Democratic bloc loosely organized under the direction of Representatives Lee Metcalf of Montana and Frank Thompson of New Jersey. He describes the difference in attitude toward remedial legislation between the Teamsters and AFL-CIO Unions. He notes that some Democratic Congressmen like James Roosevelt of California were spokesmen for the Teamsters while others favored the AFL-CIO. But he does not discuss the interaction between these considerations and the factional diversity and competition for leadership among the liberal House Democrats. This omission is ironic for two reasons. The author frequently describes the activities of Metcalf and Thompson without any apparent awareness of the larger group for which they were concurrently supplying leadership. And passage of the Landrum-Griffin Bill precipitated greater formalization of that body as the House Democratic Study Group. Likewise, the author does not develop fully enough the sharp cleavages between the presidential and congressional wings of the Democratic Party, the disability the Democrats suffered from having a substantial element of their numerical superiority consist of freshman Congressmen from marginal districts, and other significant aspects of the total picture.

As a consequence, this book is not the definitive biography of the Landrum-Griffin Act. That work remains to be done by someone with a more comprehensive conceptual framework than was brought to this study. Meanwhile, it will serve as a useful but fragmentary reference on labor-management relations in the congressional arena.
—KENNETH KOFMEHL, *Purdue University*.

Men At the Top: A Study in Community Power. BY ROBERT PRESTHUS. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. Pp. 362. $2.95, paper; $8.50 cloth.)

This book is a well-designed and executed comparative study of community power structure. The author selected two small communities in upstate New York (designated as Edgewood and Riverview, populations 8500 and 6000) whose similarities and differences suggested their suitability for fruitful comparative study. His findings are significant not only for students of community power, but also for those concerned with normative theories of pluralism and democracy.

Presthus' point of departure is an analysis of the findings and perspectives of earlier studies, focusing particularly on the familiar divergence of pluralist and elitist interpretations of community power. Sociological studies, he notes, have often followed the inspiration of the Lynds' pioneering studies, and have found an elitist power structure in which political power is derivative from economic power. Political scientists, on the other hand, tend to be "romantically pluralistic" in their assumptions, and have discovered power structures characterized by competition, fragmentation, and fluidity. These differences are viewed as perhaps stemming from different interpretations of rather similar findings, rather than from widely contrasting data. Recent political science studies are cited as having preserved the term "pluralism" while narrowing its operational meaning. This book is an attempt to explore and clarify this issue by careful comparison of two communities to determine the various social conditions associated with varying degrees of elitism or pluralism in community leadership structure.

Methodologically, Presthus analyzes the advantages and limitations of decisional and reputational methods of identifying community leadership structures. Although operating from an initial preference for a decisional approach, both methods were utilized in the study, and both are viewed as useful.

A few of the book's major findings may be briefly noted. A power structure of about eighty citizens was found in the two communities. In one case (Edgewood) economic leaders were found to be somewhat more powerful than political leaders; in the other (Riverview) political leaders were not only more powerful but "exercised relatively greater initiative and control" than did Edgewood's economic leaders. In both instances, however, a degree of meaningful competition between political and economic elites was found. These findings are related to various characteristics of the two communities.

Significant differences were found between the two communities with respect to the extent of pluralism in decision-making patterns. Pluralism was measured by membership in voluntary organizations, extent of individual participation in major decisions, and extent of organizational participation in decisions. The most striking result of these measurements was, in both communities, the surprisingly low rate of organizational participation in major decisions. Presthus suggests that "the role of voluntary organizations in ensuring pluralist forms of political decision-making has been somewhat overstated." The communities also differ with respect to the degree of consensus on basic community values. A higher degree of consensus appears to be correlated with a significantly higher rate of individual participation in major decisions. However, in Riverview, with more political competition and a higher rate of voter participation in local elections (conditions presumably associated with pluralism), decision-making is more concentrated and there is more rank-and-file apathy than in Edgewood.

Comparing his findings with those of other studies, Presthus finds a marked tendency toward elitism in small cities. Further, he feels pluralism is likely to continue to decline because of the "tendency for the major conditions of community decision-making to be set down by higher levels of government and industry."

This excellent book is rich in empirical findings which are highly suggestive. Theoretically, it serves to bridge some of the gaps between divergent interpretations. It should not be too long until a sufficiently wide range of community studies are available for a broad systematic analysis of the nature and conditions of varying degrees of elitism or pluralism in various community situations. This book is an important contribution to this development.

The book's concern with the normative problems of democratic theory is also noteworthy. It becomes increasingly clear in reading this book that some of the conventional pluralistic rules of thumb will not quite do. Anyone concerned with the problems of implementing democratic values in mass society will find an effective statement of some of these problems here.—Forbes Hays, *Carleton College.*

Race and Radicalism: The NAACP And The Communist Party in Conflict. By Wilson Record. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1964. Pp. xiii, 237. $5.00)

The Communist Party has been unsuccessful in making headway among American Negroes. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, at least up to more recent movements in the 60's, has commanded the respect of most Negroes and the so-called white power structure as *the* civil rights organization. Since the Communist party had designs in the civil rights area, it was only natural that the Party would have to weaken or obliterate altogether the strong position of the NAACP. And this is what the CPUSA set out to do. However, the NAACP has proven an insurmountable barrier to Communist designs. With broad powers vested in a watchful middle-class Board of Directors (Executive Board), the Communists have found it virtually impossible to infiltrate the Association at the national level; and whenever and wherever they have done so in the more open though nationally-oriented local branches, the leadership elite (Executive Board) of the NAACP has the power and has actually taken corrective and precautionary measures. (See esp. pp. 142–146.)

This, in part, is what Professor Wilson Record tells us in his *Race and Radicalism: The NAACP and The Communist Party in Conflict.* The study is an outgrowth of a much larger research project on the problem of Communism in American life. Professor Clinton Rossiter of Cornell University was project director, and he in turn commissioned several studies—one of which was the activities of Communists in pressure and opinion-forming groups. This sub-project was supervised by Professor John P. Roche of Brandeis University, and it was he who asked Professor Record to study the interaction between the CPUSA and the NAACP.

Record describes how the NAACP has refused to waver in pursuing its prime civil rights objective. Whether by infiltration, establishing competing organizations, staging sympathy demonstrations, and directing propaganda attacks, the CPUSA has met with little or no success in penetrating the Association or in gaining Negro support outside of it. This despite the fact that the Negro was an obvious and ripe target for the CPUSA. Here was a group for "which the American dream held least luster," and which occupied "the lowest rung on the American ladder." (p. 1)

But even so, the Negro has fundamentally been and remains an American first.

As an historical account of a relatively neglected area of civil rights research, Record's study is a useful contribution. Nevertheless, this kind of study, at least as Record does it, is not without shortcomings. One need which the book does not fill is for a serious study of this timely topic, such as that done by Record, that would appeal to a wider audience—an audience whose mind is filled with all sorts of notions, prejudices, and views on the subject. To have Professor Record's findings read by many of these persons, (and many need to read them) would be of immeasurable educational and informational value. Unfortunately, however, the laborious (albeit praiseworthy) chronological detailing of events (chs. 2–7), is apt to discourage all but the most dedicated reader.

Moreover, as Professor Record acknowledges, (p. xiii), much of the material, especially up to 1951, can be found both in his earlier book, *The Negro and the Communist Party* (University of North Carolina Press, 1951), and several journal articles. To the scholar, it thus becomes repetitious, although perhaps convenient. What the present study does is to update the earlier work, focusing somewhat more sharply on relations between the NAACP and the CPUSA. In addition, the concluding chapter considers the impact of more recent civil rights organizations (e.g., Congress of Racial Equality) on the NAACP, but here, the author attempts to do too much. While the impact of these newer civil rights organizations is relevant, the manner in which Record handles the subject is too summary a treatment of "tempting possibilities" (p. 219) not discussed in the study itself.

In another vein, it is quite apparent and even understandable that Professor Record is sympathetic to the NAACP and to the cause it espouses. This, however, should not lead him to view civil rights issues outside their proper political perspective. (Record is a sociologist at Sacramento State College.) Note, for example, the following passage: (pp. 230–31)

> And what is ahead for the NAACP? In a sense the Association is working itself out of a job. Since its single purpose is to eliminate racial barriers, once the barriers are down there will be no raison d'etre for an NAACP; indeed, once that glorious day arrives, continued organization of Negroes qua Negroes would negate what the Association has been striving for from the beginning. Negroes who dislike aspects of American society other than racial discrimination will continue to work through protest movements other than the NAACP; and it is to be hoped that with racialism behind and full acceptance won, there will come a relaxation on the part of Negroes about books and plays and movies which portray a colored man in an unfavorable light, for sophistication in such matters is the ultimate gauge of mature citizenship and full equality.

If and when that "glorious day arrives," one can rest assured that the NAACP and similar organizations will still be in business. There will be a continued need for such organizations in the sense that all groups (e.g. Catholics, Jews) require defenses (and offenses) in the ordinary play of politics between and among competing interests. What will perhaps happen is that the NAACP will reorient its program in keeping with social change and political realities.

In addition, it is idealistic to exhort any group to accept unfavorable portrayals of those identified with the group. Professor Record misses the point. What Negroes (and others) object to is stereotyped and one-dimensional character portrayals. Aside from the admittedly subjective criticism that certain kinds of unfavorable portrayals might not in themselves be worthy of "sophistication," Record's view could be criticized on the more practical grounds that such portrayals might do serious harm to the very cause which organizations such as the NAACP have fought to attain. Even more established groups, such as Catholics and Jews, maintain active organizations not only to promote their views on matters of special concern, but also to guard against threats to their social station and self-esteem. This does not indicate a lack of "sophistication. . . ." —LUCIUS J. BARKER, *University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.*

States in Crisis, Politics in Ten American States, 1950–1962. BY JAMES REICHLEY AND OTHERS. (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, University of North Carolina Press, 1964. Pp. xii, 264. $6.00.)

The journalist is the indispensable ally of any serious student of government and not least of scholars concerned with state politics. State house reporters not only supply otherwise unobtainable information from scattered parts of the nation, they also frequently provide suggestive interpretations of the events they report. Deeper analysis is, however, rarely produced by reporters whose training and daily routine discourage more intensive work. Even when freed from deadline pressures journalists usually fail to achieve perspective and rigorous analysis, as they have demonstrated in countless hackneyed volumes of journalistic commentary. There are exceptions, of course, but James Reichley's *States in Crisis* is not one of them. In contrast with his earlier work on Philadelphia politics (*The Art of Government*) the present work falls flat.

In his concluding chapters Reichley raises a number of interesting questions about the viability of American state government, but unfortunately the remainder of the book, written by ten other journalists about their states, presented Reichley with little relevant information to serve as the basis for substantial generalizations. This is a pity for the states they discussed (Arizona, California, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Virginia) are an interesting cross section that might have demonstrated something about state government trends had they received more than a journalistic once-over-lightly. Instead there is the customary retelling of well-known (or rightly forgotten) election campaign tales, of regional and factional cleavages, of adroit and inept political maneuvering. They write clearly and briskly, although in some cases with annoying cuteness, but they do not have a great deal to say.

The book is also studded with dubious inferences of the kind expected in undergraduate term papers. Who knows whether Nebraska voters "seemed to suspect that [Fred Seaton] had been too long in Washington to understand their problems?" Who can say whether labor union aid to Senator Barry Goldwater's opponent in 1958 "produced a strong reaction in the Senator's favor"? One looks in vain for more evidence in support of the assertion that the "friends and neighbors" influence is strong in Nebraska, for more information about legislative politics in almost all the states discussed, and especially for a more sophisticated treatment of such subjects as ethnic rivalries and money in politics, both of which are discussed at some length but quite superficially. Surely we do not need to be introduced to the "balanced-ticket" as if it were a new development. Also a good many political scientists who have been in and out of state government and politics for years will question the assertion that the "alliance between intellectuals and the Democrats has had little carry over at the state or local levels."

One saving grace of the book is that its authors, unlike most journalists, do not set themselves up as holier than any politician to lecture from lofty objectivity. But that and the occasional nugget of useful information the book contains do not explain to me why the University of North Carolina ever decided to launch this collection on the engulfing tide of print. (The book lacks an index, but that hardly matters in this case.)—DUANE LOCKARD, *Princeton University.*

Congressman from Mississippi: An Autobiography. BY FRANK E. SMITH. (New York, Pantheon Books, 1964. Pp. ix, 338. $5.95.)

Years ago, when I read Frank Smith's book, *The Yazoo*, in the *Rivers of America* series, I warned him that he could be forgiven for his views or his votes but not for writing a book; even John Sharp Williams, with his Heidelberg degree, never risked that. In his second volume, after a competent 12-year career of courage marked by his leadership for truth in textile labeling, public works, foreign aid, international understanding, training for the displaced, security for the mentally retarded and many other laws, he becomes the first deep South congressman to expose the arrogance of Rules and Appropriations Committees, the idiocy of rewarding renegades, the vicious race-baiting of the Memphis *Commercial Appeal*, and to make clear why he felt economic improvement is a better approach to racial progress than frontal attacks for non-local consumption. When he went to Washington I sent word that he would make the best possible congressman he could and still stay in congress. He did.

My wife, whose people have also been around Greenwood over a century, was teaching in the junior college he attended, and I have worked with him in campaigns and conventions, as well as on the other side sometimes, and share with him an Ole Miss history degree, legislative service, including the authorship of the free textbook and poll tax bills he mentions, opinions on Lamar, Collins and Sillers and know the part he played in nominating Stevenson and Kennedy. But I am unable to credit that the Delta is full of honest, public spirited leaders, in spite of Stephen Bailey, that lanterns on the levee were ever lit except in imagination, that Greenville is more liberal than Tupelo, that racists run northeast Mississippi, that we have an inferior state government, or that those who talk out of the other side of their mouths when they cross the Smith and Wesson line are liberals. The progress of Mississippi has been achieved mainly by men who have had slight support in the Delta. To state that no Mississippian since John Sharp Williams has affected national destiny is to ignore the Mississippian who was responsible for the passage of the Civil Rights plank at the 1948 convention which gave President Harry S. Truman his narrow margin for reelection.

A sharp dissent must be entered to his remark that "Few voices for racial justice have come from the church," for more ministers have been forced to leave the state than members of any other profession, and churches, with all their inadequacies, have shown more courage and sheltered more men of good will than colleges, schools, press, bar, business or government. The mentally underprivileged who bomb and burn churches realize on which side the churches are. As Rabbi Klein told a Clarksdale club, "You lost this fight in 1776, not in 1865."

This is a tremendous story of how a boy whose father was murdered by a Negro for no reason at all, and whose family was not in the top Delta bracket, has been able to carry on his father's faith that hate is not the answer, and to achieve much. He laments that he has not done more, but he could not have done much more and survived that long. The nation is using the ability as a TVA director of this statesman whom Edward Morgan called "A breath of fresh air" and to whom a constituent confided, "You are for the United States," and may well find in the future higher use for a man who is what Woodrow Wilson liked to call himself, "An emancipated Southerner."—CHARLES GRANVILLE HAMILTON, *Booneville, Mississippi.*

Religion and Politics in America. BY MURRAY S. STEDMAN, JR. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964. Pp. vii, 168. $4.95).

Religion and Politics in America is more a primer of activities and problems of churches in politics than an interpretation of fundamental questions concerning the relationship of religion to power in the United States. Anyone looking for an analysis of how seventeenth century Protestant principles shaped American political institutions and style will be disappointed. There is no discussion of how the revolutionary Protestant principle that each man is free to experience God and express the meaning of that experience without the intervention of higher authorities helped promote highly individualistic, market-organized politics. There is no exploration of the relationship of Protestant witness to utopianism in politics at home and messianism in foreign policies abroad. Nor has Stedman tried to show the theological or sociological bases for Protestant-Catholic division over such issues as censorship, divorce, and aid to parochial schools.

Stedman has mainly written about "people, as organized into churches, and the relationships between such organizations and the political process." A solid compendium of facts are here: the rates of growth of different churches; their organizational approach to politics; the various methods used by churches to pressure the government; and the different ways in which religious interests affect local politics.

Although facts and issues are introduced throughout the book, they are not usually analyzed in any depth. In the book's closing paragraph, Stedman suggests that "the churches in America are in a unique position to speak to the public interest" due to the widely held assumption that they are selfless and disinterested; but the validity of that assumption is left unexplored. Religion does affect the party affiliations of Americans, as Stedman states, but there is very little discussion of when, how, and who. While it is true that "sociological studies of American voters have indicated that there is a definite correlation between religious affiliation and party preference," it has also been shown repeatedly how closely that relationship is tied to class factors except in the case of Jews.

The absence of discussion in depth means that any single chapter of *Religion and Politics in America* reads like a good introduction to a longer study on the subject of the chapter. The very brevity of the book keeps the author from asking the whys about the facts he presents: why did the Scotch Presbyterians on the frontier become prohibitionists? Why did Methodism catch fire in the United States? Why did Mormons, Christian Scientists, and Jehovah Witnesses spring from American soil? Why does practically every American politician insist that God is on our side? Why was Kennedy able to overcome the prejudices of many voters? Why did the Irish Catholic influence in McCarthyism fail to reappear in the radical right wing of today? These are questions to be probed in a longer, deeper book on *Religion and Politics in America.*

Stedman should be praised for the concise, clearly written catalog of issues and facts he has offered, but he should also be chided for an overly ambitious title and for failing to make explicit the limitations of his effort. He also should have been reminded to look at a variety of important books which would have helped him put more meat on his own, including Robert Brown's, *The Spirit of Protestantism* and John H. Fenton's, *The Catholic Vote.*—LAWRENCE H. FUCHS, *Brandeis University.*

Leadership in a Small Town. BY AARON WILDAVSKY. (Totawa, N. J.: Bedminster Press, 1964. Pp. 388. $7.50).

Welcome to Oberlin, where "the roads to influence . . . are more than one; elites and non-elites can travel them, and the toll can be paid with energy and initiative as well as wealth." (p. 214.) Wildavsky's Oberlin is a reaffirmation of small town democracy, stressing the fragmentation of power, the influence of elected public officials, and the role of public opinion and elections in determining public policy. Alienation, mass manipulation, economic elites, power pyramids, the X family, etc., do not really exist in small town America. Who rules in Oberlin?—"different small groups of interested and active citizens in different issue areas with some overlap, if any, by public officials, and occasional intervention by a larger number of people at the polls." (p. 8)

How does Wildavsky arrive at these conclusions? Undergraduate students at Oberlin College "were asked to prepare case studies of events going on at the time." (p. vii) From these sources, together with the author's own observations, a portrait of leadership in Oberlin was constructed. Eleven case studies are presented in all, including such diverse issues and events as the determination of municipal water rates, the passage of a fair housing ordinance, the division of United Appeal funds, and a municipal election. Wildavsky's statement of a research design which can resolve once and for all the dispute between elite and pluralist theory is deceptively simple:

"If (after examing these issues) we find that the same participants exercise leadership in nearly all significant areas of decision, that they agree, and that they are not responsible to the electorate, we conclude that a power elite rules in Oberlin. . . if we find that the leaders vary from one issue to the other, with such overlap as there is between issue areas concentrated largely in the hands of public officials, we must conclude that there is a pluralist system of rule in Oberlin." (p. 253)

Armed with this criteria for affirming a pluralist political structure, Wildavsky examines his case studies and finds that no single group in Oberlin dominated decision-making in every issue area. It was true that "the number of citizens and outside participants who exercise leadership in most cases is an infinitesimal part of the community" (p. 265), but no person or group exerted leadership in all issue areas. To the extent that overlap among leaders in issue areas existed, this overlap involved public officials—the city manager, the mayor, and city councilmen—who owed their positions directly or indirectly "to expressions of the democratic process through a free ballot with universal sufferage." (p. 265) In addition to public officials, leadership was exercised by individual "specialists," who confined their participation to one or two issue areas, and "meteors," who were self-selected activists participating sporadically in one or two issue areas. Leaders very often competed among themselves and did not appear united by any common interest. Persons exercising leadership were of somewhat higher social status than the rest of the community, but it was not status or wealth which distinguished leaders from non-leaders. What are leaders? "Leaders are activists. More precisely they are the most active activists." (p. 282) Anyone could become a leader simply by becoming active; power was available for the asking. Inequalities of influence among individuals was a product of differing levels of interest and activity in public affairs.

The elitist-pluralist debate continues to characterize dialogues about community power. No doubt many readers of Wildavsky's book will not share his optimism about pluralism, competition, fluidity, access, and equality in community politics. Wildavsky's definition of elitism is so restrictive and his definition of pluralism so inclusive, that he is foreordained to conclude that any set of power relationships he discovered in Oberlin were pluralist. He assumes elitism to exist only if the same individuals possess exclusive control over every public decision, and only if there is no competition among persons exercising influence. Now it is doubtful if there was ever a society in which there was no competition among influentials, or in which specialists in particular issue areas did not influence the outcome of public decisions. Wildavsky's concept of elitism comes dangerously close to being made of straw. His concept of pluralism is so all-inclusive that it possesses little analytical usefulness. The author himself demonstrates this when he proclaims on the basis of his Oberlin findings that all cities in America are pluralist.

Wildavsky might have made a greater contribution to the study of community power if, instead of treating elitism and pluralism as a dichotomous variable, he had thought of these constructs as ideal types at separate ends of a continuum. He then could have identified those characteristics of Oberlin politics which resembled each of these constructs, and in this way Oberlin could have been located along an elitist-pluralist continuum. No doubt decision-making in Oberlin is quite pluralist, yet Wildavsky's material includes some important resemblances to the elitist construct. The total number of identified influentials was an extremely small proportion of the adult population, "cliques" were identified whose influence rested upon control of economic resources as well as political skill, and apathy if not alienation was widespread in the community. Wildavsky appears to reject the elitist view that power is a set of social relationships among people which persists over time and which is related to the social structure of the community. He views power in Oberlin as an unstructured, transient thing. Each public decision involves different individuals who establish for a fleeting moment a set of relationships among themselves. After each decision these relationships disappear to be replaced by a different set of relationships among different people when the next public decision must be made. This comes very close to saying that power *as structure* does not exist. It suggests that power is an attribute of individuals, more specifically their interest and activity level. Yet the reader suspects that even in Oberlin decisions are not *sui generis*, that some power relations persist over time, and that they are somehow related to the social structure of the community. Wildavsky might have written an even better book had he not rejected altogether the contributions to community analysis which elite theory can make.—THOMAS R. DYE, *University of Georgia.*

✓ *Interest Groups in American Society.* BY HARMON ZEIGLER. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964. Pp. viii, 343. $6.75.)

The author's command of the relevant literature and his ability to handle it with sophistication are impressive. However, the book is hard to judge largely because of the kind of book that it is: a text which moves on a much higher level than do most textbooks.

Zeigler asserts at the outset that the "intention of group theory has been misinterpreted, on occasion, as the establishment of a broad-gauge theory of the political process . . ." (p. iii) Group theory properly understood assumes rather that "public policy is formed as a result of competing pressures . . .:" (p. iv) and that organized groups furnish only a part of the pressures. The problem is to develop a "theory of the role of organized groups in politics." (p. iv) More specific questions are when do organized groups become part of the pressures on a decision and why do some groups have more success than their rivals.

Before attacking the main problem and the questions it implies Zeigler re-enforces and extends his interpretation of the received theory. He observes, "Surely it would be useless to maintain that all public policy is a result of the conflict of organized 'pressure groups,'" (p. 24) and accepts the view that opposing conceptions of the public interest when held by involved officials are factors affecting decisions just as are the activities of 'pressure groups.' I take it that Zeigler feels these propositions are a part of group theory interpreted fairly. Zeigler also endorses the criticism of group theory that "it does not provide an accurate account of the role of institutions and environmental conditions," (p. 25) particularly political culture. Finally, he feels the most serious misunderstanding concerning group theory involves the notion of interest. Zeigler's position is that group interests are not co-extensive with organized associations. Some members of an organization may not endorse its stated aims while other persons not members of the organization may agree with its aims. The author summarizes by saying, "Public policy, then, is formed as a result of the interplay of group interests. We are concerned with the role that organized 'pressure groups' play in this process." (p. 30)

Succeeding sections of the book describe the political culture and the institutional context within which these groups move. A set of three chapters deal with business, labor, and agriculture. The discussion of labor is headed, "Organized Labor: Protest and Defeat," a title which reflects the author's judgment concerning the group's power. This judgement is based, at least, in part on a comparison of labor's goals with the content of public policy, a technique for measuring influence which is open to criticism as the author concedes and which is certainly crude at best. The last chapters deal with the place of organized groups in the legislative, administrative, and judicial processes. As one might expect, these chapters are a bit uneven, a condition which reflects the state of the literature and no failure of the author.

I have three comments. First, Zeigler's interpretation of received interest group theory is informed and skillful but debatable. For instance, it may be argued that group theorists did intend a "broad-gauge theory" and certainly more than a theory concerning the activity of organized groups in politics. Again it may be argued that the received theory does involve the contention that the sum total of pressures on a policy decision is furnished by groups, organized and unorganized, official and unofficial, and that competing conceptions of the public interest are "superstructure" (to borrow a term from another theory). If Truman is taken as the text, it is a mistake to say that group theorists have neglected the impact of institutions on the group struggle. However, an argument concerning the true meanings of the group theorists or their interpreters is not inviting nor is it crucial since Zeigler's discussion of group theorists is for the purpose of setting forth his own starting point; and this leads to the second comment.

His version of group theory is a very modest one. Such modesty may be an adornment in a textbook, but this is theoretical retreat rather than advance. Instead of a limited number of explanatory statements employing more or less theoretical terms we are left with something much more diffuse and also less extensive. One may guess that the residue is called theory by virtue of the strange uses to which we put the term theory (in this book review as elsewhere). Perhaps group theory has collapsed and in reality this is all that is left. However, it seems that despite our alleged familiarity with what may be one of the few legitimate offspring of our discipline that there has been great willingness to destroy by criticism and little willingness to reformulate and use with rigor, in other words, to develop.

My last comment is that Zeigler's survey of the literature concerning the activities of organized pressure groups is on a mature level in that the complexities are retained. It is done with clarity and in good order, qualities which serve to recommend the text for use.—THOMAS A. FLINN, *Oberlin College.*

The Constitution of the United States. BY EDWARD DUMBAULD. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1964. Pp. xv, 502. $9.95.)

A clause-by-clause history and annotation of the Constitution by the United States judge for the Western District of Pennsylvania.

The American Legislative Process: Congress and the States. BY WILLIAM J. KEEFE AND MORRIS S. OGUL. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964. Pp. vii, 498. $7.95.)

A textbook describing the American legislative process topically with illustrations from both Congress and the state legislatures.

America Votes, Vol. 5, 1962. ED. BY RICHARD M. SCAMMON. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964. Pp. 456. $12.50.)

The fifth volume of this useful and carefully done series contains state, city, county and ward break-downs of voting for President, governor, senator, and representative in 1960 and 1962.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Franklin L. Burdette
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FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

The Uncommon Commoner: A Study of Sir Alec Douglas-Home. By John Dickie. (London and New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. Pp. 224. $4.95.)

The nomination of Barry Goldwater in 1964 (and of Wendell Willkie in 1940, if one follows the accounts in the left-wing journals of 1940 rather than the mythology of 1964) incited a reaction not wholly enthusiastic on the part of a certain segment of the press and public. But such a reaction is by no means confined to this country. When Harold Macmillan, rather than R. A. Butler, was made Prime Minister (and, for practical purposes, Leader of the Conservative Party) by Queen Elizabeth, the action of the Queen was denounced by some critics as "unconstitutional." And the selection of Sir Alec Douglas-Home was greeted by a letter to *The Guardian* which included the statement "After having read the shocking news that Lord Home has become Prime Minister, I have decided to renounce my British citizenship" (page xiii). The Leader of the Labour Party announced that "a week of intrigues has produced a result based on family and hereditary connections. The leader has emerged—an elegant anachronism" (page xiv). Denunciations of the undemocratic method of selection of Leader of the Conservative Party might provoke a rebuttal along the lines of Diana Spearman's suggestion that if the pre-1832 electoral system in England had been as bad as its critics suggested, it would never, in 1831, have elected a House of Commons which was favorable, in the majority, to the Reform Bill.

Mr. Dickie has written a careful and scholarly, but quite readable, brief study of the Prime Minister. Although friendly to the Prime Minister, he is not undiscriminating or uncritical. Personal touches abound, including theories as to the pronunication of the Prime Minister's name; an account of a lawsuit worthy of Perry Mason involving a salmon-catching dog (The Earl of Tankerville versus a Dog, the property of the Earl of Home), in which judgement "was given in favour of the dog" (page 5); and parliamentary repartee which includes the story of the politician who said that "all that was wrong with South Africa was that it wanted a better class of settler and a better water supply," and received the comment (perhaps from an Irishman) that that was all that was wrong with Hell (page 31). Elected in the Conservative landslide of 1931, Lord Dunglass (as he then was) introduced himself as one of the Clydesiders, (a group of firebrands of I. L. P. leanings), but parted with them soon on the issue of Scottish Home Rule. Easily returned in the election of 1935, he was shortly thereafter made Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Labour. In a memorable debate in July, 1936, he was severely heckled by his fellow-Clydesiders for his defense of the means test, shortly after which he became Parliamentary Private Secretary to Neville Chamberlain, who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer in Stanley Baldwin's government. It is Mr. Dickie's opinion that identification of Lord Dunglass with the Chamberlain policy of appeasement is considerably overdone, in that it fails to note (a) the comparative lack of influence in decision-making of most Parliamentary Private Secretaries at that time and (b) the peculiar aloofness of Chamberlain. Lord Dunglass's main political function was to act as a two-way channel of communication between Chamberlain and the rank-and-file members of the House, and this function continued after Chamberlain became Prime Minister in 1937. However, believers in guilt by association point out that it was Lord Dunglass who received from Lord Halifax and delivered to Chamberlain, *via* Sir John Simon, the Munich invitation; and that he accompanied Chamberlain to Munich, where he was shocked by the bad manners of Hitler and the vulgar vanity of Goering. In the days after Munich and in the early days of world War II it was Lord Dunglass's painful duty to report to the Prime Minister the increasing extent of anti-Chamberlain feeling. Mr. Dickie feels that "the legacy of his three years with Chamberlain . . . was twofold" (page 56), that appeasement as a policy could never succeed unless undertaken from a position of strength, and that the extent of pacifist sentiment in Great Britain was one of Hitler's greatest assets.

With the replacement of Chamberlain by Churchill, Lord Dunglass intended to join his regiment; but this was prevented by the development of spinal tuberculosis, which prompted his famous quip that his doctors had put backbone into a politician. He was able to speak in parliament in May 1944, and his remarks on foreign policy reflected his extensive reading during his illness. He came close to suggesting that Churchill's attitude toward Russia and the Polish Question was dangerously similar to Chamberlain's attitude toward Germany and the Czechoslovak Question. A year later, when the wartime coalition was dissolved, he became, for the "caretaker" period, one of the two Joint Paliamentary Under-Secretaries of the Foreign Office, going out of office as Labour came in, and losing his seat in the House to Tom Steele after a campaign in which his expressions of doubt as to the future of Russian policy were extensively interpreted as "pro-Nazi" sentiments. It may be noted that Quintin Hogg, later Lord Hailsham, had expressed the same sentiments earlier in replying to his remarks in the House. In 1950 Lord Dunglass defeated Tom Steele in a very close contest. Before the election of 1951 the death of his father had removed him from the House of Commons. The formation of the new Churchill Government in October resulted in his appointment to the new position of Minister of State for Scotland, Churchill having apparently forgotten that the new Minister was the "rebel" back-bencher who had criticized the handling of the Polish Question. The story of his appointment first to the Commonwealth Office by Eden and to the Foreign Office by Macmillan is better known, and the leadership crisis and his unexpected elevation to the premiership is well recounted by Mr. Dickie.

One slight error will probably cause offense to patriotic North Carolinians and to the D. A. R. Guilford Court House in North Carolina is referred to as "Guil*d*ford." But this is the exception that proves the rule in a work notable for its accuracy in other respects.—ARTHUR B. DUGAN, *The University of the South.*

Town Councillors: A Study of Barking. By ANTHONY M. REES AND TREVOR SMITH. (London: The Acton Society Trust. 1964. Pp. 117. 7/6.)

This brief monograph helps to fill a gap in our knowledge of British grass roots politics. It is a study in the social background, recruitment, working conditions and work perceptions of thirty councillors and aldermen of a London suburb of 72,000 persons, overwhelming working-class in character. The authors disclaim that the Borough is typical, in fact in the recent reorganization of London government Barking will join with industrial Dagenham to form a new Borough.

Some of the study's finding are as follows: Only twenty percent of councillors are native of the Borough, a minority are gainfully employed in Barking. Although it has been noted elsewhere that "the average age of councillors is a great deal too high," seventy percent of Barking's councillors belong to the 40–59 age group. Women councillors are on the average older than their male colleagues. The schooling of the majority of Barking Council was brief and limited in scope; none went to university. Twenty-three councillors, however, underwent some part time further education.

As might be expected middle-class representation on the Council exceeds by three times the middle-class composition of Barking. Unskilled manual occupations are clearly underrepresented. As regards social mobility of councillors, half have ascended socially. The authors conclude that as a group councillors "tend to be rather more mobile in an upward direction than their neighbors and this is as true of Labour members as of their opponents." In spite of this councillors have a rather low estimate of their prestige. Half of the councillors think that they do not enjoy high status in the eyes of their fellow citizens; none of them mention entering politics for the sake of future political advancement, and yet, because of the character of their political involvement they find a gratifying excitement in their Council work. While their reasons for entering politics are many, early political socialization and the impact of the Second World War loom large. The most striking fact about political recruitment in Barking is the shortage of candidates. In a working-class community, Conservatives find it even more difficult to locate candidates willing to stand for the Council and thus have been forced to recruit outside the community. At the same time Conservative candidates can get on the Council more quickly than their Labour colleagues. However, four-fifths of the councillors either experienced no delay in becoming candidates or did not want to stand initially. The relative ease of election is indicated by the fact that twenty of the thirty councillors had never been unsuccessful at the polls.

Perhaps the weakest section of the monograph is the one concerning the working conditions of the councillors. On the one hand the institutional dimensions and the functions of the Council are not clearly spelled out. On the other hand it is difficult to accept the evaluation on the part of the councillors and officers that "the line between policy-making and policy-execution was pretty firmly drawn. Certainly it does not seem that 'the officers make the policy' . . . " Nothing presented in this monograph confirms or denies the assertion. The form of the councillors' work—distribution of committee places, length of work, specialization, errand-running—all these are discussed at length. But the substance of the councillors' work, the character of their decisions and how the decision-making process works entirely escapes the reader. What is missing then in this study is the description of a policy-making process, such as the one provided by Birch in his account of rate-making proceedings in Glossop. The inclusion of the interview schedule would also have been helpful.—LUCIAN C. MARQUIS, *University of Oregon.*

The History of Parliament. The House of Commons, 1754–1790. BY SIR LEWIS NAMIER AND JOHN BROOKE. (New York, For the History of Parliament Trust by the Oxford University Press, 1964. 3 vol.)

Two volumes of a proposed History of Parliament 1439–1509 in three volumes by Colonel Josiah C. Wedgwood appeared in 1936 and 1938. Revival of the scheme on a different plan was made possible in 1951 by annual parliamentary grants to the Trustees. Emphasis is on the House of Commons and the treatment of the individual members.

The first volume of the present work contains (1) the ambitious "Introductory survey," by John Brooke, who completed the work of the late Sir Lewis Namier, and (2) the accounts of the individual constituencies in the period. The second and third volumes are devoted to the biographies (in alphabetical order) of the members. All of the accounts are centered upon the parliamentary activity of the members, and represent the latest and best information. All biographical sketches are signed. Some of the biographies are quite brief owing to the lack of personal information and the meagerness of the official record. The remark that "there is no record of his having spoken in the House," or its equivalent, occurs not infrequently, and may at times be a mute comment on the meager official record.

Progress of this *History* in capable hands based at the Institute of Historical Research, University of London, will do much (1) to augment the frustratingly meager official record, (2) probably to point the way to the eventual editing of the official record with any possible additions, and (3) possibly to stimulate the present keepers of the record to exercise the greatest of care.—JAMES B. CHILDS, *Library of Congress.*

Aufstieg und Krise der deutschen Sozialdemokratie. BY WOLFGANG ABENDROTH. (Frankfurt am Main: Stimme-Verlag 1964. Pp. 144. DM 9.80.)

The book under review is the postscript to a number of publications that have appeared at the centennial of the *Allgemeinen Deutschen Arbeitervereins* (the forerunner of the Social Democratic Party of Germany). The author, Professor of Political Science at the University of Marburg, knows much about the SPD, having been a member of the party's Executive Committee until 1962.

Since Franz Mehring's monumental *Geschichte der deutschen Sozialdemokratie* little has been published in terms of a coherent over-all survey of the party. This seems to have prompted Abendroth to have written the modest volume the way he did. His aim is to present a critical survey of the historical process in which the SPD grew from a small faction to become, in terms of members and votes, the largest political organization in Germany. A chronological approach is employed, and sources are excellently annotated. The appendix contains the major party programs from Eisenach (1869) to Bad Godesberg (1959).

In the preface, Abendroth professes that the basic premises underlying his political philosophy have been formed by Marx, Engels, and Mehring. The author asserts that democracy in Germany can be made safe only if the advanced capitalistic order is replaced by a socialistic one—a change that must be brought about by the employees. The turn, however, can be accomplished only if the workers and left-wing intellectuals follow the pattern set by the Founding Fathers of German Social Democracy.

Abendroth is highly critical of the SPD development. He states that in all great crises of German history the party was the object of rather than the shaping subject of events. Abendroth exemplifies by pointing out that the SPD, and the Internationale, capitulated during the first few days of World War I in front of the "patriotic" giddiness of national suicide. Second, he maintains that during the last years of the Weimar Republic the SPD did not understand the intensity of the national crisis and was not able to analyze the viciousness of Nazism. In following an acquiescent attitude, the party, slowly but surely, sacrificed the rights and the living standard of the German workers. The author alludes that the SPD should have taken up the united front offer of the Communists and, with the KPD, should have taken a definite stand to defend German democracy. Instead, the Social Democrats helped to reduce themselves to political impotency.

Turning to the post-World War II period, Abendroth criticizes the party for its illusionary attitude toward the re-capitalization of West German society. When the federal elections of 1949 and 1953 did not bring the anticipated electoral success, the leaders of the SPD, according to the author, lost their patience and ran after the mass mood attracted by the *Wirtschaftswunder.* The Bad Godesberg Program cast out the last remnants of socialist aims from the party platform and negated for good the method of the conscious development of the working class consciousness against the oligarchic capital. Finally, in 1960 the SPD withdrew its *Deutschland-Plan* and therewith, according to Abendroth, denied its former foreign and national political theses.

However, the author holds out some hope for the party. He thinks that the course of the party could still be changed, be it through the influence of the unions, be it through intra-party discussions or through outside pressures extended by renegade formations. These forces, individually or together, could move the party back toward the aims set forth by the Founding Fathers. Only then would the SPD again become the true representative of the employees.

Professor Abendroth has written a profound and thought-provoking volume. Unfortunately, it is much too concentrated. While the reviewer shares a few misgivings with the author about the radical changes introduced at Bad Godesberg (1959) and Hannover (1960), there are, nevertheless, two important pragmatic questions that Abendroth does not discuss in his survey of the contemporary SPD. First, do the majority of German Social Democrats subscribe to the kind of SPD advocated by the author? Second, could this socialist force become a viable party to win federal elections in affluent West Germany? The answers are obviously no.—HERBERT R. WINTER, *Rhode Island College.*

The Social Democratic Party of Germany. BY DOUGLAS A. CHALMERS. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1964. Pp. xiv, 258. $6.50.)

Beginning with Robert Michels' *Political Parties* (1911), the SPD, grandfather of all socialist parties, has been continental Europe's most intensively studied democratic party. The pre-Weimar period has been admirably treated in Carl Schorske's *German Social Democracy 1905–1917* (1955) and A. Joseph Berlau's *The German Social Democratic Party 1914–1921* (1949). Now we also have thorough and highly commendable works by Hunt on the Weimar period and by Chalmers on the party in the Bonn Republic. The Hunt and Chalmers studies complement one another particularly well in that each traces one of the two stages of the party's now complete ideological shift away from Marxist socialism and concentrates upon analyzing the consequences for the party's organization.

The SPD's developmental tendencies of the Weimar years continued into the Bonn Republic, but through the 1950's the demand for revitalization became intensified. If the party were to challenge the CDU successfully, it would have to expand beyond its class base, to respond to increasing pluralization in German society by redefining its representational role, and to respond to changes in the political culture by playing down its socialist ideology. At Bad Godesberg in 1959 the SPD adopted a program without an ideology, a program which repudiated traditional doctrine in expressing acceptance of the church, military defense, and private property.

Chalmers gives us a history of this transformation from an ideologically-oriented to a problem-oriented party, reviewing carefully the choices facing the SPD and the changes in the role of its social theory in policy decisions, in ensuring party unity, and in mobilizing public support. Thereafter he focuses, in four chapters, on the implications of the new approach for: (1) policy-making; (2) leadership recruitment; (3) party organization; and (4) public relations. The consequences of attempting to broaden appeal include the fragmenting of policy-making channels as communications are established with a wide range of groups and the passing over of organization men of the Kurt Schumacher or Erich Ollenhauer type in selecting as leader the more widely popular Willy Brandt.

Because "As an idea, a philosophy, and a social movement, socialism in Germany is no longer represented by a political party" (p. 228), the SPD is vastly changed in character. Its transformation is away from the pattern of responsiveness noted by Michels and Hunt and away from the defining characteristics of Duverger's "mass party"; though its public image has not yet greatly changed, it is gaining the flexibility and the style of the "electoral party."—SVEN GROENNINGS, *Indiana University.*

Der Kampf um den Bau Des Mittellandkanals. BY HANNELORE HORN. (Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, Staat und Politik, vol. 6, 1964. Pp. 145.)

Das Regierungssystem der Bundesrepublic Deutschland. vol. 1: Leitfaden, vol. 2: Quellenbuch. BY THOMAS ELLWEIN. (Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1963. Pp. 630.

Dr. Hannelore Horn analyzes in an absorbing manner the political processes of early Wilhelminian Prussia with regard to a particular episode: the successful mutilation by the Agrarian interests of the Prussian government's bill for the building of a much needed waterway connecting the Rhein and the Elbe, Western and Eastern Germany. Dr. Horn studies first the Landbund's penetration of the Conservatives, which until then were an old style Honoratioren party, thus molding this political group for their own purposes. She then shows how the lop-sided political arrangements of the Prussian constitutional system were utilized by the Landbund to hold up the government project until all features which might have remotely threatened their own interests were eliminated. In point of fact the canal project was completed only during the Weimar Republic. Of course, the Landbund could not have carried through its operation so successfully if the other parts of the reigning establishment had not known that any serious slight to the Landbund would endanger major navy and tariff bills in the Reichstag.

In this fight the mutual dependency of the bureaucracy, government, industry, and Eastern estate owners made it impossible for the Prussian government to continue its attempt to penalize the so-called *Kanalrebellen* (those governmental officials who were at the same time members of the Prussian diet and who in spite of all political pressures had cast their vote for the Landbund and against the government). At a time when Germany's parliaments are again filled with public officials of all sorts—c. 23% in the Bundestag, sometimes more than double their number in the individual diets—Dr. Horn's painstaking inquiry is illuminating, both in terms of the motivations, multiple pressures, and elements of choice influencing the *Kanalrebellen* and their personal careers, and in terms of the impact of the specific political decision. Today, due to the greater variety of interests with which officials are concerned, their role in German politics, both on the federal and on the state levels is more diversified and complicated. But analysis of this relatively simple model of the dual role played by officials as representatives both of state power and of agrarian interests, shows how, in the special German context, close attention to the interaction of official and group behavior may produce happy results.

Thomas Ellwein's governmental system of the Federal Republic may officially be dubbed a text for the student of German political science, but behind this modest exercise emerges an interesting and balanced analysis of the German establishment of the last fifteen years. The author shows institutional changes throughout these years, develops a typology of attitudes frequently found in important groups, and in a tentative way tries to develop yardsticks of measurement for political behavior. He asks whether a new political style has been developed and, with a side glance at the Spiegel affair, hesitates to give an unqualified answer. With this question mark, he shifts his attention to problems of administration and justice, the interrelation between *Rechtsstaat* and *Sozialstaat* to which, quite in keeping with the German public's primary interests, he devotes a good share of his book. Here the leitmotif is found in his remark that when political parties are defaulting, the bureaucracy is in danger of losing its instrumental character and of assuming instead responsibility for determining community goals. In the context of the author's thinking this remark is neither trite nor almost obvious, for it is tied to the search for a non-formalistic meaning of today's *Rechtsstaat*. What is evident throughout this volume, and gives it its striking character, is the contrast between the quasi-permanent installation of the people in the *Wirtschaftswunder* and their very provisional moral and intellectual allegiance towards the institutions of the Federal Republic.

The second volume contains a 250 page source book which includes constitutional, political, administrative, and financial material, and at the same time highlights the problems of a federal structure eternally on the move. The choice of materials should not only help the German student, but will be equally beneficial to the American teacher of German affairs. It would have been still more helpful if the author had reprinted some excerpts from the Bundestag question period of the days in November 1962 when the Spiegel affair blew up in the face of Messrs. Adenauer, Strauss, and Hoecherl.—OTTO KIRCHHEIMER *Columbia University*.

German Social Democracy 1918–1933. BY RICHARD N. HUNT. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1964. Pp. xi, 292. $7.50.)

The title of this volume in the "Yale Historical Publications" is somewhat misleading. Professor Hunt's study concerns itself primarily with the internal history of the Social Democratic movement during the Weimar Republic rather than with the SPD's part in the first German republic. However, in the reviewer's opinion this narrower focus is by no means a shortcoming, for not only has the broader issue been previously discussed in innumerable other studies, but we have heretofore lacked a first-rate history of the Weimar SPD—in English as well as in German. This we now have with Hunt's fine analysis of the development of the party organization, the sociological character of the movement, its relationship with the trade unions and its internecine factional struggles. Subsequent studies may add further details and correct some errors, but no one will hereafter be able to deal with the politics of Weimar Germany or the history of the SPD without reference to this excellent volume.

Professor Hunt's indebtedness to the late Sigmund Neumann—which he acknowledges in his preface—is evident throughout the book. He follows Neumann's 1932 analysis of the SPD as a party unable to deal with the challenge of severe crisis conditions in the political system, largely because a conservative leadership was unwilling or unable to change its accustomed ways and could not be displaced by more qualified men. Perhaps these did not exist, as some of the old leaders have claimed in their defense, and perhaps conditions external to the SPD made it impossible for the embattled party to make drastic changes in its leadership and structure by the time the party and the Republic faced the mortal danger of Nazism. No doubt, the rivalry of the Communist party and the animosity of anti-democratic elements among the German elites immensely complicated the task of the SPD—factors which Hunt fails to appreciate adequately. Nonetheless, as this study shows in unsurpassed detail, in the last analysis the nature of its leadership explains why the party did not show greater vigor in the last years of Weimar Germany.

Following a rather conventional review of the history of the SPD before 1918, Hunt describes the formal and sociological structure of the SPD organization and its leadership, accentuating the factors which led the movement to become increasingly inert and its top leadership ever more fearful of risking what it had gained and ever more hostile to challenges to its authority. As the self-proclaimed defenders of the democratic system these leaders could ill afford the self-satisfied lethargy which characterized so many of them, for the Republic needed dynamic defenders, not only in the Nineteen Thirties but throughout its history. Indeed, as Hunt indicates, these leaders faithfully reflected the mood of most of the lesser functionaries and probably most party members. But we are confronted by the question whether the task of a democratic party leadership is limited to expressing the sentiments of its supporters, or whether greater initiative on the part of democratic leaders necessarily violates the terms of their mandate. By relying perhaps too heavily on rather one-sided interpretations by various left-wing critics of the SPD leaders, Hunt tends to overstate his case and resorts at times to rather unfair characterizations of men and deed. But his diagnosis remains, for all that, fundamentally true.

To the reader who is fairly familiar with the general subject, Hunt's discussion of the relationship between SPD and the trade unions and of the left-wing criticism of the party leaders adds little that is new. Here his contribution is one of synthesis, of putting these factors in perspective in terms of the larger problems characterizing the internal development of the party. The author's sympathies lie clearly with the critics; a more balanced view might have done the SPD leaders more justice. And while his grasp of the left-wing intra-party opposition is, on the whole, adequate, that of the so-called "Young Turks" leaves something to be desired. The assertion that men like Schumacher, Mierendorf, Haubach, and Leber held in common "nationalist and demagogic inclinations" similar to those of Déat in France and Mosley in Britain is a gross exaggeration.

The potential analytical pitfalls of historicism are illuminated by Hunt's concluding observations. His analysis of the Weimar SPD leads him to conclude that if the present Social Democratic party achieves more "active grass-roots participation" and "succeeds in drinking at the fountain of youth," the earlier oligarchic trend might be reversed, the stagnation that characterized the Weimar era shaken off, and the party might at last obtain a majority at the polls. However, Bonn Germany is not the Weimar Germany. The political context of the present confronts the SPD with problems which cannot be solved by avoiding the sins of the fathers, but require a far more radical transformation of the party in the light of entirely different environmental conditions.—Lewis J. Edinger, *Washington University.*

Germany, The Wall and Berlin: Internal Politics During an International Crisis. By John W. Keller. (New York: Vantage Press, 1964. Pp. 437. $4.95.)

What explains the political stability of West Germany in the face of one potentially explosive international confrontation after another? Only the major episodes affecting Berlin need be mentioned—the blockade, the uprising in East Germany in 1953, Khruschchev's ultimatums, the Wall—to evoke the seemingly convulsive environment in which the political institutions of the Federal Republic have developed. The combination of a persistently superheated international situation on one side and a low-temperature domestic politics on the other is so incongruous as to suggest a paradox: the very fluidity and capriciousness of its international environment have helped to produce the viscosity of West German internal politics.

John W. Keller does not himself suggest this conclusion in his chronicle of West German public and partisan reaction to the building of the Berlin Wall, but his detailed documentation of this most recent episode tends to confirm it as a description of West German politics at each major crisis of the last fifteen years. In this case there is almost a litmus-paper quality about the situation since the sealing-off of the Berlin border occurred in the midst of a parliamentary election campaign that both major parties and the Free Democrats, as the "third" party, regarded as extraordinarily important in giving the party system a form that it might bear for some time to come. All three leading parties had more or less severe internal problems that were working themselves out as the campaign progressed: the Christian Democrats were split over the future role of Konrad Adenauer, the Social Democrats faced a test of their new "bourgeois" program and tactics, and the Free Democrats had to consider the possibility that the trend toward a two-party system would culminate this time in their exclusion from federal politics.

Despite such high stakes the campaign muddled along listlessly until the events of August 13. Five weeks later, when the votes were counted, it was clear that whatever portentous developments might have come had the campaign not been enlivened by the building of the wall, the new reality was an old one. Coalition government was again a necessity, and the respective gains and losses suffered and enjoyed by the three parties were ambiguous enough in size and direction to make generalization little better than speculation. In only one case were the omens clear. Adenauer, by portraying the situation as a mere "preliminary crisis" and refusing to go to Berlin—whether he did so intentionally or out of necessity can be ignored here—and by his cavalier reference in a public rally on August 14 to the question of Willy Brandt's illegitimate birth, gave his opponents in the CDU the leverage they needed to begin taking the final steps that would dislodge him from the Government.

Questions of stability, of the political style of the Bonn parties, and other aspects of the new political culture that has grown up since 1945 can be examined with profit by studying the West German political system under stress. Professor Keller touches some of these questions, but only in passing, and he makes only a minimal effort at relating his own work to the pertinent literature. He records the events, political reactions, and policy statements of the period from August through December of 1961 in great detail, but his treatment cannot be described as a study. It is, literally, a laying-out of the record, and it is based not on documentary sources but largely on gleanings from the popular press. Of reporting there is a great deal, of analysis very little. No themes are accented sufficiently to warrant mentioning here. Page after page is filled with verbatim reporting or paraphrasing from German and other newspapers. It seems unlikely that this tortuous path through the tabloids and the more respectable press will be trod again. The book may have a certain value as a documentation, but even this must be qualified by the failure to provide the scholar with that small convenience he finds so helpful, an index.—Donald R. Reich, *Oberlin College.*

Westdeutschland, 1945–1950. Der Aufbau von Verfassungs- und Verwaltungseinrichtungen über den Ländern der drei westlichen Besatzungszonen Teil II. Einzelne Verwaltungs Zweige: Wirtschaft, Marshallplan, Statistik. By Walter Vogel. (Boppard am Rhein, Harold Boldt Verlag, 1964, Pp. xvi, 433. Schriften des Bundesarchivs 12. DM 28.)

After the plan of an extremely detailed government organization manual, the author at the Bundesarchiv of the German Federal Republic in Coblenz is engaged in furnishing an exact statement of the intricate and little known structure of German zonal and bizonal authorities in the three Western Zones of Germany between the conclusion of the War in 1945 and their absorption in the German Federal Republic by 1950. Mention of the military government authorities is made only insofar as relates to the German authorities. Adequate citation is given to the sources available in the Bundesarchiv. The first part, which appeared in 1956 as no. 2 of the *Schriften des Bundesarchivs,* had only 213 pages, and treated the agencies dealing with food, agriculture and forestry. The work is being continued, and points up the need for similar work on the German authorities of the other zone as well as overall on the organization of the military government authorities of all four zones.—James B. Childs, *Library of Congress.*

Political Parties in Norway. By Henry Valen and Daniel Katz. (Olso, Norway: Universitetsforlaget, 1964. Pp. xii, 383. 40 kroner or $5.75. Exclusive English-speaking distribution by Tavistock Press.)

This is more than a comprehensive study of Norwegian political parties and voting behavior. It is a sophisticated survey research study testing many hypotheses which have been used in studies of American voting behavior (particularly, *The American Voter*) upon the Norwegian political system. By contrasting the American and Norwegian political systems, the authors have contributed greatly to our knowledge of comparative voting behavior.

Appropriately, this book is subtitled, "A Community Study." A report of a study on the 1957 general election in selected communities of the Stavanger area of southwestern Norway, this is one of a series of election studies sponsored jointly by the Institute of Social Research in Oslo and the Christian Michelsen Institute in Bergen. The authors are particularly interested in studying political tendencies in communities undergoing rapid economic and social changes. This factor governed the selection of the particular wards (*stemmekrets*) selected for the study. As a ward is defined as the "area adjacent to a polling place" it seems to this reviewer that precinct would have been a more descriptive term.

Basic data for this study was obtained from two sets of interviews. First, a voter survey of 1017 respondents was drawn from the electoral register at random. Second, a group of 149 office-holders in the party organizations at the province, commune, and ward levels were queried. These interviews yielded data with which to compare the perceptions of and attitudes toward controversial issues, the character of party leadership, and the relation of party organizations to social organizations of party voters and leaders. Elaborate appendices at the end of the volume report on the sampling procedures and contain the questionnaires used in the study. The sophisticated method used in designing the study is obvious. The series of well-organized and meaningful tables, the summaries of findings, and interpretative surveys placed at the end of each section of the study add much to the clarity of the presentation of the data.

In an intriguing chapter (Chapter 5), the authors attempt to demonstrate empirically the impact of party leadership on voting behavior. They use the Cutright and Rossi technique to hold constant the various demographic determinants of voting behavior and, thus, to assess the impact of the party organization. Professors Valen and Katz freely admit at the outset that their sample is not ideal for the employment of this technique. To supplement the Cutright and Rossi method they conducted voter interviews asking questions to tap awareness of local party activity, the existence of personal and impersonal communication from the party, citizen interest in or evaluation of party activities, and knowledge of party leadership.

The authors conclude that the degree of organizational activity of the party at the election district level made no appreciable difference in the votes cast on election day. The authors believe that other determinants of voting behavior are so important in Norway that the influence of the party organization in direct personal contacts is of no significance though the party organization may have an impact in reaching people through the mass media. In a subsequent section on the socio-economic bases of support of the Norwegian parties, it is clearly demonstrated that the three major dimensions of Norwegian political behavior are: (1) socio-economic differentiation (occupational status, educational level, and income level), (2) rural-urban factors, and (3) age.

Norwegian political behavior is notable for its high degree of stability. While in recent elections the variations between the votes of Norwegian political parties have been very small, there have been significant long-term changes in Norwegian political behavior. In looking at political change in the Stavanger area, the authors are looking for changes caused by shifts in occupation or geographic concentration occasioned by increased industrialization and bureaucratization. They explore the change between generations by comparing the voting of individuals with parental voting and parental class influence and changes within the political history of the same individual. This study destroys the prevalent notion that the long-term trend of political change in Norway is favorable to the Labor party. For while less than 20% of the first-time Labor voters defect to other parties, the absolute number of defections away from Labor exceeds the defections of the other parties to Labor. Labor's declining commitment to ideology, the growing white collar class, and age are suggested reasons.

The final chapter deals with the relation of parties to social organizations. Norwegian pressure groups are shown to operate differently than their counterparts in the United States. In Norway, pressure groups do not serve the function of furnishing information and staff work in guiding legislation; on the other hand, they do assist the government in formulating legislative programs and have a direct channel for their demands through the political parties. Informally these ties between the social organizations and the parties take the form of overlapping leadership and informal groups working within the party, especially in the nominating process.

There are many other interesting aspects of this study such as political identification and the character of leadership that merit comment but space does not permit. In conclusion, this is a highly readable and worthwhile volume. It is hoped that this study will stimulate other scholars to do similiar research on the various political systems of the world. The contributions of such studies to comparative politics can not be overestimated.—H. Gaylon Greenhill, *Wisconsin State University, Whitewater.*

500 jaren Staten-Generaal in de Nederlanden. Van statenvergadering tot volksvertegenwoordiging. Edited by S. J. Fockema Andreae and H. Hardenberg. (Assen, Van Gorcum & Comp., N. V., 1964. Pp. 341. Plates.)

In January 1464, Burgundian Duke Philip the Good called the first continuing States General in the Low Countries to convene at Bruges. From this beginning has derived the present States General of the Netherlands. Even in the period between 1431 and 1464, there had been a few special meetings of similar character. To celebrate the five centuries of parliament, nine chronological segments have been treated by nine different authors. Each contribution is accompanied by a bibliography. The work, which was published with the assistance of the Prince Bernhard Fonds, has a joint introduction by the present chairmen of the two chambers of the Netherlands States General. Beginnings of an organized central government with financial agencies are traced at a very early date. Even though the earlier States General were unicameral, the present bicameral form seems first to have appeared with the Batavian Republic in 1798. The last chapter of some forty pages by E. van Raalta treats of the States General in the most recent period, 1918–1963, and is accompanied by tables showing the political party representation in both chambers during the period. The memorial volume prepared with scientific care is concluded by a list of the members of the earliest and of the most recent States General.—JAMES B. CHILDS, *Library of Congress.*

Guía de la administración civil del Estado. BY THE OFICINA DE INFORMACIÓN, PRESIDENCIA DEL GOBIERNO. (Madrid, [Boletín Oficial del Estado, Publicaciones], 1963. Pp. 375. Organization charts.)

In contrast with the provisional edition in 1960 under the title *Guía de la administración española,* the present Spanish government organization manual has organization charts for the central administration, Presidencia del Gobierno and each of the civil ministries. As changes occur, the charts are revised and reissued with *Documentación administrativa,* the monthly review of the Centro de Formación y Perfeccionamiento de Funcionarios. The three defense ministries (Army, Air, and Navy) are represented only on the chart of the Central Administration, and not otherwise treated. The hundred or so institutes of the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas are itemized in full. Addresses are given for the various agencies, but no personal names are included. The Ministries are arranged in a hierarchical order seemingly similar to that followed in the national budget, and the subarrangement is in a like fashion. An index to agencies would do much to facilitate the use of the very helpful *Guía.*—JAMES B. CHILDS, *Library of Congress.*

Public relations in administration. I. *Official publications.. General report.* BY SUZANNE HONORÉ. (Brussels, International Institute of Administrative Sciences, 1963. Pp. 83.)

The report by Suzanne Honoré, a conservateur of the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, was presented, originally in French, to the XIIth International Congress of Administrative Sciences at Vienna, 16–20 July 1962, and was based not only upon an international survey by questionnaire, (scheduled in 1960) but upon replies from National sections of the Institute, and on several previous regional round table discussions. One of the important sources used was the UNESCO publication edited in 1958 (and now being revised) by J. Meyriat under the title *A study of current bibliographies of national official publications.* A principal conclusion is "that official publications are a first-class source for the study of the administrative sciences, as for that of the political, economic and social sciences, which are developing rapidly." Part II of *Public relations in administration* on "the influence of the public on the operation of public administration, excluding electoral rights" is under preparation for the 1965 Congress with C. Mihcioglu of the University of Ankara as general rapporteur.—JAMES B. CHILDS, *Library of Congress.*

A History of the Australian Country Party. BY ULRICH ELLIS. (Melbourne, Australia: Melbourne University Press, 1963. Pp. ix, 359. $8.50.)

This book is a fine addition to the growing number of studies about Australian politics. It is a sympathetic treatment of the Country Party. The author explains: "It is written from a point of view—from the inside looking out—and must be accepted as an interpretation by one who cannot hope to be slightly objective or even unbiased." Although the author is too modest to admit it, he has had a great deal to do with both the policy and strategy of the Country Party. He worked very closely with Sir Earle Page and Sir Arthur Fadden, both of whom held a number of different federal ministries.

The book's title is somewhat misleading as there is only incidental reference to the Party's state branches. In part, this results from two facts. First, the state affiliations, according to Ellis, are inextricably bound to the national structure. Second, to do a detailed job on the state branches would have required several additional volumes.

Since Ellis writes from a point of view and is not an academic political scientist, his history does not incorporate methods of analysis which have become commonplace in our discipline. For instance, it would have been helpful if Ellis had included some tables indicating the kind and quantity of legislation introduced by Country Party members. It also would have been useful had he done some roll call analyses to determine the pattern of parliamentary solidarity and the Party's legislative relationships with other federal parties. But such omissions do not detract from the overall worth of the study. This is all the more true when one realizes that until recently there were very few reliable secondary sources on Australian politics. Ellis provides names, places, dates, and events which will be extremely helpful to future students of Australian politics. The appendices are particularly valuable in this regard.

One point which Ellis makes is that the federal Country Party, particularly since its entry into Commonwealth politics in 1917, has not been merely an extension of the three principal non-labor parties—National, United Australian, and Liberal—which have successively vied with the Labor Party for control of the Commonwealth Government. The Country Party has never sought support in the metropolitan areas. It has entered into electoral arrangements and composite governments with non-labor parties whose strength lie in the urban centers. Through electoral arrangements there is an agreement on an allocation of seats to be contested by each partner. Critics of these arrangements contend that the Party's numerical strength, and hence its legislative power, is diminished by this strategy. The prolonged alliance with the Liberal Party, which dates from 1949 to the present, has probably sapped the Country Party's vitality both organizationally and legislatively. (From 1917 to 1964 the Country Party was involved in composite governments for 27 of the 47 years.) The Country Party has never withdrawn from a ministry. Ellis marshals evidence which indicates that this has contributed to the stability of the Commonwealth government.

Some less sympathetic students of the Country Party might conclude that it is the rural branch of the non-labor party. Such a conclusion would require investigation of Country Party participation in local governing authorities and state parliaments. Certainly, this suggestion is worthy of investigation for several reasons. First, it would provide insights into the nature of the "third party" in a three-party system. Second, and more important, it would enable us to refine our notions about party systems in general and the multi-party system in particular.—CONRAD JOYNER, *University of Arizona.*

The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine After World War II. BY YAROSLAV BILINSKY. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1964. Pp. xvii, 539, $12.50.)

This book is virtually encyclopedic in length: apart from the copiously annotated text, it contains twenty-two special notes in the appendix (the particularly interesting note on "The Jewish Question in the Ukraine" contains fourteen double-column pages) and a fifty-three page annotated bibliography. The value of the work as a compendium of hard-to-get information about a major portion of the U.S.S.R. is beyond question. But—in spite of the title—the author did not intend to write a handbook on the Ukraine. While his purpose might have been clearer to the reader if he had stated his problems at the beginning, the attentive reader soon learns that Professor Bilinsky is really concerned solely with the Ukrainian nationality question. The vast array of data he presents is designed to answer such problems as: What are the factors influencing Ukrainian national identification? How strong is national feeling today? How has Soviet policy sought to manipulate it? What are the prospects for separate national identity among Ukrainians?

The crucial problem, the present strength of Ukrainian nationalism, is the hardest to approach. The direct line of investigation pursued by Bilinsky is examination of resistance to Soviet efforts to integrate the West Ukraine (i.e., the portions acquired in 1939–46). Unfortunately, it is almost impossible for the outside investigator to assess the degree of resistance to a totalitarian regime unless the totalitarian controls are at least temporarily lifted. Bilinsky has worked very diligently to collect the very incomplete information available; this reviewer, for one, is much indebted to Bilinsky for the evidence on the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent [guerrilla] Army) which he originally presented in his Ph.D. dissertation. It is a reviewer's inescapable duty, however, to point out that Bilinsky (who spent his childhood in the wartime West Ukraine) does not take a thoroughly critical approach to the question of Ukrainian resistance. Bilinsky does not positively exaggerate the importance of the UPA; but he fails to undertake the badly needed task of critically analyzing the large body of émigré writing on the subject, particularly in regard to the territorial and chronological extent of guerrilla activities. Furthermore, Bilinsky glosses over the fratricidal conflicts which preceded and accompanied the formation of the UPA and the lasting imprint which these brutal episodes had upon the development of the nationalist movement.

On the other hand, the mere fact of Bilinsky's personal commitment makes him an especially useful source on some aspects of Ukrainian nationalism. This is especially true of the passages on contemporary relations between Ukrainian nationalists and the Vatican. An outsider could not have easily uncovered the extent and nature of nationalist resentment against what many Ukrainians regard as Vatican efforts to minimize the importance of the Ukrainian (Uniate) Catholic Church as a tactic in the effort to win over Russian Orthodoxy.

The main part of Bilinsky's book is wisely devoted, not to a direct assault on the problem of the strength of Ukrainian nationalism, but to an intensive examination of Soviet policies. He then tries to infer from the policies the nature of the national attitude which the regime hopes to influence. In pursuing this indirect approach, Bilinsky discusses in detail the hitherto largely neglected statistical data on nationality factors in education and mass media (however, his main analysis was made before the more detailed 1959 census data became available). Bilinsky wisely recognizes the impracticability of a comprehensive examination of Soviet manipulation of literary and historical symbols of Ukrainian national identity. Consequently, he approaches this facet of Soviet policy through intensive analysis of two crucial cases: the treatment of the poet Taras Shevchenko and of the "reunification" of the Ukraine and Russia in the Treaty of Pereyaslav. In analyzing the nationality aspects of Communist Party personnel changes, the author concentrates upon the period since Stalin's death. Here a good bit of speculation is unavoidable, but Bilinsky is rather too inclined to stress nationality factors in the recent power struggle. Similarly, his factually valuable discussion of the role of the Ukrainian S. S. R. in the United Nations probably overemphasizes the nationality question. In his concluding chapter Bilinsky relies heavily upon interviews with postwar defectors. He recognizes the hazards of using this uncontrollable data, but occasionally is extremely uncritical, as in his acceptance of one informant's assertion that "within a week or two, the entire city of Dnepropetrovsk, after German occupation began to speak Ukrainian." Such items are not allowed to distort Bilinsky's general findings, however, which are in accord with other scholars' conclusions. Basically, he finds, "Soviet Ukrainians tend to be so preoccupied with abolishing the ills of the regime that little thought is given to what precisely should be put in its place" and "the struggle for economic betterment occupies most of the attention of Soviet citizens, Ukrainians and non-Ukrainians alike." These findings necessarily lead to the conclusion that the future of Ukrainian national identity very probably depends upon developments which largely transcend the Ukraine itself.—JOHN A. ARMSTRONG, *University of Wisconsin.*

Economic Rationality and Soviet Politics or Was Stalin Really Necessary? BY ALEC NOVE. (Frederick A. Praeger: New York, 1964. P. 316. $8.50.)

This is a collection of seventeen articles, essays and papers by the distinguished economist Alec Nove of the University of Glasgow. Their writing spans the last decade and all except two have previously appeared elsewhere.

Mr. Nove is not one of those too-frequent specialists in Soviet economics who insist always upon the primacy of their study and tend to disregard the significance of politics, literature, Russian tradition and so forth for Soviet developments. His interests as reflected in the entries in *Economic Rationality and Soviet Politics* cover a broad spectrum ranging from "Occupational patterns in the USSR and Great Britain" to "The Peasants in Soviet literature since Stalin."

However, Professor Nove is at his best in the chapters on Soviet planning and agriculture, areas where he has his special expertise. In those chapters the author provides a topical and valuable account of Khrushchev's economic misadventures, written, in some instances, a half-dozen years before October, 1964. Nove indicates the extent to which Nikita Sergeevich's attempts to deal with the economic necessity for local autonomy and the political demand for central control converted Soviet economic planning into an almost impenetrable tohu-bohu. In agriculture, he points out that Khrushchev, as his predecessors, had fallen victim to that same *shturmoveshchina* ("campaigning") psychosis, with which, incidentally, the Russians have often impugned the Chinese comrades. Nove suggests that Khrushchev's ideas for using the virgin soil lands and the fallow areas and planting corn were all excellent—but not everywhere and under all conditions. "It is this chronic tendency to overdo a good idea, to impose it by decree," Nove writes, "which ruins its application and does so much harm to Soviet agriculture."

It is Nove's position that the Soviet planning system is not "economically" rational, since it operates on the basis of political not economic decisions, and that the present difficulties of the Soviet economy can in large part be remedied by a "big dose" of economic rationality. He further maintains that what prevents the Soviet Union from undertaking such a cure is not primarily Marxist ideology, but rather the "convictions of the political leaders and planners that *they*, and not any 'law of value,' are the regulators of economic life." Nove seems to believe that any major change in the style of Soviet planning must be predicated on significant alterations in the psychology of the leadership, which is a major reason for the labored and sometimes painful quality of the debates over Soviet planning policy which have broken out intermittently during the past few years.

One wishes that Mr. Nove's comments on the differences between "useful" economic growth and the growth of output as measured by statistics would be read by all of those who have been involved in the often meaningless debate over Soviet economic growth *vis-à-vis* that of the United States. His discussions of the mounting futility of the *trudoden* system and of the role and burden of agricultural officials at the *raion* and *oblast* levels are particularly enlightening.

As is almost bound to be the case in a collection such as this, there is a good deal of repetition of arguments and some of the materials are so outdated as to be of little more than historical interest. This is particularly so in Mr. Nove's chapter on "The purchasing power of the Soviet ruble," which first appeared in 1958. Too many of the conclusions reached here are no longer valid and there is the additionally irritating feature for the American reader of having figures given not only in old rubles but also in pounds, shillings and pence. Try converting old rubles to new, then say £1 5s 6d. to dollar and cents, then accounting for changes that have taken place in relative values since 1957, and it will quickly be seen why this chapter might have been better left out, in spite of the fact that it was at the time of its writing undoubtedly an intellectual tour de force.

Despite these minor shortcomings, the collection is justifiable and the time of any Soviet specialist would be well spent in reading its chapters on planning and agriculture. There is one further aspect of the book, which, though perhaps trivial and presumably not specifically attributable to Professor Nove, must nevertheless be mentioned, namely the alternate title: *Was Stalin Really Necessary?* Other than the introductory chapter, which is one of the least valuable in the collection, the book has almost nothing to do with this problem. One can only conclude that some sales-conscious editor decided that *Economic Rationality and Soviet Politics* would not sell, but *Was Stalin Really Necessary?* might; or perhaps that two titles are safer than one. The alternate title does the book no credit. *Caveat auctor!*—DAN N. JACOBS, *Miami University (Ohio)*.

Nationalism and Communism, Essays 1946–1963. BY HUGH SETON-WATSON (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1964. Pp. x+253. $7.50.)

Hugh Seton-Watson, head of the Department of Russian History in the School of Slavonic and East European Studies of London University and author of well known books on Russian and Eastern European history and politics has assembled in this volume a collection of previously published articles and lectures. Using the rubric of nationalism and communism, the author has brought together a valuable collection of his essays under four main headings. These are twentieth-century history, eastern Europe after WWII, communism in eastern Europe and international problems. The last category deals with such international problems as Soviet foreign policy, strategy, and the Atlantic Alliance.

The author is at his best in analyzing the long range implications of twentieth century history in which the mass movements of nationalism and communism occupy principal places. Tracing how nationalism was first formulated in revolutionary France, Seton-Watson shows how it became a democratic and secular phenomena. Turning to nationalist movements in underdeveloped countries in the last hundred years, the author points out how these movements have been directed "by a modern secular elite or intelligentsia." The nineteenth century Russian liberal leaders were the first to be called the intelligentsia but as the author points out the intelligentsia are not solely a Russian phenomena. Intelligentsia were found in all the other components of the Romanov as well as the Ottoman and parts of the Hapsburg empires.

On the future of nationalism, Seton-Watson believes that it is not as predictable as some writers who advance the causes of larger free associations and world government might have us believe. The fall of the Romanov, Ottoman and Hapsburg empires did not result in the independence of national states but "the establishment of the empire of the Bolsheviks."

On the revolutionary movements of the first half of the twentieth century the author points out that the distinguishing feature of twentieth century revolutionary movements from those of the nineteenth century is that the twentieth century movements have arisen in culturally and economically backward countries. Nineteenth century revolutionary movements arose more in the advanced countries. But the interesting phenomenon is that the nineteenth century revolutionary movements did not develop into fully blown Marxist type revolutions as did those in the twentieth century. Moreover Marx has been repeatedly proved wrong in that his forecasts for an economic revolution in industrial countries coming before the revolution in less developed agricultural societies were not born out. In the agrarian societies which had revolutions, Russia, Yugoslavia and China, the revolutions came about only because outside forces had demolished the old state apparatus. It was not the inevitable economic laws of Marx which brought about an internal upheaval because of the contradictions in capitalism but the outside forces coupled with social and political disintegration in these countries which precipitated the successful revolutions.

Coming back to the intelligentsia, Seton-Watson rightly points out that the leaders of twentieth century revolutionary movements came chiefly from the intelligentisia. Western nations desiring to influence the historical course of the new emerging nations should pay more attention to the development and training of these leaders.

The section of the book which reflects the unique personal observations of the author is on Eastern Europe after WWII. Showing the results of extensive travels and intensive study Seton-Watson's essays on the Danube states right after the war, on the Czechoslovak turnover, the Hungarian uprising and the Greek civil war are most informative. His essays end with a relatively recent discussion of Soviet foreign policy followed by a very current final essay. "Commonwealth, Common Market and Common Sense" in which he correctly pleads for Great Britain entering the Common Market and for Europe entering the Atlantic Community.

Some of these essays were written ten or more years ago but they are still valid. The fact that the first of them was published in 1946 and the others in almost each successive year is not a drawback because their incisive analyses are still valid. Moreover there is an additional advantage in the timing of these articles because the essays reveal a well written chronology of significant developments on the world scene from 1946 to 1963. There is no perspective more enlightening than that of a brilliant historian and Seton-Watson has in every sense this.—WILLIAM B. BALLIS, *The University of Michigan.*

The Yemen: Imams, Rulers, and Revolutions. BY HAROLD INGRAMS. (New York and London: Fredrick Praeger, 1963. Pp. 164, no price indicated.)

There can be little doubt that all those who some twenty-two years ago were delighted by Harold Ingrams' *Arabia and the Isles* were equally dismayed by his announced intention at the time not to write another book. His account of quaint, far-away and little-known peoples and places revealed a fascinating world as well as a man full of warmth, wisdom and charm. Many readers, like this reviewer, must have hoped that Mr. Ingrams would one day change his mind. This hope has now been realized.

It must, however, be stated at once that Mr. Ingrams' new book, *The Yemen: Imams, Rulers, and Revolutions*, is very different from his *Arabia and the Isles*. The racy, loquacious, and often eloquent manner in which he spoke of the minutiae of everyday human existence, as well as of the larger issues of tribal peace, border warfare and imperial policy, has been replaced by a tone of somber seriousness.

Mr. Ingrams' new book presents a broad survey of al-Yemen's past and present rather than a systematic study of the country and its problems. It contains a wealth of information on the tribal and denominational composition of the population; on the rise of Zaydi Shiʿism in al-Yemen; on Yemeni political personalities, both Royalist and Republican; on British-Yemeni relations, including the Treaty of 1934 and the continuing conflict over frontier questions; and on such events as the assassination of Imam Yahya, the various plots against Imam Ahmad, and the 1962 revolution which overthrew the Imamic regime.

Mr. Ingrams writes soberly and with restraint. Nonetheless, as a dedicated British colonial official who spent many of the best years of his life in South Arabia, he is a deeply committed man. Love for his country and affection for the people among whom he labored for so many years must have indissolubly linked the imperial interests of the one with the welfare of the other in his mind. He can hardly be expected to view with equanimity the forces which have brought revolution and civil war to al-Yemen, and which now threaten to shatter the British position in South Arabia so laboriously established by persons like him.

One of the interesting facts that emerges from the pages of this book is the author's change of sentiment toward Imamic rule and Imamic policies as a result of recent developments in the area. Imamic claims to British South Arabia, which had received neither the sympathy nor the support of the author prior to the appearance of the UAR upon the South Arabian scene, now appear to find justification in his eyes. In searching for a way out of al-Yemen's difficulties, it is to the present Imam al-Badr that he turns. "Maybe it is not too extravagant to suppose that such a ruler as he might well be a better proposition for al-Yemen than a Nasserite Republic or the curious hybrid Federation of South Arabia."

There is a touch of regret, and perhaps a suggestion of remorse, in the manner in which Ingrams relates how the Imam, having unsuccessfully pressed his claims to British-controlled South Arabia, invoked outside help which now threatens to encompass his ruin and radically change the power relationships in the area.

The Shiʿi-Sunni conflict, one of the lesser-known aspects of the current Republican-Royalist struggle in al-Yemen, is discussed in more than one place. Notwithstanding the fact that Arab Nationalist sources have accused the British of fomenting this conflict, Ingrams does not think it necessary to deny charges of British involvement. He gives the impression that the Zaydis, particularly the two great tribal confederations of the Hashid and the Bakil, regard the Imam's cause as their own. However, it is known that important elements of the Hashid, disgruntled by the execution of their paramount chieftain by Imam Ahmad in 1959, made common cause with the Republicans—a fact not mentioned by the author.

A few errors, perhaps inevitable in so comprehensive a survey, occur in this book. For example, the two children murdered by Muʿawiya's general, Busr Ibn Artat (pp. 20–21) were not the children of Abdullah Ibn Abbas, the ancestor of the Abbasids, but those of his younger brother, Ubaydullah Ibn Abbas. Ali was not the nephew of Muhammad (p. 20), but his cousin, as correctly stated on page 27. The Imamic title "Hamid ed-Din" does not mean "Defender of the Faith" (p. 58) but rather "He whose religion is praiseworthy."

Mr. Ingrams' concluding remarks, reiterating a theme that runs throughout the book, are a disappointing forecast of the future. The Yemenis, we are told, even after their present troubles are over, will remain as factious and disunited as ever; for like all other Arabs, they are torn between self-love and self-denial, this-worldliness and other-worldliness, individualism and desire for unity.

This slim volume contains a surprising amount of information, much of which is essential for an understanding of the present situation in al-Yemen. It is a valuable and timely contribution to the scant literature on Southwest Arabia.—WADIE JWAIDEH, *Indiana University.*

Syrian Politics and the Military 1945–1958. By GORDON H. TOREY. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1964. Pp. ix, 438. $7.00.)

The tendency of recent studies to blame the military as agents of instability in the Middle East and other under-developed areas shows no sign of weakening. Studies on the role of the military in politics can be illuminating; they remain, however, a difficult task, requiring an intimate knowledge of a people, their history, traditions, institutions, and a personal contact with both civilian and military establishments. The analyst must be primarily concerned with local assessments of the system he is scrutinizing which, added to his own, will provide him with the tools he needs. He then may begin his analysis in the light of generally recognized axioms—a tedious and frustrating process which does not guarantee the success of his enterprise.

Any attempt to analyze a situation in the Middle East or Africa from a non-local viewpoint is bound to produce inaccurate hypotheses, let alone conclusions. A knowledge gained from the local press and politicians whose prejudices are complex and manifold leads equally to deceptive conclusions.

One seeks in Torey's *Syrian Politics and the Military* a systematic study of the conditions that brought military groups into political eminence in Syria, perhaps even an analysis of the mystique of the military's political behavior there—a book of the type and stature of P. J. Vatikiotis' *The Egyptian Army in Politics* and which might serve as a sequel to that work, by studying the Syrian army as a political group with interests of its own, whose understanding of what constituted the national interest inspired its attempts and subsequent failures to emerge as the leader of a national resurgence.

The title of the book is misleading for the author has not produced such a study. As he candidly announces in his preface, the "book is a journey into the wilderness of contemporary Near Eastern history," a narrative based mainly on Syrian news releases and newspaper comments on the period. The lack of analysis or its superficiality whenever attempted makes the book a tiresome compilation of historical records for the area specialist and a confusing one for the layman.

Chapter I is a sketchy *mélange* describing such diverse topics as geography, people, historical background, society, culture, economy, education, political strikes, governmental organization, army, constitution, ministry of interior, legal system and the Syrian press. This is followed by a brief description of political parties up to independence and then by nine chapters of relatively detailed accounts of the political vicissitudes of the Syrian state. The disproportionately brief conclusion is a hasty and naive summation of "the factors which brought about the failure of democratic government in Syria," and is followed by an epilogue, appendices and bibliography.

A plethora of events are related *en vrac* without due consideration to minorities or economic and ethnic factors—so significant in Syrian politics; they are merely cited as existing and constituting crucial problems. Too much is left to the imagination of the reader: such a situation occurred "due to considerations of foreign policy," but such considerations are not spelled out. The author's conception of Nasir as a "patriarchal image" for the Arabs, moreover, is quite unwarranted. If Nasir represents anything to the Arabs it is youth, vigor and change.

Torey sees three distinct periods in Syria's political history from the end of World War Two to the abortive union with Egypt. From 1946 to 1949 parliamentary democracy was tried and found to be wanting; from 1949 to 1954 military dictatorship also failed to give the country the leadership it required; and in 1954 until February 1958 came "the return to a parliamentary regime."

Independent Syria's "entire life" is seen as "characterized by internal turmoil, near chaos at times, and continual governmental instability." But these circumstances, Torey remarks, are not peculiar to Syria, as they have characterized many other countries such as "Pakistan, Burma, Korea, Iraq, France and Argentina." What made Syria's political institutions too fragile to withstand such stresses and strains, according to the author, are its geographical position, lack of forsighted leadership, and its being part of a larger Arab nation. Moreover, Syria was not able "to weld its people into a compact and compatible nation" because it has "neither tradition nor past glories." And the leaders who struggled for Syria's independence having "fought against something all their political lives" have "become accustomed to thinking in a negative frame of mind." But, Torey thinks: "Perhaps in less demanding circumstances, they would have been equal to the challenge."

Syria's geographical situation, he finds, "continually worked against the country's survival." Because, "Set between two rival blocs, Syria became the pawn of Arab power politics, the target of the rival Hashemite and Saudi-Egyptian camps."

So the civilian failed because of an inability to provide the country with a patriarch that was also a modern innovator with a capacity to push the country forward. Later, the military also failed "largely because of their inability to mold the Syrian people into a viable nation; their being caught-up in inter-Arab rivalries; and their lack of recognition that radical socio-political ideology was becoming the order of the day in the Arab world." The military were followed by a parliamentary regime—"the golden years of the Ba'th"—which also failed while showing the "progressive officers the way to achieve their dreams."

By 1958, both democracy and army rule had failed; a new system was needed but could not be found; "perhaps it was not the Syrian people's fault." The political system they inherited was ill-suited to this oriental society "undergoing a rapidly accelerating 'Westernization'."

The four pages of epilogue are a digest of the facts of Syria's political union with Egypt which, according to Torey, failed because "Nasir's Egyptian background failed to give him the requisite understanding of the Syrian temperament and mentality."

This book is neither scholarly nor very helpful to the layman; it is informative only as are releases in a daily newspaper. Unpolished, hastily compiled and edited, it is no more than a "journey into the wilderness" of the Syrian press.—Alfred G. Gerteiny, *St. John's University*.

The City of God and the City of Man in Africa. By Edgar H. Brookes and Amry Vandenbosch. (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1964. Pp. vi, 138. $3.75.)

This small volume is composed of two lectures given by Dr. Brookes at the University of Kentucky in 1963 and a substantial introduction to each lecture by Professor Vandenbosch. Dr. Brookes is introduced as professor emeritus of history and political science at the University of Natal, but he is perhaps better known as former Native representative in the South African Senate, leader in the Liberal Party of that country, and fighter for non-European rights there generally.

Vandenbosch's introductory essays on the newly independent nations of Africa and the politics of the Republic of South Africa provide very good background material, although the former might have dealt more with internal rather than international factors. The two essays by Brookes constitute the core of the book, and the remainder of this review will examine them more closely.

In his first essay Brookes defends the European missionary enterprise as "the only way in which the faith of Christ could have been brought to Africa," a continent where lust, cruelty, and "an all-pervading fear of evil spiritual forces" were mixed with a wide variety of virtues. He stresses the missionaries' faults—especially their lack of humility—along with their virtues, and concludes that they brought the City of Man to Africa along with the City of God, a combination which he seems to imply is inevitable whenever human beings are involved. The weakness of African sexual mores, the total denunciation of colonial and missionary activities, and the messianic tendencies of African political leaders, however, are anti-Christian and consequently must be resisted totally. Thus the implementation of the City of God in Africa is the highest goal for Brookes, and evils are ranked by him according to the extent to which they impede the realization of this goal. However, his City of God is a conception developed entirely in the West, and which is to be "handed over" to Africa to defend with all her ability. It is extremely unfortunate that Brookes' failure to understand the unacceptability of this doctrine to most Africans blurs his otherwise keen insights into the contemporary African situation.

In discussing the problems of his native South Africa in his second essay Brookes once again stresses the intermixing of the City of Man and the City of God. No person or ethnic group is portrayed as the villain or the hero in this tragic situation, but rather all are shown to be caught in a struggle in which compromise is impossible, at least for the time being, although there are some signs indicating that change is taking place. Boer, Briton, and Bantu alike cannot escape the seemingly logical dictates of their cultural norms and power situations. This does not mean that Brookes is unaware of the extreme injustice that the present situation entails; he portrays this injustice vividly, but has no simple cure for it. Violence is the only way to put an end to white rule in the near future, and this is not an acceptable means because it would destroy almost everything that is good in South African society. Brookes concludes that individuals must do their duty by knowing and feeling the facts, thinking with integrity, and speaking with courage, and that they must "appeal to God with Whom all things are possible." This course of action is likely to fail to preserve South Africa, but it is the most effective way to serve the City of God, and that is what really matters. Those who do not share Brookes' faith will probably consider him a defeatist and an escapist, but of course they cannot really appreciate his position as he sees it.—JAMES R. SCARRITT, *University of Colorado.*

Tunisia: The Politics of Modernization. BY CHARLES A. MICAUD WITH LEON CARL BROWN AND CLEMENT HENRY MOORE. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. Pp. xiii, 205. $6.00.)

This is a lucid, informed study of modernization when change takes place under relatively the best of terms. Such a touchstone is valuable for students of modernization regardless of area interest, especially since the authors succeed so well in clarifying the historical, social, and economic context of what is primarily a political task.

Tunisia was fortunate in the sequence of its political development, as Brown demonstrates in a fine analytical synthesis of the effects of the first fifty years of French rule. To a small, culturally rather homogeneous country long open to Mediterranean influences, French conquest in 1881 came almost bloodlessly. A local elite, which had decades earlier already generated its own reform movements, at first accepted French rule for being modern and orderly. The established Muslim elite asked only for equal opportunities in modern education, bureaucracy, and business, or at least, perpetuation of its social status. In the 1930's, the Neo-Destour under Habib Bourguiba's leadership emerged to organize a movement among a growing mass uprooted by French-inspired modernization but without rights or, often, place, in the new society. Enough time had by now passed, however, for modern standards and skills of action and justice to infuse the cadre organizing the new mass movement. Not so much time had elapsed that the nationalist movement would suffer the fate of the Wafd in Egypt—where an elite of landowners and businessmen feared to let the masses participate in political action except promiscuously, as mobs, so that the principal nationalist organization disintegrated without direct heirs when the achievement of independence revealed the absence of a national society. By the thirties, the Neo-Destour could, in fact, already count on the integral support of a trade union movement in its dual fight against Tunisian backwardness and French domination.

Moore, in the second section of this book (drawing upon a larger study being prepared for separate publication) assesses the Neo-Destour's contemporary role. The party's solidarity and organizational effectiveness were tested by clandestine and sometimes violent struggle for 16 years prior to independence in 1956. Self-sacrifice and intellectual and practical flexibility continue to be joined to a commitment to the transformation of society by way of a centralized democracy. Two quotations may help to suggest the tenor of that tutelary transformation. Bourguiba: ". . . The governor, the executive agent of the government, does not undertake projects that the citizens have not been prepared to understand, and on the other hand, the [party] commissioner, informed of these projects, works to prepare the ground. . . . The governor and the commissioner are an emanation of my person." Moore: "In contrast to the national scene, a healthy democratic political process flourishes at the local level. . . . Through its decades of experience, the party has developed a network of branches that transcend local rivalries. . . . The branches do more than mobilize the people in support of government projects; they represent the people and give them the opportunity to manage many of their local affairs."

In Tunisia, economic development was postponed while political and social change were given precedence for at least five years after independence. First came the movement of new men with new orientation into the government at all levels; the grant of legal equality to women; the secularization and expansion of education; and the redistribution of one-fourth of the arable land. Planned economic development, delayed until 1961, is now being supported by more foreign economic aid per capita than any other modernizing nation now receives. Micaud, in a concluding section, highlights Tunisia's social and economic accomplishments so far, especially in self-help and social justice, and its major remaining problems in economic investment and growth.

The three collaborators have provided us with a most useful and succinct case study in political modernization. They conclude that "so far, Tunisia has been successful in carrying out the three major tasks of modernization that are the preconditions for rapid economic growth. It has succeeded in maintaining national cohesion, in mobilizing and educating the masses, and in transforming values and structures—without losing sight of the ultimate goal of modernization, the liberation of man." But if this case study is actually to be incorporated in a broader, systematic body of knowledge, new questions will first need answers from studies yet to be made.

Since only two or three other countries in Africa and the Middle East have so far modernized themselves as successfully as Tunisia, is success dependent on all the good fortunes and deliberate policies that have marked Tunisia's transformation? That would indeed be cause for pessimism. What are the likely political costs of compensating for the possession of fewer social and economic prerequisites? Are we, perhaps, being prematurely optimistic even about Tunisia? Modernization requires a persistent will and capacity to generate and absorb continuing transformation. How can we assess the solidity of a party's commitment to such a permanent revolution, and its ability to withstand the temptation of becoming, like Mexico's ruling party, primarily an efficient instrument for political integration among new political oligarchs? For pursuing such further questions, this book also offers a very good start.—MANFRED HALPERN, *Princeton University.*

The Afrikaner's Interpretation of South African History. BY F. A. VAN JAARSVELD. (Cape Town: Simondium Publishers Ltd., 1964. Pp. 199. R 2–80.)

The range of subjects touched upon in this collection of essays is somewhat broader than is indicated by the title, but the latter quite accurately portrays the central theme of the book. In the first essay the author describes the traditional Afrikaner ideology, emphasizing its religious themes of a mission and a calling. In subsequent essays he demonstrates the influences which this ideology has had on Afrikaans historical writing, with respect to specific works and to general trends in the form and content of this writing. There is also some discussion of the influence of history on ideology in South Africa, as a necessary background for the development of the principal theme.

Van Jaarsveld sees the Afrikaner ideology and the interpretation of history based upon it as being anti-British and defensive in orientation. Historically, the Afrikaner has had to defend both his independence and his treatment of the African (Bantu) against various kinds of British interference. In order to do so, however, he first had to mould his own people into a nation, so that they could react to the British as a self-conscious and united group. It was only during the last quarter of the nineteenth century that Afrikaans-speaking people became a nation, but in their historical image-making their nationhood stemmed from the "Great Trek" of 1836–1838. In fact, virtually all of their historical writing is concerned with the Trek, the Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902, and the intervening years. As the above events were the first two great crises in Afrikaner history, Van Jaarsveld speculates that a large volume of historical material may soon be forthcoming on the third crisis—the attainment of political awareness by the non-white peoples of South Africa. Accompanying this, the author hopes, will be a great diminution of anti-English sentiment among Afrikaners, and the unity of the two white groups in South Africa.

Because the purposes of Afrikaans historical writing have been to create a national myth, and to justify the actions of the Afrikaner and condemn those of the British, this writing has tended to manifest certain stylistic characteristics. The form of many Afrikaans historical works is either a series of carefully selected documents, loosely linked by inadequate narrative, or a flight into phantasy based on virtually no reliable documentation. Also characteristic of many of these writings is the tendency to pay little attention to motives, or to the broader context within which the events being described are taking place. For example, the international situation and the role of the non-whites are usually ignored completely. The author is careful to distinguish "pre-scientific" and "scientific" historical writings, and he stresses that the latter are much less likely to commit these stylistic errors. Some subjectivity in historical writing is unavoidable, according to Van Jaarsveld, but the historian must do everything possible to eliminate avoidable subjectivity. British and Bantu historical writing in South Africa, as well as that of the Afrikaner, has generally failed to measure up to this standard.

There is nothing in this book in the way of startling or really new conclusions, but it is a well-written and cogent presentation of a theme which, as far as this reviewer knows, had not previously received the full treatment it deserves. Because the book is a collection of essays there is some repetition, as the author admits in the preface, but this detracts only in a small way from the quality of the book.—JAMES R. SCARRITT, *University of Colorado.*

The Center of the World, Communism and the Mind of China. BY ROBERT S. ELEGANT. (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1964. pp. xii, 396. $5.95)

Communist China since 1949 has perplexed all nations, large and small. Peking's relations with the Soviet Union and non-communist nations are dynamic, subtle, almost unpredictable and often explosive. Does the Chinese Communist leadership today pursue the ancient mission of "Middle Kingdom" to impose on neighbor nations its fiat and system of government? Does China simply struggle for its recognition by all free nations before it becomes less bellicose? Or is it dedicated to the ultimate universal victory of Communism with China at the center of such a protracted struggle against every nation? Mr. Elegant in his book attempts to conclude that "The Mind of China" based on Confucian ideology recognizes no equals and insists on dominating the entire world, whether China is under Chiang Kai-shek or Mao Tse-tung. The implication is that the ancient "Mind of China" repudiates and transcends Communism and the established nation-state system. This theme certainly raises a number of complicated arguments.

To suit his own purpose, the author discussed China's modern relations with the European nations since 1600 A.D. and succeeded in establishing the basis for the Chinese outrage against Western imperialism, which climaxed in the Boxer Rebellion of 1900. He also painted a picture of incredible and kaleidoscopic changes that have taken place in China since 1949. Mr. Elegant believes that "Mao and his intimates are impelled by transcendent idealism, not by blood lust" (p. 15) and it is "The Confucian state ideology which shaped the Chinese Mind" (p. 153) which is quite hospitable to Marxist utopia. Both insist that the individual is no more than a social unit molded by official indoctrination. Mao Tse-tung "Is the creature of his own past and China's past" (p. 149) and "Communism in China is as much a reaffirmation of Confucianism as it is a reaction against tradition" (p. 171). However, he believes that Mao is a "dedicated internationalist" who sees himself as the leader of the oppressed peoples everywhere and Mao insists on "Nothing less than creation of a new, world-wide political force centered on China, . . ." (p. 350).

To destroy this "Mind of China" he suggested that any Western policy towards China "should properly proceed from a realistic appraisal of the compulsion that drives China's political leaders whether they are Communists or non-communists" (p. 368). Having repudiated the current U. S. policy towards Peking, he proposed the familiar line that the U. S. should abandon Chiang Kai-shek, extend trade and diplomatic recognition to Peking and help Peking to get into the United Nations. Thus, the unconquerable "Mind of China," to this reviewer's surprise, would become suddenly curable if the Chinese Communists are "Given the opportunities to understand the nature of the real world, so that they may stop fighting the devils of their own imagining" (p. 374).

To this reviewer, there are in his book a number of inaccurate comparisons, assertions and conflicting contentions. First of all, the "Mind of China" based on Confucianism did not always require conquest of neighbor states. Nor did it imply China's concern for oppressed peoples around it. It was nothing more than a Chinese sense of superiority. For centuries, the Middle Kingdom sought peace among neighbors through its tributary system which was based on China's superior power to pacify the battling neighbors if necessary. It is, therefore, erroneous for the author to identify the "Mind of China" with the present Communist compulsion for conquest. Secondly, the "Mind of China," if it can be correctly defined at all, underwent many revisions and transformations. The dynastic-Confucian ideology came under many internal attacks and repudiations since at least the May 4th Movement in 1919. Mr. Elegant should not resurrect the long-desserted Confucian ideology to justify Mao Tse-tung's compulsion for conquest. Confucian idealism and Marxist utopia are different in kind and degree, even though both are authoritarian and dogmatic.

It is self-contradictory for Mr. Elegant to consider Mao Tse-tung as both prudent and "Incapable of setting any limit to his ambitions" (p. 191). Recent facts have proved that the Chinese Communists are quite cautious but esoteric in their foreign policy strategy. For example, Peking has not provoked America in the Formosan Strait since 1958. Nor has it honored its announced revenge against the recent American action in the Bay of Tonkin in North Vietnam. In 1962, Peking narrowed its military action against India. It is, therefore, inaccurate to conclude that Mao "is incapable of setting any limit to his ambitions." In my mind, China today behaves just like any big resurgent nation until held back by a superior counterforce. Furthermore, it is grossly wrong for Mr. Elegant to lump together and in the same degree Professor Hu Shih, Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung as products of the same "Mind of China." They have been very different in their thoughts and actions, even though all have registered protest against Western imperialism in China.

In the author's own words, if the Peking regime has produced an "Equality of deprivation" (p. 4) and the regime is "thwarted by its own inefficiency, by popular resistance and by the law of nature" (p. 191) and if the 1958 introduction of agrarian commune system did produce "The breakdown of authority demoralized- not only the masses, but the cadres, too" (p. 299), the Peking regime would seem quite weak internally, and similar crises may recur again. Internal failures will always discourage Mao's ambitions abroad. In short, the author is apparently deluded by his contention that through concession and appeasement the West can remove Mao's compulsion for revenge. Contemporary history has not verified such contention as presented.

Finally, the "Mind of China" does not exist any more. The hostile behavior of China can be fully explained by reasons that the author fails to see clearly. As a have-not but ambitious nation, China is not prepared to accept the international status quo within the context of cold war politics. The "Mind of China" is merely a sophisticated fiction created by the author.—DAVID W. CHANG, *Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh.*

A Curtain of Ignorance: How the American Public Has Been Misinformed about China. BY FELIX GREENE. (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1964. Pp. xix, 340. $5.50.)

Felix Greene cogently denounces "the press, the experts, and . . . public officials" for having transmitted to the American people a distorted picture of Communist China—a picture which "the best intelligence in our own country knows is not true," but which "governs our actions" (p. xiii). The major thrust of his attack on the press and the experts is that their reportage "was bound to increase our hostility and fear of China and could in no way deepen our understanding of her. . . . The standard in both these professions has been appalling" (p. 321). He reaffirms, for the total American reportage on China, the conclusions reached by Walter Lippmann and Charles Merz in 1920 concerning the treatment of the Russian revolution by the *New York Times:* that it has been "nothing short of disaster," that the net effect has been "almost always misleading, and misleading news is worse than none at all. . . . " No one can seriously disagree with his conclusions. Greene's role is that of the crusading prosecutor, and his polemic is frankly written to stimulate some improvement in the situation. He uses the horrible example rather than the controlled sample to support his argument, and in so doing invites some doctoral candidate in political science to bring scientific methods and techniques to bear for a more measured analysis of Greene's thesis.

Greene begins early in the century to show how missionaries and business men first shaped an American image of China, followed by the creation of a negative image of the China of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang, which was subsequently reshaped by media under influence of the "China lobby" into a favorable image. For the Communist period, he deals with broad themes (recurrent "starvation" and "slavery," mythical representations of Chinese intentions with respect to territorial expansion, intentions with respect to nuclear weapons, etc.) and with specific issues (the wishful invention of secret codicils to the Sino-Soviet agreements of 1950, assumptions of Chinese "aggression" in Tibet and on the Indian borders, misrepresentations of life in the people's communes, etc.). As informal "controls," he uses the reportage from sources he considers more reliable, his personal judgments based on three visits to Communist China and a continuing correspondence with people in Peking, and the logic of reason and contradictions. In particular, he has searched out the patently loaded editorial judgments passed along as parts of news content. He summarizes the principal factors contributing to the prevalent American myths about China as follows: (1) preventing people from seeing for themselves; (2) ignoring accurate information that is available; (3) dissemination of editorialized or imagined "news" from such "listening posts" as Hong Kong and Tokyo; (4) the press practice of reporting official government pronouncements as statements of reality (i.e., "statements emanating from governments or political movements should not be taken as factually correct by an independent press" (p. 302)); (5) the use of headlines misrepresentative of actual story content; and (6) misrepresentative use of photographs, cartoons and captions (illustrated). The indictment is a formidable one, and Greene appeals to the conscience of the journalistic profession to set matters aright.

American, and to some extent British, scholars are also brought under fire. Passages are taken from the works of such men as John K. Fairbank, Robert C. North and A. Doak Barnett to illustrate the intermixing of editorial judgments with portrayals of factual and policy situations. *China Quarterly* (London) is taken to task for publishing Joseph Alsop's imaginings ("On China's Descending Spiral," July–September 1962), but Greene is even more pitiless in condemning the scholars who responded to the Alsop article in a later issue of *China Quarterly:* "All but one treated [it] . . . as a contribution worthy of scholarly discussion" (p. 186). Greene sets a high standard of objectivity for them; in effect, he is saying: "Write about what you *know* about, deal with the facts, avoid moralizing." Unfortunately, western academic specialists on China stand exposed to the cross fires of political environment and conflicting value systems, and some handle the data with greater discrimination than others; Greene insists they should eschew such adjectives as: "frightful," "diabolical," "brutal," "Machiavellian," "slavish," "totalitarian," etc., when they feel called upon to judge Chinese Communist actions. The leading scholars in the field (including many of those named by Mr. Greene) are fully cognizant of the problems of research on contemporary China, are deliberately working to develop schemata that will tighten research and make it more meaningful, and are painfully aware that they are often separated from the necessary sources of information and have no opportunities for field investigation. Even Mr. Greene's three visits to China have not saved him from occasionally misinterpreting what he saw. The scholars who read Greene will certainly question themselves, and the validity of his charges against individuals; but the blanket indictment may be too sweeping: many of the scholars named who have used the objectionable adjectives have also contributed to the "accurate information" that is too often ignored. Greene has searched for horrible examples, not for balances.—H. ARTHUR STEINER, *University of California (Los Angeles).*

An Instance of Treason: Ozaki and the Sorge Spy Ring. BY CHALMERS JOHNSON. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1964. Pp. 278. $6.50.)

How timely! On September 4, 1964, the Soviet Union finally acknowledged the remarkable work of the Sorge spy ring which had been broken up by the Japanese police 23 years earlier. The task of Richard Sorge, Communist of German-Russian parents who posed as a Nazi and had become a correspondent and German Embassy confidant, had been successfully completed in the fall of 1941 before his arrest. He had assured the Soviet Union that Japan was about to strike south and not against Siberia. Earlier he had predicted Hitler's attack on Russia to within two days, had reported Japanese intentions during the critical Changkufeng and Nomonhan border clashes, and had supplied voluminous other valuable intelligence. There is much speculation as to why the Soviet Union should have acknowledged the ring at this time. One theory is that the Kremlin wants to court the Japanese intellectuals who have long admired Sorge and especially his Japanese collaborator Ozaki Hotsumi without whom he could not have succeeded. As the *Asahi* newspaper's brilliant China expert, Ozaki had become close to the figures surrounding Prince Konoye who headed the government during the crucial period before General Tojo took over. This book explains the Japanese intellectuals' admiration for Ozaki and Sorge and much more.

Although the Japanese authorities had made some public statements on the Sorge case as early as 1942, the Russians quashed any mention of it during the Tokyo war crimes trials. Since then, however, a flood of reminiscences, articles, and even novels and motion pictures have appeared. Foreign attention was attracted in 1949 by an American Occupation report, followed in 1952 by publication of *Shanghai Conspiracy: The Sorge Spy Ring* by Charles A. Willoughby, General MacArthur's intelligence chief, whose book displays biases typical of the McCarthyite period and contains numerous misromanizations and other inaccuracies pointed out by Dr. Johnson, who is an assistant professor at the University of California (Berkeley). Publication of the (almost) complete police and court records did not occur until 1962 when the first three volumes of the *Gendai-shi Shiryo* (Materials on Modern History), totaling 1,835 pages, were devoted to the Sorge incident by the reputable Misuzu Shobo publishing firm. Supplementing this with Ozaki's writings and other materials in Japanese, Chinese, German, Russian, and English, Dr. Johnson has written a reliable, objective, and, in fact, fascinating study.

Johnson explains the admiration for Ozaki from the fact that he was not only an outstanding political analyst but an influential participant in Japanese politics who sought to avoid the oncoming disaster for Japan. Ozaki's published articles and books on Japan's China policies and the rise of Chinese nationalism have amazingly withstood the test of time. Through them and through his high personal connections, Ozaki "tried to warn his government—as did many other Japanese intellectuals—of the folly of a policy of aggression; but he also took independent action, through Sorge, to affect international politics in a way he thought would cushion the probable failure of the liberals' efforts." (p. 128) Many Japanese since the war have felt guilty for not having done more to fight against the prewar trend toward war; they admire Ozaki for staking his life on what he believed. If he was a "traitor," it was for the most patriotic of reasons. (p. 3) And yet the painful irony of it was that, because he had to hide his true intentions, his writings may have helped the militarists.

Despite its comprehensiveness, Dr. Johnson's book is constructively controversial, for many implications and unanswered questions remain. It nevertheless goes a long way toward putting this important case in its proper place in studies on modern Japan, on Japanese-German-Soviet relations leading to the outbreak of war, and on the revaluation of espionage in terms of its context, objectives, and results.—GEORGE O. TOTTEN, *Eastern Michigan Universly.*

The Political Institutions of Modern China. BY WILLIAM L. TUNG. (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964. Pp. xiii, 408.)

Modern China for Professor Tung is 20th century China and political institutions are whatever their enabling acts—whether constitutions, organic laws, statutes, regulations or articles—say they are. After describing the erosion of Ch'ing authority in a brief introduction, he divides his attention in the body of his study in roughly a two-to-one ratio between the Republican (Nationalist) and Communist phases of Chinese politics. Attached to the study are sixty pages of appendixes that provide the reader eight constitutions (between 1908 and 1954) for easy reference.

Professor Tung clearly writes from first-hand as much as from second-hand knowledge. Like many of his compatriots during the hopeful years of Kuomintang ascendancy, he combined academic pursuits with government service at different levels and in various roles. He was, for instance, Chairman of the first Municipal Council in Peiping (1933). During World War II he was a Counselor of the Supreme National Defence Council. More recently he has been on several faculties in this country and presently teaches at Queens College, City University of New York. Given this background one senses the strictures within which the scholar and erstwhile government functionary of his generation writes about Chinese politics. He is to a degree literally—much more figuratively—surrounded by colleagues and echoes of the past that impinge on the present in ways Westerners cannot fully understand. History holds him, and others like him, hostage for a ransom that can probably never be paid. At the same time, he is detached enough to recognize the Communist incarnation of his nation and culture for what it is and to incline toward describing certain of its political features with a realism that is sure to raise the hackles of extreme anti-Communists. Both systems, Republican and Communist, are described with notable dispassion when one considers that the observer was a responsible official in one.

The study moves chronologically and systematically from "From Autocracy to Democracy" at the end of the Ch'ing to "The Government of 'Democratic Centralism' " under Mao's regime. The most recent reference is August 1962. The author sets forth the structural design of central, provincial, and local governments in considerable detail at every stage including opposition (Southern) regimes during the warlord era and Communist governments in the 20s and 30s. This record goes farther than most descriptions of modern Chinese political institutions in detailing rules and regulations. And it sets this full catalogue of constitutions and statutes in a framework of historical discourse that provides at least an impressionistic sense of development and a clue to reasons for changing political designs.

For this reviewer, however, the study serves mainly to reinforce the long-standing awareness among most students of modern Chinese history and politics that the relation between the formal structures and the actual dynamics of Chinese political development has been far more incidental than integral and causal. There is ample evidence of Chinese interest in both the theoretical and practical aspects of constitutionalism. It was a major theme in the declining years of the dynasty among "self-strengtheners" who thought they had found a key in Western constitutions to Western wealth and power. It was more a descant than a theme during the long years of the Peking government between 1912 and 1928, though it continued to be the only generally accepted mark of legitimacy for whoever claimed authority for the moment. Successive Chinese governments have stacked constitutions one upon another down to the present as public records of shifting schematic arrangements of authority and power. As they have been stacked, they have been studied. Witness the number of constitutional analyses by Chinese historians and students of government. In a sense, this descriptive analysis of Professor Tung's is one more attestation to the fascination constitutions seem to hold for Chinese social scientists.

But these studies also attest to one of the most fundamental differences between Western and Asian politics. The West has long held it axiomatic that constitutions, basically, confirm rather than create actual political arrangements. Western constitutions have evolved where there were already working relations among major community interests, where power was already tamed in some measure by responsibility, and, most important, where there was a reliable consensus on central values and social goals. The most durable constitutions have only given design to political substance already in being. By contrast, Chinese scholars like Chinese politicians seem to have assumed that constitutions could be imposed on political chaos with the expectation that order could thus be wrested from disorder, that constitutions could be relied on to create a consensus on goals and values where none existed. Professor Tung appears, at least, to support this misconception of the function of constitutions, particularly in his assessment of the Republic. He describes in meticulous detail how institutions were organized at all levels by organic laws, regulations, and constitutions. And he would have us infer that they worked—except in those instances where he acknowledges specifically that they did not. We are also left to infer that this institutional approach to Chinese politics gives us meaningful insights into their dynamics, though he gives us no help in spelling them out.

This is acutely disappointing in the face of teasing remarks here and there that suggest that he could, if he would, assist us rank outsiders very considerably in our efforts to understand Chinese politics, particularly of the turbulent era between 1912 and 1949. The farther this period recedes into history and the more we are forced to rely on archival records, the more distorted becomes our view of the Republican interlude. Herewith, then, an appeal to our Chinese colleagues of Professor Tung's generation and comparable experience: "Come out of the archives; forsake the sterile formalism of paper institutions; and tell us something about the politics of this fascinating and critically important transitional period!"—MELVILLE T. KENNEDY, JR., *Bryn Mawr College.*

Indonesia. BY BRUCE GRANT. (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, Distributed in London and New York by Cambridge University Press, 1964. Pp. x, 190. $5.50.)

The journalist can ofttimes provide insights into political life which both add color and background to the more academic work of a political scientist. This is particularly true if he has spent considerable time in an area visited by the academician only sporadically. Southeast Asia has been well covered in recent years by journalists such as Ronald Stead of the *Christian Science Monitor* and David Halberstam of the *New York Times*. Most recently a number of books have appeared written by correspondents interpreting personal experiences (such as Robert Trumbull's *The Scrutable East*) or analyzing specific aspects of politics (such as Arnold Brackman's study of Indonesian Communism). In the book under review Bruce Grant, an Australian correspondent, has leaned on his fourteen trips to Indonesia to provide a very readable general survey of that nation's political attitudes and problems.

This is not a scholarly book and makes no pretence of being one. In his preface the author asserts that, "As I am not a scholar this is not a scholarly work. The information is often raw and the judgements made without reference to previous authority." (p. vi). Mr. Grant does not use footnotes although he does allude to authorities such as Geertz, Kahin and Feith. However, the basic inability of the reader to check sources, when combined with infrequent cases of an apparent mixture of fact and myth, limits the volume's usefulness to the scholar.

The book itself is a survey of Indonesia's history, politics and culture, mixing straight historical and biographical accounts with personal observations on policies and personalities. It is sympathetic to the Indonesian revolution, empathetic with its political leadership and rather hostile towards Dutch colonial rule. At the same time it is generally critical of contemporary Indonesian political and economic policies. Beyond providing a readable introduction to the country to the general public, it does have marginal value to the scholar in the field insofar as the material results from the author's personal background and files. In this vein, two particularly interesting chapters deal with Australia's relations with Indonesia and a compilation of interviews with six anonymous Indonesians. While the latter does not pretend to be a scientific sampling, the conversations in themselves are intriguing insights into the attitudes of various individuals in the Indonesian "elite."

This book will not provide much that is new to the student of Southeast Asia who will find its use primarily of an anecdotal nature. At the same time, the paucity of responsible information on Indonesia is such that we should welcome contributions of journalists such as Mr. Grant.—FRED R. VON DER MEHDEN, *University of Wisconsin.*

✓ *Politics of Change in Latin America.* EDITED BY JOSEPH MAIER AND RICHARD W. WEATHERHEAD. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. Pp. x, 258. $6.00.)

The Challenge of Development in Latin America. BY VÍCTOR L. URQUIDI. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. Pp. xiv, 209. $6.00; Paper $1.95.)

Among the flood of recent books on Latin America a major theme running through a preponderance of them deals with political, economic, and social change. The long-time stagnation of so much of hemisphere life is being disrupted by efforts toward economic modernization. And the ascendancy to political power of groups bent on attacking traditionalism gains especial significance in the Chilean presidential elections of 1964 when the winning Christian Democrats promised "Revolution with Freedom." Thus, it seems certain that fundamental alterations of the old order are inexorable and the major uncertainty involves normative questions—what should be the methodology, the guide lines, and directions. In *Politics of Change in Latin America* the authors turn to various aspects of contemporary processes of change, while Víctor Urquidi, in his *Challenge of Development in Latin America,* seeks to outline the essentials of economic issues.

Urquidi, an outstanding Mexican economist of international reputation, combines the vital attributes of the theorist and activist. Unlike so many Latin American writers who view their economies with a certain hopelessness, Urquidi believes that, compared with central Africa and much of Southeast Asia, in Latin America there exist far more "positive than negative factors." But these positive factors primarily relate to Latin America as a whole rather than to single nations and the apparent economic divergencies among them. In other words, he makes a strongly insistent appeal to these countries to consider themselves as members of "*a* Latin America and *a* Latin American economy."

The components of similarity include a population that is essentially young and expanding faster than any other area of the world; a majority of the people living in rural environments and largely engaged in agriculture and livestock raising; an average living standard that is low—with a gross product per person about one-eighth of the United States in 1960 and on a par with Japan, though approximately four times greater than that of central Africa and five times more than that of underdeveloped Asia; an impressive acceleration in industrial output that lamentably has been offset by a slump in the growth of agricultural production; and severely uneven income distribution which acts as a drag on economic development.

Once he explores these characteristics, Urquidi uncovers the many facets of the Latin American economy in general. He points out and explains the uniqueness of this region with its long periods of financial confusion; the role of foreign capital which has been invested with visible results at the same time that Latin America "has employed part of its own resources in unproductive activities, consumer expenditures, and even exports of its capital to more developed countries"; development's retardation due to the instability of international market conditions for primary products; and the social and institutional conditions of development, economic integration, and planning. In his final chapter the author discusses the Alliance for Progress. Since his evaluations really apply to the pre-Alliance economies of Latin America—Urquidi's book being a translation of lectures given in 1961 at the Colegio Nacional of Mexico—his main observation is one of optimism. He reminds us that at Punta del Este the United States recognized Latin American concepts of what was needed without tying the rest of the hemisphere completely to itself. At the same time, the U. S. recognized the necessity of economic planning (rather than urging dependence upon private foreign capital) and for the first time accepted the premise that Latin America's overall problem of social and economic development begs integral solutions. He concludes by commenting on the possibility that "Latin America never before has enjoyed a combination of external circumstances so favorable to converting its utopias into reality."

For the most part, the thirteen contributions to *Politics of Change in Latin America* are outstanding and seek to shed some new light on the vital subject suggested in the title. In the first segment, "The Forces of Change and Continuity," Weatherhead opens with an excellent introduction to paradoxes in the Latin American tradition of conflict. He tackles such theses and antitheses by setting out four propositions: "(1) the ideal of hemispheric unity and the reality of particularistic disunity, (2) the quest for a distinct national character and the curse of insignificance in the modern world, (3) the nineteenth century legacy and the revolutionary mystique, and (4) the dream of democracy and the practice of tyranny." Richard Morse and Arturo Uslar-Pietri consider ontological questions regarding Latin America's search for self-identity—the latter stressing the wrongness in generalizing about Latin America (hence, running somewhat counter to Urquidi's insistence that Latin America *must* consider itself as a single economic entity).

In Part Two, "The Political Puzzle," Arthur Whitaker outlines the strength and universality of nationalism among the twenty republics; Robert Alexander defines modern political party systems using as his typology traditionalistic, foreign-inspired, and indigenous parties of change; and two authors (Daniel Cosío Villegas and Stanley Ross) seek to unravel the perplexities of modern Mexico. Cosío Villegas contends that the Mexican Revolution developed built-in "forces of renewal and change," though the final revolutionary stage lies ahead. The fact that this last phase is still to come favors the Mexican Left just as the Left, albeit full of shortcomings, is indispensable to Mexican progress. Professor Ross also ponders the Revolution, but adds a special warning to the U. S. to understand our great neighbor's history and, above all, to "recognize what the Russians already appreciate—namely, that the Mexican Revolution, by its achievement of social progress while maintaining freedom, offers a meaningful alternative to revolution Communist-style."

Brazil dominates the third section. Gilberto Freyre reiterates his belief in the necessity of studying "the intimate past of a social group"—in this instance, the role of the patriarchal family in Brazil's history. Charles Wagley picks up the threads from the point of the traditional family's deterioration and goes on to make a case for the still powerful function of kinship in contemporary economic, social, and political life. But it is Anthony Leeds who performs particularly valuable yeoman service by shattering myths current in the United States about Francisco Julião. Leeds argues with great persuasiveness that Julião does not hold the influence generally attributed to him, that he is in fact a *latifundista* himself and a member of the controlling class. Furthermore, his principal motivation in tying himself to the masses is not altruistic but instead an attempt to secure an electoral base that will strengthen his own political career as well as to use this base against the powerful coastal sugar interests and traditional local leaders.

Finally, in "Challenges to the Western Hemisphere," three chapters are devoted to the need for the United States to put its racial house in order so that our image will improve in Latin America (Joseph Maier), the importance of emphasizing the first word of "Alliance for Progress" in place of "aid" (Germán Arciniegas), and certain misunderstandings besetting the Alliance for Progress (Víctor Urquidi).

All in all, both of these books merit wide attention. Urquidi's has the advantage of continuity and an integrated thesis. Whereas sometimes it is difficult to ascertain the pertinence of a given chapter to Maier and Weatherhead's general theme and a couple of chapters merely rehash old stories. Nevertheless, it does comprise some exceptionally worthy discussions. Both books acknowledge the considerable contributions of Professor Frank Tannenbaum to Latin American scholarship. And in the aggregate, the writing style, content, and choice of theme fall in the dynamic Tannenbaum tradition.—BEN G. BURNETT, *Whittier College.*

Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems: Contributions to Comparative Political Sociology. Transactions of the Westermarck Society, Vol. X. ED. BY ERIK ALLARDT AND YRJÖ LITTUNEN. (Helsinki: distributed by the Academic Bookstore, 1964. Pp. 463.)

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INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW AND ORGANIZATION

The Law of International Waterways—With Particular Regard to Interoceanic Canals. By R. R. Baxter, with the Research Assistance of Jan F. Triska. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964. Pp. vii, 371. $9.50.)

This is an important and impressive book. While it is not a book to skim, it is likewise not one to abandon before completion. Professor Baxter of the Harvard Law School, with the research assistance of Dr. Jan F. Triska of Stanford University, has succeeded in presenting with authority and clarity the results of an intensive study of an intricate subject. The reader's interest is stimulated by attention to major crises rooted in conflicting national interests concerning international waterways. Interest is maintained by skillful reference to other pertinent events as well as by citation of a wealth of documentary material. Not only is this the first comprehensive overview of the subject; for some time to come it is likely to remain the definitive work. Had the book existed at the time of the 1956 Suez affair, it can be hazarded that confusion, official and unofficial, would have been less. It is to be hoped that the work will contribute to formulation of sophisticated proposals and policies in disputes and difficulties looming on the horizon.

In the context of existing international law concerning navigation through international rivers and straits Professor Baxter focusses on the law and institutions devised to operate or supervise interoceanic canals, in particular the three major canals: Suez, Panama and Kiel. That law he sees as the outgrowth of state practice, treaties and adjudication. With the objective of maintaining free passage through these important commercial channels the developing law has placed restrictions on territorial sovereigns, operating or supervisory agencies, and users. Believing the time ripe for codification of these rules in the interests of greater precision and more widespread acceptance, Professor Baxter in an Appendix puts forth the essentials of such a code. Though he examines the organization, range of competence and functions of a possible international administering agency for interoceanic canals, he concludes that the continuing, gradual development of a body of customary international law is a more hopeful means of pursuing the objective of maximum free passage than is internationalization in the present political environment.

The elements of Professor Baxter's proposed code are probed in successive chapters concerned with the operation of interoceanic canals, passage in time of peace and in time of war, fiscal controls, and technical problems (dredging, maintaining locks, pilotage, towage, traffic control, and labor).

The suggested draft regulations are pragmatic and conservative. Admitting the difficulty of enforcing them in crises, Professor Baxter relies on self-interest to induce compliance. Crises are however, rooted in the conflicting interests of territorial sovereign, operator and users, when these are or involve different states as in the cases of Suez and Panama. It is this fact plus the political and military interests of states in none of these categories that establish the concern of the international community not only in the just resolution of differences but also in the uninterrupted flow of traffic through these vital arteries. The Suez crisis clearly showed the inadequacy of existing international institutions in both these respects and a Panama crisis may repeat the lesson.

Professor Baxter's cautious look to the future is undeniably solidly grounded in past experience. He is probably realistic in depreciating expectation of accomplishment by international organs under present conditions. But tomorrow's law is necessarily a response to today's problems. Increasingly effective institutions and the growth of community consensus are no less interrelated internationally than domestically. From so comprehensive and meticulous a study a few imaginative guideposts to more effective community organs and procedures might not unreasonably have emerged.—Ruth C. Lawson, *Mount Holyoke College.*

Maroc 1943–1956: Le Conflit Franco-Marocain. By Stéphane Bernard. (Brussells: Institut de Sociologie de l'Université Libre de Bruxelles, 1963: 3 vols. 390, 286, 402 pages. 900 FB for the 3 vols.)

This ambitious work is the second of a series of four monographs sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in an effort to contribute on a general theory of international conflicts. The author has divided his study into three parts: the first book is a history of the Franco-Moroccan conflict, the second a description of institutions and social groups involved in the conflict, and the third, the "pièce de résistance" that concerns us here, is an attempt to extract from the Moroccan experience a political theory of colonial conflicts.

The theory is based on both a functional analysis (the inability of a colonial system to solve crucial problems) and an analysis of the relations between key variables—situations, attitudes, political decisions. Underlying it is the acceptance of a political determinism that stresses the "simple cleavage" separating the anticolonialism of the subjected people and the conservatism of the "*colons*"—the only anomalous elements being the conservatism of Moroccan "notables" and the liberalism of a small fraction of the French settlers. The deterministic sequence can be briefly summed up: new conditions create new attitudes and ideologies, all of which tend to restrict the potential authority of the government. Past a certain point, this authority lapses, as it becomes impossible to use force as a substitute for the lost consensus. The incapacity of the French government and of the "Résidence," prisoner of the *colons* and the colonial administrators, to find constructive solutions to the crisis soon led to an impasse that forced the nationalists to armed opposition. The author wisely points out that the revolutionary war alone could not force a decision; "elle n'est que l'argument central de la constellation de forces matérielles, politiques et morales qui finiront par décider la métropole à abandonner la lutte, mais qui seraient inopérantes si le nationalisme local reconçait à l'usage de la force" (p. 124).

To this reviewer, the major drawback of Mr. Bernard's methodology is that it does not give him a particularly useful framework for selecting and integrating relevant data. It even seems to relieve him from carefully examining some basic assumptions and from marshalling facts to support his argumentation. Thus the assumption of a deterministic sequence is complemented by the convenient concept of the appearance of "virtual" nationalist attitudes as the result of new conditions. These virtual attitudes need to be translated into actual ones by leaders and organizations, but their very existence makes the role of leadership and organization secondary and allows the author to avoid analyzing the mechanics of the acquisition of new attitudes by various social groups.

Very little is being said about the composition of the revolutionary elites and their roles in converting urban, and much later, rural masses. Only scant allusions are made to the "complex sociological structure" of the first activist nucleus, to the entry upon the scene of Western educated leaders or to the role of the trade unions. Urban nationalism is briefly characterized as the specific protest of those groups most directly affected by the consequences of colonialism. But nothing specific is said about the "new conditions" that were to create new attitudes.

The basic error of the colonialists, according to the author, is their belief that the determinant factor in the situation was the action of revolutionists on politically neutral masses incapable of spontaneous action. The colonialist thesis thus called for the elimination of the legal fictions of the Treaty of Fez and the imprisonment of the nationalist leaders. "L'erreur de l'autorité française est d'avoir cru que les révolutions sont faites par des chefs . . . En révolution, l'adversaire n'est pas le chef révolutionnaire, c'est la masse organisée" (p. 99). But what are the "organized masses"? Are they to be identified with what is otherwise described as elites, "noyau irréductible," "minorité active"? Why assume the spontaneous reflex of a "masse en mal de révolution"? It was not, after all, until 1955, when victory seemed assured by the return to power of Mohammed V that the rural masses, some 80 per cent of the population, began to follow the nationalist leaders.

Mr. Bernard rightly points out that the logic of the situation favored the growth of a revolutionary nationalist movement in Morocco and at the same time the successful holding operation of the conservatives in both France and, for obvious reasons, in Morocco. But why dismiss the concept of consensus, that is central to his explanation of the political evolution of Morocco, when it comes to explaining the political impotence of the French Left and why replace it with the questionable concept of "social integration" to account for the absence of a powerful left wing movement of decolonization? According to the author decisions favorable to the *status quo* and to the recourse to force were inevitable in the French context, the crisis of the regime playing only a minor role. Yet a decision was easily found in 1956 to both the Moroccan and the Tunisian crises with a minimum of resistance from the Right. This decision was not due, as the author suggests, solely to the admission of defeat and to the need to concentrate French military efforts in Algeria.

The bibliography ignores most of the relevant non-French sources.—CHARLES A. MICAUD, *University of Denver.*

The Universal Postal Union: Coordinator of the International Mails. BY GEORGE A. CODDING, JR. (New York: New York University Press, 1964. Pp. xiii, 296. $6.50.)

Although even today one occasionally hears it suggested that the United States Post Office should be turned over to private enterprise, it appears that the delivery of the mails is among the oldest of government enterprises dating back at least to about 2000 B.C. in ancient Egypt. Throughout the centuries it became generally recognized as an appropriate government function, and finally, more than 100 years ago, became established everywhere as a government monopoly. The necessity for special arrangements to expedite the delivery of mail across national borders was also recognized early, the first postal treaty (between France and Spain) being negotiated in 1601; this was followed by numerous bilateral postal conventions between the various states, but their lack of uniformity made it evident that something more was needed to bring order out of chaos. Various individuals and groups made proposals for an international postal system, but it was Lincoln's Postmaster General, Montgomery Blair, who initiated the procedures that brought agreement in 1863 on the basic principles and finally the creation in 1874 of the General Postal Union (later called the Universal Postal Union).

The detailed story of these developments and of the operation of the Universal Postal Union is told in this book, in seven chapters. The author spent considerable time at the UPU headquarters in Geneva, he is also something of an expert in the field of international communications, and his account may be considered authoritative as well as interesting. The Universal Postal Union is particularly significant as the second oldest international governmental organization, being preceded only by the International Telegraph Union (now the International Telecommunications Union). It had therefore to be set up without experience as a guide, and its experience has become over the years a useful guide for other international organizations. It has grown in membership from 21 in 1874 to 123 in 1964, exceeded only by the World Meteorological Organization (125), another even more technical organization. Its size and its persistence are, no doubt, due to these somewhat unique features of its organization and operation: (1) It is technical and administrative in its purposes and functions, and about as nonpolitical as it is possible to be. (2) Colonies and overseas territories have been admitted to membership on an equality with sovereign states. This was changed in 1947 to permit generally only sovereign states in the future, but with dependent areas still admissible by special action, all of which is in conformity to the rapid dwindling away of colonial or non-self-governing territories. (3) The procedure of admission has been very easy, a simple declaration of adherence only being required until this also was changed in 1947 to the requirement of two-thirds approval by the members. (4) The organization has been quite simple, with no continuing organs whose activities could be seriously curtailed by war or other international conflict. On the other hand, the UPU was, of course, affected by both World Wars, the free flow of mail being restricted in various ways by the belligerents. But the existence of UPU and its location in neutral Switzerland made it possible for its International Bureau (or secretariat) to function continuously throughout the wars and for the Organization to renew its activities immediately after the cessation of hostilities.

The author examines also the relationship of the UPU to the League of Nations and the United Nations, respectively. In the case of the former, Article 24 of the Covenant clearly contemplated that the UPU, as well as other existing international organizations, should be brought under the direction of the League. This was not accomplished for various reasons, the most important being that consent of the contracting parties was required. The author manages to avoid direct mention of the United States in this connection, but the implication is pretty clear that we were the chief obstacle. With the establishment of the United Nations, the UPU could no longer hold out against absorption into the larger organization as a Specialized Agency, but it did secure provisions that maintain its relative independence over that of most other Specialized Agencies. The problems, advantages, and disadvantages that arise under the system are fully examined by the author.

This is a good book, scholarly and readable. There are four annexes of useful information, an extensive bibliography, and an index.—CLARENCE A. BERDAHL, *University of Illinois.*

The Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order. BY RICHARD A. FALK. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 1964. Pp. xvi, 184. $6.50.)

Professor Falk's carefully reasoned book is a contribution to the work in the Procedural Aspects of International Law under the auspices of Syracuse University School of Law's International Legal Studies Program. It is "a search for a conception of domestic judicial function that is broad enough to acknowledge the national setting and to explain the duty of upholding international law" (p. 170). This conception must come within a framework which is based on the following two factors: (1) "International law exists in a social system that possesses weak central institutions" (p. ix), and (2) "Domestic courts must struggle to become their own masters in international law cases" (p. x).

He develops the dual responsibility of national courts: the status of domestic courts as national institutions, and the status of domestic courts as agents upholding the international order. In the domestic field the court is a national institution maintaining the legal order. In the international field the domestic court is an international agent applying international law in order that the international legal order may be maintained. The domestic court, however, may be bound by the Act of State doctrine when it has a case under its jurisdiction involving international law. The author desires to have the domestic court divorced from an executive decree when it acts as an international agent. He thinks the act of state doctrine must apply to the courts only in those situations where there is no global concensus in making a substantive rule of law. When there is a global concensus, the court must be free of the act of state doctrine. He says, "The courts must not play dead when the executive chooses to act" (p. 160). It is his viewpoint that "A domestic court operates at that peculiarly sensitive point where national and international authority intersect. The character of this intersection is closely connected with the role that can be given to law in world politics" (p. 170).

National courts, acting as agents, have an added responsibility in upholding the international legal order because "States continue to be unwilling to entrust international tribunals with reliable and regular adjudicatory competence; the result is that domestic courts are often the only judicial institution likely to adjudge the legality of important controversies about the application of international law" (p. 172). He directs his argument primarily at the judicial behavior of the courts in the United States, and he thinks that if the national courts were free to apply the rules of international law without restraint, it would involve some sacrifice on our part but it would be trivial in comparison with the sacrifice we appear so ardently to make in order to uphold our obligations of self-defense. Numerous cases are discussed in depth, and special attention is given to such landmarks as: *Banco Nacional de Cuba* vs. *Sabbatino* (a significant portion of his book is devoted to a critical evaluation of the majority and minority opinions of this case), *Rich* vs. *Naviera Vacuba S.A.*, *Bernstein* vs. *Van Heyghen*

Societe Anonyme, and *United States* vs. *Pink*. (See the excellent list of cases, pp. 179–181.)

In addition, the United States, because of her peculiar position in world affairs, has a definite responsibility as well as a golden opportunity to lead the way toward the settlement of controversies involving international law in domestic courts with the courts acting more like international than national agents in upholding the international legal order. It is the duty of our courts to help fill the institutional vacuum, and it is essential for our courts to work toward a common methodology that would lead to a uniform pattern of outcomes and explanations. This is possible because "Domestic Courts have extensive experience with problems of balancing the claims of the forum against the claims of foreign states that have an interest in the outcome of a legal dispute" (p. 173). It is the author's argument in his book that particular attention must be given to the horizontal structure of international society, to a dominant convergence of values, especially in the human rights field, and to a dominant divergence in the area of economic policy. He concludes his work with the plea that domestic courts accept as their role: "First, as complete an independence of executive policy as possible; second, an extensive deference in areas of diversity, together with a considerable aggressiveness in areas of concensus" (p. 177).

This book is coolly reasoned, carefully documented, and scholarly written. In his concern with judicial deference to executive authority in American courts he has the satisfaction of seeing his reasoning primarily accepted by the Supreme Court in the famous case *Banco Nacional de Cuba* vs. *Sabbatino*. In fact, a deserving tribute is contained in the statement by Rickard B. Lillich, in his Foreword to the book, when he suggested, "After reading the book, re-read the Supreme Court's opinion in *Sabbatino* to see Professor Falk's jurisprudence in action" (p. ix).—JAMES A. GATHINGS, *Bucknell University*.

Empire by Treaty: Britain and the Middle East in the Twentieth Century. BY M. A. FITZSIMONS. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1964. Pp. xiv, 235. $6.00.)

Professor Fitzsimons' title is hardly descriptive of his work, on several scores. In the first place, the time specification is misleading, for the work is primarily concerned with the post World War II years, from 1945 to the present. Thus most of the Twentieth Century is considered only in a cursory fashion.

More important, the term "Empire by Treaty" is, according to the author, presumed to refer to British relationships with Middle Eastern states in the between-the-war years; again, this subject is, by his own choice, summarily treated.

Most important of all (p. ix), "The title is intended to suggest the characteristic form of British relationship with many Middle Eastern countries. By treaties Britain sought to gain the assent, notably of Arab rulers, to concessions and bases that Britain believed to be essential for the protection of British interests and the maintenance of a British order. The antecedents of the Treaty Empire, a half-way house of British imperialism, go back to Britain's early impact on the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms." As a corollary, this empire retreated after World War II; but Professor Fitzsimons is (p. 225) "less surprised at the ending of British influence and more impressed by the fact that for so long a time it remained formidable beyond the magnitude of its supporting power."

In one sense, the author, having stated his hypothesis, then ignores it. There is no way to determine, from the evidence he presents, whether or not this Empire was indeed unique, different from that which preceded it, as he assumes this without examining the question. Further, neither his time span nor his approach permit him to deal with the question of whether treaties were indeed significant in British relationships, or whether he is really confusing the dignified with the efficient. His more detailed analysis of the retreat from Empire indicates that this is indeed the case.

In yet another sense the author ignores his hypothesis: rather than examining British relationships with specific power structures in the relevant areas, he is giving an overall view of diplomatic history. One may, as Professor Fitzsimons has done, make inferences from the recital of events of diplomacy; this reviewer finds the evidence strangely unsatisfying.

The final corollary—that Britain, by utilizing "treaties" rather than other techniques, "slowed" (to quote the blurb on the dust jacket) "the tide of history"—is equally undeterminable. Evidentally, if there was an "Empire Treaty," it lasted from twenty to twenty-five years—hardly a durable arrangement, either in terms of human history or British imperial history. Again, the evidence is unimpressive, or indeed, contrary to the stated thesis.

Perhaps these strictures are unfair, as basically the author is not attempting in any systematic fashion to test a hypothesis. He is relating a narrative of a series of events: selected aspects of the international politics of the Middle East in the post war years with a focus on British actions. With this more modest goal, the author is more successful. While a political scientist might yearn for a modicum of conceptualization of such terms as "power," "influence" and "interest," this again would be asking the author to do a study he did not intend doing—JOHN H. MILLETT, *Wichita State University.*

Western Europe Since the War: A Short Political History. BY JACQUES FREYMOND. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. Pp. vii, 236. $5.50.)

"France and Great Britain shall no longer be two nations, but one Franco-British Union. . . . Every citizen of France will enjoy immediately citizenship of Great Britain; every British subject will become a citizen of France." It is not always easy today to recall this proposal made by Winston Churchill on July 16th, 1940, less than twenty-five years ago. Nor does one readily remember that on March 18th, 1944 General de Gaulle in Algiers evoked a vision of post-war Europe: "as inclusive as possible . . . established on an economic basis . . . The English Channel, the Rhine, and the Mediterranean would be the arteries of this grouping, which would extend outward to Africa and the Orient."

The great virtue of this little book by the Director of the Graduate Institute of International Studies at Geneva is that Professor Freymond takes a historian's perspective and thus reminds us of the whole complex background of current European developments. Occasionally, a single comment on the past is as illuminating as a beacon. On p. 63, Professor Freymond asserts, "The Western Europe of 1945 was socialist, despite the fact that no one could say what kind of socialism it was." This is true, and it is equally true that in 1964 Western Europe is anything but socialist. In most reviews of post-war European developments, insufficient attention has been given to the fact that Western Europe has not only resisted aggression from the East, recovered economically and culturally, and has made several supra-national experiments, but that Western Europe has also been less and less influenced by those socialist movements which contributed the major political initiatives of the 1930s and 1940s within the Western European democracies. It may well be that the most durable impression left by the now receding years of *de facto* American dominance of Western Europe is not economic recovery *per se*, but rather the diffusion of a pragmatic approach to politics that owes more to Roosevelt's New Deal and its exponents than to the ideas of Marx, Kautsky and Jaurès. There is in fact reason to hope that Western Europeans understand the United States far better today than they did during and just after the War. Misunderstandings of course continue, and an event such as President Kennedy's tragic assassination still shakes the faith in this country of even the most sympathetic European observer, but blindly dogmatic anti-Americanism is no longer in vogue among European youth. It may be a paradox, but even the France of de Gaulle appears in terms of public understanding to be far closer to America than was the France of Bidault, Blum and Ramadier.

Again, on p. 72, Professor Freymond concludes his review of the founding of NATO by stating, "In fact, nothing cemented this newly created alliance but the Soviet Union." This is also true, and it is a most useful reminder that the present crisis of NATO is inevitably a product, less of newly diverging purposes among the United States and her allies than of a drastic general reduction of the threat which Soviet aggression today is believed to represent. Aside from the mutual desire for a common defense against Russian attack, no greater consensus on positive common goals and policies existed among the NATO allies at its founding than exists today. If there are aspects in which NATO has been a disappointment, surely the most poignant of these is the failure to implement during the past decade its potential for generating a positive content.

Because Professor Freymond's comprehensive review is full of such helpful and stimulating reminders, it is a great pity that it is in part spoiled by inexcusably careless editing. To be useful, a short history must at least be accurate. Despite the author's penetrating analysis, it is hard to put one's faith in a book that, for example, refers to R. A. Butler in both text and index as Sir Harold Butler (pp. 37, 115, 229); that dates the East German uprising on June 17th, 1954 instead of 1953 (p. 104); that dates a crucial minute from Ernest Bevin which contributed to the founding of NATO from 1949 rather than 1948 (p. 55); and which refers to Lester Pearson as Prime Minister of Canada in 1949 (p. 61).—STEVEN MULLER, *Cornell University.*

The McNamara Strategy. BY WILLIAM W. KAUFMANN. (New York: Harper & Row, 1964. Pp. ix, 339. $5.95.

Robert S. McNamara's tenure as Secretary of Defense since January 1961 has been an extraordinary era in the administration of that extraordinary establishment, the U.S. Department of Defense. The McNamara *tour de force* is a fit subject for detailed and thoughtful examination, and Professor William W. Kaufmann has produced what we may properly presume to be an authoritative exposition of what has happened in this period. Professor Kaufmann has been close to Secretary McNamara and to many of his most influential subordinates since the beginning of the administration and this book therefore is by an insider. It is not, however, a book for insiders.

By letting "McNamara describe what he has been doing in his own words whenever possible," Professor Kaufmann has developed a sophisticated justification rather than a profound examination of the changes which have occurred in the department and its activities under McNamara. This is not a study of organization, however. The thematic structure of the book is to be found in the means by which Secretary McNamara has gone about implementing the strategy of flexible response and multiple options.

The strategy of flexible response is a strategy of nuclear deterrence based on the premise that the best deterrence is the ability to fight and "win" the war you want to deter. At the level of thermonuclear war, this strategy enters the realm of the "unthinkable" since it contemplates the various ways in which strategic nuclear weapons might be exchanged. From this contemplative act, certain conclusions may be drawn as to the ways damage might be "limited" within the fires of war.

An extension of the thermonuclear strategy of flexible response is the quest for a structure of forces—nuclear and non-nuclear—which permits "multiple options" in the face of a multiplicity of threats and commitments. Much of the effort and perhaps the most profound controversies of the McNamara Department have been directed toward a national and multilateral capability for "conventional" and "unconventional" warfare. Within the U.S. defense establishment these two elements have been symbolized in the organization of STRICOM and the build-up and redirection of Special Forces. Internationally, the focuses of these two efforts have been the controversy within NATO about a buildup of conventional forces on the one hand, and the intervention in South Vietnam on the other.

The forces to attain each new strategic option cost something more and characteristically cost is the central theme in the McNamara era. The secretary is an accountant at some level of existence and a principal contrast between him and his predecessors may follow from that fact. Particularly in the administration of Charles Wilson the budget ceiling was the effective control device and the outcome was summarized as a "bigger bang for a buck." Typically McNamara has started with a strategic goal and by comparison shopping and cost accounting looked for suitable weapons at lowest cost. The difference, according to Professor Kaufmann, comes about through the procedures of planning-programming-budgeting, and the technique of cost-effectiveness analysis. By these means strategic requirements and budgeting constraints are brought into meaningful inter-action and consideration is given to alternative means (presumably at different costs) to attain an objective.

Professor Kaufmann's book is good without being very exciting for students of the Department of Defense. It is a record of McNamara's views on what McNamara has been trying to do. For that reason other views on some of the questions hardly see the light of day. For example, the author effectively dismisses rather than discusses the admittedly very subtle question of whether or not military judgment has been eliminated in decisions on weapons systems, and gives few of the arguments opposed to the conventional build-up in NATO, or the hasty MLF agreements.

Moreover, the highly personal focus of the book, which has stimulated at least one characterization of it as a campaign document, tends to distort the fact that reorganizations of the DOD and other events in the Eisenhower administration made it possible for McNamara to implement his methods, that the strategic ideas originated with others such as Maxwell Taylor, Albert Wohlstetter, Herman Kahn, and even W. W. Kaufmann, and that the procedural ideas were developed by Charles Hitch, Roland McKean, Alain Enthoven, Henry Rowen, et al.

In a somewhat Panglossian chapter on tests of effectiveness of the McNamara defense establishment, Professor Kaufmann discusses the Berlin crisis, the Cuban affairs, and South Vietnam. His general summation is that the outcome of these various events could have been worse, that with a choice of means the President could also require his antagonists to make choices, and that given the need for fighting there has been a selection of forces at hand. One may question whether it is this sort of conclusion which is relevant to the effectiveness of the McNamara department or whether the long run effect of the kind of decisions symbolized by Skybolt, TFX, nuclear powered aircraft, or communication satellites would be more to the point.—David A. Wilson, *University of California at Los Angeles.*

New Nations in a Divided World, The International Relations of the Afro-Asian States. Edited by Kurt London. (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1963. Pp. 336. $6.50 cloth, $2.25 paper.)

Les Nouveaux Etats dans les Relations Internationales. Edited by Jean-Baptiste Duroselle and Jean Meyriat. (Paris: Armand Colin, 1962. Pp. 495. No price given.)

Anyone concerned with the so-called "third world" must, if he tries to keep up with the literature, become increasingly frustrated and confused. The trickle of books and articles on the subject has become a roaring flood, and the company of scholars and "experts" in the field has grown to an army. Thus not only has the number of individual studies increased tremendously, but increasingly, anthologies, symposia, conferences, group discussions, seminars, have come to publication. Unfortunately, the need to swell the flood all too often takes precedence over coherence and clarity. Sometimes, however, a symposium may result in the publication of a well organized, intelligently edited collection. The two books under question, although dealing ostensibly with the same general theme, are excellent examples of this very difference.

Les Nouveaux Etats was the result of a symposium sponsored by the *Centre d'étude des relations internationales* (C.E.R.I.) of the *Fondation nationale des sciences politiques*, and appeared in its *Cahiers* series. The scholars represented in the volume initially worked from two separate but related questions: What are the distinctive characteristics of the foreign policies of the new states? How have the "older" countries, in particular the "great powers" in the traditional sense, been affected by the appearance of an increasing number of new states on the world scene? With questions of such magnitude, the temptation to be prolix and global in scope must have been enormous. The editors and authors showed exemplary restraint, and the result was a series of well-integrated essays grouped under three main rubrics. The first includes three studies dealing with the effect of external models of political, social, and economic development—particularly the Soviet and Chinese examples—upon the new states. Of the three essays, "*Les pays sous-developpés devant les modèles marxistes: U.R.S.S. et Chine*," by the USSR-China section of the C.E.R.I., is noteworthy as one of the best explorations of the subject in print. The second group of essays examine several aspects of the influence of the old colonial powers—*les anciennes metropoles*—upon their former wards. Of particular interest is Raymond Barré's excellent survey of the persistence of economic ties, "*L'indépendance a l'epreuve des réalites économiques*." The essay complements rather neatly Elliot Berg's now almost classic "The Economic Basis of Political Choice in French West Africa," published in the *American Political Science Review*, June 1960. The third rubric groups three articles dealing with the role of the new states in international affairs, with their attitudes vis-à-vis such questions as non-engagement, and neutralism, and with their participation in international organizations. The rush of events has already made much of the material in these last three essays out of date, but they remain useful as thoughtful explorations of the adjustments faced by the new states as they confront a world in which they find their problems considered peripheral, rather than central preoccupations of statesmen and international organizations. In all, the eleven essays in this book are of high quality, and together they present a coherent whole. A useful index completes the book.

In contrast, the collection edited by Kurt London exemplifies the perils of the anthologist's craft. It includes some twenty of the fifty-seven papers submitted to the International Congress on "The Non-Aligned Afro-Asian Countries in a Divided World," held in Athens in September, 1962. Judging from London's introduction—probably the most interesting piece in the book—the conference must have been extremely lively, involving as it did Europeans, Americans, Africans, and Asians in a stimulating, apparently often emotional series of discussions. It is unfortunate, therefore, that the papers are of such uneven quality and that they reflect so little of the apparent vigor of the conference. Most appear as little more than position papers, and only a handful explore their subject with any thoroughness. One would have wished that the editor had used his prerogatives fully and selected a smaller number of pieces, had them expanded, and then reprinted them along with some of the discussions that followed. This reviewer would, for example, have liked to have seen expanded versions of such papers as Walter Laqueur's " 'Neo-Colonialism'—the Soviet Concept," B. G. D. Folson's "The Communist View of Colonialism—An African Interpretation," Kalu Ezera's "The Role of a Constitution in Developing Political Systems: The Nigerian Example," and W. Edward Blyden (III)'s "The Idea of African Neutralism and 'Non-Alignment.' " Finally, there is the question of emphasis. If the papers are any evidence, then the conference must have been "haunted by the specter of Communism." Fifteen of the papers reprinted by London deal explicitly with the Soviet Union, Communist China, and the Communist world's relations with the new nations. The Conference's Cold War preoccupation is perhaps understandable, but somewhat difficult to explain, since most of the new nations' relations are with the West and, increasingly, with each other. The picture presented by the book is, therefore, an unhappily distorted one. The three major rubrics under which the papers are organized testify to this: (1) Colonialism and Communism—seven papers; (2) New Nations in Transition—four papers; (3) Communist Policies in Non-Aligned Countries—nine papers.

In sum, the contrasts between the two books bespeak both the dangers and the possibilities of such enterprises. The Duroselle-Meyriat volume deserves to be read and pondered over, and—hopefully—translated into English. The London volume is simply not worth the price of purchase. —VICTOR T. LE VINE, *Washington University, St. Louis*.

Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy. BY EDWARD S. MASON. (New York: Harper and Row, 1964. Pp. ix, 118. $3.50.)

The recent frustrations and agonizing debates in Congress have prompted the writing of several sophisticated works on foreign aid, of which this book is an outstanding example. Dr. Edward S. Mason, Lamont University Professor at Harvard, has a long and intimate connection with his subject, including membership on the recent Clay Committee. The substance of this thoughtful little book was originally presented as the Elihu Root Lectures at the Council on Foreign Relations in May, 1963.

Naturally there is no attempt in a work of necessarily limited scope to cover all aspects of foreign aid. Professor Mason directs his efforts primarily to a thoughtful examination of the most pressing questions which have recently been troubling the Congress and the public. While there is much support for foreign aid on the basis of a disinterested desire to help other peoples, as evidenced by the popularity of the Peace Corps, congressional support is closely related to the political objective of security, and some special economic interests are also served, as in the disposal of surplus agricultural commodities. Professor Mason believes experience has demonstrated that many of the instruments of foreign aid "are not likely to be subtle, flexible, and convenient tools adapted to tactical use and rapid maneuver." He feels that aid employed to win votes at the United Nations or to bolster unstable governments is likely to be less productive than aid based on a long term strategy of security. That objective, too, should be realistically limited. Consequently, he rejects the creation of a community of free nations based on the consent of the governed, supporting economic and social justice, and cooperating on matters of mutual concern, as unrealistic goals productive of bitter disillusionment.

Instead, foreign aid should support a will and capacity for economic development and a desire for independence in the recipient country, thereby offering its people real alternatives to communism and to the necessity for mobilizing internal resources by totalitarian methods. It has been found that in many countries a program of foreign aid can move towards such reasonable objectives. In some of these, however, progress is limited. External assistance cannot be fully utilized unless internal reforms are undertaken. In an interesting discussion, Professor Mason explores the limitations and possibilities of utilizing foreign aid as leverage for reforms by intervening in domestic affairs. He concludes that it can be done successfully under certain circumstances, and preferably by multi-lateral agencies such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

A separate chapter is devoted to the problem of sharing equitably the aid burden, a matter especially troublesome for Congress in view of recent balance-of-payments difficulties. Progress in this complex field is reviewed, and some thoughtful observations are made on the alternative courses available and the limitations of the methods for determining equitable shares. In a critical examination of America's major current aid obligation, the Alliance for Progress, Professor Mason recommends better coordination of policy in Washington and the creation of a regional organization in which the Latin American countries will have an effective voice and through which they will be able to promote domestic reforms essential to economic development in a number of countries.

The perspective of this book is pragmatic rather than doctrinaire, and essentially American. One hopes that Professor Mason will find the opportunity to analyze many points in greater detail. For example, certain responsibilities attach to the country or international agency which applies outside pressure for internal reforms. How do they avoid the real dangers of domination, paternalism, and lack of continuity of interest and effort? What if the reforms prove inadequate or produce harmful political and economic results? Then what are the responsibilities of the outsider? Does not the fostering of independent states by outside intervention assume some form of international interdependence? It would be helpful if scholars in the recipient countries would be stimulated to add to the current discussion of foreign aid by frank presentations from their own perspectives.—ALFRED FERNBACH, *University of Virginia.*

A Strategy of Interdependence: A Program for the Control of Conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. BY VINCENT P. ROCK. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964. Pp. 399. $7.50.)

At some point in the life of every human organization, the environment becomes so threatening as to make continued success in coping with it increasingly improbable. In that contingency, several options are available. The organization may deny its incompatibility with that environment by exaggerating its own capabilities, downgrading the extent of the threat, or converting an objective relationship into a purely ideological confrontation. A more adaptive response, of course, would be to appraise the nature of the incompatibility and then search for ways of modifying either the organization or its environment, in order to increase the probability of survival. *A Strategy of Interdependence* points very clearly toward the latter, more adaptive, response. The author recognizes—and articulates in a most compelling fashion—the inadequacy of strategic deterrence as a sole or primary means of pursuing our national interests and assuring our survival.

He does not, however, espouse any leap from the frying pan of military capability to the fire of trust in the goodwill of our adversaries. Rather, the study is an effort to dove-tail short-run defense policies with longer-run policies of collaboration based on mutual confidence.

As Rock sees it, the bridge between these two orientations is the recognition of existing elements of Soviet-American interdependence and the creation of additional ones. His proposed alternative to current American policy is "first, to devise and to invest in areas which will provide understanding and common actions in order that. . . the common interest will prevail over parochial . . . purposes; and, second, to seek by a variety of approaches to restrain and limit the means and occasions of violent conflict" (p. 21). Though he never quite comes to grips with the distinction between the *recognition* and the *creation* of interdependence, the emphasis seems to be heavily on the latter, with comprehensive and suggestive chapters on: (a) space, atmosphere, and oceans; (b) spread and application of technology; (c) communication, education and culture contact; and (d) the developing regions, as areas in which greater interdependence might be generated.

Since the policy proposals are by no means as "startling" as the jacket blurb implies (including the by-now-conventional emphasis on tacit and informal bargaining) let me turn to the research base from which they derive; this is the most interesting and unorthodox aspect of the volume. Both in the text itself and in a meaty 22 page Appendix, the author summarizes and builds upon a fairly impressive segment of the sociological and social-psychological literature, especially that which deals with conflict as a dependent variable. In addition, in his role as coordinator of an Institute for Defense Analyses project conducted for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, he consulted with and received reports from perhaps three dozen of the nation's leading Soviet specialists, military analysts and behavioral scientists.

As might be feared, however, his rich experience in government and little academic immersion was insufficient to assure that all these empirical and conceptual inputs would be systematically distilled and meaningfully synthesized. Thus, the sampling often lacks discrimination, effective integration is infrequently achieved, and redundancy abounds. Moreover, the absence of tight and disciplined organization of his material further accentuates the ethereal impression. Even if the author lacks any coherent theory with which to structure his many excellent ideas—as do, unhappily, those of us with whom he consulted—he might nevertheless have gone further in developing his taxonomy, however static. Though this is clearly the sort of interdisciplinary effort that ought to be encouraged, and its policy proposals are of the sort with which few serious international relations scholars would quarrel, the reviewer must concede that its major value probably lies in the extent to which it advanced the education of its author.—J. DAVID SINGER, *University of Michigan.*

The Soviets in International Organizations: Changing Policy Toward Developing Countries, 1953–1963. BY ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964. Pp. xx, 380. $7.50.)

The notion that was held strongly after the failure of the League by some scholars and the planners of the United Nations was that a broad economic and social cooperation was essential to have political collaboration among nations. Emphasizing this notion, David Mitrany in 1944 even hypothesized that functionalism will gradually lead nations toward political integration. In fact, the economic and social activities in the U.N. have been one of the most growing and active areas of the Organization. Needless to say, these activities have been interwoven into a political fabric of the U.N. This trend has been largely due to the fact that underdeveloped countries have increased their bargaining power and used that power in the reality of Cold War politics. The *primary* aim of the book under review is neither to test the hypothesis of political integration nor to examine the role of economic and social forces affecting the Organization as such; but rather it attempts to answer a general question: Why the Soviets became actively involved in the specialized agencies and regional economic commissions of the U.N.? The book focuses on Soviet attitude and policy toward developing nations within the limit of technical and economic activities.

Unlike many books on Soviet foreign policy, this case study rightly rejects an *a priori* position. More than two-thirds of the book is devoted to describing and to analyzing Soviet relationships with underdeveloped countries in the field of technical and economic activities, with a view to examining the determinants of Soviet policy changes. While Rubinstein holds that the core of Soviet ideology remains unchanged, its policies and attitudes have been flexible and will still be changed in order to achieve a better political climate in international organizations. Having become convinced of the political significance of underdeveloped and neutralist countries, the Soviet Union, the author points out, reversed its attitude toward international organizations from one of merely attempting to forestall the formation of anti-Soviet coalitions to active participation in functional activities. Largely through this new position, the Soviets have increased their prestige and confidence among these dramatically growing countries both in number and influence and thus have been able to command more influence.

Thus the changing policies of the Soviets have been a means of achieving goals and objectives. However, this manipulative consideration of Soviet participation in international organizations, as in the case of the other Great Powers, may lead, in the long run, to "the most promising hopes for the consequent erosion of Soviet ideology." (p. 356) The proposition here is that any genuine international stability must stem from the world-wide basis and that the nations, including the Soviet Union, will cooperate as long as they are convinced of the possibility of advancing their interests. The result might be a system whereby political climate can be controlled. This assumption, it should be pointed out, was made without clear assessment of the role of economic and social forces in international organizations.

Like many policy-oriented books, this one has some "proposals" to offer. It argues that the West (1) should not manipulate international organizations for temporary political victory of dubious merits; (2) should initiate and challenge the Soviets to join programs of helping needy countries within the institutional framework; (3) should elect a Soviet citizen as the head of a Specialized Agency; and (4) should not only establish the headquarters of a Specialized Agency in Moscow but also meet sessions of the General Assembly alternately in New York and Moscow.

Owing to these proposals, the book should be read by policy makers and the thinking public. For political scientists, it does demonstrate a methodologically interesting suggestion; namely, the determinants of Soviet policy—for which there is a lack of authentic records of policy formation—may be explored by resorting to a comparative analysis of relevant speeches, actions, internal Soviet professional and scholarly commentaries, and interviews. Unfortunately, however, the book often fails to document interpretations of data and it provides neither explanatory notes nor descriptions of survey research which constitute a major portion of its source materials. Thus, lacking clear methodological assistance, political scientists are left without being convinced of the validity of the data nor of the soundness of the interpretations.—SUNGJOOK JUNN, *Mercer University*.

Walter Lippmann's Philosophy of International Politics. BY ANWAR SYED. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964. Pp. 348. $6.00.)

It is probably safe to argue that the *Laws* of Plato and the *Politics* of Aristotle are the works from which we learn the most about the principles of politics. A reading of Professor Syed's book supports the argument that from these same two authors we can learn the most about the political ideas and ideals of Walter Lippmann, for in fifty years of public writing during which he was, as often as not, far from the opinions of others and far from what he himself had written a book or two back, he was never far from his classical mentors. It is not so much that Lippmann has on occasion stated the obvious, but rather that he has consistently re-stated the Greeks. The "dead but sceptered sovereigns" rule his public and himself.

For Walter Lippmann the good society is a civilized society, a society under control. This means that decision making will be in the hands of men who are practical, realistic, and rational, men who will be making decisions for the benefit of their fellow citizens who lack these required characteristics and are hence uncivilized. Civilized men do what is right, he argues, because to do so is natural for them. Only such men can be trusted to do important jobs well. Lippmann combines, however, this approach of Plato with the Aristotelian view that the function of governors is to issue commands and give decisions, but with educated public support as a base to all action. The idealistic foundation for this realistic philosophy is the concept that man is answerable to a higher law than man's own average nature can comprehend. The supremacy of reason is not given to all but only to some. *Theirs* is the civilizing mission.

But the world is not yet the good society nor has it ever been. Men live in squabbling nations and not in the world at large. The real question is how do civilized men as leaders of nations deal with one another. Can a substantive theory of international politics be made of this relationship? Does not the tension between international theory and international reality make illusory any concept of the good society? Has not the hydrogen bomb made us all brothers in the one sense of naked survival but in little else?

According to Professor Syed, Lippmann accepts the struggle for power as a fact of international politics. In this sense Lippmann follows the thinking of Hobbes. The goal of the statesman is national self-interest, properly understood, which for Lippmann means prudently understood, for he would not have us take life and death stands in places that are "muddy and marshy and full of jungles." But man, says Lippmann, is obligated to pursue an ideal beyond mere power politics. This ideal is the comity of nations, which for Lippmann is something akin to the peace and wisdom of the philosopher kings. Indeed, for Lippmann, it is something akin to the peace and wisdom of *Anglo-American* philosopher kings. Such an Alliance would be the first step toward a "civilized world," the structural principle of public international order. Professor Syed has done a good job of researching this point, even to showing how Walter Lippmann walked in the path cut by Andrew Carnegie!

Necessarily, the author refers to major events and developments in international politics over the past half century, and it is interesting to see him drag Mr. Lippmann through some rather prickly thickets of Mr. Lippmann's own making. The only trouble with this approach is that there will be some who will count the changes of opinion that Mr. Lippmann has made without understanding that the world has changed, too. One will have to let such critics feast away, I suppose.

This reviewer has but one major quarrel to pick with the author. To know a man's philosophy one should first know the man, or at least something about him. Professor Syed makes no facts on this score known to his readers, and thus we are left to guess that family, religion, education and experience—beyond the recounting of a few Harvard professors that Mr. Lippmann knew as a student—are of little consequence to the study of Walter Lippmann's views of man and the world. But noting this, the reviewer wants to go on record that this is a good book that will enlighten readers and that does justice to a notable American who has talked a lot of commonsense in his time.—MILTON COLVIN, *Washington and Lee University.*

The Philippines and the United States: Problems of Partnership. BY GEORGE E. TAYLOR. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. Pp. 311. $6.95.)

The Philippines and the United States: Problems of Partnership is an important and stimulating book which contributes much to the American's otherwise inadequate understanding of Philippine affairs. This is a provocative, analytical discussion of the big issues in Philippine-American relations. Its author, Professor George Taylor, who prepared this study for the Council on Foreign Relations, reminds us that "it is not generally understood that U. S. policies in Southeast Asia today depend in great measure on political and military partnership with the Republic of the Philippines. . . ." He adds, "The success of the partnership however, can no longer be taken for granted." This salient fact, of course, helps explain the timing of the book's publication.

Taylor's own special contribution is that he has focused his attention on the major cause for recent changes in Philippine-American relations, the Filipino nationalist renaissance. He presents an historical survey of the development of Philippine nationalism and explains why the Filipino nationalist today views certain important events of the past as he does. Taylor here shows real empathy for the Philippine nationalist position. His book should be required reading for Americans participating in the formulation of U. S. policy toward the Philippines.

Despite its broad coverage, however, this book is not as useful a reference in the field of Philippine-American relations as might be hoped. It is without bibliography, and in many passages footnotes are an inadequate guide to students wishing to do further reading on the topics covered. Occasionally the sources upon which the author relied are not appropriately noted. A few footnotes are marred by gross inaccuracies, such as the incorrect title for Golay's, *The Philippines: Public Policy and National Economic Development* on page 215. Inaccuracies have also crept into the body of the text, for example, "the Philippine action [making claim to North Borneo] opens up the possibility of claims to British Borneo coming from Indonesia, *which actually has a more plausible case here than it had in West Irian.*" (p. 267. Italics added.) Nor were the first two presidents of the Philippines Protestants (p. 160), though they were Masons.

While Taylor's ready willingness to accept and understand nationalism as a valid, even desirable, expression of contemporary Filipino political thinking is refreshing, in Chapter 13 he tends to blur unnecessarily the distinctions between anti-American nationalism, intellectual Marxism, and "the parliamentary tactics of the Communist Party of the Philippines." The sweeping, unsubstantiated accusations of Communist infiltration in the press, universities, labor unions, and political organizations would seem to inhibit the author's own appeal for appreciating the native mainsprings of the nationalist revival, and for distinguishing spontaneous nationalist sentiment from Communist "tactical devices." (p. 265) Furthermore, though there is undoubtedly some Communist infiltration, the urgency of the alarm which he sounds is not convincing.

The author says, for example, "Even though the parallel is far from being an exact one, the rapid transformation of China between 1946 and 1949 provides the warning of what can happen in the briefest span of years. . . . Although the military power of the Huks, unlike that of the Chinese Communists, has been broken, the Communists in the Philippines are relentlessly carrying out the war by methods that are potentially just as dangerous, such as the manipulation of political symbols and the creation of a new intellectual climate. As in China in 1946, there is little to indicate today that events could move so rapidly and so disastrously for the government in power."

(pp. 272–273) This reviewer would consider the parallel with China of 1946 neither exact nor meaningful. And the author has been unable to marshall evidence that would make it so.

Taylor also contends (p. 173) that in the election of 1961 the "left-wing" delivered union support to President Garcia in "impressive amounts"; yet the most careful studies of voting patterns in that election do not indicate that union leaders of any persuasion were able to deliver substantial blocks of votes to any national candidate. While citing the Roman Catholic Church as a staunchly anti-Communist organization, the author adds that "secularizing tendencies" in Philippine society have "tended to neutralize the influence of the Church in politics." Other commentators have, on the contrary, noted the very significant political revival of the Church in the last decade.

In presenting supposed examples of Communist infiltration into a variety of social and political organizations, mention is made of the "Council of Elders, an informal group of highly respected citizens whose Action Committee was dominated by left-wing individuals." As a result, so Taylor thinks, the Council denounced the Government's ban on travel to the Communist-sponsored World Youth Festival in Vienna. Previously (p. 190) the Council of Elders had been identified as "a political body that the president uses on occasion to approve high policy decisions, such as a request for missile bases, when he wishes to avoid further discussion." Were the Council in fact under the "left-wing" influence which the author suggests, it would not be very useful for the purpose mentioned.

Despite shortcomings, however, this book is a much needed survey and analysis of the increasing tensions in Philippine-American relations. Addressed primarily to the policy-maker, it is interspersed with a number of imminently sound policy recommendations. Taylor urges the U. S. (pp. 288–299) to "take this nationalism very seriously." He argues convincingly that it is the only sentiment capable of providing the political dynamism to bring about important social changes, that it is the most effective weapon against the Communist movement, and that it is a necessary part of the Philippine drive to seek a new cultural identity, the necessary foundation for a mature and self-reliant nation.

While Taylor says he believes that it is wise for the U. S. to anticipate and encourage change in the Philippines, he recognizes (p. 298) that "such a policy calls for considerable U. S. participation in the internal affairs of the Philippines, always a dangerous business." But, he says, "the risks must be taken unless we are willing to let our military and political alliance disintegrate." He contends that U. S. policy should be "directed in fact and theory to the task of imaginative participation in the political and economic development of the Philippines." (p. 4) Yet his careful attention to the resurgence of Filipino nationalism leads him to throw caution on his own recommendations. He had already noted that (p. 220), "Possibly the direct involvement of the United States in the domestic politics of the Philippines has reached the point of diminishing returns." Taylor here has been caught on the horns of a dilemma which has impaled other Americans sincerely concerned about the most appropriate role for the United States in assisting economic development in a new nation.—DAVID WURFEL, *University of Singapore.*

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NEWS AND NOTES

WASHINGTON OFFICE NEWSLETTER

Seminar for Freshman Congressmen. In early January, the Association co-sponsored, with a bipartisan group of eight members of the House, the second Seminar for Freshman Congressmen. This week-long series of meetings is designed to acquaint new members with the workings of the House, with such problems as organizing a Congressional office, dealing with pressure groups and effective committee service.

The meetings are conducted by experienced Representatives and a wide range of Congressional staff personnel, political scientists and other outside experts. As an adjunct to the 1965 seminar, a draft copy of *An Introduction to Legislative Service,* a 225-page manual prepared by the Association, was distributed to serve as a text. The book will undergo final revision and eventually be published in an appropriate manner, serving as a permanent reference for Congressmen and others interested in the workings of the House.

Reaction to the comprehensive program offered in this year's seminar was again uniformly favorable; between 50 and 60 of the new Members attended each of the sessions, held January 5–8 in the House Judiciary Committee Hearing Room.

Congressional Fellowship Program. There are 30 participants in the 1964–65 Congressional Fellowship Program, which is now in its 12th year of operation under Association sponsorship. The group is composed of seven journalists, one law school faculty member, eight political scientists—including one selected in cooperation with the Canadian Political Science Association—an Asian Fellow sponsored by the Asia Foundation, 11 Federal Service Fellows, a Harkness Commonwealth Fund Fellow from London, England, and a Middle Eastern Fellow sponsored by American Friends of the Middle East.

Winners of the 1965–66 Fellowship awards sponsored by the Association were announced in mid-February and included:

Journalists winners:

John M. Berry, 27, reporter, Providence (R.I.) *Journal-Bulletin.*

Conrad Christiano, 38, reporter, Rochester (N.Y.) *Democrat & Chronicle.*

Ted G. Kolderie, 35, editorial page staff writer, Minneapolis (Minn.) *Star & Tribune.*

Dale D. Pullen, 36, city editor, Hollywood (Fla.) *Sun Tattler.*

Donald W. Robinson, 27, reporter, Eugene (Ore.) *Register-Guard.*

Edward K. Shanahan, 29, reporter, *Berkshire Eagle,* Pittsfield, Mass.

Political science winners:

Carl Baar, 25, Ph.D. candidate, University of Chicago.

Michael Lipsky, 25, Ph.D. candidate, Princeton University.

David L. Paletz, 31, Ph.D. candidate, University of California, Los Angeles.

Armin Rosencranz, 28, Ph.D. candidate, Stanford University (currently in London on Fellowship-sponsored research)

Stephen L. Wasby, 28, assistant professor, Moorhead (Minn.) State College.

Ruth Widmayer, 39, professor of political science, Colorado Woman's College.

Law school faculty member winners:

Ian R. Macneil, 36, professor of law, Cornell University.

George B. Trubow, 32, associate professor, John Marshall Law School, Chicago.

Psychologist winner:

Frank I. Moore, 27, project director, legislative council study of mental illness and retardation, Oklahoma City.

Alternates:

William C. Baum, 34, assistant professor, Creighton University, Omaha.

William L. Morrow, 30, assistant professor, DePauw University, Greencastle, Ind.

Wesley G. Pippert, 31, reporter, United Press International, Chicago.

Paul R. Wieland, 27, reporter, Buffalo (N.Y.) *Evening News.*

United States Senate Youth Program. The Third Annual Senate Youth Program was held this year from January 31 to February 6. The Program, authorized by Senate resolution and financed by a grant from the William Randolph Hearst Foundation, brings to Washington two outstanding high school student leaders from each of the 50 states and District of Columbia.

The Association, by developing and conducting the week's agenda, introduced the students to the workings of their Federal government with particular emphasis on the Senate. Highlights were provided by a meeting with President and

Mrs. Johnson, luncheon with Vice President Humphrey, comprehensive seminars produced by the Departments of State and Defense, and an interview with Justice Arthur Goldberg.

The Association's work on this program falls within the framework of its Social Studies Project.

Seminar in Legislative Operations. Another in a series of seminars conducted jointly by APSA and the U.S. Civil Service Commission for 20 Federal executives in grades 15 to 18 was held March 15–19. Patterned after the Seminar for Freshman Congressmen, the sessions were conducted by political scientists, members of both houses of Congress, and staff personnel from both the Legislative and Executive branches.

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

The Southern Political Science Association held its annual meeting in Durham, N. C., November 12–14, 1964. The Nobel Peace Prize winner, Martin Luther King, was an honored guest during the proceedings. John H. Hallowell, President of the SPSA and chairman of Duke University's department of political science, gave his presidential address on November 13. David B. Truman, President of the American Political Science Association, delivered the opening day address. Those who gave papers and their topics were: Charles G. Hamilton, Pikesville College: "Mississippi: Resistance and Consequent Politics"; Normal L. Parks, Middle Tennessee State College: "Post Kefauver Politics in Tennessee"; Arpad von Lazar, Vanderbilt University: "Human Resources and the Dilemma of Political Development"; and Robert O. Tilman, Tulane University: "Political Development as an Integrative Process: Concepts, Theories and Directors for Research."

The joint meeting of the Western and Pacific Northwest Political Science Associations took place in Victoria, B. C., March 17–20, 1965. The program chairman for the conference was Maure L. Goldschmidt of Reed College.

A three-day conference on political development was held at the University of Pennsylvania on November 11–13, 1964. Participants included about 20 scholars and officials from other universities, private institutions and government agencies. At the three general sessions papers were presented by Marion Levy, Princeton University; Arthur Smithies, Harvard University; and Lucian Pye, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Discussants were Kalman Silvert, Dartmouth College; Howard Wiggins, Department of State; Wilfred Malenbaum, University of Pennsylvania; H. Field Haviland, Brookings Institution; and Karl von Vorys, University of Pennsylvania. At the closing luncheon, David E. Bell, Administrator of the Agency for International Development, delivered an address on "Foreign Assistance and Economic Development."

Southern Methodist University will be host to a second conference on "Mathematical Applications in Political Science." The conference is scheduled for July 18 to August 7, 1965. It is designed to serve political science faculties active in teaching and research. Stipends of $300 plus travel allowances of 4 cents a mile will be available for thirty participants. Applications will be accepted through April 15. Inquiries should be directed to: Joseph L. Bernd, Director, Conference on Mathematical Applications in Political Science, Box 1099, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas 75222.

The annual meeting of the New England Political Science Association was held on Saturday, April 24, 1965, at Smith College, Northampton, Massachusetts. Officers for 1964–65 are: president, Laurence I. Radway (Dartmouth); vice president, Karl Deutsch (Yale); secretary, Gerald Grady (University of Massachusetts); members of the executive committee, Lawrence Fuchs (Brandeis), Fred Green (Williams), and Alona Elizabeth Evans (Wellesley).

The department of government at Indiana University was host to the Midwest Conference of Political Science in Bloomington, April 22–24, 1965.

The XIIIth International Congress of Administrative Sciences will meet in Paris, July 19–23, 1965. Papers will deal with public relations in administration; the influence of the public in the operation of public administration; new techniques of budget preparation and management; and administrative management of public enterprises. Special meetings of representatives of schools and institutes of public administration will meet to discuss the role of their institutions in development administration. For further information write: The International Institute of Administrative Sciences, 25 rue de la Charite, Brussels 4, Belgium.

The 1965 conference of the World Association for Public Opinion Research will be held in Dublin, Eire, from September 6–10, 1965. Direct all inquiries to: Dr. Irving Crespi, The Gallup Organization, Inc., 53 Bank Street, Princeton, New Jersey.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

For the eighteenth consecutive year, the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan will hold a summer institute in survey research techniques. The institute is designed to meet some of the education and training needs of persons engaged in business and governmental research and other statistical work, graduate students and university instructors interested in quantitative research in the social sciences.

The 1965 institute will be presented in two four-week sessions, the first from June 28 to July 24, and the second from July 26 to August 21. They may be taken independently or successively. For further information write to: Survey Research Center, The University of Michigan, P. O. Box 1248, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106.

The Comparative Administration Group of the American Society for Public Administration has established a national committee on comparative urban studies. The committee is planning a program of meetings and conferences, a summer research seminar, and the distribution of a newsletter. The executive committee of the new group consists of Victor Jones, University of California (chairman); Fred Cleaveland, University of North Carolina; William Gore, University of Indiana; Wallace Sayre, Columbia University; Frank Sherwood, U. S. C.; and Frank Smallwood, Dartmouth.

A Midwest Universities Consortium for International Activities, Inc. was organized in 1964 by the Universities of Illinois, Wisconsin, Indiana and Michigan State University. The purpose of the new organization is to enable the institutions to render more effective technical aid abroad and to gain from their overseas operations the maximum of academic benefit on their respective campuses. Of the eight members of the board of directors of the corporation four are political scientists: Edward H. Buehrig, Indiana University; Leon Epstein, University of Wisconsin; Ralph Smuckler, Michigan State University; and Royden Dangerfield, University of Illinois.

In celebration of its fiftieth anniversary, the department of government at Indiana University held a series of six lectures, November 5–7. The lectures, which will be published, were as follows: "The Uses of Theory in the Study of Politics," Anatol Rapoport; "The Representative Function in Western Systems," David B. Truman, Columbia University; "Political Parties in Western Democratic Systems," Leon D. Epstein, University of Wisconsin; "The Making of Foreign Policy in the United States," Charles Burton Marshall, Washington Center for Foreign Policy Research; "Problems in the Study of Local Politics," James Q. Wilson, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University, and "Approaches to the Understanding of International Politics," Quincy Wright, University of Virginia.

The Ford Foundation has announced a renewal grant of $250,000 for five years to continue support of the program of the Comparative Administration Group of the American Society for Public Administration. Fred W. Riggs, Indiana University, will continue to serve as chairman of the CAG, with the support of an executive committee containing the following members: Fred Cleaveland, North Carolina; Ferrel Heady, Michigan; John Montgomery, Harvard; Clarence Thurber, Penn. State; Dwight Waldo, California; Edward Weidner, East-West Center, Hawaii; and Don Bowen, ASPA executive director. The CAG will conduct summer seminars in 1965 at Pittsburgh, under the direction of James Heaphey, and at California, with Dwight Waldo as director. A workshop for career development training of overseas program officers will be conducted at Pittsburgh in conjunction with the CAG seminar, under the direction of Edgar Shor, chairman of the political science department at Colgate University. The themes of the Pittsburgh and California seminars will be the spatial and temporal aspects of development administration, respectively.

The Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania have announced that three awards, each of $5,000, may be made for distinguished work in the humanities and the social sciences, to appear as succeeding volumes in the Haney Foundation Series. The first volume has just been published.

Statements of interest, or inquiries, should be addressed to Mr. Bernard J. Ford, Secretary, Haney Foundation Series Committee, Charles Patterson Van Pelt Library, University of Pennsylvania, 3420 Walnut Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104. The deadline of the submission of manuscripts is August 1, 1965.

The Conference on Communist Studies, an autonomous unit of the American Political Science Association, recently completed arrangements to include China and other Communist nations in Asia in its activities. Established in 1958, the Conference until now dealt with Soviet affairs and Eastern Europe. The change in scope is reflected by a modification in the name (formerly the Conference on Soviet and Communist Studies) and the election of a specialist on China, A. Doak Barnett of Columbia University, as Conference chairman for 1965–66. Conference membership henceforth will not require annual dues and will consist of all individuals who are identified as specialists in the politics of Communist nations by the appropriate organizations, *e.g.*, the American Political Science Association, the Association for Asian Studies, and the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies.

The activities of the Conference on Communist Studies center on the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. The Conference organizes the Comparative Politics panels on Communist nations, and sponsors a luncheon with a guest speaker and election of officers.

George Fischer, Cornell University, is Conference chairman for 1964–65; A. Doak Barnett, Columbia University, is vice-chairman; and Allen B. Ballard, Jr., City College of New York, is secretary-treasurer.

The Institute of Advanced Projects of the East-West Center at the University of Hawaii sponsored a conference during 1964 on "Communications and Innovation in Development Policy." Papers emphasized the experience of mainland China, India and the Philippines. The major papers are now being edited for publication as a single volume by Wilbur Schramm, Stanford University, and Daniel Lerner, MIT, co-chairman of the conference. Other APSA members who participated were Lucian Pye, MIT; Lawrence Fuchs, Brandeis University; and V. K. N. Menon of India.

A month-long institute on Comparative Communist Systems and Ideology, jointly sponsored by the School of Education and the Oregon State Board of Education was held on the campus of the University of Oregon during 1964. Joseph Fiszman, department of political science at the University of Oregon, served as director.

The eighth annual institute on United States foreign policy was held at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, March 21, 1964, sponsored by the Department of State in collaboration with various agencies in Milwaukee. It was the first such regional conference in Wisconsin under State Department auspices. Speakers included Mrs. Kate Louchheim, Robert Manning, Richard Davis, Walt W. Rostow, Marshall Green, and Ben S. Stephansky, all of the State Department.

The fifth annual Governor's conference on the United Nations was held at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, May 2, 1964, sponsored by the Wisconsin Governor's Committee on the U. N. and the university's Institute for World Affairs Education. The U.S.S.R. ambassador to the U.N., Nicolai Federenko; Sidney Yates of the United States delegation; Zenon Rossides, Cyprus ambassador to the U. N.; and José Rolz-Bennett of the U. N. Secretariat participated in the conference.

The University of Denver has established a graduate school of international studies. It will engage in programs which encourage research and cooperative efforts in international relations in the Rocky Mountain-Great Plains region.

The American Historical Association, at its annual convention in Washington, D.C., December 29, 1964, awarded its Watumull Prize, $500, for a work on the history of India, jointly to two political scientists: to Charles Drekmeier, associate professor at Stanford University, for his *Kingship and Community in Early India* (Stanford University Press), and to Charles Heimsath, associate professor of South Asian studies, The American University, for his *Indian Nationalism and Social Reform* (Princeton University Press).

Ten scholars met at the Rockefeller Foundation's Villa Serbelloni at Bellagio, Italy, in September, 1964, to plan a series of volumes on the smaller European democracies. The editors of this series, financed by a grant from the Ford Foundation, are Hans Daalder, University of Leiden, Netherlands; Robert Dahl, Yale University; Val R. Lorwin, University of Oregon; and Stein Rokkan, Christian Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway. The discussions at Bellagio concerned the "common core" elements of all these volumes, which would deal with such essentially durable features of each system as the qualities of the citizenry, their loyalties, apathies, and alienations, the qualities of the elites, the role of consensus and conflict in historical changes, and the direction of long-run changes.

HENRY J. ABRAHAM, University of Pennsylvania, participated in the sixth World Congress of the International Political Science Association in Geneva in September, 1964.

CHARLES BACKSTROM, University of Minnesota, directed a state-wide faculty workshop in December on the 1964 election. The workshop was a project of the Minnesota Council for Education.

JAMES D. BARBER, Yale University, has a junior faculty fellowship and is spending the year at the Brookings Institution.

ERNEST R. BARTLEY, University of Florida, has been elected to full membership in the American Institute of Planners.

THAD BEYLE is on a year's leave of absence from Denison University on an NCEP fellowship. He is serving as an assistant to the Governor of North Carolina.

Hugh A. Bone has been appointed by Governor Albert D. Rosellini to be chairman of the Washington State Commission on Registration and Voting Participation.

David P. Calleo, Yale University, is on research leave in France for 1964–65.

Harold W. Chase has returned to the University of Minnesota after a two-year absence during which he served as visiting professor at Columbia University (1963–64) and engaged in research at the Brookings Institution during 1962–63.

Frederick N. Cleaveland, University of North Carolina, has been elected President of the Southern Political Science Association for 1964–65.

Orville Cope, University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee, spent the 1964 summer doing research in Chile.

James T. Crown, New York University, visited the University of Poland in December, 1964, to make arrangements for a seminar in Warsaw for American graduate students to be held in the summer of 1965.

James C. Davies, University of Oregon, spent the spring term of 1964 in Brazil.

Paul Dolan, University of Delaware, will be on sabbatical leave during the spring semester, 1965.

JeDon Emenhiser, Utah State University, is a Fulbright professor at the University of Saigon in South Vietnam during 1964–65.

David Farrelly, UCLA, continues as director of the University of California's Education Abroad program in Padua, Italy, for 1964–65.

James W. Fesler, Yale University, is engaged in European research during the current academic year.

Russell H. Fifield, University of Michigan, has been appointed Secretary General of the XXVII International Congress of Orientalists to be held in August, 1967.

Edward B. Glick has resigned from the System Development Corporation to become senior staff political scientist with the Washington branch of the Bendix Corporation's Arms Control Projects Office.

Lee S. Greene, University of Tennessee, has been named Distinguished Service professor at that institution.

Arthur M. Hanhardt, Jr., University of Oregon, was in Germany in July, 1964, as a guest of the cultural exchange division of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Murray C. Havens, University of Texas, has been named Secretary of the Southern Political Science Association for 1964–65.

Ferrel Heady has received a faculty distinguished achievement award at the University of Michigan. He is a senior specialist in residence at the Institute of Advanced Projects, East-West Center, University of Hawaii, January to July, 1965.

James Jarvis has returned to Wayne State University from San Jose State College where he was visiting professor of public administration for the past two years.

Conrad Joyner, University of Arizona, has been appointed co-ordinator of the university's Peace Corp training center.

Roy E. Jumper has resigned from Wake Forest College to continue as consultant to the Ford Foundation in Lebanon.

Gladys Kammerer has received a citation for distinguished teaching and research at the University of Florida.

Ravi Kapil has returned to the University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee following a year of research in Somalia.

Kemal Karpat, New York University, addressed the Conference on Democracy in Asia held in Turkey in November, 1964.

Malcolm Kerr is on leave from UCLA for the period 1964–66. During 1964–65 he is a fellow at the American Research Center in Egypt. He will be a visiting associate professor at the American University of Beirut during 1965–66.

John H. Kessel returned in January to the University of Washington from a year's leave of absence during which he served as an NCEP fellow with the Republican National Committee.

Kenneth Kofmehl, Purdue University, has been appointed consultant to the Committee on Science and Public Policy of the National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D. C.

Norman Kogan, University of Connecticut, is on leave during 1964–65 and is residing in Rome.

Stuart A. MacCorkle, director of the Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Texas, received an honorary doctor of laws degree from Washington and Lee University in June, 1964.

HENRY MASON, Tulane University, will be a Fulbright professor at the *Otto Suhr Institut* of Free Berlin during the summer session of 1965.

ROGER D. MASTER, Yale University, is spending 1964–65 in France under a junior faculty fellowship.

DOUGLAS MENDEL, JR., University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee, has been appointed Far Eastern representative of the Roper Public Opinion Research Center at Williams College.

STEPHEN R. MITCHELL, Washington State University, was an NCEP fellow at the Democratic national convention in Atlantic City.

PHILLIP MONYPENNEY, University of Illinois, is serving a two-year appointment as member of the Illinois Commission on the problem of cities, villages and towns.

JAMES N. MURRAY, JR., State University of Iowa, is teaching at the University of Istanbul on a Fulbright award.

JOHN NORMAN, Fairfield University, Connecticut, was one of the two bi-partisan plaintiffs in *Buttersworth* v. *Dempsey*. The case, involving reapportionment and redistricting of the legislative districts of Connecticut, was upheld by the U. S. Supreme Court.

CHARLES B. NEFF is on leave from the University of Hawaii to direct the Peace Corps operation in Bogotá, Colombia.

THOMAS PAGE, University of Illinois, is serving as secretary to the personnel advisory board of the Department of Personnel in Illinois state government.

BELDEN PAULSON has returned to the University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee from research in southern Italy.

RALPH MIWA, on leave from the University of Hawaii, has been promoted to the position of administrative assistant to Senator Daniel Inouye of Hawaii.

CARL H. LANDÉ, Yale University, is conducting research in the Philippine Islands during the current academic year.

WALTER LAVES, University of Indiana, was appointed by President Johnson to serve as an alternate delegate to the 13th General Conference of UNESCO held in Paris October 18-November 19, 1964.

WERNER LEVI, University of Hawaii, is in India on a grant from the American Institute of Indian affairs.

WILLIAM S. LIVINGSTON, University of Texas, has been named book review editor of the *Journal of Politics.*

ROBERT E. LORISH, Ohio Wesleyan University, is on leave during 1964–65 to serve as an administrative intern in the office of the provost of Michigan State University.

NORMAN PALMER, University of Pennsylvania, presented a paper at the Sixth World Congress of the International Political Science Association in Geneva in September, 1964.

R. N. ROSECRANCE, UCLA, was a visiting fellow in international relations at the Australian National University in Canberra during the spring term, 1964. He is currently a Rockefeller research fellow in the department of war studies, Kings College, University of London.

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK, University of Bridgeport, has been elected president of the Honorary Social Science Society. He has also been appointed to the editorial boards of the *Revista de Ciencias Sociales* (Spain) and *Sociologia Internationalis* (Berlin).

STUART A. SCHIENGOLD is on leave from the University of California at Davis and is spending the year at Harvard's Center of International Affairs as a research associate.

FRED SONDERMAN, professor of political science and associate dean at Colorado College, was invited by the British Foreign Office to participate in a conference in February, 1965. The conference dealt with the economic, political and defense problems of the Atlantic Community.

ROBERT S. STAUFFER has returned to the University of Hawaii from a year spent at the University of the Philippines under a Fulbright award.

JAMES A. STEINTRAGER has been awarded a research grant by the University of Texas.

WILLIAM L. STRAUSS has been granted a three-year leave by the Arizona State College to become the executive director of the United States Education Commission in Korea.

OSCAR SVARLEIN, University of Florida, has been elected to a two-year term on the executive council of the American Society for International Law.

JOHN E. TURNER AND ROBERT HOLT, University of Minnesota, did field research in England prior to the 1964 British elections.

PEDRO C. M. TEICHERT has returned to the University of Mississippi from a four-month stay at the University of Buenos Aires, Argentina, where he was a visiting professor under a Fulbright-Hayes grant.

Peter A. Toma, University of Arizona, is participating in an inter-university consortium of social scientists who are engaged in research mapping for AID's Food for Peace Program.

Rocco J. Tresolini, chairman, department of government, Lehigh University, was one of two recipients of the R. R. and E. C. Hillman award. The award is given annually by the university to faculty members who have contributed most toward the advancement of the interest of the university.

Richard W. van Wagenen has returned to his post as dean of the Graduate School at American University after two years with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Ellis Waldron, Montana State University, studied at Harvard Law School during 1963–64 under a Carnegie Foundation fellowship.

Robert Warren has returned to the University of Washington from a year spent with Resources for the Future, Inc., in Washington, D. C.

Henry Wells, University of Pennsylvania, read a paper at the Sixth World Congress of the International Political Science Association in Geneva.

T. P. Wright, Jr., has returned to Bates College after a year's absence spent in India under a Fulbright award.

STAFF CHANGES

New Appointments

Charles F. Andrain, assistant professor, San Diego State College

Andrew Baggs, instructor, University of Florida

Howard Ball, instructor, Rutgers—the State University

Theodore Becker, University of Hawaii

Dennis E. Beller, instructor, Miami University (Ohio)

William J. Blough, University of Houston

Leroy L. Bradwish, assistant professor, Drake University

Doyle Buckwalter, instructor, Brigham Young University

Ronald F. Bunn, associate professor, Louisiana State University

Ronald H. Chilcote, assistant professor, University of California at Riverside

William Coplin, assistant professor, Wayne State University

Edmond Costantini, lecturer, University of California at Davis

Phillip Coulter, instructor, University of Massachusetts

Lawrence J. DeNardis, assistant professor, Albertus Magnus College

Joel R. Dickerson, instructor, Millikin University

John P. East, assistant professor, E. Carolina College

James F. Engel, assistant professor, New Mexico State University

Lee W. Farnsworth, assistant professor, Brigham Young University

Jack D. Fleer, assistant professor, Wake Forest College

J. Leiper Freeman, professor, Vanderbilt University

Robert Fried, assistant professor, University of California at Los Angeles

Sterling Hale Fuller, professor and chairman, University of Missouri at Kansas City, effective September, 1964

Douglas S. Gatlin, assistant professor, Florida Atlantic University

William Gerlach, associate professor, Eastern Kentucky State College

Donald Gerth, professor, Chico State College

Louis Gold, instructor, Oberlin College

John Gunnell, assistant professor, Graduate School of Public Affairs, the State University of New York at Albany

Michael Haas, University of Hawaii

Harlan Hahn, assistant professor of political science and research associate in the School of Health, University of Michigan

Fred Hanga, Jr., associate professor, Graduate School of Public Affairs, the State University of New York at Albany

Charles M. Hardin, professor, University of California at Davis; formerly associate director for Humanities and Social Sciences of the Rockefeller Foundation

Martin J. Hauser, instructor, University of Minnesota

Duane W. Hill, associate professor, Colorado State University; also research associate of the Social Science Foundation of the University of Denver

Douglas Hobbs, assistant professor, UCLA

John A. Hobbs, assistant professor, San Diego State College

George C. Hoffman, assistant professor, Butler University

John Hutchinson, associate professor and research associate of Industrial Relations at UCLA

David E. Ingersoll, assistant professor, University of Delaware

Lester Jackson, instructor, Newark College of Arts and Sciences, Rutgers University

George Jenkins, assistant professor, University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee

James E. Jernberg, assistant professor, University of Minnesota

Kenneth F. Johnson, assistant professor, Colorado State University, and research associate in the Social Science Foundation of the University of Denver

W. Landis Jones, Waynesburg College

Joyce K. Kallgren, lecturer, University of California at Davis

Henry S. Kariel, associate professor, University of Hawaii

Boyd R. Keenan, professor and head of the department of political science, Purdue University; formerly associate director of the Committee on Institutional Cooperation and visiting professor at Purdue

Samuel Krislov, associate professor, University of Minnesota

Roger A. Kvam, assistant professor, University of Akron

Everett C. Ladd, Jr., assistant professor, University of Connecticut

Joseph LaPalombara, professor, Yale University

Paul M. Leary, instructor, Rutgers—the State University

Michael Lofchie, assistant professor, UCLA

Stuart A. MacKown, instructor, Washington College, Chestertown, Maryland

Richard L. McAnaw, Western Michigan University

Robert McNeill, associate professor, Wayne State University

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Frank E. Meyers, instructor, State University of New York at Stony Brook

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Jon M. Reinhardt, instructor, Wake Forest College

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Harold V. Rhodes, assistant professor, Wake Forest College

Allan Richards, professor and director of the Bureau of Public Administration, Louisiana State University, effective February, 1965

William L. Richter, instructor, University of Hawaii

Carey G. Rickabaugh, instructor, University of Maryland, effective January, 1965

Robert E. Riggs, associate professor, University of Minnesota; formerly of Brigham Young University

Edward T. Rowe, instructor, University of Connecticut

Leonard I. Ruchelman, assistant professor, Alfred University

Rudolph J. Rummel, assistant professor, Yale University

Mary Clarke Santopolo, associate professor, Eastern Kentucky State College

Ashley L. Schiff, associate professor, University of New York at Stony Brook; formerly at the School of Public Administration of the University of Southern California

Carl L. Schweinfurth, assistant professor, Bethany College

Richard D. Sears, instructor, Wake Forest College

Josef Silverstein, associate professor, Rutgers—the State University

Robert Smith, Western Michigan University

William Standing, assistant professor, Wayne State University

Murray S. Stedman, professor and chairman of the department of government at Trinity College, Connecticut

Barbara B. Stevens, assistant professor, University of Connecticut

Phillippa Strum, instructor, Newark College of Arts and Sciences at Rutgers University

Kirk Thompson, assistant professor, Reed College

Woodworth G. Thrombley, associate professor, Institute of Public Administration, University of Indiana; for the last three years, principal advisor to the Indiana University-Thammasat Public Administration program in Bangkok

Rexford G. Tugwell, research professor, Southern Illinois University, effective March, 1965

Manfred Vernon, chairman of political science, Western Washington State College at Bellingham; formerly of the University of Alabama

Larry L. Wade, assistant professor, Charlotte College, North Carolina

J. Richard Wagner, instructor, University of Arizona

Joseph Willard, associate professor, University of Toledo

Fred W. Willhoite, assistant professor, Louisiana State University

Carwin C. Williams, Brigham Young University

William R. Willoughby, senior professor, University of New Brunswick, Fredericton, N. B.; formerly of St. Lawrence University

Calvin Woodward, lecturer, University of New Brunswick

Amos Yoder, lecturer, University of California at Davis

Virgil B. Zimmerman, associate professor, Graduate School of Public Affairs, the State University of New York at Albany; formerly head of the Bologna program of the University of California

Temporary and Visiting Appointments, 1964–65

David Bane, U. S. Foreign Service Officer: visiting lecturer, University of Iowa

Eugenio Benedetti, University of Padua: visiting assistant professor, Ohio Wesleyan

Clarence A. Berdahl, professor emeritus, University of Illinois: distinguished visiting professor, University of Delaware, spring semester, 1965

Lowell W. Culver, assistant professor, Pacific Lutheran University

Howard Dean, Portland State College: visiting professor, University of Washington, autumn, 1964

Rupert Emerson, Harvard University: visiting professor, UCLA, spring semester, 1965

Robert H. Ferrell, University of Indiana: visiting professor, University of Connecticut

Gerald Friedberg, acting assistant professor, University of California at Davis

Emmett Graybill, instructor, Allegheny College

Claude H. Heyer, visiting instructor, University of Idaho

James Hurley, instructor, Dennison University

Raghavan Iyer, lecturer, UCLA

Yung-Hwan Jo, assistant professor, Colorado State University

Claudius O. Johnson, Washington State University: visiting professor, Montana State University, 1963–64 and winter and spring quarters, 1965

RALPH JOHNSON, lecturer, Allegheny College

A. D. H. KAPLAN, Brookings Institution: distinguished visiting professor, Graduate School of Political Affairs, State University of New York at Albany

TODD R. LAPORTE, University of Southern California: visiting assistant professor, Stanford University

EDWARD G. LEWIS, University of Illinois: Chester W. Nimitz professor of social and political philosophy, Naval War College

DENNIS A. LIVINGSTON, acting assistant professor, University of California at Davis

JAMES S. NYMAN, University of California at Davis: visiting assistant professor, University of Arizona

KAN ORI, visiting professor, University of Minnesota

DAVID F. PAULSEN, JR., University of Washington: visiting assistant professor and research specialist, Institute of Government Research, University of Arizona

DE VERE PENTONY, San Francisco State College: visiting professor, University of Iowa

WALFORD H. PETERSON, Bethel College (St. Paul): visiting professor, University of Minnesota

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KARL M. SCHMIDT, Syracuse University: visiting professor, University of Hawaii

DAVID SCOTT, Southwest Missouri State College: visiting professor, Southern Illinois University

ALAN SELTZER, acting assistant professor, UCLA

ELI SILVERMAN, lecturer, Allegheny College

LEA H. WILLIAMS, Brown University: visiting lecturer, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University

DAVID WILSON, acting assistant professor, UCLA

JAVAN TABIBIAN, lecturer, UCLA

LOUIS F. WECHSLER, acting assistant professor, University of California at Davis

BYONG-MAN YOON, assistant professor, Colorado State University

SEPHER ZABIH, assistant professor, Oberlin College

PAUL E. ZINNER, University of California at Davis: visiting professor, National War College

OTHER APPOINTMENTS

BRUCE ADKINSON, Hofstra University: assistant dean of faculty

TOTTEN J. ANDERSON, UCLA: chairman of the department of political science

CAROL E. BAUMANN, University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee: director of the Institute of World Affairs Education

RONALD CHILCOTE, University of California at Riverside: coordinator of the program on Latin American research

MANNING J. DAUER, University of Florida: director of the Division of Social Sciences at the University of Florida

DONALD R. GERTH, Chico State College: dean of students

M. JUDD HARMON, Utah State University: chairman, department of political science

HERBERT KAUFMAN, Yale University: chairman, department of political science

YOUNG W. KIHL. Juniata College, chairman, department of political science

GERARD J. MANGONE, Syracuse University: associate dean for academic programs, Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University

NORMAN MELLER, University of Hawaii: chairman of the department of political science

GENE EDWARD RAINEY, American University: assistant dean of the Graduate School

JAMES R. ROACH, associate professor, University of Texas: coordinator of international and foreign area programs

DONALD R. SHEA, University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee: dean of international studies and programs

ROBERT STEPHENS, formerly Chief of Eastern and Southern African Office of African Programs, State Department: assistant director of East Asian Studies, Syracuse University

JAMES A. STORING, Colgate University: provost

ROBERT WILLIAMS, East Carolina College: associate dean of the College and dean of the School of Arts and Sciences

PROMOTIONS

To the rank of assistant professor:

- ALBERT L. GASTMAN, Trinity College, Hartford, Connecticut
- MARSHALL N. GOLDSTEIN, University of Oregon
- RAY C. HILLAM, Brigham Young University
- JAMES E. NADONLY, Western Michigan University
- KNUD RASMUSSEN, Colgate University
- THOMAS M. SCOTT, University of Minnesota

To the rank of associate professor:

- JAMES E. ANDERSON, Wake Forest College
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- BEN G. BURNETT, Whittier College
- ALFRED B. CLUBAK, University of Florida
- ROLAND H. EBEL, Western Michigan University
- AHMAD R. HAFFAR, State University of New York at New Paltz
- CLARKE HAGENSICK, University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee
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- J. LEO CEFKIN, Colorado State University
- LANE DAVIS, University of Iowa
- STEPHEN T. EARLY, DePauw University
- STANLEY H. FRIEDELBAUM, Rutgers—the State University
- PHILIP O. FOSS, Colorado State University
- CHARLES D. FARRIS, University of Florida
- MILTON GREENBERG, Western Michigan University
- ROBERT HOLT, University of Minnesota
- KAREL HULICKA, State University of New York at Buffalo
- FRED KORT, University of Connecticut
- MANOUCHER VAHDAT, Northwestern State college

RETIREMENTS AND RESIGNATIONS

PHILIP W. BUCK will reach emeritus standing at Stanford University in August of 1965, after thirty years in the department of political science.

MARSHALL KNAPPEN, H. Fletcher Brown professor of history and political science at the University of Delaware, retired on February 1, 1965.

CHARLES M. KNEIER, professor of political science at the University of Illinois since 1930, has retired.

MYRON R. RUBINOFF of the University of Toledo has resigned.

WALTER SHARP, professor of political science at Yale University since 1951, retired in June, 1964.

LLOYD SHORT, professor of political science, University of Minnesota, will retire in June, 1965.

JOSEPH E. BLACK has resigned as chairman of the department of government at Miami University (Ohio) to become director of Humanities and Social Studies with the Rockefeller Foundation.

The Inter-University Consortium for Political Research will sponsor seminars in Quantitative Political Analysis, Community Political Analysis, and Methods of Historical Analysis at Ann Arbor, Michigan, this summer, with expenses of participants partially borne by grants of the National Science Foundation. Information may be obtained from the ICPR, P. O. Box 1248, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106.

IN MEMORIAM

Everett Somerville Brown, Professor Emeritus of Political Science at The University of Michigan, died at Ann Arbor, Michigan, on December 19, 1964, at the age of 78. He is survived by his wife, May Morgan Brown.

He was born in Corralitos, California, a son of Peter C. and Katis S. Brown. He received his B.L. degree in 1907, his M.L. degree in 1908, and his Ph.D. in 1917, all from the University of California. He came to The University of Michigan in 1921 as assistant professor of political science, was promoted to be an associate professor in 1924, and professor in 1931. He served as Acting Chairman and Chairman of the Department from 1942 to 1947, and was given the title of Professor Emeritus at the time of his retirement in 1956.

During his long period of faithful service to the University, Brown published four substantial books, and some sixty articles in scholarly journals. His earlier writing was largely historical and included *William Plumer's Memorandum of Proceedings in the United States Senate, 1803–1807* and *The Missouri Compromises and Presidential Politics, 1820–1825.* For fifteen years he regularly contributed articles to the American Yearbook on "The President and His Policies." His *Manual of Government Publications: United States and Foreign,* is still a basic reference in the field.

In his period of service he instructed more students, both graduate and undergraduate, than any other member of the department. His insistence on high standards of performance, his careful attention to thoroughness and detail, and his wise and sympathetic guidance of students have left several generations of Michigan men and women deeply in his debt. There is not a single administrative task in the department, however heavy or laborious, which he did not perform—from being lecturer in large introductory courses, to being graduate adviser and chairman of the department during the difficult war and immediate post-war years. Because of his robust health his record for class attendance may be equalled but never broken.

Before coming to Michigan, Brown served as assistant to Herbert Hoover when the former President was head of the American Relief Administration in 1918–20. His colleagues and students will long remember him as a true friend, and as a genial and kindly colleague.—James K. Pollock

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GRANTS FOR ASIAN POLITICAL SCIENTISTS

The American Political Science Association again has received from The Asia Foundation a grant for encouraging closer relations between Asian and American political scientists. The funds will be used in three ways:

1) To enable Asian political scientists to become members of The American Political Science Association for a one-year period at greatly reduced rates. Membership includes subscription to *The American Political Science Review.* To be eligible, applicants must reside in one of the Asian countries listed below.

2) To enable libraries, university departments, and research institutes in Asia, who have heretofore been unable to do so, to subscribe to *The American Political Science Review* at greatly reduced rates.

3) To supplement travel expenses of Asian political scientists who are in the United States and who wish to attend meetings of The American Political Science Association. The next meeting will be held September 8-11, in the Sheraton-Park Hotel, Washington, D.C.

(Applicants must be at least at the graduate student level and may come from any of the following Asian countries: Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, the Ruyukyus, the Republic of China (Taiwan), Thailand, and Vietnam. Applicants who have not previously received grants will be given first consideration. Application forms may be obtained from The American Political Science Association, 1726 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20036.)

Notice

Resolutions at Annual Business Meeting

In accordance with ARTICLE VIII of the Constitution; this is to call attention of members of the Association to the provision of the APSA constitution that:

> "All resolutions shall be referred to the Council for its recommendations before submission to the vote of the Association at its Annual Business Meeting."

The Council of the Association will meet all day September 7, 1965, in the Wilmington Room, Sheraton-Park Hotel, Washington, D.C.

1964 ANNUAL MEETING PANEL PAPERS AVAILABALE

A limited number of the following mimeographed panel papers presented at the 1964 annual meeting in Chicago are still available for 75¢ each. Checks should be made payable to The American Political Science Association and orders should be sent to the Association office at 1726 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

ALKER, Hayward	"Long Road to Mathematical Theories of International Politics: Problems of Statistical Nonadditivity"
BANKS, Arthur	"A Cross-Polity Survey: Preliminary Analysis"
BARBER, James D.	"Dimensions and Determinants of Influence: Analysis of Data from Twelve Local Government Committees"
BISCO, Ralph L.	"Information Services for Political Science: Progress and Prospects"
BLACKWOOD, George D.	"Civil Rights and Direct Action in the Urban North"
BOOTH, David Alan	"Leadership and Ideology in the Danish Party System"
BURKE, Fred G.	"Local Governance and Nation Building in East Africa"
CAHILL, Robert and FRIEDMAN, Harry	"A Strategy for the Comparative Study of Local Government"
CHASE, Francis S.	"Teacher Education for Effective Teaching of the Bill of Rights"
CHASE, Harold W.	"Federal Judges: The Appointing Process"
CUMMINGS, Milton	"Southern Congressional Elections"
DEAN, Alan L.	"The Federal Aviation Agency Field Organization Configuration Study"
DIAMOND, Martin	"On the Relationship of Federalism and Decentralization"
FAGEN, Richard R.	"International Politics and the Making of Citizens: The Case of Cuba"
FOLTZ, William J.	"Social Structure and Political Behavior of Senegalese Elites"
GALANTER, Marc	"Hindu Law and the Development of the Modern Indian Legal System"
GARVEY, Gerald	"Methodological Problems in Democratic Consensus Theory: The Theory of Party Equilibrium"
GILBERT, Charles	"Administrative Responsibility in Public Welfare"
GLICKMAN, Harvey	"Traditional Pluralism and Democratic Processes in Tanganyika"
GOODNOW, Henry F.	"The Influence of British Administrative Process and Practices on Public Administration in Pakistan"
GRASSMUCK, George	"Emerging Republicanism in the South"
HAMMOND, Paul	"Dilemmas of Control and Strategy in a Pluralistic Democracy: A Discussion of the Administrative Politics of National Security Policy-Making in a Democratic Political System"
HARSANYI, John C.	"A Bargaining Model for Social Status in Informal Groups and Formal Organizations"
HERMANN, Charles F.	"A Validity Problem: Crises in Simulated Foreign Policy Organization"
HOLT, Robert T.	"Contrasting Approaches to the Study of Comparative Politics"

HUDSON, Michael	"Pluralism, Power, and Democracy in Lebanon"
HUITT, Ralph	"Congressional Reorganization: The Next Chapter"
JUVILER, Peter	"Family Reforms on the Road to Communism: A Case Study of Policy Formation in the USSR"
KENDRICK, Marvin	"The Reform of the British Civil Service"
KOVENOCK, David	"Communications and Influence in Congressional Decision-Making"
LAPALOMBARA, Joseph	"Decline of Ideology: Myth, Reality or Selective Perception?"
LANDAU, Martin	"Political Theory and Due Process of Inquiry"
LEISERSON, Avery	"Scientists and the Policy Process"
LEVINE, Donald	"Legitimacy in Ethiopia"
LIEBESNY, Herbert	"Legal Processes: Stability and Change: Islamic Law"
LINDBERG, Leon N.	"Decision-Making and Integration in the European Community"
LIPSITZ, Lewis	"Work Life and Political Alienation"
McMURRAY, Carl	"Some Problems in the Application of Factor Analytic Techniques to Roll Call Votes, Judicial Decisions, and Survey Responses"
McPHERSON, William	"Lobbying and Communication Processes"
MILBRATH, Lester and JANDA, Kenneth	"Computer Applications to Abstraction, Storage, and Recovery of Propositions from Political Science Literature"
NAJJAR, Fauzi M.	"Caliphate—Sultanate"
NEAL, Fred Warner	"The Republics in Yugoslavia"
PIERCE, Roy	"Ideological Politics: French Theory and Practice"
PLOSS, Sidney	"Political Conflict and the Soviet Press"
PRICE, H. Douglas	"Southern Politics in the Sixties: Notes on Economic Development and Political Modernization."
*PRITCHETT, C. Herman	"Equal Protection and the Urban Majority"
RASMUSSEN, Jorgen S.	"Leadership and Ideology in a Parliamentary Third Party: The British Liberals"
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SPIRO, Herbert	"Contrasting Approaches to Comparative Politics"
STOKES, Donald	"Ideological Competition of British Parties"
TARR, David	"American Military Presence Abroad"
TOTTEN, George	"Factionalism: The Problem of Leadership and Ideology among the Japanese Socialists"
WASBY, Stephen	"The Supreme Court, Obscenity, and Oregon Policy"
WATSON, Richard, DOWNING, Rondal and SPIEGEL, Frederick	"Lawyers and Judicial Selection under the Missouri Plan"
WEIKER, Walter F.	"The Ottoman Bureacracy: Modernization and Reform"

* presidential address

Announcement

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
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

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

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



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
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Aqueduct Books	255
Australian National University	253
Blaisdell Publishing Company	287
University of Chicago Press	291
Columbia University Press	281
Dodd, Mead & Company, Inc.	289
Dorsey Press	256
Doubleday & Company, Inc.	283
The Free Press	274, 275
Casimir Gecys	305
General Motors Corporation	261
Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.	258, 259
Harper & Row, Publishers Inc.	1, 286, 298, 299
Harvard University Press	292, 293
D. C. Heath & Co.	312
Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc.	313
Houghton Mifflin Company	268
Oscar Ibele	Cover III
Kraus Reprint Corporation	263
J. B. Lippincott Company	290
Little, Brown & Company	269, 270, 271
McGraw-Hill Book Company	314, 315
Macmillan Company	6, 294, 295, 296, 297
Mendota Research Group	254
New American Library	309
Northwestern University Press	253, 308
Oxford University Press	276, 277, 278, 279
Frederick A. Praeger	Cover II
Prentice-Hall, Inc.	301, 302, 303, 304
Princeton University Press	310, 311
Rand McNally & Company	4, 5
Random House—Alfred A. Knopf	264, 265, 266, 267
St. Martin's Press, Inc.	305
Scott, Foresman and Co.	288
Charles Scribner's Sons	280
University of South Carolina Press	300
Syracuse University Press	282
Teachers Insurance & Annuity Assn.	262
D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc.	Cover IV
Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc.	306
George Wahr Publishing Co.	255
John Wiley & Sons, Inc.	272, 273
Yale University Press	260

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